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Development: On 7 April the Ecuadorean government presented the visiting mission from the Organisation of American States (OAS) with its conditions for the restoration of diplomatic ties with Colombia.

Significance: The fact that the Ecuadorean government has now articulated to the OAS the conditions it requires for the re-establishment of ties with its neighbour means that it may be possible to move forward from their current diplomatic stalemate.

The OAS mission, headed by the Bolivian Ví­ctor Rico, is designed to try and resolve the ongoing diplomatic crisis with between Ecuador and Colombia since the military incursion by the latter into Ecuadorean territory on 1 March. Correa's interior minister, Gustavo Larrea, said that the Ecuadorean conditions to the OAS stand broadly in "defence of national territory" and "dignity as a country", and suggest "measures which basically tend towards promoting mutual trust".

Despite the air attack of 1 March ostensibly being overcome by regional heads of state at the Rio Group Summit on 7 March, normal relations between Ecuador and Colombia have not been re-established. Ecuadorean foreign minister Marí­a Isabel Salvador told the BBC on 4 April that this is because Colombia has been sending Ecuador "mixed messages" over whether or not it is really interested in restoring positive bilateral ties.

A further significant aspect of the meeting with the OAS was the presence of  US Ambassador in Quito, Linda Jewell; while her press officer said that it was not on her agenda to discuss Colombia, details as to why she was there were not provided. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the controversy sparked by President Rafael Correa's allegations on 4 April that the Ecuadorean military intelligence service is "completely infiltrated" by the CIA.

The Ecuadorean defence minister, Wellington Sandoval, announced on 7 April that a high-ranking civil commission will be set up to investigate Correa's allegations that reports were leaked by the country's military intelligence to the CIA, who he said passed them on to Colombia. Local daily El Comercio revealed on 5 April that the Ecuadorean military intelligence receives around US$17m annually for "exchange of information".

Development: On 13 May President Alvaro Uribe authorised the extradition of 14 of the most senior paramilitary leaders to the US to face charges of drug-trafficking.

Significance: Uribe provided three reasons for his sudden and surprising decision. He said that the paramilitary leaders were continuing to commit crimes from behind bars, that they weren't compensating the victims of their paramilitary activities, and that they weren't telling the truth about the same. Sending the paramilitaries to face trial and punishment in the US is a drastic response, and one which means it is highly unlikely that Colombia will ever know the whole truth about paramilitarism. Questions will linger as to whether that was precisely Uribe's intention.

The 14 former paramilitary leaders, who are now in various prisons across the US awaiting trial, were instrumental in securing a peace deal with the government which brought to an end two decades of paramilitarism. They include Salvatore Mancuso, the former military chief and a founder of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC, the paramilitary umbrella group); Rodrigo Tovar Pupo (alias Jorge 40); Diego Fernando Murillo (alias Don Berna); and Francisco Zuluaga-Lindo (alias Gordolindo). They join Carlos Mario Jiménez, alias Macaco, who was extradited to the US on 7 May.

Only eight of the 25 most senior paramilitaries remain behind bars in Colombia. The most powerful are Iván Roberto Duque (alias Ernesto Báez), Ramón Isaza, Rodrigo Pérez Alzate (alias Julián Bolí­var) and Éver Veloza Garcí­a (aka HH). They have been spared extradition because they are not under investigation by the US for drug-trafficking.

Uribe has inflicted upon the extradited paramilitary leaders what they feared most: trial in the US courts and punishment in US prisons. Few Colombians will lament the paramilitaries' plight, but they might well question Uribe's motives for extraditing the paramilitaries at this point: it appears that the president is trying to prevent the paramilitaries from testifying in Colombian courts.

The president has two excellent reasons for not wanting the paramilitaries to reveal the full extent of their activities at the present time. First, the parapolitical scandal: 67 legislators have been implicated in the scandal so far, paralysing congress. Further revelations regarding the connections between paramilitaries and politicians would have cast congress further into the mire.

Secondly, the still-pending trade deal with US: Jorge 40 and Don Berna had both hinted in recent weeks that they would come clean about various murders and massacres they and their men committed (sometimes in cooperation with the security forces), including the killing of trade unionists. Democrat legislators in the US have criticised the Colombian government for failing to protect trade unionists, and they have cited this failure as one of the key reasons why it opposes the free trade agreement that President George W Bush signed with Colombia.

More generally, the Democrats have accused Uribe of fomenting a spirit of impunity as far as the paramilitaries were concerned. They took a dim view of the peace and justice legislation (the legal framework for the peace process), because it appeared that the paramilitary leaders would almost certainly avoid serving even a day in prison despite committing numerous crimes against humanity. Uribe can certainly no longer be accused of being soft on the paramilitaries, and he can expect the (consistently unproven) accusations that he has links to the AUC to diminish as a result.

But while Capitol Hill will welcome Uribe's decision to afford US law primacy over his own country's legislation, many Colombians are worried that the peace and justice law has collapsed entirely. Uribe stressed that the paramilitaries' victims are now more likely to receive compensation, since the government will be able to expropriate the leaders' ill-gotten assets once they are convicted in the US. Moreover, the president pointed out that the paramilitary leaders would still be liable for questioning by Colombian authorities or the judiciary at any point. Yet there is little chance of the whole truth about paramilitarism ever emerging via such a process.

Colombia's institutions (especially congress) might breathe a sigh of relief, but their credibility will be tarnished indelibly by lingering doubts regarding the extent to which they were infiltrated by paramilitaries.

Moreover, Uribe's decision will rob the tens of thousands of Colombians who suffered at the hands of the paramilitary leade rs of both an acknowledgment and an explanation for their experiences. It is also very likely that many will never know where relatives who died at the hands of the paramilitaries are buried.

Police 'montages' scupper trials of Mapuche radicals

Questionable police tactics in the capture of prominent Mapuche activists have led to the acquittal of one leader of the radical Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), Héctor Llaitul, and could affect the trial of another. In both cases the defence has argued that the purported evidence against them was the result of 'montages'; in one, torture was also alleged. In the Llaitul case these arguments were deemed proven.

On 13 June one of the most prominent radical Mapuche leaders prosecuted by the government under the anti-terrorist legislation introduced in the Pinochet era, Héctor Llaitul, was acquitted after the only testimony against him was thrown out because it had been coerced and he was able to produce a credible alibi. This deflates the government's claim that it had effectively decapitated the CAM.

Llaitul had been charged with 'terrorist arson' and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The same charges were filed against another Mapuche militant, Roberto Painemil. Llaitul was alleged to have led a group which, on 25 December 2006, had torched a truck, a wooden tower and machinery belonging to the forestry firm Mininco. The prosecution based its case largely on Painemil's testimony, which implicated Llaitul.

During the trial, however, Painemil retracted his testimony, claiming that it had been extracted from him by torture. Llaitul's defence lawyer, former judge Juan Guzmán (famous for having prosecuted Pinochet), was also able to prove that at the time of the events, Llaitul, together with two of his sons, was visiting friends 35 kilometres away from the site of the arson attack. Guzmán successfully argued that the accusation against Llaitul had been a 'montage'.

Painemil was also acquitted of 'terrorist arson' but was convicted of illegal possession of firearms. At the time of his release, Llaitul had spent almost a year-and-a-half in 'preventive custody'.

The outcome of the Llaitul case may rebound on the trial of another Mapuche leader, Iván Llanquileo, lonko (head man) of the Comunidad Juana Millahual in Arauco and the man who inherited the mantle of leadership in the CAM after the arrests of Llaitul, José Huenchunao and Luis Llanquileo (Iván's brother).

Iván was arrested in a spectacular operation involving about 300 police officers in August 2007. At the time the police said he had been found 'in possession' of an M-16 rifle, ammunition, military training manuals and a flag of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA. He was charged with the illegal possession of firearms and receiving stolen property.

At a court hearing two months later Llanquileo was released after the prosecution admitted that it had found no evidence linking him with the rifle or the 'safe house' where the rifle and other elements were found. Members of Llanquileo's community claimed from the outset that the rifle had been planted by the police, and Llanquileo's defence insisted throughout that he was the victim of a police 'montage'. The Llaitul case, where the argument of a 'montage' led to acquittal, is now likely to be used to claim that there is a proven pattern of police behaviour in actions against Mapuche militants.

Llanquileo failed to meet bail conditions (weekly sign-ins at a police station) and in November a warrant was issued for his capture. He had not gone far underground: on 25 March this year police arrested him in the vicinity of the Comunidad Juana Millahual. His capture was billed as that of 'the last remaining ringleader of the CAM'. With Llaitul's release, this is no longer the case.

Who is he?  Daniel Dantas is an engineer and economist, as well as the founder of Rio de Janeiro based, Opportunity Bank. 

Why watch him?  Dantas accused the government of extortion in 2006, and now finds himself accused of bribery. He was arrested and freed twice the week of 7 July 2008, and is now at the centre of a major corruption scandal involving the Supreme Court.

Born: 1954, Brazil

Education:  After graduating from the Federal University of Bahia with a degree in civil engineering, Daniel Dantas continued his post-graduate studies in economics at the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, where he was the student of Mário Henrique Simonsen, former minister of agriculture, before going on to obtain his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1982. 

Public Life:  Though he was considered as a possible Minister of Agriculture during Fernando Collor's government, Daniel Dantas broke onto the national scene when he privatised the state-run telecommunications corporation, Telebrás.  As the owner of Banco Opportunity, he helped lead the block (made up of Citigroup, Caixa, Petrobras, Banco do Brasil and Telecom Itália) that bought out Brasil Telecom, which operated in the North, Centre-West and South regions.  This sparked a dispute when Telecom Itália decided the group's policies were against its interest.  In 2004 Brasil Telecom was accused of spying on Telecom Itália.  Dantas denied the allegations, but was asked to give up management of the company in September of 2005.

In 2006, Dantas testified against the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores, accusing them of extortion.  He claimed they undermined his business when he failed to 'donate' US$50m to the party.  He said his refusal caused former president of Banco do Brasil, Cássio Casseb, to force Opportunity out of the management of Brasil Telecom.

The week of 7 July 2008, Daniel Dantas was arrested (and subsequently freed) twice in connection to the 2005 vote-buying scandal, as part of investigation Operação Satiagraha, carried out by the Policia Federal to crack down on money laundering and use of inside information in share deals.  His quick releases have sparked a larger corruption scandal involving the courts, with Dantas now accused of bribing federal judges.

Timeline:
1982: Obtains PhD from (MIT)
1990-1992: Mentioned as the possible Minister of Agriculture in Fernando Collor's government.
1994: Creates his own company - Opportunity Asset Management
1997: Chosen by Citibank to generate resources that would be applied to the privatisation of state-controlled businesses.
1998: Dantas privatises Telebrás
2006: Testifies against the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) and accuses them of extortion by undermining his business after he failed to 'donate' US$50m to the party.
8 July-11 July 2008: Arrested twice in link to the 2005 vote-buying scandal involving President Lula da Silva's ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores. 

Weaknesses:  According to Judge Fausto Martin de Sanctis, there was new evidence that Dantas attempted to bribe a delegate of the Operação Satiagraha.  At least 130 judges have signed a statement in support of de Sanctis. Following his testimony in 2006, the PT's leader in the senate, Senator Ideli Salvatti, accused Dantas of lying. She said that Dantas had links with the opposition's government (1994-2002) and that Opportunity's control of BrasilTelecom, gained during the opposition's tenure, was illegitimate.

Strengths: Aside from his intelligence, his financial assets and business savvy, Dantas has also managed to assert a certain authority over Brazil's government officials.  Despite being implicated in at least 20 corruption scandals in present and past federal administrations, Dantas has managed to escape prison, and it is obvious he knows the right people to influence. 

Weaknesses: Dantas' reputation may make it harder for him to escape this time.  The fact that he has avoided arrest for so long makes him exactly the type of character police want to humiliate.

Prospects:  Justice Minister, Tarso Genro asserted it would be difficult for Daniel Dantas to escape conviction, now that the courts have been involved in the scandal.  In light of new developments, it seems unlikely the government will allow the scandal to blow over.  Having been released a second time, Dantas has now returned to Rio de Janeiro where he currently resides, to await further developments.  

Development: On 21 August the leading candidate in Rio de Janeiro's mayoral race, Senator Marcelo Crivella, said his mayoral policies would imitate those of President Lula da Silva, with a main focus on poverty reduction.

Significance: Crivella, of the Partido Republicano Brasileiro, is one of the many candidates hoping to hitch a ride on the coattails of the popular President Lula in the upcoming local elections on 5 October, in which a nod from the president is considered gold dust.

Crivella, who has won the official support of the president in Rio over other candidates from the ruling coalition, reiterated that he was a candidate “close to the heart" of Lula, saying that he had learnt a lot from the president about how to run an administration. Crivella who is also a bishop (of the Pentecostal Universal Church of the Kingdom of God) said he had “a horror of intolerance" and would govern for all of Rio.

According to the latest mid August survey by local pollsters Ibope, Crivella is leading Rio's mayoral race with 28% of voting intentions. In joint second place were the Communist Party candidate, Jandira Feghali, and the candidate for the government-allied Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), Eduardo Paes, who were technically tied on 12% and 11% respectively. However, Crivella also had the highest rejection rate (29%) and it is unclear whether he could win a second round run-off.

The current mayor of Rio, Sergio Cabral of the PMDB, has not always had easy relations with Lula.

Development: During a lunch at the Council of the Americas in New York on 25 September President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner denied that inflation is a problem in Argentina.

Significance: Fernández's argument that “the conditions [for high] inflation do not exist" in Argentina is intended to counter the prevailing attitude within the international financial community that her government is covering up the true rate of inflation. She specifically defended the state statistics department, Indec, which has been accused of under-reporting inflation by a factor of two or three.

The Argentine president's defence of her government's economic model has become much more aggressive since the crisis in the global financial sector. She said that there was no need for her government to come up with a Plan B because Plan A was working so well. “The people who need a Plan B are you, the US and Europe," Fernández told her fellow guests at the Council of the Americas.

Among these guests were Thomas Shannon, the Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs; Elaine Chao, the US labour secretary; and José Miguel Insulza, the secretary-general of the Organization of American States.

Development: On 28 October Brazil announced that its state-owned energy giant, Petrobras, is to sign a deal with Cuban state oil company, Cupet, to begin exploring for oil in Cuban waters.

Significance: This news had been expected, but its announcement just before Brazilian President Lula da Silva travels to Havana tomorrow (30 October) for a two-day official visit, is designed to highlight Brazil's desire to strengthen bilateral relations. Brazil's offer to invest in Cuban oil confirms the theory that Brazil is attempting to counterbalance Venezuela's influence as Cuba's biggest trading partner and primary supplier of petrol to the island.

The agreement between Petrobras and Cuba Petróleo (Cupet) is due to be signed this week during Lula's visit, when he will also invite Cuba's President Raúl Castro to visit Brazil in December and to attend the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Development and Integration, which will take place in Salvador, the capital of the Brazilian state of Bahí­a, on 16 and 17 December. This would be Raúl Castro's first official state visit in person since taking over full presidential powers on 24 February.

During his visit to Cuba, Lula will visit areas of the island that have been devastated by recent hurricanes Gustav and Ike, in “an expression of [Brazil's] solidarity with the Cuban people and government, and of the importance Brazil bestows on bilateral relations". Since the hurricanes crossed the country leaving at least US5bn in losses, the Cuban government has been reaching out to a number of foreign powers for both long-term economic co-operation and short-term aid. As well as the two Latin American heavyweights (Brazil and Mexico), these also include Spain, the EU, and Vietnam.

Sticking to doing what its best at, in addition to exploring for deep offshore oil reserves in waters off Cuba's northern coast (which Petrobras is particularly good at), Brazil is planning to begin cultivating soya in Cuba with the support of the Empresa Brasileña de Pesquisas Agropecuarias. This would involve transfer of technology and know-how to Cuban staff, and would begin with 2,000 ha of plantations in Ciego de Avila province, eventually increasing to 40,500 ha in the long-term.

Development: On 1 December Tijuana's head of public security was sacked.

Significance: Jesús Alberto Capella, the head of public security for the municipality had been in office for five days shy of a year but had failed to curb the murder rate in the border city. He is being replaced by a former solder, Colonel Julián Leyzaola Pérez, who was previously the city's police chief. Another former soldier, Gustavo Huerta Martí­nez, takes over for Leyzaola as police chief.

Capella was sacked only a day after three police officers (as well as another six civilians) were decapitated in the city. Over the weekend of 29 and 30 November, a total of  37 people were murdered in Tijuana. The state authorities claim that over 700 people have been killed in the city so far this year, but the count by Mexico City newspapers puts the death toll for the whole of the state of Baja California at 519 this year. 

Tijuana is controlled by the Partido Acción Nacional to which President Felipe Calderón Hinojosa belongs.

Development: On 15 January La Prensa, the main independent newspaper in Nicaragua, reported that the government had done a deal with the Alemán faction of the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC).

Significance: The terms of the deal are simple: Arnoldo Alemán, a former president convicted of corruption, will get his 20 year jail  sentence erased and his nominee will be elected president of congress; in return Alemán will commit his 10 deputies in the unicameral congress to supporting President Daniel Ortega's proposal to change the constitution to allow Ortega to run for consecutive presidential terms. The deal will unblock congress, which has been inquorate since the controversial municipal elections in November: the non-Alemán faction of the PLC claims that Ortega's Sandinistas rigged the elections.

As La Prensa said, such deals as the Ortega-Alemán trade-off never become public. The paper argues that there is corroborating evidence suggesting that such a deal is in the works, principally the strange statement from a Sandinista supreme court justice, Rafael Solí­s, who said that his PLC colleagues had suddenly started working on a mechanism for erasing Alemán's conviction.

The first test of such a deal will come today when congress is due to meet to pick a new president and other officials to run congress.

On 18 January the Región Autónoma Atlántico Norte (RAAN) municipalities in the north east of the country which did not vote in November go to the polls to elect new mayors. The smaller parties, opposed to both the Sandinistas and the Alemán faction of the PLC, are likely to do better here than in the rest of the country. 

Development: On 23 February three deputies from the ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists) left the government's political grouping, the Frente para la Victoria (FPV).

Significance: Seven legislators have now broken with President Cristina Fernández's government in as many days. The small scale exodus from the FPV, a faction of the PJ formed by Fernández's predecessor and husband Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007), is symptomatic of mounting opposition within the PJ to Kirchnerismo (the ruling couple's political movement) amid renewed protests by the country's farming sector.

The three deputies to leave the FPV, Jorge Obeid, Walter Agosto and Ariel Dalla Fontana will join the new provincial grouping, Santa Fe Federal, formed by the popular Peronist senator, Carlos Reutemann, after he quit the FPV on 17 February. Reutemann broke with the government, he said, in order to defend the interests of his province, Santa Fe, a key agricultural zone. He was joined by fellow Santa Fe senator, Roxana Latorre. Two days later Salta province senators, Juan Carlos Romero and Sonia Escudero, followed suit and quit the FPV, after which Romero accused the government of having authoritarian “Stalinist attitudes". 

Farmers will meet production minister, Deborah Giorgi, today (24 February) after a four day suspension of grain and cattle sales, their first strike of 2009. If the government does not prevent the conflict from escalating further, it is likely that more desertions from the FPV will follow as legislators mindful of the influential rural vote reassess their priorities ahead of October's crucial mid-term elections.

Argentina: The prospect of a rapprochement between Argentina and the IMF moved a step closer on 29 March when the Fund's western hemisphere director, Nicolás Eyzaguirre, said that he and his colleagues were “ready and willing" to discuss a loan deal with the country. The IMF has faced heavy criticism in Argentina in recent years led by the previous president, Néstor Kirchner, who blamed it for the crisis of 2001-02. Argentina paid off its outstanding IMF debt in 2006 and has had little contact with the Fund since. Eyzaguirre said that the Fund was waiting on government approval for an 'Article IV' consultation, an economic diagnosis of the country which is the first step towards future loan agreements.

Cuba: On 31 March a bipartisan group of US senators introduced a new bill to eliminate US travel restrictions on Cuba. The latest bill would bar the US president from regulating travel to Cuba. The timing could be apt for the US president Barack Obama ahead of his regional debut at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad on 17-19 April.

Introducing the bill, Senator Byron Dorgan (D, North Dakota) suggested he has enough votes to secure its approval. Dorgan represents the US agricultural lobby which strongly advocates increased trade with Cuba. The strength of the bipartisan pro-embargo Cuba lobby on Capitol Hill, however, should not be underestimated. An identical bill was due to be introduced to the lower house on 2 April.

In his 2008 election campaign Obama said that he would “immediately allow unlimited family travel and remittances to Cuba", dismantling restrictions placed by George W. Bush in 2004. Measures to ease family travel and agricultural trade restrictions and curbs on sending medicines and food were approved in the 2009 budget, marking a return to the pre-2004 status quo. There was no change, however, to the current family remittance regulations.

Mexico: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton struck a conciliatory note with Mexican officials during her trip to Mexico on 25 and 26 March. Clinton suggested that the US shared culpability with Mexico for the failure to tackle the violent drug trade in Northern Mexico. “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade_Our inability to prevent weapons from being illegally smuggled across the border to arm these criminals causes the deaths of police officers, soldiers and civilians [in Mexico]," she said. Clinton also made modest commitments to provide $80m towards the financing of three Black Hawk military helicopters and proposed greater cooperation and information sharing between Mexican and US officials to make joint initiatives more effective. On 31 March a group of US senators headed by an independent, Joe Lieberman, proposed allocating a further US$550m to boost US drug enforcement activities along the border with Mexico.

Peru: On 31 March President Alan Garcí­a proposed that the US increase its investment in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) as a sign of goodwill towards Latin America. In an open letter to Washington, Garcia said that the US should contribute to the IDB's proposed capital increase. Garcí­aH said that the increase would be 'new boost to US relations with Latin America.' He pointed out that the bank's capital had not been increased since 1994, despite the economies of the region growing by 140%.

Region: The US vice-president, Joe Biden, promised a new era in US relations with Latin America but made few clear policy commitments during a tour of the region. At the Summit of Progressive Leaders, held in Viña del Mar, Chile, Biden announced on 28 March that the US would no longer “dictate unilaterally" to Latin America but declined to commit to a lifting of the US embargo on Cuba. A day later, in San José, Costa Rica, Biden urged patience from Central American leaders, saying that there was little the US could do for the isthmus until its own economic situation had improved.

Development: On 12 May the government is due to unveil its new strategy to combat terrorism in the Vrae region.

Significance: The government seems certain to switch from a military-led approach to a police-led one. The government has been embarrassed by a couple of nasty ambushes mounted by remnants of the Sendero Luminoso in the past six months. Since the government launched the military-led Operación Excelencia last August, 33 soldiers and policemen have been killed in the river valleys of the Apurí­mac and Ene (Vrae) for not much obvious gain.

The interior minister, Mercedes Cabanillas, outlined the new strategy on 10 May, and said that the change would be boosted by an increase in spending of N$137m (US$46.2m) on equipping and training police in the Vrae. She said that there were currently 1,400 policemen in the Vrae and this was probably sufficient. On 1 May the government sacked Percy Rivera, the police commander in the Vrae, and most of his staff.

The rethink on the strategy for the Vrae is happening simultaneously with a government-led effort to increase the military budget. The government has been alarmed by Chile's decision to buy 18 F-16's from Holland. The government is advocating that the 2.5% regional mining royalty should be switched to boosting the military budget. Regional presidents, despite mostly being unable to spend the royalty money, do not want to lose it.

Development: On 16 June the government's majority in the lower house approved the final draft of a law to grant reparation to victims of the country's 44-year conflict, known as the “victims' law" ['Ley de Ví­ctimas].

Significance: The law is controversial because it differentiates between victims of illegal armed groups and victims of state violence.   The opposition, victims' groups and human rights organisations argue that the final draft is discriminatory and has altered beyond recognition the original bill introduced to congress some two years ago.

Under the government-sponsored draft, victims of paramilitary and guerrilla groups will be able to receive compensation fairly easily, via administrative channels. However, victims of the security forces - including the families of victims of extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances - will have to prove their case before a judge. In practice, this will mean that very few victims of state violence will be compensated. The draft approved also establishes that, when the state does give out compensation, it does so out of “solidarity" (and thus, crucially, not out of “responsibility").

The bill was passed by 81 deputies, all from President Alvaro Uribe's ruling coalition, who approved all 50 articles proposed by the government in a single block vote, without further debate or analysis. They rejected the discussion or approval of some 50, mostly opposition-sponsored, changes to the bill. Critics argued that by the time of the vote, few of the government's deputies knew exactly what they were voting for.

The proponent of the original bill, opposition deputy Gullermo Rivera, said that the government's actions were “a legislative atrocity". “The project does not retain one single of the guiding principles called for by victims organisations and the international community", he told journalists.

Last week, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, sent a letter to senate president Hernán Andrade requesting that the bill "does not include any discriminatory clauses and that the principle of equality for victims, which is universally accepted, be maintained".

The opposition have promised to oppose the new draft when it goes to a bicameral committee for final approval.

Argentina: The cabinet chief, Anibal Fernandez, denied that the economy will go into recession in 2009 although he did admit that the rate of growth would slow down.

Colombia: The central bank did not cut interest rates on 24 July. This was the first time for the bank has left rates unchanged for seven months. They stand at 4.5%.

Development: On 2 September guerrillas brought down a Fuerza Aérea Peruana helicopter, killing its two man crew.

Significance: The worry from the military point of view is that the Sendero Luminoso, which the authorities immediately blamed for the attack, is becoming bolder. This was its third major attack in just over a month and the first time in 10 years that the guerrillas have downed an airborne helicopter.

The pattern of the latest Sendero attacks, beginning with a police station on 1 August, followed by a 26 August ambush that killed two soldiers and yesterday's attack on the helicopter, suggests that the organisation has plenty of resources, both human and hardware.

The Sendero started off as a Maoist guerrilla group but is now, the authorities claim, just a criminal organisation that provides armed protection for drug traffickers. The authorities have been claiming that the Sendero is all but defeated, but the group's recent operations suggest that it still has a considerable offensive capacity.

In the past month, the police have arrested at least six people whom they alleged were active Sendero members. The most prominent of these is “Camarada Marcos", who stands accused of killing 13 police officers and a public prosecutor.

The Peruvian government's counter-insurgency strategy in the area known as the Vrae (the valleys of the rivers Apurí­mac and Ene, where the Sendero is most active) has veered between using the army to defeat the Sendero and trying to win hearts and minds by boosting public investment.

The current defence minister, Rafael Rey, is a hardliner, and likely to push for more military resources for counter-insurgency.

The problem for the government is that Sendero's intelligence seems to be improving, which suggests that it is supported to some degree by local communities in the Vrae.

It is not clear how the M-17 helicopter was brought down. It was hovering, preparing to land at the Santo Domingo de Acobamba military base to pick up three wounded soldiers, when it was hit. The aircraft then crashed nose-first into the ground. The military were clearly worried about the guerrilla's capacities, because a second helicopter was also hovering above the ill-fated chopper as it came in to land. This second helicopter immediately fled back to the main military base at Pichari after the attack.

Rey claimed that the downed helicopter was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade. Military sources say that the attackers were some way from the base. The last time the Sendero brought down an airborne helicopter was on 2 October 1999, in Satipo, also in the Vrae.

The mission to pick up the three wounded soldiers seems to have been oddly handled. The helicopters arrived at the base at dusk (5.30pm), which may have given their attackers an advantage.

Besides these recent major attacks, Peruvian military sources say there have been three other firefights with terrorists in the past 10 days.

First there was the ambush on 26 August. Then on 31 August, two soldiers were wounded when a Sendero column attacked the Unión Mantaro military base in Juní­n. The third attack was on 1 September, which wounded the three soldiers awaiting rescue on 2 September.

There is no clear evidence that the military inflicted any casualties on their attackers in these skirmishes.

Development: On 12 October 20,000 indigenous protesters took to the streets across the country to protest at the failure of President Alvaro Colom to improve life for the rural poor.

Significance: The indigenous groups, who purportedly form part of Colom's support base, used the anniversary of Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas, known as “Columbus Day" to highlight their concerns. Specifically they drew attention to promises made by the government three months ago after a similar show of unrest.  These include the pledge to address land disputes and annul mining, hydroelectric and cement concessions granted to multinational companies, which, protesters claim, are destroying their natural resources. According to government statistics, 42% of Guatemala's 12m inhabitants are indigenous although some groups put the figure at over 60%.

Unlike the July demonstrations which were largely peaceful, on this occasion the protests turned deadly after the occupants of car opened fire on a group of indigenous people who were blocking streets near the capital, killing a 19-year-old  and wounding two others. The police have arrested three in relation to the violence.

After a six hour meeting between negotiators for both sides, the indigenous leaders agreed to a meeting with Colom, scheduled for 15 October, in exchange for halting protests.

Development: On 21 November the authorities in the southern state of Guerrero confirmed that they had found the body of the leader of Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente (ERPI).

Significance: The ERPI leader, known as Comandante Ramiro, had been killed with four shots. The official explanation for his death is that he was killed after falling out with one of his lieutenants on 2 November. In May 2009, Comandante Ramiro claimed that the government was using gangsters as a way of liquidating social activists.

Comandante Ramiro, whose real name was Omar Guerrero Solí­s, claimed in May that the federal government was protecting Joaquin “El Chapo" Guzmán, a leader of the Sinaloa gang, so that “he could do the dirty work of killing social activists". Guzmán was named 10 days ago by Forbes magazine as the 41st most powerful person in the world.

Comandante Ramiro had been a revolutionary for years. He was in jail from 1998 until 2002 when he escaped, along with 13 other prisoners, among them eight Colombian drug traffickers. The Asamblea Popular de Pueblos de Guerrero (APPG) wants the local human rights' ombudsman to investigate the Comandante Ramiro's death. 

The ERPI is one of several small guerrilla groups operating from Guerrro. It broke away from the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR) in 1998. The EPR operates across central Mexico and claimed in January 2009 to have assassinated two senior police officers responsible for the disappearance of two leading EPR militants.

Development: On 13 January President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica said he would not attend the investiture of Honduras' new president, Porfirio Lobo, on 27 January.

Development: Arias said he lamented the fact that Lobo will have a “lonely" swearing-in ceremony, but noted that Lobo appeared "weak" due to his inability to persuade the de facto president, Roberto Micheletti, to step aside in advance of 27 January so that Lobo would not have to take over from what the US and the rest of the region considers an illegitimate coup administration.

The US, with the backing of other regional players like Arias, an early mediator in the Honduran crisis following the 28 June 2009 coup, argue that the de facto government should step down in favour of a consensus transition team so as to allow Lobo, elected on 29 November, to take office with a relatively clean slate and to give the incoming administration greater legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Under pressure from the US, Lobo has made several public pleas for Micheletti to step aside, but to no avail. Lobo's position has not been helped by the fact that his own Partido Nacional voted in favour in congress of the removal of the ousted president, Manuel Zelaya, back in June, and again in December to assert the legitimacy of Micheletti's position.

Micheletti has repeatedly argued that there are no legal grounds for him to resign ahead of the end of his tenure on 27 Janaury. Yesterday, congress, which is currently debating a political amnesty for Zelaya and all those involved in the events of 28 June, made Micheletti a deputy for life, in recognition of his six successive terms in congress since 1981.

It also declared him a “great man and a great Honduran citizen" and awarded him the congressional merit of the 'Grand Cross '(Gran Cruz Extraordinaria).

Development: On 8 April President Lula da Silva attacked a former minister for diverting disaster relief funds away from Rio de Janeiro to Bahia.

Significance: The mudslides in Rio have already killed at least 182 people and perhaps as many as 400 other people are missing presumed dead. Lula claimed that the disaster was made worse by a decision by Geddel Vieira Lima, a former national integration minister, to switch money from Rio to Geddel's home state of Bahia. Geddel is running for the governorship of Bahia on the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB) ticket.

The Brazilian press has reported that Rio received only 1% of the integration and disaster-prevention money that Bahia did.

The mudslides in Rio, especially in the municipality of Niteroi, were caused by heavy rain. Lula said that the federal government has already authorised R$200m (US$113m) in immediate aid. He added that he had been in touch with Eduard Paes, the PMDB mayor of Rio and Jorge Roberto Silvera, the Partido Democrático Trabalhista mayor of Niteroi.