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Chile: The central bank left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at its current record low of 0.5% and indicated that the rate will remain stable until at least the second quarter. The bank cut rates an accumulated 775 basis points between January and July 2009 in an effort to stimulate the domestic economy. End-year consumer price inflation was -1.4% in 2009 and is forecast at 2.5% at end-2010.

Mexico: The global indicator of economic activity (IGAE) contracted a worse-than-expected 5.2% year-on-year in October 2009. It rose 0.1% month-on-month over September. The government tried to put a positive spin on the result, pointing out that the IGAE is a lagging indicator. The official expectation is for a real annual GDP result of -7.0% in 2009, with a rebound to +3.0% in 2010.

Argentina: Industrial production rose 8.32% year-on-year in January 2010.

Brazil: Unemployment rose on a month-on-month basis to 7.2% in January 2010, up from   6.8% in December 2009. However it was a record low for the month in the current series. Unemployment in January 2009 was 8.2%. Real monthly average wages were R$1,373.50 (UUS$752) in January.

Brazil: The index of industrial confidence (Icei) compiled by the National Industry Confederation was 67.8 points, with 21 of 27 sectors expressing optimism.

Cuba: Tourist arrivals in Cuba reached 254,845 in January 2010, a 4.9% decline on the same month the previous year. In 2009, Cuba received 2.43m tourists, 3.5% more than in 2008 although income from tourists dropped 11%. Most tourists come from Canada (more than 900,000 in 2009), followed by the UK, Spain, Italy and France.

Development: On 9 April Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega hosted his Honduran peer, Porfirio Lobo.

Significance: The surprise meeting, which lasted three hours, is the latest sign of success in Lobo's efforts to end Honduras's international isolation and suggests that the re-integration of Honduras into the Central American Integration System (SICA) is only a matter of time.

Ortega is a close ally of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and both have been vocal supporters of ousted president Manuel Zelaya. El Salvador's Mauricio Funes, is leading efforts in Central America to re-integrate Honduras into regional institutions after its suspension following the coup which toppled Zelaya in June 2009

Funes, whose unequivocal backing of the US line on Honduras had rankled with his ruling Frente Farabundo Martí­ de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) called on SICA to readmit Honduras.  Honduras has already been readmitted back in into the talks between Central America and the European Union over trade and the cooperation association agreement.

Lobo, Funes and Ortega were due to meet yesterday (11 April) to discuss Nicaragua's recognition of Honduras but the meeting was cancelled by Funes, who had a health problem.

Bolivia/Brazil: Today (20 May) Bolivia will begin exporting 31.5m cubic metres of gas per day (cmd), up from the average 21m-24m cmd of previous months.

The dirtiness of the gubernatorial elections
On 4 July there are gubernatorial elections in 12 of Mexico's 32 states. These elections matter because they are the antepenultimate test of public opinion before the 2012 presidential elections. Political commentators and politicians themselves are horrified by the viciousness of the current campaigns and fear that the 2012 presidential and congressional contests will be even worse.

In the current campaign, at least two of the gubernatorial candidates, Gregorio Sánchez Martí­nez in Quintana Roo and Jesús Vizcarra Calderón in Sinaloa, have questions to answer over their alleged links to drug gangs. Sánchez, a left-wing candidate, is in jail and barred from standing; Vizcarra, however, is still running (and likely to win) as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional's   (PRI) candidate for state governor,   despite being close enough to one of the country's top gangsters, Ismael “El Mayo" Zambada, to appear in photos with him. Another challenger to the PRI, in the election for governor of Puebla, has been accused of being a transvestite by the PRI governor.

Although 38% of the national electorate can vote in the 12 gubernatorial elections, the key contests are in four states: Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Puebla, and Veracruz. In each of these states, the perceived closeness of the election has resulted in a host of dirty tricks. In all four states, the candidates from the incumbent PRI look on course to win. Indeed the PRI may win all 12 gubernatorial elections, which will give the party huge momentum going into 2012. One of the features of this year's gubernatorial races is the number of “Stop the PRI" alliances. The most important of these is in Oaxaca, but Puebla and Hidalgo also have such alliances.

The PAN and the main left-wing parties, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Convergencia and the Partido del Trabajo (PT), however, failed to forge an alliance in Veracruz, the biggest state going to the polls on 4 July. On 17 June, the governor of Veracruz accused the PAN, which holds the presidency of the country, of spying on him. The state is currently ruled by the PRI but in the last election, six years ago, 60% of the voters backed rival candidates, leaving Fidel Herrera to win with just 35% support. This year's race looks equally tight. The main challenger to the PRI candidate, Javier Duarte de Ochoa, is Miguel Angel Yunes of the Partido Nueva Alianza (PNA). The third candidate is Dante Delgado, of Convergencia, who took 28% of the votes six years ago.

Herrera accused the PAN of illegally tapping his private conversations. These show him offering PRI candidates cash and support to help their campaigns. Technically, the governor should be neutral during the campaign. Herrera does not deny that the voice is his, but argues that under the constitution, private telephone calls are privileged communications.

More seriously, Herrera claims that the PAN has been using state agencies to tap his phones for purely political purposes. Herrera demanded to know why his phones were tapped. Usually, a judicial warrant is needed for a telephone tap. Herrera argues that there is nothing criminal in what he said in the calls.   The non-PRI candidates disagree and claim that he has broken the law by allowing state money to be used for electoral purposes.

In Oaxaca the anti-PRI alliance has coalesced behind Gabino Cué Monteagudo. He is up against Eviel Pérez Magaña, who is backed by the current (controversial) governor of the state, Ulises Ruiz, and the Partido Verde Ecologista de México (PVEM). The problem for the alliance is that Cué, according to the opinion polls, is running only neck-and-neck with Magaña. If the alliance cannot defeat the PRI candidate nominated and supported by Ruiz, it will disappoint a host of its backers who are dismayed at Ruiz's authoritarianism. Ruiz forced the federal government to send in about 5,000 federal police to retake control of the centre of Oaxaca at the end of October 2006.

In Hidalgo, Xóchitl Gálvez, who was commissioner for indigenous affairs in the government of President Vicente Fox, is running for the broad alliance “Hidalgo nos Une". She is backed by the PAN, PRD and Convergencia. She is up against Francisco Olvera from the PRI, whose party claims that not only will he win the governorship easily but that the PRI will win all 18 of the first-past-the-post seats in the state congress. In the opinion polls, the PRI is slightly ahead of Gálvez.

Development: On 5 August Chile announced that the Colombian government had handed Chile documents which Colombia said proved that some Mapuche militants had received training from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc).

Significance: Chile has passed the information straight on to the prosecutors and police combating the low level terrorism (mostly aggravated vandalism) being waged by Mapuche militants in the extreme south of the country.

Sergio Moya, the district attorney for Temuco, said that the information ran to 200 pages and included communications from Mapuches found on the computer seized by the Colombian armed forces when they attacked a Farc camp in Ecuador and killed the Farc's second-in-command, Raúl Reyes on 1 March 2008.

Moya said that at least one former member of the Farc had seen a Mapuche, Daniel Caní­o Tralcal, at the Reyes camp. Canio is accused of raiding a farm in Chile's deep south. Moya believed, even before the Colombian dossier, that the leaders of the Coordinadora de Comunidades Mapuche en Conflicto Arauco Malleco (CAM) had received Farc training.

Development: On 14 September, Paraguay and Brazil launched a joint counter-narcotics operation, 'Nueva Alianza V', in border areas.

Significance: The two countries' have concerns over their shared border, where narco-trafficking groups control plantations and establish labs and transport routes enabling them to enter the Brazilian market and use Brazil as a springboard for onward shipments to Europe.

During the first day of operations in the eastern department of Canindeyú, which borders the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso do Sul, members of the Brazilian federal police and Paraguay's counter-narcotics force, Senad, destroyed 12 hectares of marijuana plantations, seized 900kg of ground marijuana and destroyed three camps used by cultivators to control their plantations.

According to calculations by the Senad, the destruction of the plantations would roughly equate to the seizure of 36 tonnes of processed marijuana. In the first eight months of 2010, authorities reported the destruction of 686 hectares and the seizure of 84 tonnes of marijuana, the drug that remains the main problem for Paraguayan counter-narcotics agents in terms of volumes produced and sold.

Development: On 25 October in Miami, Mexico's former president Vicente Fox (2000-2006) called for the Mexican army to be pulled off the streets in the government's declared 'war' against the country's drug gangs.

Significance:   President Felipe Calderon's strategy to directly confront the drug gangs with the support of the armed forces has largely backfired. Drug related violence has steadily increased since the military was first deployed in the war in 2008, with little real evidence to back up the government's claim that this increase is evidence of its success against the gangs. The president's strategy has already come under fire from the opposition; but now, as Calderón's ruling Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) gears up for internal general elections on 4 December, critics have also sprung up from within the party ranks.

Fox, Calderón's predecessor and the first PAN president in 71 years, is still very influential within the party. His comments are not entirely new - he has made similar arguments before, but the timing is sensitive for Calderón and may cause further divisions within the PAN as it prepares to elect a new party president and a national executive committee (CEN) to lead them into the 2012 presidential elections.
 
Speaking at a media conference in Miami, Fox said that the military should be pulled out of the streets in order to avoid the further degradation of human rights and called for a different kind of strategy to be used in the fight against drug trafficking and crime. “The war against crime can't be won by overriding human rights, limiting liberties in the streets, or undermining the judicial system" he said.
 
A proponent of legalisation since he left office, he went on to criticise Western countries for not doing anything to address their drug consumption problems, underlining the need to “change the paradigm" in the fight against drugs. Touching on the economy, Fox also declared “Oil has been a gift from the devil for Mexico", arguing that it had prevented the country from undertaking economic reforms needed to boost growth.

Development: On 8 December, President-elect Dilma Rousseff named another bunch of ministers, giving the main coalition ally, Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), a total of six cabinet portfolios.

Significance: The most notable thing about the January 2011 incoming cabinet is its continuity - several of President Lula da Silva's most trusted ministers will remain in office. Dilma, aided by her new chief of staff, Antônio Palocci (Lula's first finance minister and Dilma's chief campaign coordinator this year), appears to have faced down much of the pressure from the main coalition partners for more influential roles. However, that doesn't mean that the coalition partners are happy with their prospective lot, amid rumblings about a lack of proper consultation in a top-down process. The tricky battle between the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and PMDB for the presidencies of the senate and lower house has yet to be fought and the outcome of that contest will dictate governability in 2011 and beyond, regardless of Rousseff's nominal parliamentary majority.

Dilma's other major fight in congress will be her demands for budget rationalisation - no new minister will want to contemplate cuts. However, latest consumer inflation figures for November were the highest in five years (5.63% year-on-year), and yesterday the central bank gave warning of higher interest rates again, making a fiscal retrenchment unavoidable in the New Year.

In a statement released yesterday, Dilma called on the new appointees to "work in an integrated way with other government sectors to implement our program for development with income redistribution and economic stability, ensuring an improved quality of life for all Brazilians".   Having satisfied the demanding PMDB, Dilma will now move on to the rest of the coalition allies, which are also clamouring for additional posts in the cabinet and at the top of state agencies and companies. The full cabinet, comprising 24 state ministries and fourteen other cabinet-level offices, will be finalised by 15 December. The new government takes office on 1 January, with the new congress due to sit on 15 February.

Cabinet to date
PMDB
Edison Lobão - Mines & Energy (reappointed)
Garibaldi Alves - Social Security
Pedro Novais - Tourism
Wagner Rossi - Agriculture (reappointed)
Nelson Jobim - Defence (reappointment expected)
Moreira Franco - Secretary of Strategic Affairs
PT
Ideli Salvatti - Fishing & Agriculture
Maria do Rosário - Human Rights Secretary
Paulo Bernardo - Communications (moves from Planning ministry)
Helena Chagas - Social Communications Secretary
Antonio Palocci - Minister of the Presidency
Miriam Belchior - Planning (moves from ministry of the presidency)
Alexandre Tombini - Central Bank president
Guido Mantega - Finance (reappointed)
José Eduardo Cardozo - Justice
Gilberto Carvalho - Secretary General of the presidency

Partido da República (PR)

Alfredo Nascimento - Transport (reappointed)

Development: Today (31 January), President Dilma Rousseff marks one month in office with her first trip abroad, to Argentina, where she will be received, in a historic moment, by her female counterpart, Cristina Fernández.

Significance: Dilma, accompanied by seven ministers, aims to establish “extremely close links" with Argentina, arguing that the two countries must share responsibility for regional socio-economic development and integration. Dilma is carefully shifting Brazilian foreign policy away from the contentious (and arguably inconsistent) approach pursued by her predecessor and mentor Lula da Silva (2002-2010). Her foreign minister, Antônio Patriota, has commissioned a review (due in March) of Brazil's relations with the US and Iran, among others.  Brazil heads the UN Security Council for a month starting 1 February.

Key points:

The two presidents will sign some 15 accords, including a deal for the joint construction of two atomic reactors, one in each country, for research purposes and the production of radioisotopes (typically used in the medical and food sectors). Brazil is driving that deal. Other agreements relate to a long since pending joint hydro project, Garabí­, and joint trade promotions in third countries.

Argentina wants to resolve the trade asymmetries between the two heavy weights in the Southern Cone common market (Mercosur). Despite a surge in imports of Argentine-made cars and other goods, Brazil's trade surplus with Argentina rose to US$4.09bn in 2010, up from US$1.5bn in 2009, according to preliminary Brazilian (central bank) figures. Total bilateral trade was worth US$33bn in 2010, up 40% annually. Dilma has mooted regional content deals for Brazil's mega infrastructure projects over the next decade - ranging from the World Cup/Olympics to the deepwater oil sector.

In a sign of her desire to place human rights at the heart of her foreign policy, Dilma will also meet the mothers and grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo. In a 30 January interview with Argentine press, Dilma stressed that human rights are non-negotiable and should not be used for political ends. Notably, she called out both Cuba and Iran.

Development: Over the weekend (19-20 March), the Colombian political weekly Semana released the contents of a WikiLeaks US diplomatic cable pointing to the presence of 100 undercover Colombian soldiers in the Venezuelan border state of Zulia in 2005.

Significance: The document, dated April 2005, confirms the denunciations made at the time by President Hugo Chávez , who repeatedly accused the Alvaro Uribe administration (2002-2010) of violating Venezuelan sovereignty, allegedly in pursuit of high ranking members of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). The presence of Colombian soldiers in Zulia, which according to the cable was aimed at capturing 'Iván Márquez' (Luciano Marín Arango), a member of the Farc's secretariat, indicates that Colombia pressed on with undercover operations in Venezuela even after the escalation of bilateral tensions following the kidnapping of Rodrigo Granda, the so-called Farc 'foreign minister', in Caracas in mid-December 2004.

Key points:

The cable reveals that the Colombian forces operated with the knowledge of some members of the Venezuelan security forces, including the army and the national police. This appears to confirm the rumoured internal divisions in the Venezuelan forces, triggered by political disagreements with the Chávez administration. Purging the forces of disloyal segments has been a key component of Chávez 's security policy.

A November 2008 cable also confirmed that Colombia's then-defence minister Juan Manuel Santos (now president), strengthened relations with Israel, by hiring Israeli security training specialists and purchasing armaments, ships and other military materials. It also revealed that Santos consulted with the US about the possibility of an armed conflict with Venezuela. The US felt that Venezuela's military would not be able to sustain a conflict. In the eyes of US intelligence analysts, Venezuela's deployment of forces to the border was nothing more than a display for the media.

Who is he? Ferreira was recently chosen from a shortlist of three candidates by the board of Vale do Rio Doce SA (Vale) to replace the outgoing CEO, Roger Agnelli, whose mandate ends on 22 May. 

Why watch him?  The choice of Agnelli's replacement was controversial. The Brazilian government, which indirectly controls 61% of Vale through the Valepar holding group, has taken issue with some management decisions at the mining giant in recent years. Ferreira's appointment is seen as a political move by the new government led by President Dilma Rousseff.

The markets, and private investors in Vale, fear that the Rousseff government, which is keen to use 'national champions' to promote domestic economic development, might seek a more active say in the running of the world's second largest mining company

Date of birth: 1953.

Location: Uberaba, Minas Gerais.

Education: Completed high school studies at the traditional Colégio Bandeirantes in São Paulo, after moving there with his brother, aged14.  Obtained a bachelor's degree in business administration at the Fundação Getulio Vargas - São Paulo. Also obtained a postgraduate degree in finance and administration at the Fundação Getulio Vargas-Rio de Janeiro. Later completed a specialization course in mergers and acquisitions at the International Institute for Management Development (IMD) business school in Lausanne, Switzerland.

Public Life: Ferreira joined the-then state owned Vale as an economic and financial advisor straight out of university. He was at the company almost continuously for over 30 years, slowly rising through the ranks. He eventually became director of Vale's aluminium operation, Aluvale, where he came into close contact with prominent government officials, including the-then mining and energy minister, Rousseff.

In 2006, as business development director, he led the takeover of a big Canadian nickel firm, Inco. A year later, he was appointed director of Vale Inco. Ferreira made a good impression in Canada unlike his successor, Tito Martins, who has had a testy relationship with the local trade unions. However, Ferreira's non-confrontational and patient approach was questioned by CEO Agnelli. Eventually, amidst health concerns and following a spat with Agnelli over the company's expansion plans, Ferreira left Vale and set up his own consultancy.

Timeline:

1977:  Joins Vale as an economic and financial advisor.

1998-2004: Appointed director of Aluvale (Vale's aluminium arm), after Vale is partially privatized.

2001-2004: Takes charge of Alabras, Brazil's second largest aluminium producer, in which Vale had a 51% stake. Under his guidance the company became highly profitable and sections were successfully sold off to a Norwegian company, Norsk Hydro.

2005-2007: Becomes director of Vale's business development, in charge of acquisitions and fusions.

2006: Oversees takeover of Canada's Inco for US$17 bn, which was the largest ever international deal concluded by a Brazilian company at the time. It took Vale from the world's fourth largest mining company to the second largest.

2007: Appointed president of the new Canadian subsidiary, Vale Inco, by Agnelli.

2008: Leaves Vale after falling out with Agnelli over the proposed acquisition of the Anglo-Swiss outfit, Xsrata. Ferreira was opposed to the acquisition while Agnelli pushed for it. He was replaced at Vale Inco by Tito Martins, who was mooted as a prospective successor to Agnelli. 

2009-2011: Founds 'Studios Investimentos', an investment management firm.

April: Appointed the new Vale CEO by the board of directors in record time after an international headhunting company took only three days to compile a three-candidate shortlist. 

Strengths: Ferreira has over 30 years experience in the mining sector, most of that at Vale. He knows the company and the business very well. Another plus is his successful stint abroad. He was backed as a prospective CEO (some say appointed) by President Rousseff who first met and worked with Ferreira as mining and energy minister, and its assumed relations between the company and the government will run more smoothly. Ferreira is considered much more conciliatory and open to negotiations and dialogue than Agnelli, who had more a few run-ins with Rousseff's predecessor and mentor Lula da Silva (2002-2010).

Weaknesses: Vale's major private stockholder, the Brazilian private bank Bradesco, apparently backed Martins over Ferreira, arguing that Martins has been actively participating in the day-to-day running of the company. Ferreira certainly has big shoes to fill. Under Agnelli's 21 years at the helm, Vale grew from a domestic powerhouse to a truly global player.    

Prospects: Despite Ferreira's lengthy experience, his nomination was a surprise and the markets reacted cautiously. Some commentators suggest that Ferreira will be more subservient to the administrative board than the independent and forward-thinking Agnelli.

President Lula da Silva began pushing Vale to move more aggressively into the labour-intensive steel producing sector, prompting tensions with Agnelli. Private investors are unsure as to how this technocrat, with no formal party affiliations, will conduct himself as company director.  Apart from keeping the government happy however, Ferreira must also work to keep Vale internationally competitive. It's main customer is China, which devours its iron ore supplies.

China's Minmetals singed a deal with Chile's Corporación del Cobre (Codelco) on 27 May under which it will inject "quasi equity" into a joint venture with the state-owned copper mining company in return for a guaranteed supply of copper. Codelco is the biggest producer of copper in the world.

Minmetals is injecting subordinated debt into Codelco. In return for the investment, Codelco will commit to providing Minmetals with 57,000t of copper cathodes a year for the next 15 years. The deal, signed by the Chilean finance minister, Nicolás Eyzaguirre, during a visit to Beijing, is clearly seen by both sides as a statement of intention. Eyzaguirre added that the deal gave Minmetals the first option to swap its guaranteed supply of copper for an equity stake of between 25% and 49% in Codelco's Gaby project. 

Gaby is due to come on stream in 2007. It is designed to produce 170,000t of fine copper a year. The mine will cost US$600m to set up.

China is likely to import 6m t of copper this year, up from 4m t in 2004. Chinese demand for copper has driven the price to the highest level since the London Metal Exchange began trading copper in its current contract in 1986. In April China imported 360,000t of copper, 80% more than in April 2004. Copper traders say that China needs copper to increase the capacity of its electricity transmission system: in 2004, 24 of China's 27 provinces were hit by power cuts. 

MERCOSUR: US rejects "4+1" agreement with Mercosur

US BUDGET: Changes in Latin American funding package

NICARAGUA: US claims army sold SAM-7 missiles

OAS: US contribution increases by 20%

IMMIGRATION: Immigrants fight Mexican ID card ban

MERCOSUR
The US has rejected a "4+1" trade agreement with Mercosur in favour of pursuing the hemisphere-wide Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the deputy US Trade Representative Peter Allgeier said on 8 February. Allgeier said that the 4+1 proposal made by Brazil which would consist of direct negotiations between the US and the Mercosur bloc (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) "is something which does not interest the US". Allgeier said that the US was less interested in industry than it was "intellectual property, transparency and legal protection for investments (which) have become essential to any negotiation". Allgeier is expected to relaunch FTAA talks with Brazil's Adhemar Bahadian, his co-president of the FTAA, at the end of the month. The friction between Brazil and the US over the FTAA has been well documented. The Brazilian government advocates an FTAA-lite; the US has pursued separate deals with several South American countries, including Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, and with Central America.

US BUDGET
The US budget for the 2006 fiscal year, presented to congress by President George W Bush on 7 February, cuts anti-drug cash for Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, a move badly received in these countries, but boosts US support for opposition political parties in Venezuela. On the drug front, the US is clearly changing tack, moving away from eradication programmes, which have been largely discredited, towards air tracking and interception. Overall, the budget allowance for the Andean region (the Andean counter-drugs initiative) is up by about US$9.4m on 2005 at US$734.5m. By far and away the main beneficiary is Colombia, which will receive 63% of this figure. Elsewhere, the budget steps up support for the National Endowment for Democracy, which has been active in supporting opposition political parties in Venezuela, from US$59m to US$80m.

NICARAGUA
An article published in The Washington Times on 27 January which cited unnamed US officials who claimed that rogue elements in the Nicaraguan army were selling SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles on the black market has caused resentment in the Nicaraguan army and indirectly threatened the position of President Enrique Bolaños. Bolaños told the Miami-based El Nuevo Herald on 5 February that he would not be at all surprised if the army were selling SAM-7s on the sly. His comments provoked an icy response from the outgoing head of the armed forces, Javier Carrión, who pointedly sought (and received) support from the opposition-dominated national assembly. The opposition is currently chipping away at the powers of the executive and could revive an initiative it toyed with last year to impeach the president. The Washington Times article cited Roger Pardo-Maurer, the deputy-assistant defense secretary for the Western Hemisphere: "If this is what it appears to be, it calls into question not only the professionalism and integrity of the Nicaraguan armed forces, but it really calls into question their sanity. Playing with shoulder-fired missiles is one of the most dangerous things out there and is at the top of concerns by the Department of Defense," he said.

OAS
The US government's draft budget for the fiscal year 2006, which starts in October, calls for a 20% increase in the US contribution to the budget for the Organization of American States. The US will provide US$65m of the OAS's US$80m budget. This largesse may swing some support behind the US's candidate for the job of secretary general, Francisco Flores, the former president of El Salvador. Initially, however, the announcement produced the defection of Honduras from the Flores camp to support Luis Ernesto Derbez, the Mexican foreign minister. Derbez now has the support of Canada, Belize, Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico and St Vincent & The Grenadines. The frontrunner for the secretary generalship is the former Chilean foreign (now interior) minister, José Miguel Insulza.

IMMIGRATION
For the first time immigrants' rights organisations banded together on 8 February in Los Angeles to uphold the validity of the Mexican identity card. Rightwing groups in the US want to stop banks and other organisations recognising Mexican identity cards as a valid identification for opening bank accounts and other activities. The move to roll back banks and local governments' acceptance of Mexican ID cards is being led by a Republican, Michael Antonovich. He is the district supervisor for the Fifth District in Los Angeles who refuses to accept Mexican ID cards. At a board of supervisors meeting on 8 February he produced what he said was a false Mexican ID card with his name on it. He argued that both the FBI and the US department of justice had concluded that the ID card was too easy to forge. The LA board of supervisors, however, voted to continue to accept the ID cards. The Mexican consul in LA. who debated the issue face to face with Antonovich on 8 February, said that he was pleased by the decision. Mexican ID cards have been accepted by one of the big banks in California, Wells Fargo, since November 2001.

Colombia: On 23 June, the Inter-American Human Rights Court (IAHRC) issued a landmark judgement holding the Colombian government responsible for the 1994 assassination of a prominent senator, Manuel Cepeda, who was shot dead in an operation organized by Colombia's army. The Colombian state's perceived weak human rights record is a challenge for the US Barack Obama administration as it tries to convince congress to approve a pending Free Trade Agreement with Colombia. Myles Frechette, a former US ambassador to Colombia, acknowledged that "this is a problem for the United States," adding that the incoming administration, to be led by the former defence minister Juan Manuel Santos, must be committed to preventing abuses and ending impunity; "He has to say, 'Colombia is a modern country, and we understand all these things about human rights violations, and we're going to stand up and fly right'", Frechette stated. Luis Alfonso Hoyos, Colombia's ambassador to the Organisation of American States, said that Colombia readily cooperates with the IAHRC's investigations.

Jamaica: On 29 June, the government of Prime Minister Bruce Golding reported that the US assistant secretary of state, Philip Crowley, had commended Jamaica for its work to support the transfer of the alleged drug baron, Christopher 'Dudus' Coke, to the US. The apparent recovery in US-Jamaica relations is a boost to Golding, whose credibility has been hugely damaged over his handling of the US extradition request for Coke. Following his arrest by the Jamaican authorities on 22 June and subsequent waiver of his right to judicial extradition proceedings, Coke is now in the US to face charges of narcotics and arms trafficking. Golding's nine month refusal to comply with the US extradition request before bowing down last month under considerable political pressure soured bilateral ties.

Venezuela: President Barack Obama this week named Larry Palmer as the new ambassador to Venezuela, pending ratification by the senate. The top US envoy for Latin America, Arturo Valenzuela, said Obama had sought to forge better ties with the region but it was “difficult" to deal with a country that saw you as its “main enemy". After President Hugo Chávez , who hosted Syria's President Bashar-al-Assad early this week, made disparaging comments about Israel, Eliot Engel, the chairman of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, reacted angrily: “It's not difficult to understand why President Chávez would try to distract from his problems at home. If my country had the one of the highest murder rates in the world, the highest inflation rate in Latin America, and an economy which is expected to shrink by more than 6% this year, I, too, would be talking about anything but what's going on at home", he stated.

Friday

Chile: President of Mozambique Armando Guebuza will begin a two-day official visit to Chile where he will meet Chilean President Michelle Bachelet.

Venezuela: Vice Chinese Premier Hui Liangyu will continue his four-day visit to Venezuela where he is expected to sign agricultural agreements. He will then visit Uruguay and Argentina before ending his tour of the region on 15 May.

Argentina: Austrian chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer will continue his three day visit to Argentina before heading to Brazil on 11 May to meet with a group of overseas Austrians, and Brazilian President Lula da Silva. He will then travel to Chile on 14 May to meet Chilean President Michelle Bachelet.

Saturday

Peru: The meetings of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum will begin with the "Digital Economy Forum for Women 2008: Global Strategy and e-Development of Asia Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.

Sunday: Portuguese foreign minister Luis Filipe Marques Amado will visit Paraguay to meet his Paraguayan counterpart Rubén Ramí­rez where he is expected to firm up bilateral relations and sign a memorandum on trade and investment.

The four-month-old uprising in the Mexican state of Oaxaca has drawn from the Mexican government the unusual admission, albeit oblique, that it is more concerned about the threat from guerrilla organisations than it has so far let on. The defence minister, General Clemente Vega, has stated that it has had 5,414 soldiers patrolling different parts of Oaxaca 'for the containment of armed groups'. The federal chief prosecutor's office, the PGR, announced that it had identified nine armed organisations 'with real presence', chiefly in four states.

General Vega's statement, on 5 October, was a response to a claim by a newspaper columnist (Juan Ramón Bustillos, of El Impacto) that he had refused to obey an order by President Vicente Fox to prepare for military intervention in Oaxaca. This claim had actually been a distorted version of the assertion by another columnist, Raymundo Riva Palacio, that Vega had argued against military intervention, in the same vein as he had refused Fox's order to prepare to intervene against supporters of Mexico city mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador at a time when Fox was seeking to have him removed from office on a criminal charge, so as to abort his presidential bid.

Riva Palacio's main point had actually been that Fox had come to rely more on the navy than on the army for domestic counterinsurgency purposes. In Mexico's institutional setup, the defence ministry only has control over the army and the airforce; the navy has a separate ministry of its own.

Vega said that 5,414 troops had been patrolling Oaxaca since March this year, that is, almost four months before a teachers' strike in Oaxaca had escalated into an uprising aimed at unseating the state governor, Ulises Ruiz, of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). According to Vega, the navy was acting in support of this effort. Riva Palacio claimed that the navy had begun to deploy intelligence personnel in the state 'four months ago', about the same time as the escalation began.

Reports of navy presence began to circulate among the Oaxaca rebels on the last weekend of September, when navy helicopters were seen overflying the barricades they had set up in the state capital.

After the Riva Palacio and Bustillos reports, and General Vega's response, on 10 October the navy announced that it was calling an end to the Adiestramiento Otoño 2006 exercises in Oaxaca, under which it had conducted an amphibious operation involving close to 1,000 personnel, mainly heli-borne marines. An interesting detail: this was only the second public mention of the exercises, the previous one having been only a day earlier, at the tail-end of a selected list of training exercises held by the navy since 2003. The navy ministry normally issues monthly reports of its activities, but none of these has alluded to 'Otoño 2006'.

The PGR added its bit on 10 October, when José Cabrera, head of the division devoted to terrorism and gunrunning, held a press conference to report that it considered nine 'armed groups' (see list below) to have a 'real presence', mainly in the state of Chiapas, Guerrero, México and Morelos. Other self-proclaimed armed groups, he said, were no more than 'fronts' which only existed in their public proclamations. 

Cabrera's aim was to debunk the apparent threat posed by a group calling itself the Organización Revolucionaria Armada del Pueblo de Oaxaca (ORAPO), which on 2 October had set off low-powered explosive devices in front of four bank branches in Oaxaca city, leaving behind a communiqué in which they 'declared war' on the state and federal governments. Another armed group, the Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR), deemed the most dangerous by the PGR, has warned that any attempt by the government to suppress the Oaxaca uprising by force would trigger 'a new phase in class warfare'.

The PGR's list of nine 'armed groups'

• Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN)
• Ejército Popular Revolucionario (EPR)
• Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgentes (ERPI)
• Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP)
• Comando Jaramillista Morelense 23 de Mayo (CJM-23)
• Ejército Villista Revolucionario del Pueblo (EVRP)
• Comité Clandestino Revolucionario de los Pobres 'Comando Justiciero 28 de Junio' (CCRP-28)
• Tendencia Democrática Revolucionaria (TDR)
• Coordinadora Guerrillera Nacional 'José Marí­a Morelos'

Officials in Itamaraty, Brazil foreign ministry, are trying to figure out just how solid a “strategic ally" Argentina's President Néstor Kirchner will turn out to be. After having openly opposed Brazil's bid for a permanent seat on an eventually enlarged UN Security Council, in December Kirchner appeared to be taking issue with President Lula da Silva's grand integration scheme for South America.

Kirchner stayed away from the December summit held in Cusco, Peru, which launched the South American Community of Nations (CSN), one of Lula's pet schemes that had been actively promoted by Kirchner's predecessor, former President Eduardo Duhalde, now chairman of Mercosur's council of permanent representatives. Kirchner invoked health reasons (intolerance of high altitude), but let it be known through well-placed leaks that he did not consider this initiative to be in Argentina's interest. 

Late in the month, when he attended the Mercosur summit in Ouro Preto, Kirchner aimed thinly veiled criticism at Lula (“none of our countries is on its own big enough or strong enough to dissociate itself from the region's destiny") and called for Mercosur to return to its original purpose which he defined as seeking to erase economic asymmetries between its members instead of pursuing purely politically-motivated expansion. 

He was not heeded. As planned, the summit saw the incorporation of Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador as associate members of Mercosur — with which Mercosur now embraces all the founding members of the CSN save Guyana and Suriname.

Back in October, Argentine foreign minister Rafael Bielsa had revived Kirchner's early opposition to Brazil's Security Council aspirations, in terms that were not too friendly. “The precarious balance prevalent in the region," he said, “is not consolidated with Brazil occupying a permanent seat on the Security Council." What Argentina wants, said Bielsa, is a reform of the Security Council “with a regionalist criterion, with two categories of countries: some with a right to sit [on the Council] for four years, others with a right to sit for eight years. If it attracted the requisite endorsements, Brazil could be entitled to eight years — the same as Argentina, of course."

As Bielsa has personally reminded UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, this coincides with the reform proposals put forward by Annan's group of experts, under which the Security Council would be expanded to include 'semi-permanent' members.

Argentina has just taken up, in January, a non-permanent seat on the Security Council in representation of Latin America (replacing Chile), which it will hold for two years. It started out occupying the presidency of the Council, and immediately showed that it intends to make a mark, convening a special session on Haiti, which issued a presidential declaration calling on the Latortue government to initiate a political dialogue with the pro-Aristide camp, respect human rights and stop delaying action to disarm the public. It also stated its willingness to stay on in Haiti for as long as necessary, and decided to send, before 1 June, a joint mission with Ecosoc's special consultative group on Haiti to give additional impulse to the preparations for elections this year.

The main worry in Brasí­lia is that Kirchner might end up emulating his predecessor Carlos Menem and seek a separate understanding with the US.

Who is Winter Etienne?
He is another of the paramilitary leaders of the rebel groups whose activities have led to the overthrow and exile of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. His group is the Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales (FLRN) previously the more aggressive sounding Front de Résistance de l'Artibonite. It is strong in the north of the country and took control of three of the country's biggest cities towards the end of February, precipitating Aristide's overthrow. Ominously, after the cities fell scores were bloodily settled and hundreds of people killed.

Why watch him?
Winter Etienne was close to Amiot Métayer, who ran the Canibale group before he was brutally killed in September 2003. Etienne is one of the leaders of the 300,000 or so paramilitaries who rampaged across the country during the Duvalier régime which Aristide replaced.

Place of birth: Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

Public life:
Etienne sprang to prominence in recent weeks when his band took control of Gonaïves, the fourth-biggest city in the country, and home to 200,000 people. His allies were Buteur Métayer (Amiot's brother) and Milfort Ferdinand (alias 'Ti Will'). Etienne appointed himself director of police for the region, mayor of the city and police commissioner.

Timeline

1990: Etienne trained part of the paramilitary forces loyal to the Duvalier family. These forces are reckoned to number about 300,000 men. They are inured to violence and used to getting their own way.
1990: He took part in the military coup which toppled President Aristide, who had won the elections seven months earlier.
1994: After the US intervened and forced out the leader of the coup, Raoul Cedrás, Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to power.
1995: The Haitian army was demobilised.
2003: Until recently, Etienne used to train Aristide's shock troops. When Aristide appeared to be on the way out, Etienne joined the opposition and now runs several cities in the north of the country.
2004: He set up what became the Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales (FLRN) with Métayer and Ferdinand. The FLRN is backed by former paramilitaries.
2004: On 22 February, the FLRN takes Cap Haïtien, the second-biggest city in country.
2004: On 29 February, Jean-Bertrand Aristide goes into exile again. The rebels, loyal to Etienne and his partners, control the north of the country.

Strong points:
Etienne can count on the cowering support of hundreds of thousands of terrified peasants in the interior of the country. These people have vivid memories of the state of terror under the Duvalier régime. To be fair, Etienne also enjoys the benefit of the doubt from the urban population which has seen their standard of living wilt since the US restored Aristide. Etienne and his colleagues can count on the support of most of the paramilitaries.

Weak points:
He and his colleagues do not command much support in the US. The US government said that it would not negotiate with rebels. Presumably, the UN-backed multilateral force, led by the US and France, will stay until fresh elections are held. They were scheduled for October.

Prospects:
Etienne and his colleagues are in a powerful position, controlling as they do, the north of the country. The divisions between the rebels mean that he is unlikely to take national power, though he will be a significant powerbroker.

Who is he? Fernando Collor is a former president (1990-1992), whose term was cut short when he was forced to resign in order to avoid being impeached amid corruption scandals. He is a former arch political enemy of President Lula da Silva, having beaten him in the race for Brazil's presidency in 1989.

Why watch him? Collor, who was elected a senator for the northeastern state of Alagôas in 2006 after several years in the political wilderness, has recently returned to public and political prominence as a member of the senatorial commission of enquiry (CPI in the Portguese acronym), currently   investigating alleged financial corruption and other irregularities   in the state oil giant, Petrobras.   Collor is also president of the senate Infrastructure committee, through which all the projects linked to the government's Growth Acceleration Plan (Plano de Aceleração do Crescimento [PAC]) pass.

In 2007 Collor swapped his party to become a member of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), one of those political parties that has managed to be a part of every government since Brazil's democratization in 1985, and which is currently allied with the Lula government.

As such he is in the pro-government majority on the Petrobras CPI, and the government is hoping to use this majority to control the direction of the enquiry.

Lula's recent tactics to limit the impact of the CPI have included enlisting the help of another former president and bitter enemy now turned government ally: the current senate president, José Sarney, of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB, [p.1985-1990]), who Lula, with the help of Collor, has recently defended tooth and nail against a series of highly damaging corruption scandals that have resulted in a serious institutional crisis in the 81-seat senate. Lula's defence of Sarney has two motives: he needs a friendly senate president to ensure the CPI is under control, and he also needs to keep the PMDB onside ahead of general elections in 2010.

The sight of Lula publicly cosying up to the likes of Collor and Sarney, the veteran and much discredited 'dinsoaurs' of Brazilian politics, has turned many stomachs in the traditional left and prompted much debate in the media about whether Lula has 'gone too far' in his efforts to hold onto power.

Born: 12 August, 1949

Place of Birth: Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Education:   Collor studied economics and journalism at the state's Federal University in Brasilia

Public Life:   The young Collor began his career within the family empire. A very successful media businessman, Collor earned both wealth and renown, and gained some international notoriety as something of a playboy. In 1975 he first married Lilibeth Monteiro de Carvalho, a young aristocratic, with whom he had two sons, but they divorced in 1981.

He entered politics in 1979, when he became mayor of Maceió, the capital city of Alagôas. He served ably in that capacity until 1982, and then decided to take advantage of the policy of abertura, or gradual political democratization, permitted by General João Batista Figueiredo, the last of the five generals that ruled Brazil from 1964 to 1985.

In 1982 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies for the conservative Partido Democrático Social, serving the nation in Brasilia for four years as its youngest congressman. While in congress his interest in, and official concern with, economic matters became marked, and he achieved a reputation as a no-nonsense financial reformer. His special cause was the long-neglected northeast, including Alagôas, and he was easily elected governor of his home state in 1986. Meanwhile, in 1984, he remarried, to Rosane Malta, a college freshman from Alagôas.

Time Line:

1976: Collor became a president for a short period of a football club in Alagôas “Centro Esportivo Alagoano".

1979-1981: Mayor of Maceió, the capital of Alagôas state.

1982-1985: Federal deputy representing Alagôas.

1986-1989: Governor of Alagôas (PMDB).

15 December 1989: Defeats Lula in the second round of the presidential race, representing the conservative Partido da Reconstrução Nacional.

1990: Aged 41, Collor was the youngest-ever president of Brazil. Upon taking office he introduced the Collor Plan, which attempted to reduce the money supply by forcibly converting large portions of consumer bank accounts into non-cashable government bonds, while at the same time increasing the printing of money bills, ostensibly to combat hyperinflation. He also began a process of economic liberalization and privatization.

29 December 1992: Collor resigned the presidency, after the lower house of congress voted overwhelmingly to suspend him after finding evidence of massive personal corruption. He was barred from holding office until 2001.

December 1994: The supreme court acquitted him of the corruption charges, but he remained barred from holding public office.

2006: Collor de Mello begins his political rehabilitation, and was elected to the senate for the small leftist Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro, taking his seat in 2007. He later switched parties and joined the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro.

Strengths: Collor's re-ascendancy, marked by his party's tactical decision to support Lula, has been remarkable, given the notorious end to his presidency. Despite his weak public reputation, Collor retains strong political links in Brasilia and has been a useful ally for Lula in the senate.

Weaknesses: Collor's reputation precedes him; Brazilians have not easily forgotten the 'Confisco', when the government restricted cash withdrawals in order to combat inflation. Despite his current revival, the ever-pragmatic Lula would just as soon ditch Collor if he were no longer of use to him or if he threatened to become a political liability ahead of next year's elections. Collor has little or no appeal to voters.

Prospects: For now, Collor serves a useful purpose for Lula in the senate, both on the Petrobras CPI and as president of the all-important infrastructure committee and the PTB may expect some payback for this support ahead of the polls next year. It is unclear whether Collor will run for senate re-election.