All Categories

Development: The government expressed its concern, on 19 December, at the number of small bombs that have exploded in various parts of Santiago in the past few days.

Significance: The attacks look coordinated. They look as though they are the work of a sophisticated, probably rightwing, urban terrorist group. As all but one of the targets have either a Spanish or British connection, the supposition is that the bombers sympathise with the late Augusto Pinochet, who was arrested in Britain on a Spanish warrant for human rights abuses.

So far no-one has been killed. The most recent bombs, which exploded early on 19 December were at a Carabineros barracks in Ñuñoa and at a branch of Santander Chile, in Recoleta. The bomb at the barracks is the only target which did not have a European connection. On 18 December another bomb exploded at a local office of Telefónica Chile in San Miguel. Investigator say that it is unprecedented for Santiago to have three bombs explode in a 24 hour period.

The interior minister, Belisario Velasco, implied that the most recent attacks shared similarities with bombs that exploded at a British diplomatic mission and at the Cámara Española de Comercio earlier in the year. The government noted that at some of the bomb sites, pamphlets demanding the release of "Mapuche political prisoners" had been found.

Development: On 30 January, the police found the bodies of five men who had been executed.

Significance: The massacre came only a day after a UN-sponsored report alleged that the murderous Mara gangs were starting to move into Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Traditionally, the Maras have been active in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Los Angeles and are moving into Mexico.

The men, each of whom was killed by a single shot to the back of the head, were probably killed on the morning of 30 January. Women alerted police when they heard shots. The massacre took place at a rubbish dump, at Ciudad Neily, in the department of Corredores, close to the Panama border. The men had been roped together and made to lie face down.

The police's initial suspicion is that the men were not Costa Ricans but foreigners, probably Panamanians or Colombians.

Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega has reversed his position regarding the recent World Court decision on his country's maritime dispute with Colombia. He now accuses Colombia of defying that decision and warns that Nicaragua will use any means available to defend its sovereignty (with Venezuela's help).

On 26 January in Caracas President Ortega said 'I wish to denounce that the government of Colombia is not abiding by the ruling of the International Court of Justice and is maintaining military vigilance in the disputed maritime zone which according to the Court ruling is no longer a border.'

Ortega's version of the court's decision is not accurate. What the court did was exclude the San Andrés & Providencia archipelago from its consideration of Nicaragua's claim, on strict application of the norms of the 1948 Bogotá Pact invoked by Nicaragua. It went on to say that it would seek to determine the precise delimitation of that archipelago, and establish the maritime boundary beyond that.

A request from Colombia's foreign ministry to respect the status quo until such time as the court handed down its final ruling was dismissed out of hand by the Nicaraguan government as 'provocative'.

It was not, however, until 12 February that the Nicaraguan government came up with a concrete instance of Colombian actions in alleged violation of the court's decision. The foreign ministry sent a note protesting that two days earlier a Colombian frigate had 'intimidated fishers and divers of a Nicaraguan lobstering vessel' within Nicaraguan waters east of the Miskito Cays (just over Meridian 82, in an area north of the San Andrés & Providencia archipelago). The Colombian government promised to investigate and the matter was left at that.

This entire sequence of events has been seen by several analysts as linked with Venezuela's escalation of verbal hostilities against Colombia and its proposal for Alba to incorporate a military dimension.

Ortega issued his first accusation against Colombia at the closing of the Alba summit in Caracas, and later, on 1 February, proclaimed, '[The Colombians] know that with Nicaragua and Venezuela united in Alba we are strong and they must respect us.'

BRAZIL: The World Bank has lent US$95m to finance the construction of a subway line in Sao Paulo.

COLOMBIA: The World Bank has approved a loan of US$500m for the country's growth and poverty-tackling projects.

MEXICO: The World Bank has lent US$501.2m to support the  national strategy on climate change.

REGION: Latin America received 24% of the world investment on mining exploration in 2007 according to Metals Economics Group. This represents US$2.4bn of a total US$9.9bn.

VENEZUELA: Unemployment fell to 7.6% in February, almost 3 points below January's figure (10.2%) according to the planning minister, Haiman El Troudi.

Chile takes new look at 'dormant' guerrilla group

Chilean police are trying to determine whether six alleged former members of a guerrilla organisation recently captured in Araucaní­a have remained active since their last known action in mid-2005. They are being charged with past criminal offences, but investigators are looking into their links with a radical indigenous organisation responsible for arson attacks in the Mapuche heartland. and with a Ciolombian guerrilla organisation.

The authorities said the six were members of the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria - Ejército Guerrillero del Pueblo - Patria Libre (MIR-EGP-PL), a splinter of the old MIR which had broken away in 1992 to continue armed struggle. Together with them the police detained three other people said to be associated with the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), the radical Mapuche organisation that has been conducting arson raids on forestry firms and land invasions in the Mapuche heartland of southern Chile.

The six have been charged with criminal conspiracy, robbery aggravated by homicide and illegal possession of firearms. Members of the MIR-EGP-PL are held responsible for the December 2004 raid on a BancoEstado branch in Loncoche, from which they stole the equivalent of US$43,478 after wounding a security guard, and for the abortive June 2005 raid on a pensions office in Machalí­, where they were prevented from making off with the equivalent of US$200,000. In that raid two of the attackers were killed, as well as a security guard and a civilian.

The organisation is believed to have used part of the proceeds from the Loncoche robbery and other criminal activity to finance the legal expenses of trying to secure the release from a Brazilian prison of  Mauricio Hernández Norambuena, a leader of the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodrí­guez (FPMR), sentenced to a 30-year prison term for the November 2001 kidnapping of advertiser Washington Olivetto. A campaign is under way to secure Hernández's extradition to Chile on 'humanitarian' grounds, to serve out the rest of his term in Chile.

Ostensibly the detainees were in the southern region of Araucaní­a filming a documentary on life in radical Mapuche communities. The police reported the discovery of a 'small arsenal' (two pistols and several replica firearms) in the home of one of the detainees, Flor Domí­nguez, together with uniforms similar to those used by the Carabineros when they conduct raids. Domí­nguez, which is director of culture at the municipality of Ercilla, says that all these elements were being used as props in the film.

The film appears to be genuine enough: it was being carried out with financing from the national council for culture and the arts. Its director, Elena Varela López (another of the detainees), had also been granted public funds in 2006 for a film on the young members of the MIR who were trained at the shortlived 'guerrilla school' of Neltume in the early 1980s.

Servando Pérez, chief public prosecutor in Rancagua, has claimed that the detainees had received military training from the Colombian guerrillas of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). This is being investigated, as well as whether the detainees' association with the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM) went beyond the CAM's participation in Elena Varela's film. The CAM has been conducting arson raids on forestry firms and land invasions in the Mapuche heartland of southern Chile and has recently been accused of connections with foreign guerrilla organisations.

Development: On 18 June the government announced a deal with food producers that freezes the prices of 150 staple foods.

Significance: The move is further evidence of both the government's worries about inflation and its populist response to economic problems. The deal is with the Confederación Nacional de Cámaras Industriales de México (Concamin) and commits Concamin members to holding some prices at their current level for the rest of the year.

Among the items whose prices are fixed for the rest of the year are: various sorts of cooked beans; tinned tuna; fruit juices and coffee. Some other foods, notably cooking oil and wheat flour, will only have their prices fixed until either July or August. The president of Concamin, Ismael Plascencia, said that if there were no sharp rises in the prices of these two items by then, their prices would probably also remain fixed until the end of the year.

The government is issuing food stamps of M$120 (US$11.3) a month to 25.6m Mexicans and buying up a strategic reserve of 500,000t of maize. The government is also waiving import duties on 100,000t of bean imports as well as on maize; rice; wheat and fertilisers and halving the tariff on imports of powdered milk.

The cost of the government's efforts to limit the effect of high international food prices on the Mexican poor is comparatively little when set beside that of the fuel subsidy, which costs M$200bn (US$19bn) a year.

Chile: Chile's exports of fresh fruit declined by 4.4% in volume in the 2007-2008 season, mainly due to adverse weather conditions.

Costa Rica: Costa Rica's trade deficit reached US$2.7bn in the first half of 2008, representing a 103.9% increase compared to the same period in 2007.

Cuba/Mexico: Trade between Cuba and Mexico increased “between 75 % and 84%" in the first quarter of 2008 compared to the same period the previous year, according to Mexican officials.

Development: On 25 August Paraguay's foreign minister, Alejandro Hamed Franco, said it was “totally feasible" that Venezuela could become a full member of the regional trade group Mercosur.

Significance: It is hardly surprising that the new Paraguayan government, led by President Fernando Lugo, has offered its support to Venezuela's Mercosur bid. Last week, Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez promised to supply Paraguay “with all the petrol it needs, right down to the very last drop".

With the support of a new ally in Paraguay, Venezuela's full adhesion to Mercosur now seems only a formality. In July 2006 Venezuela was accepted as a member of the trade bloc but the parliaments of Paraguay and Brazil have yet to ratify Venezuelan membership. Under previous president Nicanor Duarte of the long-ruling Partido Colorados, Paraguay had been more hostile to Chávez .

Having already secured the backing of his chief ally in the Southern Cone, President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, President Chávez has also lately sought to leverage additional support from Uruguay, whose congress has already approved Venezuelan membership. For good measure, Chávez donated US$100m for hospitals in Montevideo last week.

The sticking point remains Brazil. President Lula da Silva of Brazil has voiced his support, although the Brazilian senate has not yet been convinced. Lula is likely to impress upon legislators his belief that allowing Venezuela into Mercosur would boost the group's trade and integration agenda and would also allow Brazil to contain Chávez .

Development: On 25 September Justice Minister Aní­bal Fernández said that the Argentine government was not worried by allegations made in a Miami courtroom that Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez provided money to Cristina Fernández's campaign to be elected president last year.

Significance: This was the first official comment since Guido Antonini Wilson, a part-Venezuelan businessman, testified last week that there was US$5m on a flight he took from Caracas to Buenos Aires in August last year and that the money was handed over to members of the Argentine government. Fernández accused Antonini Wilson (who was caught by customs officials at a Buenos Aires airport with US$800,000 of that money) of saying whatever the FBI told him to say and said that the whole scandal was concocted by the US to incriminate Chávez .

Aní­bal Fernández also reiterated his government's demand that the US extradite Antonini Wilson to Argentina so that he can be questioned as to the real reason why he was caught trying to smuggle US$800,000 into Argentina. The justice minister asked the US to grant the extradition request in the interests of “truth and freedom".

But the justice minister's indifference to the allegations does not tell the whole story. Sources claim that during a recent visit to New York Cristina Fernández's predecessor and husband, Néstor Kirchner, expressed his anger about the so-called suitcase scandal to Thomas Shannon, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Kirchner is reported to have blamed the administration of President George W Bush for the affair and warned that it was damaging relations between the US and Argentina.

Development: On 29 October the lower house voted against a reform to the constitution that would allow President Alvaro Uribe to be re-elected for a third term in 2014, after a period out of government.

Significance: Uribe's only hope for re-election is now a referendum bill, currently being debated in congress, that if passed would allow him to run for president again in 2010. His supporters will now devote all their energies to winning approval for the proposal in congress. Matters are somewhat complicated, however, by the fact that Colombia's enduringly popular president still refuses to make clear whether or not he wishes to run again.

Uribismo's so-called “Plan B" - article 19 of a package of political reforms currently under debate in congress - was permanently killed by a vote of 76 to 40 proposed by the opposition Partido Liberal. The use of electronic voting means that it is unclear as to how many members of Uribe's ruling coalition voted against the reform. A spokesperson for the pro-Uribe Partido de la U, however, said that the party was in favour of confining the re-election question to the referendum, so as not to paralyze the rest of the political reforms under debate. A series of measures to restore legitimacy to congress in the wake of the parapolitical scandal, in which some 60 congressionals have been accused of links to paramilitary groups, have barely been touched upon by congress since the controversy over the 2014 re-election clause began.

It may well be that the reform was sunk in order to force Uribe to declare his re-election intentions. Both the opposition and, in particular, the president's coalition of supporters, are beginning to jostle for position ahead of the presidential race in 2010. The president's supporters are split between some six different parties and, if Uribe does step down, a power struggle within Uribismo could well ensue.  Significantly, presidential hopeful and leader of influential pro-Uribe party Cambio Radical, Germán Vargas, has yet to lend his support to the referendum bill.

A referendum to allow Uribe's re-election would be by no means unprecedented; the president, who came to power in 2000, already changed the constitution once in order to allow him to run again in the 2006 election.

Development: On 2 December the Partido Conservador (PC) said that it is likely to vote in favour of a referendum to allow President Alvaro Uribe's re-election in 2014, rather than in 2010.

Significance: This deals a further blow to Uribismo's bid for a third consecutive term. The PC controls 29 key votes in congress and its support will be crucial to passing a referendum bill. Another important element of Uribe's ruling coalition, Cambio Radical, led by presidential hopeful Germán Vargas Lleras, has already refused to back the 2010 project.

Uribe's ruling coalition has divided over whether to support re-election in 2010 or 2014. The controversy centres around the original wording of the re-election bill, which proposed a referendum to allow a president who “has served two terms" to be re-elected for a third term. The problem that Uribe's opponents have seized upon is that the president will not have served two complete terms at the time of the 2010 elections, and thus technically would not be eligible for re-election in 2010 even if the referendum was passed.

The PC has, up to now, backed a vote on Uribe's immediate re-election, but has changed its stance following the narrow defeat of the 2010 project in its first debate in congress last week. The lower house's First Commission voted against altering the text of the bill and instead approved a referendum to allow Uribe's re-election in 2014.

While some of Uribe's supporters argue that the measure failed to attain quorum and can thus be re-debated, this session of congress will end on 16 December and legislators are keen to end the re-election stalemate, which has also disrupted the rest of congress' legislative agenda.

Vice-President of the lower house Odí­un Sánchez Montes de Oca, of the Partido de la U (members of which sponsored the original re-election bill) said yesterday (2 December) that the majority of his party would, like the PC, back the original text of the bill “so that the project can pass [through congress] without encountering difficulties and to avoid a change that could kill the whole referendum project".

If the text is approved unaltered, the responsibility for deciding whether an election should be held in 2010 or 2014 will pass to the constitutional court.

The decision of the PC comes a day after stalwart Conservative and 2010 presidential hopeful Carlos Holguí­n warned that the party could not continue to gamble on an “uncertain" referendum as its “only alternative". The former interior minister said that the Uribe himself had told him that the PC ought to ready itself to fight an election campaign “without [Uribe's] re-election": “I am the most Uribista of Uribistas, and I back re-election as strongly as anyone, but I do not believe that there is going to be a referendum, and nor is there going to be re-election", he said.

Interior minister fired

The interior minister, Francisco Jiménez, was dismissed last week as President Alvaro Colom continued the high-level changes on the security front instigated at the end of last year. His departure follows that of the army top brass, including defence minister Marco Tulio Garcí­a Franco. Jiménez's successor, Salvador Gándara, a former deputy interior minister and three-time mayor of one of the most violent municipalities in the country, has been welcomed by the right-wing opposition Partido Patriota (PP) for his hard-line stance on crime. Human rights organisations were less enthusiastic.

Colom's announcement that Gándara would take over the interior ministry portfolio on 7 January was hardly a surprise, given both the government's recent admission that it was unable to cope with the current security situation and concerns voiced by the opposition regarding Jiménez.

Indeed, Jiménez had been summoned to defend his security strategy in congress in the wake of spiralling crime [WR-08-48]. There were more than 6,200 murders registered in 2008, according to police figures, making it one of the bloodiest years in the country's recent history. Jiménez was also facing the possibility of a vote of no confidence in congress.

While Jiménez, an academic who has since been “promoted" to coordinate the technical secretariat of the recently established national security council (CNS), was popular with human rights organisations, Gándara's appointment has aroused concern from civil society groups, who fear he may well signify a return to a more repressive security policy. These fears have been fuelled by the fact that the PP welcomed his appointment, in light of his identification with a more hard-handed “mano dura" approach to tackling crime.

Gándara
Gándara was head of the Secretarí­a de Coordinación Ejecutiva de la Presidencia at the time of his appointment. He previously served as deputy security minister under the Arzú administration (1996-2000). He was also elected mayor of Villa Nueva, one of Guatemala's most violent municipalities, on three occasions.

While the new security minister is undoubtedly familiar with the country's parlous security situation, civil society groups have flagged up concerns about his possible involvement in human rights violations committed under Arzú, particularly with regard to dealing with gangs of kidnappers. The umbrella human rights group, Convergencia por los Derechos Humanos, which comprises organisations such as the Archbishop's Office of Human Rights in Guatemala (ODHA) and the Centro de Acción Legal de Derechos Humanos, released a statement warning that his appointment could represent a step backwards, while Convergencia spokesperson Claudia Samayoa highlighted the increase in cases of “social cleansing" or extrajudicial crimes which occurred in Villa Nueva while Gándara was in charge.

Continuity
Colom stressed that the change was designed to boost efforts against organised crime. Gándara pledged to continue with the strategy currently in place. This includes purging the institutions of corrupt officials, a move rendered necessary given the widespread perception that police officials themselves are operating in league with organised crime groups in the country.

Development: On 24 February business leaders appealed to the government of President Oscar Arias for additional support measures in an effort to prevent mass layoffs.

Significance: The call came amid grim new trade figures, with exports down 17% year-on-year in January. President Arias yesterday admitted that real GDP growth this year will be marginal at best citing a figure of between 0.0%-1.0%. Other analysts are more bearish. Economic output fell 3.1% year-on-year in December 2008, its third consecutive monthly fall, indicating that the economy was in recession at the end of the year.

Costa Rica is coming off several years of strong growth:  GDP growth averaged 7.3% annually in 2005-2007, although it likely fell back to around 4.0% in 2008. The local economy is trade dependent, and will suffer heavily from the slump in the US, its main trading partner.

According to latest figures, exports to the US, which account for a third (34%) of total sales abroad, fell 17.6% year-on-year in January. Foreign direct investment is expected to drop by around 40% this year, according to the government.

In January the government announced a new stimulus package (Plan Escudo) to prop up domestic economic activity, following an earlier injection of additional capital into state-owned banks in order to ease credit conditions.

Yesterday, the head of the Union of Private Sector Chambers and Associations, Manuel Rodrí­guez, said that the organisation will present the government with additional proposals tomorrow (26 February), including a 30% reduction in working hours and a cut in banking reserve requirements.

Rodrí­guez said that 60% of firms in the country were being affected by the global economic crisis, with the construction, tourism and retail sectors, the worst affected.

Unemployment in Costa Rica was an estimated 4.9% in 2008.

Development: On 1 April two Supreme Federal Court (STF) judges ruled that a 1967 Press Law is unconstitutional.

Significance: The other STF judges have yet to vote on the ruling, with the session postponed until 15 April. However rulings by Carlos Britto and Eros Grau that the draconian law, which dates back to the military dictatorship, is 'incompatible' with the constitution - are further evidence of how the courts in Brazil do more for reform than government and congress.

Carlos Ayres Britto noted that Brazil's 1988 constitution defends the right to a free press and prevents any censure on freedom of expression.

The 1 February 1967 law allows prison sentences for offences of "defamation", "denigration" and "insult". The law also prevents any foreign participation in Brazilian media.

There has been a longstanding campaign to repeal this law.

In February 2008, the STF first ruled to suspend 22 of the 77 articles of the law for six months because of their incompatibility with the constitution. This was extended in September 2008.

Deputy Miro Teixeira of the Partido Democratica Trabalhista first requested that the law be revoked a year ago, on the 45th anniversary of the 1964 coup d'etat that led to the military dictatorship.

Teixeira has also called on the federal congress to revoke the law.

More bombings & false alarms in Chile, but few arrests

On 1 May a bomb detonated at the Hualpén branch of a pharmacy chain, becoming the 102nd explosive device set off in Chile since 2004. Responsibility for most of the bombings is mainly claimed by groups with anarchist leanings. This latest bombing followed a month in which police were kept busy chasing after false announcements that devices had been planted. Despite a very public expression of government exasperation last February at the failure of the police and prosecutors to bring the bombers to book, only a few arrests of minor players have been reported.

On 2 May the newspaper La Tercera published a report attributed to the Carabineros (paramilitary police) according to which its special operations group, Gope, had conducted 159 'proceedings' connected with explosive devices last year. Of these, 19 were cases when the devices actually went off, and another seven involved the deactivation of devices. The Gope also had to deal with two 'simulated artefacts' and 131 cases of 'suspicious packages' and reports or announcements that bombs had been placed.

In early December last year, sources close to the special prosecutors appointed to investigate the bombings leaked to the media the news that the Carabineros had detected four anarchist groups linked to some 20 bombings in Santiago, and possibly even more. The sources said that Carabineros had photographs, video footage and witness statements that identified suspected members of these groups. Publication of these claims led the undersecretary of the interior, Felipe Harboe, to demand from the chief national prosecutor an explanation of how close the law enforcement agencies and the prosecution were to making arrests and putting the culprits on trial. The only visible response to this was a shakeup of the team of prosecutors charged with investigating the bombings.

In January this year, the government's spokesman, Francisco Vidal (currently defence minister), took the unusual step of urging police and prosecutors to make more of an effort. 'It is intolerable,' he said, 'that a country should have sixty-something bombings and not know who [the bombers] are.'

In early February, another leak claimed that the Carabineros and the investigations police, PDI, had drawn up a list of 20 people suspected of involvement in the 63 bombings recorded since 2006. This timeframe reflects the fact that most tallies begin with the bombing of the state intelligence agency, ANI, in January 2006. At least another 29 bombings had been recorded in the two previous years. The identification of the 20 suspects was attributed to statements made by Gustavo Fuentes Aliaga, a man described as an anarchist who had been arrested, not in connection with the bombings, but on a charge of attempting to murder his girlfriend. Fuentes had a lengthy criminal record, with more than 20 arrests on charges of drug trafficking, affray, damaging property and assaulting police officers.

Results continued to be meagre. On 26 March, police arrested a student charged with having made a telephone call alleging that a bomb would occur within minutes at the offices of the public defender in Temuco. On 2 April, two students were arrested in central Santiago carrying bomb-making equipment. This consisted of plastic bottles with muriatic (hydrochloric) acid, one-peso coins and can-opening rings presumably meant to trigger the chemical reaction that would cause the explosion. These devices are usually dismissed as 'noise bombs', though they can spread shrapnel as far as 10 metres and can cause a conflagration if there is any naked flame close by. Most of the more serious bombings have been carried out with devices consisting of metal tubes packed with black gunpowder.

In late February and March there were five false bomb warnings and one actual placement of a device at the El Mercurio offices in Valparaí­so (detonated by police). In April there were four more false warnings and two bombings (one of them with a muriatic acid device). In May there were two more bombings — and one arrest of a man transporting explosives, though police consider that this was not linked to the 'anarchist' bombings.

Significance: The reform package was originally conceived to impose sanctions against political parties whose members are linked to paramilitary or other illegal groups, namely by preventing parties from substituting compromised legislators with new representatives. Its focus has, however, gradually shifted towards measures which, critics argue, will serve the interests of the government of President Alvaro Uribe ahead of national elections in 2010.

Significantly, the senate voted to remove various existing restrictions on party membership, which will allow legislators to change political party after the reform package is passed. This would facilitate government efforts to create a single 'Uribista' party, possibly through the expansion of the Partido de la U (one of six members of Uribe's ruling coalition).

The reforms will prevent the future substitution of compromised legislators, but will not be retroactive; the opposition argues that this will create impunity for political parties already implicated by the so-called parapolitical scandal (the majority from Uribe's ruling coalition). Also, under the draft approved by the senate, political parties will only permanently lose a seat when one of their members is found guilty of illegal links, and not when he or she is under investigation.

The government is working against the clock to push through outstanding legislation before congress goes into recess at the end of the week. This sense of urgency owes in part to the government's desperation to secure approval by a bicameral committee, and then both houses of congress, of the referendum bill which would allow for Uribe's re-election for an unprecedented third term in May 2010. This has been delayed by wrangles over the committee's composition. It is possible that Uribe may convene extra sessions of congress to push ahead with the project.

Development: On 24 July the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and national electoral court (CNE) agreed a deadline to review the progress of the new biometric electoral register.

Significance: The agreement is a concession (albeit a temporary one) by the MAS following pressure from the CNE. Last week the vice president, Alvaro Garcí­a Linera, unexpectedly called a congress session to discuss the possibility of allowing the existing electoral roll to be used amid fears that the new biometric register - which will include the signatures and photographs of 3.8m eligible voters in Bolivia and 211,000 expatriates - would not be ready in time. The move had provoked an outspoken response from the CNE president, José Antonio Costas, who maintains the new roll will be ready by 15 October.

Under the 24 July agreement, the government and CNE set the deadline of 24 August to evaluate progress of the biometric register and depending upon the results, congress will debate whether to amend the law to allow the old register to be used. This prospect points to tension ahead however given the lack of MAS majority in the senate. Garcí­a Linera said that the decision to suspend last week's congress session was the result of discussions with the CNE, but Oscar Ortiz, the anti-government senate president, claimed that the decision reflected the weakness of the MAS in the senate. The opposition wants the elections delayed and are using the row about the new register for this purpose.

Friday 4 September

Panama: Interparliamentary Conference about 'The right to food security'.

Saturday 5 September

Venezuela: Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez begins a visit to Iran which will end on 6 August.

Venezuela: Opposition groups demonstrate against the government's plan to 'criminalise social protest'.

Monday 7 September

Brazil: President Nicolas Sarkozy visits Brazil, accompanied by Economy Minister Christine Lagarde.

Chile-Paraguay: The secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS), José Miguel Insulza, travels from Chile to Asunción , Paraguay to meet Paraguay's President Fernando Lugo, Vice-president Federico Franco and the President of the National Congress, Miguel Carrizosa.

Tuesday 8 September

Mexico: UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon visits Mexico City for two days for the UN Disarmament Conference.

Friday 11 September

Nicaragua-Guatemala: Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega, visits Guatemala to sign an agreement to sign Nicaragua up to the Central American customs union.

Development: Yesterday (13 October) the two teams representing the ousted president Manuel Zelaya and the de facto government that replaced him following the 28 June coup d'etat reported good progress in the last ditch talks to bring about a negotiated solution to the political crisis that has brought the country to a standstill.

Significance: Apparently a deal is '90%' secured, but it all still hinges on the one remaining obstacle: Zelaya's restitution to power ahead of the scheduled 29 November general elections. Yesterday, Zelaya played a fresh card in an effort to secure the deal - he ditched the Frente Nacional de la Resistencia, the trade union led group that has agitated most for his return.

It had become clear that the leftwing Frente had become a liability for Zelaya in the talks with the de facto administration, which are being mediated by a small mission from the Organization of American States. The Frente's leader, the trade unionist Juan Barahona, yesterday gave up his place on Zelaya's three member negotiating team, and was replaced by a lawyer, Rodil Rivera Rodi.

Barahona had been adamant that there could be no agreement without an insistence on the need for a constituent assembly to oversee a reform of the 1981 Constitution. Zelaya's insistence on pushing ahead with a non-binding plebiscite (ruled illegal by the Supreme Court) to canvass public support for a constituent assembly led to the coup. Barahona and the Frente continued to insist on this point, in spite of the fact that under the 'San José Accord', which is the working template for a final agreement, Zelaya will expressly renounce all efforts at constitutional reform, including the convening of a constituent assembly.

Rodil Rivera Rodi, who joined the Zelaya team as an advisor on Monday, will now work alongside Zelaya's former government minister, Ví­ctor Meza, and his ex labour minister, Mayra Mejí­a, in the final, difficult effort to address point six of the 'San José Accord', which refers to the return of the state powers to their status quo ante prior to 28 June - which implicitly means Zelaya's restoration to office to complete his one-term mandate to 27 January 2010 (and, presumably, the de facto president Roberto Michelettti's return to his earlier post as head of congress). Legally, this is going to be tricky - the de facto administration has always argued that Zelaya's removal by congress was Constitutional and it was backed on this point by the (heavily politicised) Supreme Court. From Micheletti's point of view, there was no coup but a constitutional succession and therefore there is legally no avenue for Zelaya, who is also facing 18 political and criminal charges, to return.

The question of a general amnesty (point 2 of San José Accord) for Zelaya and the coupsters remains unclear. It seems that the three working commissions have decided not to include this in the final document. Barahona said that this was because granting an amnesty would mean 'whitewashing' the coup.

Another unknown is whether, even if the Micheletti team accept point six, Zelaya might still have to face the courts - the Supreme Court and the attorney general's office have separately charged him with treason, abuse of power, violating the constitution and fraud, among others.

Development:   On 23 November the latest CNT/Sensus poll was released indicating a fall in support for the leading 2010 presidential contender, José Serra of the main centrist opposition Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB).
 
Significance: Serra, who is still not the confirmed PSDB candidate, insists that he will not begin his electoral campaign until after party primaries in June next year. The PSDB, however, is getting nervous, as the presumptive candidate for the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), Dilma Rousseff, is already effectively on the campaign trail at home and abroad, with the heavy backing of the enormously popular President Lula da Silva.

Rousseff's trips around the country and abroad have raised her profile tremendously and she has gradually acquired a more 'presidential' bearing. She also now has on her side a strongly rebounding economy and has (more or less) secured the support of Brazil's electoral kingmakers, the allied Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), which will likely field her vice presidential runner. While Serra still has the edge over his rivals in the all important second round scenario, increasingly its not inconceivable that the PT, with the help of its allies, will be returned to power for a third consecutive term next year.

Serra, who only months ago looked a sure victor in 2010, now runs the risk of getting lost in the fray. The PSDB, which is still split between Serra and his main party rival Aécio Neves, is now suddenly on the defensive.

Serra had the support of 31.8% in the latest poll. That is a drop of 15 points since this time last year, when he was the only 'unofficial' runner.   As such, some drop is natural, as other players enter the race, but such a precipitate decline was unexpected and has thrown the race open.

Rousseff was on 21.7%, followed by the socialist Ciro Gomes, on 17.5%, and the former PT environment minister, Marina Silva, who will likely run for the Greens, on 5.9%.

The polls reinforce the importance of Lula's 'stardust' - his approval rating was 78.9% in November and just over half of respondents (51.7%) said they would vote for any candidate backed by him.

Notably, 49.3% said they would not support a candidate backed by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) of the PSDB, who has heavily supported Serra.