All Categories

Las autoridades del estado sureño de Guerrero confirmaron el 21 de noviembre que habí­an hallado el cuerpo del lí­der del Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente (ERPI). El lí­der del ERPI, conocido como Comandante Ramiro, habí­a sido muerto de cuatro disparos. La explicación oficial por su muerte es que fue muerto después de una riña con uno de sus lugartenientes, el 2 de noviembre. En mayo de 2009, el Comandante Ramiro afirmó que el gobierno estaba usando pistoleros como una manera de liquidar a los activistas sociales.

El Comandante Ramiro, cuyo nombre real era Omar Guerrero Solí­s, afirmó que el gobierno federal estaba protegiendo a Joaquí­n “El Chapo" Guzmán, un lí­der de la banda Sinaloa, para “él pueda realizar el trabajo sucio de asesinar a activistas sociales". Guzmán fue mencionado hace 10 dí­as por la revista Forbes como la 41ra persona más poderosa en el mundo. Ramiro habí­a sido un revolucionario por años. El estuvo en prisión desde 1998 hasta 2002, cuando se escapó, junto con otros 13 prisioneros, entre ellos ocho traficantes de droga colombianos. La Asamblea Popular de Pueblos de Guerrero (APPG) desea que el defensor de derechos humanos local, investigue la muerte de Ramiro.

El ERPI es uno de los varios pequeños grupos de guerrilla que operan en Guerrero. El se separó del Ejército Popular Revolucionario (ERP) en 1998. El ERP opera a lo largo del centro de México y afirmó en enero de 2009 haber muerto a dos altos oficiales de policí­a responsables de la desaparición de dos importantes militantes del ERP.

• Rumores

La cocina de rumores en Ciudad México, se agitó en Ciudad México la semana pasada, cuando el ex presidente Ernesto Zedillo, hizo una rápida visita a la capital. El respetado diario Reforma, especuló que Zedillo podrí­a reemplazar a Agustí­n Carstens, el ministro de finanzas que, a su vez retornarí­a al banco central como gobernador. El actual gobernador, Guillermo Ortiz, ya ha servido dos términos, luego de haber sido designado por Zedillo, y deberí­a ser nominado por un tercer término el 1 de enero de 2010.

El Presidente Fernando Lugo apeló al congreso la semana pasada para que abandone sus incesantes amenazas de iniciarle juicio polí­tico y se comprometa en un proceso de diálogo para abordar los profundos, y más insolubles problemas que afligen al Paraguay. La apelación de Lugo, parte de su mensaje de Semana Santa a la nación, se produjo dí­as después de haber participado en el lanzamiento de un nuevo movimiento de coalición de izquierda, donde algunos de sus más radicalizados miembros pidieron que el congreso sea “barrido" si intentaba iniciar juicio polí­tico a Lugo. En los próximos dos meses, los partidos pro-Lugo y los partidos de oposición planean realizar grandes actos para calibrar sus respectivos apoyos. Con la campaña para las elecciones municipales en noviembre también comenzando, cualquier proceso de diálogo es improbable que logre despegar.

La oposición habí­a comenzado a discutir abiertamente el juicio polí­tico para esta fecha, el año pasado, luego que las revelaciones de una serie de escándalos de paternidad, que coincidieron con la Semana Santa, dañaron la credibilidad de Lugo. Y desde entonces ha planteado de manera periódica la perspectiva del juicio, especialmente cuando Lugo ha insinuado alguna reforma polí­tica o judicial. Lugo le restó importancia a la amenaza de juicio polí­tico, del cual dijo que era menos que una Espada de Damocles y se trataba de un “debate estéril". El dijo a los lí­deres del congreso, y del poder judicial, que deberí­an reunirse con él en un amplio diálogo para abordar las cuestiones de importancia nacional (no fue más especí­fico) pues el público estaba exigiendo más trabajo y menos conversación.

El presidente del senado, Miguel Carrizosa, del opositor Partido Patria Querida (PPQ), rechazó la apertura de Lugo. Dijo que Lugo habí­a desdeñado la oportunidad para el diálogo en agosto pasado, cuando el congreso habí­a propuesto la firma de un “acuerdo democrático" para “preservar la gobernabilidad" [IL-09-33]. Representantes de los principales partidos de la oposición en el congreso firmaron el acuerdo, que tení­a el claro motivo ulterior de impedir cualquier renovado intento de Lugo para celebrar un referéndum para evaluar el desempeño del congreso y la corte suprema, con vista a convocar una asamblea constituyente. Lugo no firmó el acuerdo debido a “diferencias conceptuales". En cambio, sus asesores elaboraron una “contrapropuesta" que abogaba por una mayor participación ciudadana en la democracia paraguaya.

Son, precisamente, esas “diferencias conceptuales" las que hacen que las perspectivas de un amplio diálogo nacional ahora luzcan sombrí­as, y la polarización institucional por el término del mandato de Lugo (que se extiende hasta 2013), con una carencia concomitante de progreso sobre cuestiones de “importancia nacional", es cada vez más probable. Carrizosa dijo que las conversaciones serán “un diálogo de sordos" a menos que se restaure la confianza entre las tres ramas del gobierno. Dijo que el discurso de Lugo era “incoherente". Dijo que por un lado Lugo llama al diálogo, mientras que por el otro él era “un cómplice silencioso" de la “izquierda autoritaria".

Carrizosa se referí­a a la asistencia de Lugo al lanzamiento del Frente Guasú (Frente Grande o Frente Amplio, en guaraní­) el 20 de marzo, una amalgama de 22 partidos y movimientos sociales, la mayorí­a parte de la Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio (APC), la coalición que llevó a Lugo al poder en el 2008: el Frente Guasú está modelado en la coalición de izquierda gobernante de Uruguay, Frente Amplio. Lugo habló en el lanzamiento, durante el cual Elvio Bení­tez, el militante activista rural que encabeza la Coordinadora de Productores Agrí­colas de San Pedro Norte, el departamento donde Lugo sirvió como obispo, planteó “barrer al congreso". El lanzamiento, provocativamente, tuvo lugar fuera del edificio del congreso. Aunque Bení­tez clarificó dí­as  más tarde que él sólo querí­a significar hacerlo por medios electorales, en las elecciones municipales de noviembre y en las elecciones generales en 2013, y no por la fuerza de las armas, Carrizosa dijo que era vergonzoso que Lugo no le haya llamado la atención.

En cambio, Lugo extendió una invitación a todos aquellos que están comprometidos con la “profundización del proceso de cambio democrático en Paraguay" (ver más abajo). La oposición intenta frustrar la democracia más participativa abogada por Lugo. Carrizosa dijo que Lugo estaba conspirando abiertamente incitando al congreso para que le inicie juicio polí­tico y así­ él podrí­a llamar “al pueblo" a las calles y disolver el congreso. “Eso es obvio. Eso es lo que [Rafael] Correa hizo [en Ecuador]," dijo. “El congreso es culpable del espantoso manejo improvisado del ejecutivo," agregó irónicamente.

La administración Lugo es cauteloso de otros paralelismos regionales -especialmente con Honduras bajo Manuel Zelaya, que fue depuesto en junio de 2009 principalmente por tratar de profundizar su visión de “democracia participativa" afrontando la concertada oposición de una elite polí­tica reaccionaria. El Frente Guasú, como también otro nuevo partido, el Movimiento 20 de abril, liderado por el jefe de gabinete Miguel López Perito, están planeando una “Marcha por la Victoria" para conmemorar el segundo aniversario del triunfo electoral de Lugo, el 20 de abril, que también servirá para calibrar el nivel del apoyo popular que él disfruta. El opositor Partido Colorado está planeando una marcha de protesta anti-gobierno exactamente un mes después, el 20 de mayo, para tratar de calibrar el sentimiento anti-gobierno.

Tensión con EU
Lugo también aprovechó la oportunidad durante su discurso en el lanzamiento del Frente Guasú de lanzar su peso detrás de su acosado ministro de defensa, Luis Bareiro Spaini. Bareiro es la fuente de otro conflicto con el congreso. El fue citado ante la cámara baja a principios de este mes, donde fue interrogado por más de cuatro horas. Fue convocado para explicar una nota de protesta que él envió a la embajadora de EU, Liliana Ayalde. La nota llama a Ayalde una “neófita" con “una carencia total de tacto diplomático" por haber invitado a una reunión en la embajada a “notorios enemigos" de Lugo, que “aprovechan cualquier oportunidad para denigrar al gobierno", entre los que Bareiro enumeró, el Vicepresidente, Federico Franco.

Bareiro no se mostró arrepentido. Dijo a la cámara baja que Franco era un “enemigo del gobierno" debido a que con su cuestionamiento en una embajada extranjera, él habí­a generado un clima de ingobernabilidad. Es probable que la cámara baja censure a Bareiro, pero esa censura no es vinculante y Lugo simplemente puede ignorarla, aunque eso inevitablemente elevará la tensión entre el ejecutivo y el congreso. Bareiro obtuvo el apoyo del Frente Guasú, que rápidamente difundió una declaración repudiando al congreso por convocar a Bareiro, agregando que él habí­a actuado patrióticamente en defensa de la soberaní­a nacional del Paraguay.

Lo más enigmático acerca de la riña es que sólo pocos dí­as antes el presidente del subcomité de asuntos exteriores para el Hemisferio Occidental de la Cámara de Representantes de EU, Eliot Engel, destacó la necesidad de una “especial atención de EU a paí­ses clave como El Salvador y Paraguay" como uno de los “siete pasos clave en polí­tica" para que aplique la administración Obama [IL-10-11]. Estaba implí­cita en la afirmación de Engel la sugerencia que si EU no lograba atraer a esos paí­ses ellos podrí­an avanzar radicalmente hacia la Izquierda, en la órbita del Presidente de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez . Lugo, al igual que Chávez , acusó a “sectores" -un eufemismo para referirse a los medios y a la oposición- durante su discurso de Semana Santa, de mentir al pueblo acerca de lo que el gobierno está haciendo.

• Cambio
  “El cambio no puede ser frenado," dijo el Presidente Lugo durante su discurso de Semana Santa. Están aquellos que arguyen que el cambio ni siquiera ha comenzado. El 25 de marzo, la Federación Nacional Campesina (FNC), realizó su marcha anual de protesta hasta Asunción . Unos 5.000 campesinos de 10 departamentos convergieron en la capital (la mitad de la participación del año pasado, pues muchos no pudieron llegar debido al mal tiempo). Los lí­deres de la FNC se reunieron con Lugo. Ellos pidieron al gobierno que cumpla su promesa de campaña de reforma agraria. “No podemos hablar de cambio si 80% de las tierras fértiles permanecen en manos del 1% de la población, mientras más del 85% de los campesinos tienen acceso a sólo 6% de la tierra," dijo el secretario general de la FNC, Odilón Espí­nola.

Hemos cambiado recientemente la manera en la que distribuimos electrónicamente nuestras publicaciones. Las mismas ahora serán enviadas desde “LatinNews" a la siguiente dirección email:
[email protected]

CHILE | Recuperación en pleno auge. El Presidente Sebastián Piñera predijo el fin de semana que más de la mitad de la infraestructura destruida por el fuerte terremoto del 27 de febrero, estará reemplazada para finales de año. Piñera estaba hablando en la inauguración del nuevo puente Juan Pablo II en la ciudad sureña de Concepción, la obra pública más importante que habí­a sido dañada por el terremoto. El dijo que su gobierno ha presidido sobre “la más rápida, más eficiente y más profunda reconstrucción en la historia del paí­s." Piñera, cuyo rating de aprobación trepó 10 puntos porcentuales, a 63% en octubre, comparado con el mes previo, reveló la encuestadora local Adimark esta semana, respondiendo a las crí­ticas de alcaldes y diputados de la oposición en el sentido que los fondos de la reconstrucción habí­an sido liberados muy lentamente. El ministro de finanzas, Felipe Larraí­n, afirmó que el desempleo también estaba cayendo en las regiones más afectadas por el terremoto -de 7,3% entre junio y agosto, a 6,8% de julio a setiembre en Maule y de 9,5% a 9,1% durante el mismo periodo de tiempo en Bí­obí­o. El también anticipó que el objetivo del gobierno fijó de crear 200.000 empleos en su primer año en el poder serí­a sobrepasado, y que 300.000 empleos era una clara posibilidad.

PARAGUAY | El boom no llega a los cofres. El PIB creció en un masivo 12,2% en el segundo trimestre de 2010, sobre igual periodo de un año antes, anunció el banco central, y en 11,7% en la primera mitad. La estimación de 9% de crecimiento del PIB real en 2010, repentinamente luce conservadora, pues incluso el FMI ahora está prediciendo un crecimiento del 10%, la más rápida tasa de crecimiento en la región. El gobierno del Presidente Fernando Lugo no recibirá nada del beneficio que derive de ese crecimiento y que deberí­a recibir de ese nivel de crecimiento. La razón de eso es debido a que el crecimiento está conducido por la demanda y los altos precios de los productos agrí­colas, principalmente la soja, y porque los impuestos a las ganancias agrí­colas se mantienen en un mezquino 2,5%.
     La alta tasa de crecimiento puede atribuirse en parte a la baja base de comparación: la economí­a se contrajo 3,8% en 2009, debido a una declinación del 25% en el sector agrí­cola, como resultado de las malas condiciones del tiempo y a la declinación económica global. El esfuerzo de Lugo por llenar los cofres del estado impulsando una ley que introduce el impuesto a las ganancias personales -atascado en el congreso por meses- fue derrotado esta semana. Lugo habí­a argumentado que era un anacronismo que Paraguay careciera de ese impuesto, que alegó que era necesario para elevar la transparencia; regular mejor el empleo; y mejorar el gasto social. El principal opositor, el Partido Colorado y la Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Eticos (Unace), decidieron restringir el poder de gasto social de Lugo y hacer que su gobierno luzca como ineficiente, anulando el veto presidencial y posponiendo de nuevo la introducción del impuesto hasta 2013, cuando Lugo debe dejar el poder. En ese momento, los individuos que ganan US$32.500 por año (120 veces más el salario mí­nimo) pagarán un impuesto a los ingresos de 10%.
     El ministerio de finanzas dijo que el voto del congreso fue un triunfo para la opacidad económica. Dijo que eso perpetuarí­a la impunidad del soborno, el contrabando, y la compra de conciencias. La oposición alegó que el gobierno pretende utilizar los ingresos extras con el propósito de extender el clientelismo polí­tico y no para el gasto social.

“No querer dejar los gobiernos, envejecer en el poder y heredarle a parientes el gobierno no es revolucionario. La izquierda latinoamericana necesita abandonar el mito cubano para asumir de una vez por todas a la democracia (que ha demostrado ser más revolucionaria) como su identidad."

-Joaquí­n Vallalobos de El Salvador, un ex guerrillero del FMLN.

“Por lo que respecta al Estado de México se compite con el referí­ vendido, el ring tiene dos patas, la campana no suena y el público no existe."

-El principal estratega del PAN de México,  Javier Corral, sobre la elección en el Estado.
 

“Soy un servidor público, mi oficio es la polí­tica. Inhabilitar a un polí­tico es como quitarle la madera a un carpintero […] es como estar preso en libertad."

-El lí­der de la oposición venezolana, Leopoldo López.

Tres paí­ses con sistemas parlamentarios -las Bahamas, Jamaica y Trinidad y Tobago- deberán celebrar elecciones generales este año. En todos los casos, los titulares tienen la opción de llamar a elecciones antes de finalizar sus mandatos constitucionales.

Jamaica

Quizá sea la más incierta de las tres elecciones: las posiciones de los candidatos ha estado cambiando desde finales del año pasado. Portia Simpson Miller se convirtió en lí­der del gobernante People's National Party (PNP) en febrero de 2006, y Primera Ministra (PM) en marzo. Rechazando la presión de algunos sectores de su partido para elecciones anticipadas, que ella ve probable ganar confortablemente, la nueva PM vio decaer, con el paso de los meses, la posición de su partido en los sondeos. 

En agosto, el PNP disfrutaba de una ventaja de casi cinco puntos porcentuales sobre el opositor Jamaica Labour Party (JLP); para octubre, estaban cabeza a cabeza, luego de expectativas que el PNP finalmente habí­a superado las disputas internas y no se avanzó para designar los candidatos para una elección anticipada.

El disenso interno permanece como la principal desventaja del PNP ante el electorado. Sin embargo, el lí­der del JLP, Bruce Golding, no logró capitalizar eso en su provecho, debido a la carencia de carisma que, gracias a la repetición en los comentarios de prensa, parece volverse uno de sus más enraizados rasgos personales, obscureciendo sus contribuciones a la discusión de polí­ticas.

Un sondeo sobre la evaluación de los votantes de las cualidades de liderazgo de Simpson Miller y Golding, realizado en enero de este año, muestra a la primera con un rating de aprobación de 52% ante 34% de Golding, y un rating de desaprobación menor en 10 puntos al de su rival. Los porcentajes pueden ser engañosos en un paí­s con un sistema de elección de mayorí­a simple. En 2002, el PNP atrajo 52% de los votos, y el JLP, 47%. Pero eso se tradujo en 58% de las bancas en el Parlamento (35 bancas frente a 25 del JLP).

Hay una extendida impresión que incluso ahora una sustancial porción del electorado está dispuesto a dar a Simpson Miller una oportunidad para probarse a sí­ misma, con un mandato propio.

Trinidad y Tobago

La gran pregunta que pende sobre las elecciones en Trinidad y Tobago (la fecha lí­mite es octubre) es el impacto de la escisión en el opositor United National Congress (UNC). Tuvo lugar en setiembre pasado, cuando el lí­der de UNC, Winston Dookeran, reaccionó ante el constante menoscabo de su posición por el ex primer ministro Basdeo Panday, retirándose y formando su propio partido, Congress of the People (CP). Hubo mucha especulación que el PM, Patrick Manning, podrí­a llamar a elecciones anticipadas para aprovechar la ventaja de la confusión en la oposición y el ánimo de "bienestar" creado por la economí­a en expansión.

Bahamas

En las Bahamas, la más temprana contienda en este año (fecha lí­mite mayo) se determinará si Perry Christie, que llevó de vuelta al poder al Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) en 2002, luego de 10 años en la oposición, logrará asegurar un segundo periodo. Una medida del estado de la polí­tica bahameña, la da el lí­der del opositor Free National Movement (FNM), el ex PM, Hubert Ingraham ha sido reducido a usar el caso del culebrón de la fallecida Anna Nicole Smith, una ex modelo de Playboy convertida en heredera millonaria, como su principal tema de crí­tica al gobierno.

Jamaica: Recientes resultados de las encuestas
% de las preferencias de votos (Stone-Jamaica Observer)
Partido/Lider	Agosto 2006	Octubre 2006
Portia Simpson (PNP)	30.1	28.7
Bruce Golding (JLP)	25.4	28.6
Otros	0.5	0.1
0Indecisos	23.3	16.1
No dice/no vota	20.7	26.5

Jamaica: Como califican a los lideres
% de entrevistados (Bill Johnson-Gleaner - 6 de enero)
Lider	Aprobacion	Desaprobacion
Portia Simpson	52	30
Bruce Golding	34	40

The President, Jorge Batlle, has high hopes for the orange business after a trade mission to Miami and Puerto Rico. The country's biggest export earner, wool, is also doing well, with exports up by 17% in the first six months.  

Batlle led the trade mission to Miami and Puerto Rico in the first part of September. The main outcome was a deal under which an unnamed Florida citrus producer would buy a Uruguayan citrus business in Paysandú. The president claimed that this deal would open the way for Uruguayan citrus exports to get into the US. The US is major net importer of citrus fruit and drinks. Traditionally, the US buys these products from South Africa and Australia.

Wool exports, in the first 10 months of the season, which closes at the end of October, were 17% ahead of the previous season's figures, at US$172.5m. Prices were up significantly, because the volume of exports was down by 13.6%, at 43,100t.

China is the main market for the country's wool, taking 22% of the total produced. Italy took 18% and Germany 9%. The next most important markets were Colombia and Mexico, which both bought just under 5% of the crop. Brazil's purchases of Uruguayan wool amounted to 2.5% of the total exported.  

Immigration: wanting out
Even though the economy has stopped contracting at the double digit pace of last year, one in five Uruguayans still wants to emigrate. Fortunately for the government, only half of those who wish to emigrate have actually done anything about leaving the country. The most popular destination is Spain (47%), followed by the US (17%).  

The survey, by Equipos-Mori for El Paí­s in Montevideo, found the proportion of people wanting to emigrate, at 22% of the total adult population, was the highest since records began. Between 1993 and 2000, the proportion of people saying that they wanted to emigrate rarely got above 10%. It jumped to 19% in 2001, when the economy suffered its third consecutive year of recession.  

Most people (80%) cite the economic situation as the reason for wanting to move. Worryingly for policymakers, 80% reckon that things will get worse next year. Presidential elections are due next year.

The annual maintenance work on the Panama Canal, which took place in the first week of June, created a tailback of ships on both sides. The Canal Authority admitted that the tailback would not be cleared until the beginning of July.

The tailback is graphic evidence of the pickup in world trade this year. Last year, though the Canal Authority carried out similar maintenance and closed the canal for 10 days, the queue was much shorter.

There is also a queue of trucks trying to cross into the country from Costa Rica. It is not entirely clear why the trucks are not being allowed into the country; officials say that they do not have the requisite agricultural import licences. The problem began on 18 June and the line was still growing on 23 June. Officials claimed that the problem concerned only trucks carrying Costa Rican products. Around 160 trucks were stranded at the border.

A crucial national congress (the XIX) of Mexico's biggest political party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional agreed on 4 March, the party's 76th birthday, to modify its hostility to allowing private companies into the energy and electricity industries. The party reaffirmed that oil and electricity were strategic industries and should remain under state control but it did not rule out reform. The fact the PRI did not specifically rule out private sector involvement in the energy industry was seized on by the government, and some foreign commentators, as a major change in the PRI's stance.

The PRI's president, Roberto Madrazo, said that the changes did not mean that the party would support the government's (stalled) plan to open up both the oil and electricity industries to foreign investment. He said that both the state oil company, Petróleos Mexicanos, and the electricity company, the Comisión Federal de Electricidad, would remain under state control.

What the government, and particularly the interior minister, Santiago Creel, misunderstood is that the PRI's subtle change in stance is in preparation for what it hopes to be a successful presidential election campaign in 2006. What the XIX assembly decided was that Prií­sta legislators would be able to vote for a (PRI) reform of the energy laws without having to go back to the party for guidance. The proposals that they will be free to back will not, however, be those of the current government.

Essentially, the PRI hierarchy wants to avoid having another assembly when there are specific proposals before it. The PRI knows that its membership is more populist than its politicians: President Ernesto Zedillo was badly bruised by an assembly during his mandate which stopped the party coopting technocrats to run the country. 

That assembly ruled that all candidates for senior positions in the party or in government should have either won internal party elections or public elections. By getting the change in principle approved now, when there is no actual proposal to divide the party, Madrazo has got what is effectively a blank cheque.

The irony is that both the PRI and PAN now, in principle, are agreed that reforms in both fiscal and energy policy are needed, but neither will support the other party's proposal. The PAN blocked President Zedillo's attempted reforms in 1999 in both areas. Even the leftwing Partido de la Revolución Democrática, which has ideological objections to both energy and fiscal reform may be prepared to countenance some changes. 

When Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, arguably the most statist-minded of PRD leaders, was mayor of Mexico City he investigated financing a private power station to provide the city with electricity at a lower price than that provided by another of the state electricity companies, Compañia de Luz y Fuerza. Some other perredistas are becoming equally pragmatic about reforms both on the fiscal and energy sides.

The exception to this realism is the mayor of Mexico City, Andrés Manuel López Obrador. He immediately declared that he was against any opening up of the energy industry to private (or foreign) companies. López Obrador is the frontrunner to become president of Mexico in 2006. Whether he could prevent the opening up of the energy industry to foreign companies is moot. One commentator points out that it is theoretically possible that the new congress (in an alliance between the PRI and the PAN assuming that no party has overall control) could agree to open up the industry before López Obrador takes office. 

The new congress meets on 1 September. The new president takes office on 1 December 2006. The elections, for both congress and the presidency, are on 2 July 2006. President Fox, whose relations with López Obrador are poor, would probably take great delight in signing into law a proposal his successor opposed. 

What is clear is that the PRI's change of stance was unexpected by political and economic commentators. Most commentators had expected the XIX assembly to focus on two issues: the mechanism for picking the party's presidential candidate and working out a way of dealing with the party's dissident number two, Elba Esther Gordillo. 

The PRI's change of stance is, however, far from definitive. It does not, for example, call specifically for private sector investment in the energy industry. Nor does it concede, on the fiscal reform front, that VAT should be extended to food and medicine, which is the simplest (and some economists argue the fairest) way of increasing the government's revenues and diminishing the state's dependence on oil revenues. 

What the PRI has done is to overrule the boisterous hardliners, headed by senator Manuel Bartlett, who oppose any opening up of the oil industry. The PRI's change of stance shows that Bartlett and his cronies are no longer determining the policy and that more pragmatic prií­stas will drive policy. What these prií­stas want is a policy that wins votes.

Congress's current consideration of changes to the way Pemex is taxed will give some indication of scale of the reforms the PRI may be prepared to contemplate in the next administration. What the XIX assembly probably shows is that those prií­sta senators who had been sitting on the fence or leaning against Bartlett's side of it have changed their positions and now recognise that some reforms are needed. The changes to the way Pemex is taxed should be sorted out by the end of the current session of congress at the end of April. 

Manlio Fabio Beltrones, one of the PRI's leaders in the lower chamber and the president of congress, said that the party was drawing up proposals to give Pemex more operational autonomy and to set up an independent regulator for the energy industry. 

Beltrones said that the PRI deputies in no way supported the government's plans for opening up the energy industry. He said that the PRI did not support [President] Zedillo's privatisation initiative nor [President] Fox's. What he said that the party was prepared to do was to modernise the system but it would not surrender the state's control of energy in Mexico. 

Beltrones's statement on 8 March was immediately contradicted by the PRI's leaders in both the lower chamber and the senate. Emilio Chuayffet, from the lower chamber and Enrique Jackson, from the senate, said that the PRI had no plans for any proposal. Beltrones is widely seen as Madrazo's man while Chuayffet and Jackson come from the wing of the party opposed to Madrazo. 

The PRI is still a long way from supporting the radical proposals being advanced by executives from Pemex, who want foreign companies to be allowed to develop the deep water oil fields of the Gulf of Mexico. The radicals' proposals are backed by the energy and finance ministries. 

Mexican airports: The Grupo Aeropuerto del Sureste (Asur) concluded its privatisation process, which has taken four years, by selling 11% of its shares through the stockmarket on 8 March. The sale, to 3,200 shareholders, raised M$1.1bn (US$100m). Four years ago the company started the process by selling shares to an operator (Inversiones Técnica Aeroportuarias, which holds 15%) and foreign investors who hold 68%. 

Big (or institutional) investors in Mexico hold 17% of the shares. The transport ministry and the state development bank, Nafin, will now try to sell 85% of the Grupo Aeroportuario del Pací­fico. They expect to sell between 15% and 30% of the shares to local investors. The sale should be concluded by the third quarter of this year. 

Brazil: At the end of February President Lula da Silva's blurting out that he knew that there had been some dodgy dealing over privatisations during the previous government of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, but he had done nothing to investigate further, created a political storm. 

At least one senator, Maguito Vilela from the PMDB, which has been in alliance with Lula's government, said that businessmen had been actively offering bribes to senators if the parliamentary investigations into corruption could avoid their activities. He also said that he knew who had been offering the bribes but he has yet to name names. 

Peru: A Brazilian iron ore miner, CVRD, won the auction for Peru's Bayovar phosphate deposit on 15 March. The deposit is, potentially, the ninth largest in the world. Building the mine will cost US$300m. The project will enable Peru to become one of the world's biggest providers of fertilisers. The deposit is in the north of the country and will involve the construction of a new deepwater port 

Colombia: An Australian insurer, QBE Insurance, bought 96.9% of Central de Seguros and 5.8% of Central de Seguros de Vida. Both stakes were sold, on 24 February, by the state owned Fondo de Garantí­as de Instituciones Financiers which sells off financial companies which have been rescued by the government and sorted out. 

The insurance companies' shares were part of the assets of two banks in liquidation, Banco Central Hipotecario and Central de Inversiones. Central de Seguros cost the Australians US$21.1m while the life company stake cost US$345,000. QBE is in the top 20 of the world's biggest insurance companies. 

The central bank raised interest rates on 5 January to 4.25% in an attempt to bolster the Nuevo Sol. The currency has come under pressure following the rise of Ollanta Humala, a leftwing, anti-Chilean and anti-US nationalist, in the opinion polls for the 9 April presidential elections. The most recent poll, published on 16 January, had him at 28% comfortably ahead of the centre-right candidate Lourdes Flores who was on 22%. The bank raised rates for the first time since October 2004 in December 2005 to 4%.

The Sol was one of the weakest currencies against the dollar in the second half of 2005, falling by 6% against the dollar. Humala said on 5 January that he would raise oil royalties, restrict foreign investment and hold a referendum on whether Peru should ratify the free trade agreement with the US. The free trade agreement with the US is deeply unpopular with small farmers, though it is popular with the textile industry.

The political problem overshadows what is otherwise a decent economic outlook. Growth in 2005 was over 6%. In 2004 it had been 5%. The latest GDP data, for November, showed the economy growing at 7.9% year-on-year. This was the fastest rate for 10 months and the 53rd consecutive month of year-on-year growth.

The problem is that growth has been led by capital intensive industries, notably mining. The construction of the gas pipeline from Camiesa to Lima will lead to an increase in gas exports.

Inflation: The inflation rate in 2005 was 1.49%. This was a three year low and less than half the 2004 rate of 3.5%. The inflation rate was helped by a 2.5% fall in electricity prices. this offset a 9.3% rise in fuel prices and a 1/2% rise in food prices.

Unemployment: The unemployment rate in December was 7.5%, down from 8.6% in November.

A report from the World Bank, published at the end of October, claimed that environmental degradation costs the Colombian economy more than the government spends on the long-running internal conflict. The World Bank puts the costs of environmental damage at Col$7 trillion pesos (US$2.9bn) a year. The military budget for 2006 stands at Col$5.4 trillion.

In GDP terms, the cost of the environmental damage is running at around 3.7% a year. The World Bank calculated its figures for 2004 as part of its Country Environmental Analysis. This analysis is designed to help the government achieve its Millennium Development Objectives, set by the UN.

The World Bank's analysis found that Colombia's biggest environmental shortcoming was in water and sewage services. Around 9% of the population does not have access to clean (treated) water. On top of this 20% of the urban population does not have access to sewage services. The World Bank reckons that sorting out these two issues would diminish diarrhoea (which the World Bank prices at Col$25,000, less than US$10, per case) and deaths from waterborne diseases (which the World Bank prices at Col$136m or US$56,000 each). The cost of death is calculated by multiplying GDP per capita by the shortfall in life expectancy. So the death of a child is more costly than the death of a middle-aged person. 

What is galling about the figure for water-borne deaths is that Colombia has three times as much fresh water as the average for all Latin American countries. The World Bank reckons that atmospheric pollution, from the burning of solid fuels, comes in at roughly the same cost: it estimates that pollution causes 6,000 preventable deaths. Another 1,100 people die prematurely because of "domiciliary pollution" or smoky houses. 

The World Bank identifies exhaust fumes as a separate sort of atmospheric pollution. It said that the most polluted places in the country were the Bogota suburbs of Kennedy, Puente Aranda and Fontibón. The World Bank notes that although Bogotá as a whole is less polluted than either Santiago in Chile or Mexico City, it is more polluted than São Paulo, Los Angeles or Tokyo. The other major factor in causing environmental damage are regular natural disasters. In the past 25 years Colombia has suffered six major earthquakes; three major volcanic eruptions; three major mud slides and three avalanches. 

The Bank reckons that on average Colombia is hit by three damaging, but not major, natural disasters a year. This is the third highest rate among the 19 countries in Latin America. The average annual cost of dealing with floods and landslides was around US$453m between 1993 and 2000. On top of the cost of repairs, there was a capital cost (in the form of the death toll). In the eight years under review 30,000 Colombians lost their lives primarily because of natural disasters. 

The fourth significant environmental cost is deforestation and erosion (which arguably magnify the effects of natural disasters). The World Bank puts the cost of this at 0.8% of GDP a year.

The US is the country's main export market, followed by South Korea and Haiti.

In 2006, exports to the US came to US$495m, up 42% on 2005, according to a report from the Centro de Exportación e Inversiones de República Dominicana (CEI-RD). El CEI-RD said that exports to the US accounted for 32% of the country's total exports.

South Korea is something of a surprise at number two. Exports jumped by 154% in 2006 to US$181m. This is because South Korea took increasing volumes of ferronickel, the country's biggest single export.

Haiti, which shares the island of Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic, accounted for 19% of Dominican exports worth US$124m.

Ferronickel exports were worth US$199m in 2006 while sugar exports were worth US$92m.

Debt: The country' s public sector debt fell by US$94m in the second quarter of 2007, the finance minister, Vicente Bengoa, reported. This represents a 1.1% fall in outstanding debt. At the end of June total public sector debt was US$8.32bn or 25.4 of GDP. The overhwleming bulk of the debt is foreign (US$7.2bn) and only US$116m was domestic. Bengoes said that during the quarter the country made payments of US$442.7m and received loan disbursements of US$379.4m.

The first shipment of oil arrived from Venezuela's state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), on 5 June as part of the Petrocaribe initiative.

The President, Manuel Zelaya turned up in person to hail the 82,000 barrels which arrived in the city of Puerto Cortés, 300 km north of the capital, Tegucigalpa. Congress had agreed to join the Venezuelan initiative, which sells oil to Central American and Caribbean countries with soft financing, on 13 March. Under the oil deal, the country will receive 20,000 bpd of fuel and will pay 40% of the bill in 90 days. The remainder is to be paid over 25 years, with a two year grace period and 1% interest. Within Central America, Honduras is the second country after Nicaragua to have signed up to the initiative.

Inflation: In May the rate was 1.8 %, up on April's 1%. This brought the rate   for the first five months to 5.8% and the rate for the past 12 months to 11.2%. The rate for 2007 was 8.9%.

As the US credit rating agencies, Moody's, Standard Poor's and Fitch have learned to their cost in the past 12 months, judging credit is much more of an art than a science. Box ticking is no way to assess securities and risks that have years of life before them. Judging credit risk in Latin America has throughout history been a mug's game. Banks even managed to persuade themselves to believe that countries with more foreign currency liabilities than assets could not “go bust".

In the 1980s, to the banks' consternation, a host of countries indeed went bust. This time Latin America's financial position, going into the current world economic crisis, is strong. Only Argentina is still addicted to other people's savings. Well managed economies such as Chile and Brazil look as though they will pull through the crisis without much difficutly. Even Venezuela managed to register positive GDP year-on-year growth in the first quarter.

Peru was sitting pretty, boasting about having the fastest growth in the region in 2009, until some local academic economists drew public attention in May to the fact that a lot of this impressive growth was due to the strong performance of the services sector. This performance, the economists' pointed out, was recorded in surveys of business opinion rather than in actual statistics. So, they concluded, the growth may prove illusory.

What is interesting is that the financial markets no longer take much notice of what the credit rating agencies say. On 12 May Standard & Poor's (S&P) lowered Mexico's credit rating outlook to negative from stable. S&P's move followed some outspoken comments by Claudio Loser, a former Western Hemisphere director at the IMF, on 11 May. Loser, an Argentine, noted that Mexico had to pay a higher spread in the markets than Brazil, yet credit rating agencies rated Mexico a better risk than Brazil. He concluded that Mexico's rating was too high.

The other way of looking at the issue is to say that Brazil's rating is too low. Several big international companies have made huge bets on Brazil. One of the biggest bets has been placed by Santander, a Spanish bank, which has also been snapping up distressed banks in the UK. Santander now reckons that 15% of its profits come from Latin America (and 10% from Brazil). Latin America as a whole is now the third biggest revenue earner for the bank after Spain and the UK. Santander now employs more Brazilians than Spaniards or Brits.

Putting up money to back business judgment is not unique to Santander. Brazil is capturing far more than its fair share of foreign direct investment, even in gloomy 2009, which underlines why it is the region's best credit.

The central bank (Banco de la República de Colombia) estimated that real annual GDP growth was a mere 0.1%-0.2% in 2009. The bank expects GDP growth of between 2% and 3% in 2010.

In fact, the bank was being too pessimistic. The official GDP growth figure for 2009, published by the Departamento Nacional de Estadí­stica (DANE) was 0.4% year-on-year. This was down from 2.4% in 2008.

The main reason for the better-than-expected figure was, once again, the strong performance of the mining and quarrying sector. This sector increased output by 11.3% annually in 2009, up from 7.3% in 2008. Construction also had a decent year, rebounding from a contraction of 0.3% in 2008 to strong growth of 12.8% in 2009.

On the other hand, virtually all other industrial sectors contracted or grew more slowly than they had done in 2008. Agriculture rose 1% year-on-year in 2009, but this compares with a growth rate of 2.6% in 2008. Financial services rose 3.1%, but this was down from 5.6% in 2008. Manufacturing continued its slump. It contracted 6.3% year-on-year in 2009, following a decline of 1.8% in 2008.

Growth in the utilities sector (water, gas and electricity) was flat, at 1.2% year-on-year,   while communications, which had grown 4% in 2008, contracted 1.2% in 2009. Even government services (taxes, royalties and fees) contracted 4.4% in 2009, compared to growth of 3.2% in 2008.

The DANE figure is pretty much in line with the government's 2009 GDP forecast of about 0.5%. However, the DANE figure showed a far stronger final quarter of 2009 than the central bank had calculated. DANE put the year-on-year growth rate at 2.5%, while the bank reckoned that in the final quarter of 2009 the economy managed to grow at a year-on-year rate of only 1.5%.

Forward-looking data from the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios (Andi) shows that industry has been recovering strongly since November 2009. The Andi figures have been a good indicator of the official Dane figures. In January 2010, Andi reported a 5.1% year-on-year increase in industrial output. The chemicals, textiles and automotive sectors all recorded double-digit increases in output.

Exports: In February, export revenues rose 6.4% year-on-year. This was despite a 73% fall in exports to Venezuela to US$126m, from US$465m in February 2009. Exports to Ecuador rose 21% year-on-year in February, according to figures from Colombia's Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (Dian). Chile has now become Colombia's third biggest market after the US and Holland.  

In the first two months of 2010, Colombia's exports rose 10.2% year-on-year, to reach US$5.36bn. In 2009, total exports fell 12.7% year-on-year. Non-traditional exports (primarily manufactured products) fell 15.4% year-on-year over 2008.

The Andi reckons that total exports rose 15% in the first couple of months of 2010, thanks largely to a jump in oil exports. Less encouraging is its report that non-traditional exports were down 8.7% in the same period. If Venezuela is excluded from the comparisons, export revenues are up by 26%.

Inflation: In February, monthly inflation was 0.83%, up from 0.69% in January. The rate for the past 12 months was 2.09%. In 2009, inflation was 2.0%.

The central bank is forecasting that the economy will grow faster in 2011 than it did in 2010, when it grew 2.6%.

The central bank is more optimistic than the World Bank which is forecasting that Guatemala, along with El Salvador, will be the slowest growing of the Central American economies. The World Bank is forecasting 2.5% GDP growth for both countries in 2011 rising to 2.8% in 2012.

Its worth noting that the World Bank's forecast for 2011 is even more optimistic for El Salvador as its economy grew by only 1% in 2010.

Our view is that the Guatemalan central bank forecast is more plausible. This is partly because the central bank reported that the inflow of remittances rose at twice the rate El Salvador reported.

In 2010 Guatemalan remittances came to US$4.13bn, up 4.35% on 2009, when they came to US$3.9bn. Oddly, June was the best month for inflows (at US$394m). The worst month was January at US$246m. December 2010's inflow was US$348m.

Although the 2010 figure was an improvement on 2009 it did not match the US$4.3bn the country received in 2008.

The country has 1.3m expatriates, 95% of whom live in the US.
 
Inflation: The consumer price index rose by 5.4% in 2010. This meant that the 2010 rate was well inside the central bank's target for a rate of between 4% and 6%.   The central bank hopes that inflation will again be between 4% and 6% in 2011.

A team from the IMF is due in Quito at the beginning of September to evaluate the government's economic programme. The President, Lucio Gutiérrez, is currently on a trip to China.

The IMF's big worries are about tax reform. The IMF wanted the government to send its proposals to congress by the end of August. Yesterday the tax office sent revised tax reform proposals to congress. Business and academics have until 29 August to comment on the draft. The main innovation in the draft is an effort to tax the informal sector (the effort is known as Rise). The government claims that its reforms will broaden the tax base to 1.6m people next year and pull in an extra US$100m. The main changes involve the elimination of 23 tax breaks. The government has been especially vigorous in chopping incentives for borrowing.

The government is unlikely to meet the IMF demands that it put the state-owned telephone and electricity companies under foreign management. The multilateral also wants the government to auction off the loan portfolios of troubled banks and liquidate eight of them.

The science and technology minister, Roberto Amaral, has emphasised that the government is determined to push on with its plans to develop a nuclear-powered submarine. Amaral was addressing a seminar on nuclear technology, sovereignty and development held by the lower chamber.

Amaral emphasised that although Brazil wanted to develop a nuclear powered submarine, to help to keep the peace, it did not want to develop a nuclear bomb. He said that the government's priority was to develop nuclear technology for energy and medical uses. Amaral caused controversy in January when he said that Brazil, under President Lula, would not drop any scientific research projects, including those which could lead to the manufacture of a bomb.

Amaral said that the main difference between a nuclear submarine and a conventional submarine as that a nuclear sub can remain under water for up to five years. A conventional submarine has to surface every 36 hours. The Brazilian navy has already bought the parts needed to build a reactor and estimates that it will cost US$180m to assemble the device. The Navy claims that the nuclear sub could be used for fishery protection.

The main drug gang in São Paulo, the Primeiro Comando da Capital, intends to continue with its attacks on the police. Telephone intercepts indicate that the PCC commanders will continue to keep the pressure on.

Yesterday there were eight attacks on police stations. One militarised policeman was killed. The authorities claim that they have nabbed four more PCC leaders. They have failed, however, to grab the two main PCC leaders still on the loose: Alejandro Herbas Camacho and Adilson Daghia.

The PCC attacks the stations in a range of ways. Sometimes they are machine-gunned from cars. On one occasion yesterday a bicyclist apparently lobbed a grenade into a station. The grenade did not explode, but the bicyclist pedalled off.

The Argentine political scene has been rocked by revelations that former President Fernando de la Rúa paid US$4.3m to at least nine senators so that they would approve a labour reform bill. The accusations were made by former senate clerk Mario Puntaquarto on 12 December in an interview with the weekly magazine TXT.

  The scandal surrounding the April 2000 labour reform is not new. Accusations of bribery made at the time prompted the judiciary to examine the case and dealt a serious blow to De la Rúa's credibility. Until now, however, there has been no substantive evidence.

An investigation into Puntaquarto's claims is already underway and will be handled by federal judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral. It is not just De la Rúa who faces prosecution; the Argentine intelligence service Secretarí­a de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE), headed at the time by Fernando de Santibañes (a friend of De la Rúa), is accused of providing the funds for the transaction, while then-labour minister Alberto Flamarique is also implicated. The most high profile former senator to be linked to the pay-off is the present governor of San Juan, José Luis Gioja, of the ruling Partido Justicialista. Two other senators named by Puntaquarto belong to the opposition Unión Cí­vica. Radical cabinet chief Alberto Fernández called on the senators involved to 'present themselves to justice' and 'face the consequences'.

All the legislators implicated in the scandal have denied wrong-doing, but Puntaquarto has said that he has written proof of the transaction. Meanwhile, De la Rúa's former vice president Carlos Alvarez, who quit in October 2000 over the government's refusal to address rumours about the legislation, welcomed the fact that there was finally proof of the President's bribery, which he described as 'a political certainty'. De la Rúa has denied all knowledge of any payments and has claimed that he is the victim of a campaign orchestrated by the government. Buenos Aires has denied that it was involved at any stage, and has stressed that it is up to the courts to investigate the scandal.

The government has also ordered current labour minister Carlos Tomada to examine whether the labour law should be annulled. The bill was highly controversial at the time, restricting as it did the powers of the unions.