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The IMF claims that the country has benefited from its macro-economic advice. Growth in 2005 was best in Central America, at over 4%. Inflation was comparatively, for the region at least, low at 7.7% and the fiscal deficit has come down from 5.2% in 2002 to 2.5% of GDP. The government expects inflation to fall again in 2006 and expects the macro-economy to remain stable. The previous government managed to control current spending without stinting on investment. Wages, especially, were tightly controlled.

Inflation: Inflation in January was 0.4%, unchanged from December 2005. the rate for the past 12 months was 7.3%, down slightly on calendar 2005's 7.7%

The pressure is growing on Prime Minister Portia Simpson-Miller to name the date for a general election. Constitutionally, an election must take place by October and the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) is becoming increasingly insistent in its demand for an end to the speculation. After a disappointing Cricket World Cup for the West Indies, both as a team and as hosts, Simpson-Miller has not experienced the anticipated bounce in the polls. The JLP, meanwhile, has been celebrating the news it is ahead in one of the island's key constituencies which has gone to the party that ends up forming the government in every election since 1962.

Simpson-Miller lays out her plans
Despite her refusal to name a date, Simpson-Miller already appears to be in election mode. On 2 May the prime minister announced a wide range of measures designed to bolster support for her People's National Party (PNP). In a three and a half hour presentation, Simpson-Miller announced an increase in housing subsidies and school places as well as the abolition of health care fees for children.

In the same speech the prime minister dismissed critics of the newly built stadium used for the Cricket World Cup, saying that Jamaica is well positioned to develop sports tourism into a multi-billion dollar business. Simpson-Miller, a practicing Christian, also added that she would be stimulating the development of "faith tourism". "The entire Caribbean region has become known as a spiritual oasis and Jamaica with its strong religious base has significant potential for the faith market," she said.

Meanwhile, the government's finance minister, Omar Davies, has attacked the opposition JLP for its "ill advised and impractical proposals" advanced during the 2007-08 budget debate. In particular, Davies took umbrage at the party's suggestion that it would abolish all hospital and school fess once in office. "It is not becoming of leaders in a serious budget debate," he said. "Persons abroad, not understanding the games people play at election time, may take them seriously, what do we tell them?"

What the JLP say
In response, the JLP's finance spokesman, Audley Shaw, said that his party's proposals were feasible and would be outlined in his party's election manifesto. Shaw also accused Davies of failing to disclose how the initiatives Simpson-Miller had launched would be financed.  

Separately, the JLP general secretary, Karl Samuda, said the party was losing patience with the government's failure to call an election. "You have less than six months when we are constitutionally required to hold an election, we just need to cut the drama and get down to the reality," he said, arguing that the continued delay is likely to affect planned socio-economic programmes for the island.  

The PNP, which has been in power for the past 18 years, is seeking an unprecedented fifth term in office, but recent opinion polls have shown the party to be trailing the JLP, including in the constituency of St Elizabeth South West, which has gone to the eventual winner since independence.  

• Finance minister
  Jamaica's Minister of Finance and Planning, Omar Davies, dismissed claims that the JA$9 billion (US$135m) incurred as part of the country's preparation for the hosting of the ICC Cricket World Cup 2007 could have been better directed at interventions in the social sector. Davies, who closed the 2007/08 Budget Debate in the House on 2 May, explained that a portion of the funds was in the form of in-kind donation and hence could not be used for any other purpose.

While thousands of Nicaraguans turned out on 19 July to celebrate the 29th anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, the celebration nevertheless came just three days after the largest protest march against President Daniel Ortega since he took power in January 2007. As well as the government's failure to address inflation, protesters also expressed discontent at Ortega's recent moves to curtail democracy [RC-08-06], measures which have lost him support in recent weeks among international figures formerly sympathetic to the Sandinista cause.

“Mega marches"
On 16 July more than 30,000 Nicaraguans marched in Nicaragua's capital Managua in what was the second demonstration against Ortega's policies in less than a month. Organised by the Coordinadora Civil, which represents 300 civil society groups, protesters demanded an end to the spiraling cost of living. With inflation in June at 23.09% year-on-year, the highest rate in Central America, Nicaraguans have seen a 25% decline in their purchasing power over the last twelve months according to economist René Vallecillo, cited in national daily La Prensa.

Another source of discontent was Ortega's moves to curtail democracy - reflected in a ban on two political parties and the postponement of regional and municipal elections in the Región Autónoma Atlántico Norte, a region which the opposition was almost certain to dominate [RC-08-06]. The ruling Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) is also moving to strip one of the opposition leaders, Eduardo Montealegre, of his immunity and prosecute him for his alleged part in the financial scandal involving the Certificados Negociables de Inversión (Cenis). These were bonds controversially issued during the government of President Arnoldo Alemán between 2000 and 2002 to stabilise the banking system after five banks had failed [RC-07-11].

These moves have been criticised by former prominent members of the FSLN such as Dora Marí­a Téllez (whose dissident Sandinista party, the Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista, was one of the two parties recently banned). They have also come under fire from Carlos Mejí­a Godoy, a famous revolutionary singer-songwriter but now an opponent, who recently demanded that the government stop using his recordings at its rallies.

• Sandinista sympathisers concerned

At the end of last month, leading international celebrities and intellectuals who backed the Sandinista revolution in the 1980s wrote an open letter accusing President Daniel Ortega's government of stifling dissent. A US academic, Noam Chomsky; a British novelist, Salman Rushdie; and a human rights activist, Bianca Jagger (who is Nicaraguan), were among the signatories.

The leadership of the opposition Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) resigned en masse on 5 October as part of declared efforts to “renovate and rejuvenate" the party from within. The move is the latest sign of the ongoing crisis afflicting the PRD, which has yet to recover from its defeat in the 3 May presidential and legislative elections.

Party infighting had proved a significant factor in the PRD's defeat [RC-09-05], together with corruption scandals and the personal unpopularity of its presidential candidate, Balbina Herrera. Even the way in which the “collective" decision to resign was announced made these divisions obvious; Juan Carlos Navarro, Herrera's running mate and former Panama City mayor, who has made no secret of his disdain for Herrera or former president Martí­n Torrijos (2004-2009) [RC-09-07], declared he was stepping down a day earlier than the rest of his colleagues, reportedly betraying an agreement to resign “collectively". The resignations take effect from 18 October, when a special national meeting of the PRD will take place to discuss the party's future.

The need to “renovate and rejuvenate", particularly at a grassroots level, has never been more necessary. Statistics from the national electoral tribunal show PRD membership has dropped from 636,404 in May to 612,823 at the end of August. The party has also suffered from the declared “anti-corruption offensive" launched by the new government of President Ricardo Martinelli, which has included re-opening the investigation into the 2001 'Cemis' corruption scandal [RC-09-08]. The case involves allegations that PRD deputies were bribed to vote in favour of a contract-law between the-then government and the San Lorenzo Consortium to develop the Services and Multimodal Industrial Centre (Cemis) in the Colón Free Zone.

The current crisis afflicting the party has failed to dampen the leadership aspirations of party members. So far Laurentino Cortizo Cohen, a former president of the national assembly and ex minister of agricultural development, has stepped forward to declare his interest in becoming the next PRD general secretary.

• Cortizo

Laurentino Cortizo Cohen, who competed in the most recent presidential primaries for the opposition Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), coming a distant third, has general support in the party. He could however face difficulties over the re-opening of the CEMIS scandal given his role at the time as chair of the congressional commerce committee, responsible for reviewing the CEMIS contract. He has, unsurprisingly, strenuously sought to distance himself from the scandal.

Social investment:   Last month the government announced its intention to finance record social spending this year - a move widely perceived to have electoral motives (the March 2012 legislative and municipal vote).   Citing the fight against poverty and the establishment of a “system of universal social protection" as Funes's main strategic objective, the technical secretary to the presidency, Alexánder Segovia, announced US$819m (3.8% of GDP) had been set aside for social investment in 2011 - 70% more than in 2010.

Remittances: According to El Salvador's central bank (BCR), remittances reached US$23.3m in January 2011, a 9.9% increase on the same month in 2010 and the biggest monthly rise for the last 35 months. Remittances amounted to just US$3.54bn in 2010, a small increase of 2.2% on the previous year.

Trade deficit: The BCR reported that El Salvador's exports reached US$4.47bn in 2010, an 18% increase on 2009. Imports grew by a similar amount to US$8.55bn, resulting in a US$4.08bn trade deficit. Oil imports rose by 33% in 2010 to US$1.44bn on the previous year.

On 19 September the head of the Chilean army, General Juan Emilio Cheyre, gave two interviews demanding that the politicians involved in the 1973 coup take their share of the responsibility for the human rights' abuses committed in the aftermath. Undermining his previous plea to 'keep the army out of politics', Cheyre also used the occasion of the 'day of the glories of the army' to lend his support to the 384 military officers 
currently facing legal action because of their roles in human rights violations in the Pinochet era.

Speaking in an interview with the conservative daily newspaper El Mercurio and the state-owned Televisión Nacional (TVN), Cheyre said the politicians have a debt pending with the military, who are the only ones accused of the crimes committed during the dictatorship. 'No one has worked as much as we have to assume responsibilities that really aren't all ours […] The debt politicians have with the military has not been cancelled. Those who provoked the conditions that led to the collapse of our democratic institutions, those who called upon the Armed Services to act, those who remained indifferent and silent. All of them have reintegrated into society, but this hasn't been possible for the army,' he said.

President Ricardo Lagos was quick to agree with Cheyre, perhaps unsurprisingly given that many of the current opposition Alianza por Chile politicians worked hand-in-glove with Pinochet's military regime. Lagos's comments, however, were somewhat more subtle than those of his political allies and concentrated on backing up the army chief's comments on speeding up the trials of military officials. 'I think Cheyre is right, because we have tended to say, well this happened during a military regime, and a military regime was the result of the military, and that's not the case. This is why I think we have to move on, these judicial cases cannot remain pending forever,' he said in an interview with TVN on 20 September.

Lagos explained that current legal delays are mainly due to the old legal system, under which the military are being tried, and that following full implementation of criminal-justice reforms (see previous page), such problems will not arise in the future. Starting in June 2005, all human rights cases will be heard under the new justice system and trials should last no longer than one year.

The president's political allies meanwhile, used the opportunity to fire a few pot-shots at the opposition. The interior minister, José Miguel Insulza, said that Chile's rightwing politicians needed to take responsibility for their part in the September 1973 coup that overthrew the democratically-elected government of Salvador Allende. 'I suppose that Cheyre was talking about other politicians, not about us […] If there is anyone who still has to cancel a debt with the army, it certainly isn't us, we who were persecuted and imprisoned for 16 years. […] While some of us assumed responsibility for what happened, we still haven't heard any self-critique from the other side,' Insulza said.

Joaquin Laví­n, the leader of the rightwing Alianza por Chile coalition, expressed an eagerness to move on. 'These are event from the past, let's try to find a reconcilitation.' Unfortunately for Chile's right, however, with Pinochet in the dock, stripped of his immunity from prosecution and facing prosecution for both human rights abuses and financial misdemeanours, the country's media, certainly, is unwilling to move on. 

• A Chilean judge, Jenny Book, ordered the state to pay compensation of 300m pesos (US$488,000) to the family of a communist leader disappeared in 1974. José Flores Rojas was arrested by a military patrol on 23 August 1974. He was taken to the prison and torture camp 'Villa Grimaldi' in Santiago. There has been no trace of him since. Judge Book also ordered the state to pay 150m (US$244,000) pesos in compensation to the family of murdered student, Alejandro Parada González who was killed in the torture centre 'Londres 38' by agents from the DINA, the military regime's secret police.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: CHILE

The Chilean economy is going over the points. Some indicators show that the economy is faltering, others that it is booming. Retail sales are a case in point. Car sales in August were the highest for five years, yet retail sales overall were the poorest for 14 months in August, largely because of poor clothes' sales. Despite the patchiness of demand in the domestic economy, the central bank has changed its monetary policy stance. In early September it raised interest rates for the first time in four years. Politicians were unhappy at the central bank's action, the more so when some bleak unemployment figures for May to June were published. These showed unemployment at 9.7% which was the worst for that three month period for more than three years. The rate in May to June 2004 was 0.1 of a percentage point up on the previous quarter and 0.6 of a percentage point up on the same quarter of 2003. Outlook The central bank is forecasting that in 2005, the growth rate will be back down to between 4.5% and 5.5%. The central bank is concerned by the rise in oil prices: it reckons that the annual inflation rate for 2004 will be 2.9%. Currently the lagging 12 month rate is 2.4%. the bank is forecasting that inflation in 2005 will run between 3% and 3.5% but fall to around 2.8% (annual rate) by the end of the year. The central bank is bullish about copper prices, which provide 40% of the country's export revenues and investment. It expects copper prices to average US$1.15 a per pound in 2005. The average copper price so far this year has been US$1.26 per pound. The bank is forecasting that investment in 2005 will hit 24% of GDP. This will be the highest rate for five years. GDP: 5.0% to 5.5% growth (2004) (central bank) Inflation: 1.4% (to August)

President Lula da Silva is still in the clear. His name did not feature among the 120 people implicated by the parliamentary inquiry into illegal gambling, an investigation which also covered allegations that the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) had paid congressmen monthly bribes - "a mensalão" - to support the government. With the election due in June, time is running out for Lula's opponents to tie the president to the corruption scandals which has dogged his party and his government.

No whitewash

The final report produced by the gambling inquiry was published on 29 March, was 3,000 pages long and weighed 4kg. The report is not a whitewash and it is not surprising that it Lula wasn't found to be involved given that no evidence tying the president to the mensalão was produced at the inquiry.

While Lula might have been spared, the report called for two of his former ministers, José Dirceu (Lula's right hand man for a decade and minister of the presidency for two years) and Luiz Gushiken (former minister of communications) to be prosecuted for corruption, along with a host of senior figures in the PT and 19 members of congress. The report called for prosecutions against a long list of high-profile figures from the world of politics, business and banking.

Lula will derive a degree of grim satisfaction that the mensalão is not a phenomenon unique to his party. Instead, the report confirmed that the practice was institutional and was not just set up as a shadow account to boost election spending.

The report shows that between January 1997, five years before Lula was elected president, and August 2005, R$2bn (US$910m) of public money was corruptly allocated to politicians.

That said, all but one of the 19 deputies named in the report come from the PT or its allies. The exception is Eduardo Azeredo, a former president of the opposition Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), who is now a senator. The PSDB was the party of former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso and is Lula's most powerful opponent.

What next?

So far so good, then, for the gambling inquiry's attempt to expose the corruption endemic to Brazilian politics. However, it is far from a foregone conclusion that the wrongdoers exposed by the report will face adequate justice.

In late April the attorney general, Antonio Fernando de Souza, announced criminal charges against 40 of those implicated in the mensalão scandal. A senior prosecutor from Minas Gerais, Jarbas Soares Júnior, said this list was just the beginning and that the attorney general intended eventually to charge 500 people in connection with the corruption.

Be it 40 or 500, few Brazilians expect Fernando de Souza's campaign will mete out justice to more than a tiny percentage of those accused. The timing of the report might prove to be crucial: had it exposed Lula to be an accomplice in the mensalão, it would almost certainly have ruined his chances of re-election, however its proximity to the October vote (and its concomitant political frenzy) means that it will be very difficult for the judiciary to chase errant members of the political elite.

There is no chance of the central bank hitting its inflation targets for 2007. The central bank's target was for a rate of between 4.5% and 6.5%. The consensus is for a rate of around 7.6%. The lowest forecast for 2007 was for a rate of around 6.9%. Most local economists expect that inflation will come down from July's lofty rate in August and some expect months of negative inflation in the second half of the year, but none expect inflation to come out anywhere close to the government's target. 

Apart from inflation the economy is doing moderately well. In the first seven months exports rose by 10.3%, year-on-year, to US$2.57bn. Although traditional exports (meat, wool and leather) were 4% down on the same period of 2006 at US$750m, non-traditional exports, mostly manufactures, were up by 17% at US$1.82bn.Seragro, a consultancy, expects agricultural exports to rise by 30% this year to be US$550m, 30% higher this year than they were in 2006. Rice and barely exports are likely to be particularly strong as are soya, wheat and maize exports. The wheat crop is likely to be around 600,000t of which a third will be exported.

Already the winter season exports have brought in US$140m compared with the US$85m they earnt in the same period of 2006. 

Seragro expects the total harvest to weigh in at 3.5m t, up 20% on the 2006 harvest. 

Inflation: In July the rate was 0.83%, well up on June's 0.13%. This brought the accumulated rate for the first seven months to 8.03%.

The fiscal position deteriorated in January, with the surplus down 40% year-on-year. One of the few constants in economic policymaking under recent governments (led by Néstor Kirchner and his wife and successor, President Cristina Fernández) has been solid, and often rising, fiscal surpluses.

In January 2009, the fiscal surplus was US$580m, about 40% down on January 2008. In 2008, the country ran a fiscal surplus of 3.2% of GDP. This was the sixth consecutive year of an operating fiscal surplus (i.e. before debt payments). Even after debt payments, the surplus was still a respectable 1.7% of GDP.
Both sides of the government's balance sheet are deteriorating. Spending is rising, as the government jacks up subsidies for gas and electricity charges and tariffs.

On the income side, revenues are no longer rising as the economy starts to slow down. In September and October 2008, revenues were still rising at a 40% annual clip, but in January the annual increase was only 20%. Indeed, government revenues would have contracted in January but for the effect of its recent nationalisation of the country's private pension funds. Members' payments into these funds are now classed as social security payments and government revenues.

The Fernández administration is under pressure. The government already lifted electricity, water and gas prices to appease the mostly foreign controlled companies which had invested heavily in these industries when they were first privatised only to see anticipated profits wither as successive governments capped price increases: the companies retaliated by slashing investment, leading to severe shortages. 

Another sign of the government's lack of room for manoeuvre is that it has been organising new deals to roll over maturing debts. The government has enough cash to meet scheduled interest payments in 2009, but does not want to take the risk of making capital repayments.

A third sign of fiscal pressure is the government's change of tone with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On 26 February, the IMF announced that it would undertake an annual review of the Argentine economy “in the next few months". The Fund can only do this at the invitation of the government. Kirchner and Fernández had both previously opposed any dealings with the IMF. A new agreement with the IMF would reopen Argentina's path to fresh multilateral credit from the World Bank and the Paris Club. Former president Kirchner signalled how significant this step was by claiming that the country would neither ask for an IMF loan nor take its advice until the Fund changed its economic recommendations.

This looks like a fig leaf. The IMF is currently widely touting its support for additional government spending and the acceptability of fiscal deficits in order to stave off global depression. For the past 25 years, the IMF has preached the benefits of balanced budgets and privatisation. In Argentina, it is roundly blamed for the catastrophic economic crisis of 2001, when convertibility (i.e. the fixed exchange rate system) collapsed, leading to default and economic crisis. In 2006 the Kirchner government paid off all IMF loans and ended its annual reviews of the economy. Argentina was copying Venezuela's lead in both instances. Venezuela paid off the IMF back in 2004.

• Trade: In January, exports fell 36% year-on-year at US$3.7bn, while imports were down 38% at US$2.76bn. In volume terms, exports were down 25% while in prices terms they fell 14%. Imports were down very sharply in volume terms, as prices were only 1% lower.

On 23 September the central bank raised interest rates from 6.25% to 6.5%, on concern about inflation. On 4 October the national statistics institute (INE) reported that monthly consumer prices rose 0.3% in September, bringing the annual rate to 6.32%. In 2009 inflation was 6.9%. The central bank's target for 2010 is for an annual inflation rate of between 4% and 6%.

The big danger in pushing up interest rates is that the peso will now appreciate. Few economists believe that the quarter point rise in rates will have much effect on inflation or inflationary expectations, despite the central bank's protestations. Further rises in interest rates look inevitable. Even after the quarter-point rise, interest rates are still effectively zero in real terms. Monetarists also point out that the money supply is expanding faster than nominal growth warrants. Inflation is unlikely to get seriously out of hand, however, because the government sets key tariffs such as gas and electricity. The government appears to want to keep these prices steady, which will reduce inflationary pressure in the economy, though at a cost of weakening the government's fiscal position.
The government's fiscal position is already under pressure, because congress increased budgetary spending without increasing taxes. Arguably this may not matter if the economy keeps on growing as fast as it has been (the local consensus is for 7% growth in 2010) because tax revenues will increase faster than budgeted. Real wages should rise about 4% in 2010, which should translate into further strong GDP growth, powered by domestic demand, in 2011.
If the peso starts to rise on the back of expectations of higher interest rates, business will become more difficult for exporters. The government is on record as saying that it wants to keep the peso at between Ur$21 and Ur$22 to the dollar. On 4 October it was trading at Ur$20.55 to the dollar.

Exports: In the first nine months of 2010 exports increased 23% year-on-year to US$5.03bn. The figures come from the Instituto Uruguay XXI.

Not for the first time, Colombia and Venezuela have pulled back from the brink, accepting polite fictions about the Granda kidnapping [see page 6]. This has not deterred the widespread conviction, on both sides of the pro/anti-Chávez divide, that what is under way is an inexorable drift towards war - a war with repercussions in many other parts of the hemisphere.

The pro-Chávez camp has been cultivating this belief since before the April 2002 coup: they are convinced that the US wants to oust Chávez because he represents a threat to US hegemony in the region. On the opposite side, Chávez has been portrayed as part of a new 'Red axis' (with Cuba's Fidel Castro, Brazil's Lula de Silva and, in some versions, Argentina's Néstor Kirchner) determined to tilt the whole hemisphere leftwards, and as an ally of the 'narcoterrorists' in Colombia, the Farc and ELN guerrillas; Evo Morales and other militants in Bolivia; and Antauro Humala's nationalist 'reservists' in Peru.

The Montaner scenario
Now Chávez is being accused of plotting to unleash war on a Latin American scale. Carlos Alberto Montaner, the rightwing Cuban columnist who claims a following of 6m readers, has just published an exposé of these intentions under the title Chávez y la próxima guerra latinoamericana ('Chávez and the next Latin American war'). His scenario begins with Chávez 's plans to buy from Russia 50 MiG-29s “and an important number of tanks, helicopters and armoured materiel". His purpose, says Montaner, “is easy to guess: an eventual confrontation with Colombia, aimed not only at eliminating the 'oligarchic and pro-US' government of Alvaro Uribe, but also of beginning the reconstruction of the Gran Colombia, that great fatherland unsuccessfully attempted by Simón Bolí­var in the first half of the 19th century, which also included Ecuador."

But, continues Montaner, Chávez 's plans do not end there: “This dangerous Bolivarian imperial dream has an even more dangerous derivation- the war against Chile to destroy the bastion of 'neoliberalism'." The chosen instruments for this war are Bolivia and Peru; the strategy, to “reopen the old wounds of the War of the Pacific (1879-83) and the territorial losses then suffered by those two nations, to create an alliance which will restore the cartography of the 19th century." This war, ventures Montaner, could treble the 90,000 fatalities caused by the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay (1932-35).

Averting this danger, he suggests, will demand an intense diplomatic effort by the US, Mexico and the OAS 'while countries like Brazil and Argentina decide whether they will allow themselves to be dragged into the conflict by Chávez or whether they will act sensibly.'

'Operation Condoleezza'
The Venezuelan journalist Raúl Bosque claims to have found evidence of a very different scenario: a plan hatched by the US State Department and baptised 'Operation Condoleezza' (after the new Secretary of State) by those in the know. This plan involves seeking 'once more' to unseat Chávez , but avoiding the 'mistakes' of the recent past, such as letting Venezuela's extreme right take over the 2002 coup, and pursuing the oil strike and lockout of the following year.

Bosque says that the 'first phase' of this plan is already under way, with about 50 CIA agents already at work inside Venezuela, making contact with potential allies (Bosque names many, including a number of people currently in the chavista camp, but then goes on to say that being on the list does not mean commitment by those named; only that they have been targeted for persuasion). He says that a variant has been proposed by a serving Venezuelan diplomat: that of recruiting present and past Chávez sympathisers to set up a régime that would practice 'chavismo without Chávez '; something akin to European social-democracy. 

Ultimately, with Chávez out of the picture, he says, the plan is to 'proceed along the flanks of the Meta plains to fight the battle that, with the aid of bombing, will definitively dislodge the Farc from its stronghold' inside Colombia. This, says Bosque, 'is an operation of continental scope, in which the south of Venezuela and the north of Colombia would turn into a zone occupied by the US Marines.'

The Dieterich scenario
Heinz Dieterich, of Rebelión, has come up with an alternative to Bosque's scenario. He claims that it is Uribe who will covertly provoke a hostile response from Venezuela, after a softening-up media campaign conducted by the US, linking Chávez with the Colombian guerrillas, the drugs trade and Islamic terrorism. 

Venezuela's reaction would then be used as an excuse to convene the OAS in an emergency session and invoke the Inter-American Democratic Charter 'and the entire legalistic-interventionist arsenal of the OAS, as well as economic sanctions' to isolate Venezuela. This would be accompanied by the opening of an 'internal front' in Venezuela. Dieterich does not carry his scenario any further but he does claim that the timeframe for its launch is about now.

Indications from the US?
News Hounds, the US-based team that monitors the output of Fox News, suggested in early February that this media network might be “beginning the brainwashing process, laying the groundwork for something that is being planned by the Bush administration."

It arrives at this from the presentation of a two-part special on Venezuela by Steve Harrigan, run by the Fox Report: 'Venezuela, a country in turmoil. Now our explosive investigation exposes allegations of political corruption, violence and how the policies of its controversial leader could put it on a collision course with the US [...] It drives business and fuels our economy: oil. It's the life-blood of America. But, are we about to be cut off? Venezuela: we expose the truth about its leader. Could Hugo Chávez create a crisis?'

One Fox monitor adds a comment: “Why does Fox News care about Venezuela all of a sudden? Anything south of Brownsville, Texas or Tijuana might as well be on another planet as far as Fox is concerned. I say something's up and it's spelled o-i-l." 

This outlook is not rare in the US. Bob Chapman, editor of The International Forecaster, recently published an item headlined “USA creating a base for war on the people of South America and Venezuela." He writes, “Considering the actions of the US, in both Colombia and Venezuela recently, and the oil war now in progress, we believe the Bush administration wants to do the same thing in Venezuela as they have in Iraq and they are using Colombia as a springboard. In fact, it's surprising that they did not pursue Venezuela first...Plan Colombia and the domination of the region by the US has begun: our government was not able to overthrow the Chávez government so the next move will be to bring about warfare."

The results of the first round of Ecuador's presidential elections confounded the forecasts of pollsters. Rafael Correa, the radical leftwinger who wants to scrap congress in favour of a constituent assembly, end the US's lease on its airbase at Manta and renegotiate foreign oil companies' contracts, was narrowly beaten by Alvaro Noboa, a rightwing populist and one of the richest men in the country. From being the frontrunner, with some pollsters even suggesting the possibility of an outright victory in the first round, Correa is now languishing behind Noboa in the second, due on 26 November.

On hearing the news Correa immediately aired his suspicions of fraud, an accusation rejected by President Alfredo Palacio. Although polls had shown Noboa rising, Correa was still set to win by at least a five-point margin in the final, private polls. The campaign for the second round got underway shortly after the release of the first exit polls. In a brief, nasty spat on TV, Correa accused Noboa of using child labour on his banana plantations, an accusation previously levelled at him by the US. Noboa, in response, accused Correa of being a crypto-dictator who wanted to establish communism in Ecuador. 

Correa was not the only loser on 15 October. León Roldós, Cynthia Viteri and Ecuador's traditional political parties all fared badly as the electorate opted for populism over moderation (see box below). Roldós, a social democrat running for a coalition of his own Red Etica y Democrática and the Izquierda Democrática who was the favourite for several months prior to the election, won just under 15% of the vote, coming fourth behind Gilmer Gutiérrez, who is running effectively on behalf his brother Lucio, the president deposed in April 2005 and now deprived of his "political rights" for the next two years. Viteri had also been considered a strong contender, backed by the weight of the election machinery of the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), the largest party going into the election. In the event, she failed to win even 10% of the vote and the PSC suffered significant losses in congress (see box below). 

Party	Seats 2006	Seats 2002
Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (Prian)	27	10
Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP)	21	5
Izquierda Democrática/  Red Etica y Democracia (ID-RED)	13	13
Partido Social Cristiano (PSC)	12	26
Pachakutik	7	5
Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano	6	15
Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD)	3	2
Unión Demócrata Cristiana	2	4
Others	9	20
Source: Teleamazonas, projected total

The next round
With an estimated fortune of US$1.2bn from banana, coffee and banking interests, Noboa's brand of messianic populism helped him reach the second round in both 1998 and 2002 but never as the first-place candidate. The eye-catching features of his 2006 campaign, in which spent US$1m more than Correa, his closest rival in the spending stakes, include the handing out of computers, wheelchairs and bundles of cash while asserting his role as an "emissary of God" and scaring the electorate with apocalyptic forecasts of a totalitarian future under Correa. 

The real success of his campaign, however, appears to have been something much simpler: the promise of jobs. While Correa's message on the need for refounding the country's political institutions may have resonated with intellectuals and the far left, Noboa's emphasis on job creation and better healthcare proved much more popular. On 15 October Noboa beat Correa in the coast, urban and rural districts, whereas Correa won only in the Andean highlands and the sparsely populated Oriente and Amazonian provinces.

For the second round, Noboa has entered into a pact with the Gutiérrez brothers' PSP, which will become the second-largest party in congress in January. The PSP's support, however, was conditional on Noboa committing himself to investigate and prosecute those involved in the toppling of Lucio in April 2005. While Gutiérrez is seeking revenge against his former vice-president, now the actual president, Alfredo Palacio, Noboa is after Correa, who served as Palacio's first economy minister. If the PSP-Prian pact holds (an unlikely scenario, given Ecuador's history of political alliances), it will be just three votes short of a majority in congress next year.

For the election at least, Noboa can also count on the backing of the PSC. The Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano, another significant political force, may have a free vote; many of its members would be expected to back Noboa, who served in the PRE government of Abdalá Bucaram. Those parties are particularly strong on the coast; Correa's support comes from the highland parties. Despite vowing not to compromise, and refusing to promise any jobs in return for support, Correa has received the backing of the Izquierda Democrática-Red Etica y Democrática (though not that of the coalition's presidential candidate, León Roldós); the indigenous party, Pachakutik, and the far-left Movimiento Popular Democrático. 

Polls for the second round
On 4 November the Quito-based daily El Comercio published four opinion polls which showed Alvaro Noboa significantly ahead of Rafael Correa in voter intentions for the second round of the presidential elections due on 26 November. The poll published by Consultar, carried out on 28-29 October, found that 50% of respondents would vote for Noboa; 28% for Correa. Null and blank votes would account for 19%, while 3% did not know who they would support. A Cedatos poll, of 5,062 people, put Noboa on 49%, followed by Correa on 33%. A Market poll put Noboa on 49% and Correa on 30%; while a poll by Informe Confidencial put Noboa on 47% and Correa on 32%.

Correa's party, Alianza PAíS, did not field any congressional candidates, meaning that if he does not win the second round he will have a significant power base, but no democratic outlet. Given his suspicions the first round was tainted by fraud, despite a lack of evidence, Correa may not accept defeat easily. By contrast, Noboa, should he lose, is still likely to have a sizeable stake in congress and will certainly attempt to thwart Correa's plans for a constituent assembly. As regards what the election means for Ecuador's future, it is worth noting the thoughts of Roldós, who if nothing else is an experienced political operator in Ecuador. Prior to the election he said that a Correa or Noboa government would not last 90 days.

Peru finally got around to presenting its maritime boundary dispute with Chile before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague on 16 January. In a sign of just how seriously he is taking it, President Alan Garcí­a removed his defence minister, Allan Wagner, from his post in order to head Peru's case. Garcí­a also made an exceptional appearance before congress to announce the suit: he would normally only visit congress once a year to present his state-of-the-nation address.

Garcí­a said he deeply regretted having to take legal action but that negotiations had failed to resolve the issue, leaving this as the only "civilised and sensible" option. This did not placate the Chilean government, which accused Peru of making an unfriendly gesture and stressed that talks towards a bilateral FTA would now be put on the backburner.

"The government of Chile profoundly laments this presentation," Chile's foreign minister, Alejandro Foxley, said. President Michelle Bachelet has appointed the deputy foreign minister, Alberto van Klaveren, to preside over Chile's defence from Santiago: a team of legal experts will be in situ in The Hague.

Peru, while making a big show of playing down the tension with Chile, appears to be upping the stakes in the dispute. Although its case before The Hague is confined to establishing the maritime boundary (Peru claims that the bilateral treaties signed in the 1950s were only accords over fishing rights), the government presented a new bill to congress delineating its land border with Chile.

This claims that Peru's land border begins at the obelisk marking the coastal Punto de la Concordia, about 220 metres southwest of the inland Marker N º1, in the province of Tacna. This is the same point from which Peru based its maritime claim, drawing an 'equidistant' line in a south-westerly direction out some 200 nautical miles to sea. Peru might try and add this bill to its case.

• Healing the rift

"Here there is only one cause, and the cause is Chile," President Michelle Bachelet said on 14 January, after meeting the leaders of all of the country's political parties. They pledged their complete support for the government in the maritime dispute with Peru. This temporary show of unity provided some respite for Bachelet, as the ruling Concertación succumbs to infighting: defections from the Democracia Cristiana have cost the coalition its majority in both chambers of congress. The opposition Alianza por Chile also rallied behind Bachelet, although this show of unity is unlikely to stretch to other issues.

The Chávez government remains under pressure on crime. Ahead of congressional elections in 2010, the opposition will seek to refocus attention on this issue, and not without reason: crime consistently tops surveys of voter concerns.

Venezuela's Internal Affairs and Justice Minister, Tareck El Aissami, was on the backfoot again in July over the country's crime statistics, denying that the government was in any way hiding or manipulating the figures, and rounding on the conservative rightwing opposition media for deliberately provoking public fears over crime.

However the evidence of rising crime in Venezuela, and in Caracas in particular, is fairly incontrovertible, with studies from a range of independent national and external institutes and NGOS all pointing in the same direction. Several of these organisations have recently called for the government to publish the 'real' figures, suggesting official statistics downplay the true extent of homicides and other violent crimes such as kidnapping.

According to the latest official figures, there were 9,653 homicides in Venezuela in the period January-September 2008. The NGO, Observatorio Venezolano de la Violencia (OVV), estimates that a further 844 people were murdered in the first quarter of 2009, up a sharp 31% on its figures for the same period of 2008.

Nationally, it estimated 4,659 murders, up from 3,562 a year earlier. The total national homicide toll for 2008 was estimated at 14,400, up from 13,156 in 2007.

In attacking the press and the opposition state government of Miranda (which encircles Caracas) for its failure to deal with citizen insecurity El Aissami highlighted the politicisation of the problem. The Chávez government routinely accuses opposition state governors and municipalities of failing to cooperate with the federal authorities on crime initiatives (and vice versa). Chávez used this argument to intervene in state ports in the opposition-controlled state of Zulia earlier this year, alleging that the local government had allowed drug trafficking networks to profilerate on its watch. This only gets the federal government so far however, given that the ruling Partido Unido Socialista de Venezuela controls the vast majority of states and local town halls.  

To date, Chávez 's April 2008 police reform, aimed at bringing the country's 126 regional and municipal forces under one new central command, doesn't appear to have achieved much. The president is vulnerable on this front: polls consistently indicate that voters hold him personally responsible for the breakdown in law and order.

• Not safe
  According to the OVV, Caracas, long known as the most dangerous city in Latin America, now has an annual homicide rate of 130 per 100,000 (inhabitants). The OVV does not compile regional statistics but the UN and the World Bank put the regional annual average for Latin America at about 27 per 100,000. It estimates Venezuela's overall annual average at 65 per 100,000.  

Ecuadoreans will go to the polls on 7 May to vote on a popular referendum tabled by President Rafael Correa. The referendum, which contains 10 questions, was adjudged to be acceptable by the constitutional court. Correa can now partake in a surrogate electoral campaign for the next two months, at a cost of US$22m. The stakes are high. If he wins, he will be empowered, among other things, to undertake a sweeping judicial reform. The traditional opposition, which he pejoratively describes as the partidocracy, will try and thwart him, but the main challenge will be provided by founding members of his Alianza Paí­s (AP), who have grown disillusioned with what they consider to be the increasingly authoritarian turn of his citizens' revolution.

A two-thirds majority on the constitutional court (six of the nine justices) voted to approve the referendum. The court made some minor changes, such as removing the leading phrases at the start of all of the questions. It also altered the first two questions of the referendum, related to penal reform. It kept the pre-trial detention limit to one year - ironically, increasing this limit was initially Correa's sole purpose for calling a referendum - but it left unaltered the questions related to judicial reform. Correa described the court's verdict as “a triumph for democracy". The opposition accused the court of caving into pressure (some 1,000 supporters gathered outside the Carondelet palace five days before the verdict to hear Correa accuse members of the court of “trying to rob us of our referendum") and violating the very constitution it was meant to defend.

Ultimately the referendum campaign will probably revolve around Correa rather than the questions, culminating in a test of his popularity, which he should win. The trouble for the opposition is that it is anything but coherent. The traditional opposition will play into Correa's hands by framing the referendum as a vote for or against Correa (in its terms, 'for authoritarianism' or 'for democracy'). The opposition from within, which cannot abide the traditional opposition, is likely to be much more principled. The president of the constituent assembly that drew up the present constitution in 2008, Alberto Acosta, has launched a movement called Montecristi Vive (named after the town where the assembly convened), which he insists will debate the questions, rather than the man behind them.

The one thing on which all the opposition seems to agree is that the main target of their criticism should be the proposed judicial reform. The traditional opposition argues that the referendum violates the separation of powers by effectively empowering Correa to handpick judges for 18 months. The opposition from within is prepared to accept that the judiciary is corrupt and needs reforming, but it objects strenuously to the manner in which Correa is setting about the process, which it considers to be a betrayal of the constituent assembly and the citizens' revolution.

“There is no citizens' revolution without citizen participation," is becoming a familiar refrain. The opposition from within argues that it is all in favour of referendums to increase citizen participation but not when they are designed to disempower people. What does it mean? On the surface it seems counterintuitive, but what has really incensed the estranged founders of the AP is that Correa has sidelined the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control (Cpccs). It sees the Cpccs, created by the constituent assembly in 2008, as the embodiment of the citizens' revolution.

The seven-strong Cpccs was meant to be the fifth branch of government, exercising extraordinary powers to increase citizen participation. It was supposed to appoint citizens' commissions, comprised of a representative of each of the five branches of government - the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the national electoral council and the Cpccs itself - and five citizens chosen by the public, to organise a merit-based selection process for a whole range of key public appointments, including the judicial council, which hires and fires judges.

The big irony is that the Cpccs was just concluding the selection process for the judicial council when Correa announced his referendum. If, as Correa argued, “the country cannot lose time, it needs radical change," why did he cancel an open competition that was ready to run and propose in the referendum the creation of a three-person committee to be given 18 months to assume the powers of the judicial council and then to appoint its future members?

Two of the representatives on the committee would come from the executive and the legislature, where the AP is by far the largest party; the Cpccs would be given the final position. The traditional opposition has always been critical of the Cpccs, which it claimed was merely putty in Correa's hands, but for many of those who drew up the constitution it was the crowning glory of the citizens' revolution. They now face the challenge of persuading voters that the referendum will deprive them of their chance to have an enduring influence on the revolution.

Mixed reaction to Libyan uprising
The Ecuadorean government has taken the middle ground on the popular uprising in Libya between fellow members of the Alba integration bloc - Nicaragua, Cuba and Venezuela, which have failed to condemn the violent repression of protests by the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi - and neighbouring Peru, which has severed ties with Libya because of Gaddafi's repression.
      Ecuador's foreign ministry released a statement condemning the violence in Libya. But, while Colombia voted on the UN Security Council, along with Brazil, the rotating president on the Council, in a unanimous vote to sanction Gaddafi's government (slapping an arms embargo on it, freezing his family's financial assets, and referring alleged crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court), Ecuador called on the international community not to permit the approval of a resolution in the UN General Assembly to serve as a pretext for the Security Council to legitimise an intervention as in Iraq in 2003. The foreign ministry statement made it clear that Ecuador's government rejected “foreign intervention in the internal affairs of any country". This is, in part at least, a legacy of the Colombian military incursion into Ecuador to bomb a guerrilla camp in March 2008.
      The statement was also equivocal about whether Libya should be suspended from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), saying that this should be looked at in-depth as it could be used politically against other countries. On 1 March the General Assembly suspended Libya from the UNHRC, a body on which a rotating group of 47 countries have seats, to which Libya was elected last May. The UNHRC had recommended that Libya be ejected from the body for committing “gross and systematic violations of human rights".

• Revolution
  President Correa has “earned the right to be the sole owner of the citizens' revolution," Deputy Paco Velasco of the ruling AP told the weekly magazine Vanguardia in its 31 January-6 February edition. The opposition from within argues that the whole point of the citizens' revolution is that it is for everybody and that it is precisely this sort of religious faith in one leader which is threatening to undermine already weak democratic institutions in Ecuador. It argues that the constitutional court in Ecuador, for instance, would lack the independent strength to act like Colombia's constitutional court, which threw out a request for a second re-election for former president Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010)

Enviados de alto nivel se dieron prisa para ayudar a hallar una solución pací­fica que mantenga las cosas dentro del marco constitucional.

El 16 de octubre, cuando la crisis en Bolivia amenazaba quedar fuera de control, los presidentes de Brasil y Argentina, Lula da Silva y Néstor Kirchner, decidieron intervenir en conjunto en lo que fue descrito como 'un intento de reunir a las partes' detrás de una 'pací­fica' solución que 'respete el imperio de la ley'. Los términos elegidos son importantes, considerando el contexto: anteriores declaraciones desde fuera de Bolivia se concentraron el apoyo al 'orden constitucional', y un funcionario de la OEA enturbió las aguas proclamando que al exigir la renuncia del Presidente, como estaban haciendo los manifestantes bolivianos, era 'inconstitucional.'

Dos enviados de alto nivel fueron despachados: Marco Aurélio Garcí­a, uno de los diseñadores de la polí­tica exterior de Lula, y Eduardo Sguiglia, secretario para asuntos de América Latina de la cancillerí­a argentina. Desde un principio, el mensaje que llevaban era que una solución verdaderamente constitucional, considerando la situación de ingobernabilidad, serí­a la renuncia de Goni Sánchez de Lozada y su sucesión por el Vice-Presidente Carlos Mesa.

Garcí­a más tarde rememoró que durante su primera reunión con Goni, él mostró poca inclinación a renunciar, pero eso fue alterado al pasar las horas y fue dejado virtualmente sin apoyo polí­tico. Su más importante socio, el MIR, ya habí­a señalado que tomaba distancia cuando salió en apoyo de la reforma constitucional -una de las exigencias de los manifestantes.

Esto fue seguido por la deserción del NFR, que se unió al coro que exigí­a la renuncia del Presidente. Uno de los primeros en transmitir a todo el mundo que Goni habí­a decidido renunciar, fue Garcí­a.

La evaluación sobre cuánto influyó el esfuerzo brasileño-argentino en el resultado, varí­a de una fuente a otra. Garcí­a ha dicho que 'de ninguna forma' habí­an influenciado él o Sguiglia sobre la decisión de Goni. El canciller argentino Rafael Bielsa, sin embargo, dijo que el esfuerzo conjunto de los dos gobiernos fue 'decisivo'. Brasil fue el primer paí­s en ofrecer, el 17 de octubre, su 'total disposición a colaborar con el nuevo gobierno boliviano'. El Grupo Rí­o siguió el ejemplo, avalando de manera significativa la solución 'constitucional y democrática' a la crisis.

BRASIL | Crecimiento modesto. En la reunión del gabinete del 7 de enero, para discutir estrategias de crecimiento, el ministro de finanzas Antônio Palocci, dijo: 'No hay paí­s en el mundo que pueda tener crecimiento sustentable acompañado de alta inflación. Brasil no será el que logre esa proeza.' Espera que la economí­a crecerá en 3% y 4% este año, contra el 0,3% estimado para 2003. 'El objetivo del gobierno es trabajar para crear condiciones que permitan el crecimiento a largo plazo a tasas aun mayores con más estabilidad.' Palocci espera inversión pública en obras sanitarias básicas y vivienda para ayudar a reducir la tasa de desempleo, actualmente de 12%. El ministro de agricultura, Roberto Rodrí­guez, dice que su sector puede crear 1,3m de empleos, ahora que la cosecha 2003/04 se espera que sea 5,7% mayor que la última. El í­mpetu principal para el crecimiento este año, como fue en 2003, se espera que provenga de las exportaciones, que predicen que se expandirá en 8,3% a un nuevo nivel record de US$80bn.

BRASIL | Signos de repunte en la industria. La producción industrial el pasado noviembre fue 0,8% mayor que en octubre, con lo que la producción acumulada a 11 meses, subió a 0,1% sobre el periodo comparable en 2002. El desempeño mejor fue el del sector mecánico, que subió 9% gracias a la demanda de tractores y motores diesel. El peor fue el farmacéutico (-18,4%) y vestidos y calzado (cayó 12,5%). La producción de vehí­culos en 2003 subió 2%, ayudada por 37,7% de incremento en ganancias de exportación, pues las ventas internas cayeron 3,4%.

ARGENTINA | FMI avanzará en la revisión. Leyendo la prensa de Buenos Aires (sobre la base de informes del gobierno), el FMI ya ha aprobado su retrasada primera revisión de desempeño bajo el acuerdo standby de US$12,5bn, a tres años. En realidad, lo que ha ocurrido es que el director gerente del FMI, Horst Köhler anunció que la revisión seguirí­a adelante, apoyada en una carta de intención de Buenos Aires en la cual, crucialmente, las autoridades argentinas 'reiteran [...] su determinación de completar una reestructuración de la deuda que atraiga el amplio apoyo de los acreedores.' El ministro de economí­a, Roberto Lavagna, ha dicho que el gobierno de EU ayudó a persuadir al Fondo. El hecho que también recibió una carta de felicitaciones de la vice directora gerente, Anne Krueger sugiere que hubo alguna concesión del lado argentino.

Argentina fue testigo de un fenómeno inusual el 1 de abril: 130.000 personas salieron a las calles en la ciudad de Buenos Aires, y miles más marcharon en varias capitales de provincias, para exigir del gobierno una acción más efectiva contra el crimen. El hecho fue provocado por el secuestro y asesinato de un joven de un barrio próspero -el tercer caso prominente desde 2002 de un secuestro seguido de asesinato.

El hecho que el asesinato ocurrió, según se informó, luego de un tiroteo entre la policí­a y los secuestradores, que frustró la entrega del pago del rescate, fue interpretado por el público como un signo que elementos de la policí­a pueden haber estado involucrados en el secuestro.

Felipe Solá, gobernador de la provincia de Buenos Aires, en cuya jurisdicción tuvo lugar el crimen, exigió US$344.000 extras del gobierno federal 'para poner más policí­as en las calles'. Mientras tanto, sacó a 1.300 policí­as de tareas administrativas y los envió a patrullar. El Presidente Néstor Kirchner felicitó al padre de la ví­ctima, Juan Carlos Blumberg, por haber convocado y liderado la protesta masiva. Luego, a través del ministro de justicia, Gustavo Béliz, hizo saber que pronto harí­a conocer un 'plan nacional' contra el crimen.

El ruido hecho por los funcionarios fue apagado por el hecho que lo que se estaba prometiendo era una repetición de anuncios ya hechos durante el año pasado o más. Todos los elementos del 'plan nacional' de Kirchner -remoción de obstáculos judiciales en la investigación de secuestros, reestructuración de la policí­a federal, reforzamiento de controles sobre las fuerzas policiales- se suponí­a que ya estaban en marcha desde hace algún tiempo.

Raí­ces más profundas que la crisis de 2001
Muchos vincularon la escalada del crimen en Argentina, y en particular el secuestro, con la severa crisis económica de 2001-02. En realidad el paí­s ha sufrido una callada escalada de los secuestros mucho antes de la crisis económica de 2001-2002, que fue acompañada por una explosión de los secuestros exprés que atrajeron la atención internacional.

No es un secreto que el secuestro organizado en Argentina puede rastrearse en la insurgencia y la consiguiente 'guerra sucia' de los '70; algunas de las bandas fueron formadas por miembros de los 'grupos de tareas' de la contrainsurgencia de las fuerzas armadas y la policí­a. Lo más descarado fue hecho por Raúl Guglielminetti, un 'guerrero sucio' que logró ser designado en el servicio de seguridad de la presidencia durante el gobierno de Raúl Alfonsí­n, que habí­a inaugurado el retorno a la democracia en 1983.

Una banda de secuestradores, 'Los Arcángeles', incluí­a a policí­as previamente destinados a la inteligencia del ejército; fue desbandada en 1991. La llamada 'banda de los comisarios', formada por miembros de la policí­a federal, fue responsable de al menos cinco secuestros de alto perfil entre 1978 y 1991, incluyendo el del empresario y polí­tico Mauricio Macri (se pagó US$6m), antes de ser desarticulada. Se sugirieron lazos entre esa banda y la que secuestró a una media hermana de Macri en 2003 (se dijo que se pagaron US$1,5m).

Aún activos hoy
Esa conexión ha persistido. Kirchner reconoció la participación de oficiales de policí­a en actividad en los secuestros del año pasado. Sus ministros no estaban muy dispuestos a aceptar la evidencia que al parecer apuntaban a criminales de hoy con conexiones que llegaban hasta la casa de gobierno y el ministerio de defensa. En noviembre pasado, Eduardo de la Cruz, fiscal general de la provincia de Buenos Aires, anunció que cerca de 700 llamadas fueron ubicadas entre teléfonos vinculados con la investigación de delitos graves y el edificio del ministerio de defensa, y otros 3.300 de esos ví­nculos fueron encontrados con la Casa Rosada, el palacio presidencial, donde también funciona el ministerio del interior, que está a cargo de la seguridad interna en general.

Esas llamadas cubrí­an un largo periodo, que comenzaba en 1997 (significa que cubre parte del periodo de la presidencia de Menem y todo el de de la Rúa y Duhalde). Las llamadas estaban asociadas con la investigación de 200 casos delictivos, que abarcan secuestros, asesinatos, y robo a mano armada.

La primera ofensiva de Kirchner
A fines de 2003, Kirchner ordenó una ofensiva de dos ví­as contra el delito. Por un lado, gran número de oficiales de policí­a fue desplegado en las calles, y fue creada una nueva unidad anti-secuestro de elite, con alcance federal, ayudado por una nueva legislación, penas más duras para secuestros y aliviando restricciones a los investigadores. Por otro lado, una purga en la policí­a de la provincia de Buenos Aires (la más grande en el paí­s) condujo a docenas de procedimientos contra oficiales corruptos. En menor escala, algo similar comenzó a ocurrir dentro de la policí­a federal.

La nueva 'brigada anti-secuestro', de 100 hombres, encabezada por el comisario Juan José Schetino, debí­a trabajar en coordinación con fuerzas policiales provinciales y, de acuerdo con el gobierno, gozarí­a de 'autonomí­a total' para desplegarse en cualquier parte del paí­s si el juez a cargo de un caso de secuestro lo creí­a necesario.

Se señaló entonces que el alcance de acción planeado para la nueva unidad, podí­a tener problemas legales, e incluso constitucionales. En la actualidad, la policí­a federal y las fuerzas de seguridad sólo pueden desplegarse fuera de la capital federal en casos que caen dentro de la jurisdicción federal (asuntos de frontera, tráfico interprovincial) o cuando un gobierno provincial requiera su asistencia. Al contrario de EU, en Argentina no hay previsiones para tratar los secuestros como delitos especí­ficamente federales; cae en jurisdicción federal si la ví­ctima fue tomada cruzando fronteras provinciales.

En semanas, funcionarios del gobierno federal y de la provincia de Buenos Aires proclamaban el éxito de esas iniciativas, señalando la caí­da en los secuestros exprés y robos de autos. Esto es difí­cil de verificar. Las estadí­sticas precisas y consistentes son escasas. El gobierno informó que en el área del Gran Buenos Aires, que incluye la capital federal y una serie de municipalidades en la provincia de Buenos Aires, se denunciaron 207 casos de secuestros en la primera mitad del año pasado. Se dijo que representaba 95% del total nacional y 25% más que en igual periodo del año anterior. El gobierno de la provincia de Buenos Aires dijo que en 2002, se denunciaron 135 secuestros en su jurisdicción, de los cuales 49 fueron clasificados secuestros por largo periodo de tiempo. Des estos últimos, 42 fueron resueltos.

Impacto de la corrupción policial
Pero en diciembre, el aluvión de secuestros en la provincia de Buenos Aires fue descrito por el gobierno como un 'mensaje' para el ministro de seguridad de esa provincia, que avanzó en la purga de las filas policiales. Unos 23.000 miembros de la fuerza estaban entonces bajo investigación por una serie de irregularidades, y 4.000 afrontaban procesos en las cortes.

Ese mismo mes, el jefe de gabinete, Alberto Fernández, sugirió que la serie de robos armados en negocios y restaurantes en dos distritos de la ciudad de Buenos Aires podí­an ser 'represalias' de miembros de la policí­a federal investigados. En ambos distritos, los comisarios de la policí­a local sirvieron hasta hací­a poco en la división de asuntos internos de la fuerza. El ministro de justicia, Béliz y Norberto Quantí­n, ministro de seguridad interna compartí­an la opinión de Fernández.

Béliz insinuó en esa ocasión, abiertamente, que existí­a colusión de funcionarios con los criminales. Aludiendo al distrito de Villa Urquiza, donde los vecinos protestaban contra la actividad criminal, dijo: 'Hubo casos de bandas criminales que llevaron a cabo asaltos en el vecindario, que fueron arrestados sólo para salir libres 48 horas más tarde -no una, sino tres, cuatro y cinco veces.'

La extensión de la corrupción en las fuerzas policiales fue ilustrada al investigar el año pasado los activos personales de 149 oficiales de la fuerza de 41.000 hombres de la provincia de Buenos Aires. Dos altos oficiales, el comisario general Julio César Frutos y Héctor Dí­az (jefe y subjefe de operaciones), fueron despedidos y se iniciaron procesos criminales contra ellos. Es probable que sigan más pues 24 de los oficiales investigados no pudieron explicar satisfactoriamente la procedencia de sus activos -propiedades, autos de lujo, yates y jugosas cuentas bancarias, todo más allá del alcance de sus salarios oficiales.

En la policí­a federal, su jefe, el comisario Roberto Giacomino, fue destituido y acusado de mal uso de fondos públicos (manipulación de contratos de compra de computadoras, a precios inflados, a una firma de propiedad de su cuñado). Giacomino habí­a sido el único oficial de alto rango que escapó de la purga hecha por el Presidente Kirchner apenas asumió el poder. Tení­a esa posición desde diciembre de 2001, cuando su predecesor Rubén Santos, fue destituido para afrontar acusaciones de uso excesivo de la fuerza contra manifestantes durante las demostraciones y disturbios que provocaron la renuncia del Presidente Fernando de la Rúa.

Hay que señalar que el jefe de gabinete, Fernández, ve la situación en la policí­a federal mucho menos seria que la fuerza de la provincia de Buenos Aires. 'Aunque no estudié el tema en detalle,' dijo, 'no detecto en la fuerza federal el mismo nivel de enriquecimiento que hallamos en la policí­a de Buenos Aires.'

Este panorama de fuerzas policiales corruptas con amigos en altos cargos y quedando fuera de control, ha llevado a que algunos pidan que los militares sean llamados para actuar contra el crimen; una acción que se probó en varios paí­ses de América Latina, hasta ahora sin efecto duradero. El ministro de defensa José Pampuro, desechó la posibilidad que esto ocurra en Argentina, pues 'el ejército tiene prohibido por ley cualquier participación en la seguridad interna.' El precedente de indiferencia mostrado por la jurisdicción provincial con la nueva unidad anti-secuestros, sugiere que ese obstáculo, debido a la presión del público, puede ser superado. Pero si dará o no resultado convocar al ejército, es un asunto enteramente diferente.

Pais	Fuente	Marzo	Abril	Mayo	Ult 12m	Ene-Dic 2003
Argentina	Indec	_	0.90	0.70	3.10	3.70
Bolivia	INE	-0.27	0.02	0.41	3.94	3.94
Brazil	FGV	0.93	1.15	1.46	5.89	26.41
Chile	INE	0.40	0.40	0.50	-0.30	1.10
Colombia	Dane	0.98	0.46	0.38	11.29	9.87
Costa Rica	DGEC	0.46	0.91	0.67	11.29	9.87
Ecuador	Inec	0.70	0.65	-0.48	3.65	6.07
El Salvador	Min.Ec.	0.64	0.86	0.70	3.90	2.50
Guatemala	BCG	0.72	0.50	0.83	0.45	5.85
Honduras	BCH	0.40	1.10	0.80	7.20	8.10
Mexico	Bco.Mx.	0.34	0.15	-0.25	4.21	3.98
Nicaragua		0.48	0.83	0.88	7.22	6.48
Paraguay	BCP	0.50	-0.20	0.20	1.60	9.30
Peru	INE	0.46	-0.02	0.35	0.46	2.78
Uruguay	DGEC	0.06	1.23	1.04	8.68	10.19
Venezuela	BCV	2.10	1.30	1.20	33.40	27.10
US	DOL	0.60	0.30	0.60	1.70	1.60
Previous: WR-04-23

El Presidente Vicente Fox sigue adelante con su plan de reunirse con lí­deres de los principales partidos de oposición, con un telón de fondo de revelaciones que dan cierta credibilidad al reclamo del alcalde de ciudad México, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, que los procedimientos en su contra son parte de un complot de la presidencia para eliminarlo de la carrera presidencial de 2006.

Salió a la luz que en abril pasado, Fox tuvo una reunión con el presidente de la corte suprema, Mariano Azuela, para discutir la posible privación de inmunidad de López Obrador -una cuestión que estudia la cámara baja del congreso. Se ha revelado que Fox también discutió el tema con el fiscal general federal.

Los involucrados, insisten en que no hay nada incorrecto en esas conversaciones. El Presidente, dicen, solamente se estaba informando de la situación y sus posibles derivaciones. El Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), de López Obrador, dice que, en todo caso, los encuentros han dañado la imagen de imparcialidad de la justicia.

Primera ronda de conversaciones
Por ahora, Fox programó reuniones con Roberto Madrazo, lí­der del Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) y Leonel Godoy, lí­der del PRD; el primero el 22 de setiembre, el último el 23. Funcionarios de la presidencia han dicho que las reuniones serí­an desarrolladas con una agenda abierta, y que la cuestión de la inmunidad de López Obrador podrá discutirse. Como Godoy lo expresó, él aceptó la invitación por las seguridades que no habrí­a 'temas tabú'.

El ministro del interior, Santiago Creel, fue cuidadoso ante la pregunta de si la reunión entre Fox y Godoy conducirí­a a otra, entre Fox y López Obrador, para hacer las paces. Su ambigua respuesta: 'El gobierno está abierto al diálogo con todos los actores polí­ticos, y en particular con los que tienen responsabilidades de gobierno. Trataremos de asegurar un diálogo que pueda producir los acuerdos polí­ticos que el paí­s necesita.'

El mensaje que él trata de expresar es que el 'diálogo' de Fox es con el fin de asegurar consensos sobre un número de 'reformas', ahora que el gobierno ha decidido evitar cualquier cosa que pueda requerir una enmienda de la constitución -y que eso no debe ser eclipsado por problemas polí­ticos 'menores'.

En una petición dirigida principalmente al PRD (pero que también abarca las recientes diferencias electorales con el PRI), Creel dijo: 'Es responsabilidad de todos los actores polí­ticos en el paí­s cultivar el diálogo, para evitar las confrontaciones y los propósitos cruzados que pueden obstruir el diálogo convocado por el Presidente.'

Creel ya mantuvo su propia reunión con Godoy, para familiarizarlo con el nuevo enfoque del gobierno sobre la agenda de 'reforma' pendiente. Ellos acordaron establecer una comisión conjunta para seguir cualquiera sean las conclusiones a que se llegue en el encuentro entre Fox y Godoy. [Las reuniones con lí­deres del Partido del Trabajo, el Partido Verde Ecologista y Convergencia probablemente se realizarán dentro de una semana o un poco más.]