All Categories

Events in Haiti appear to be moving too fast for those on the outside who are trying to influence the outcome of the crisis. All external parties, beyond nuances, have agreed that the first step towards a solution should be an agreement between President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the opposition. They are deliberately excluding the armed rebels, who in the meantime are extending their control over the country. Soon there will be no choice but to engage them, one way or another.

The nature of the insurgency in Haiti changed last week with the arrival of former members of the disbanded Haitian army and paramilitary forces, under Guy Philippe, a onetime soldier who later became chief of the US-trained police in Cap Haí¯tien, to end up exiled in the Dominican Republic after attempting a coup against Aristide.

Formally, Philippe and his men, as well as the former paramilitaries headed by Louis Jodel Chamblain, have `joined' the former Armée Cannibale to create the new Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales (FLRN). In command is Philippe, whose contingent outnumbers their partners by more than two to one. Both newcomers have been busy recruiting among their former associates from the days between Aristide's ouster and his reinstatement.

Their arrival made an immediate difference to the pace of the insurgency. Starting with highly mobile raids on police stations — the visible symbol of central government authority — they began to face decreasing resistance. Exceptions were Hinche, seen as the gateway to Cap Haí¯tien, and then Cap Haí¯tien itself; the second-largest city in Haiti. Not only has the regular police force melted away: the élite has drawn back to protect the capital, and the chimí¨res, the gangs of pro-Aristide `enforcers', have been acting sporadically, and mainly against the unarmed political opposition to the régime.

Many witnesses have reported that Philippe's forces have been warmly received by the population. Most telling, perhaps, is that the public has not adopted the formal name of the rebel force. Instead, they tend to refer to it as Lamé (creole for l'armée, the army), and often say they expect the new arrivals to put an end to the violence and restore order.

Philippe has said that his next target in Port-au-Prince. Taking the capital may prove a tougher proposition than Cap Haí¯tien, but even merely encircling it would establish the insurgents as the real power in the land. If this happens, any deal between Aristide and the political opposition will be irrelevant — unless the outsiders decide to go in and fight the insurgents, a prospect for which, to borrow Colin Powell's expression, there is no enthusiasm.

A new party has been created as a `platform' for the presidential aspirations of former foreign minister Jorge Castañeda. México Ciudadano has been set up by people with a provenance not dissimilar to its candidate's: the `renewalist' faction of the Communist party, social-democrats and likeminded `friends of Castañeda' - all determined to rid Mexico of partidocracia, or party-dominated rule.

Two of the promoters, Joel Ortega and Humberto Parra, say that their main aim is to `rescue' the political and social rights of Mexico's citizens, which they say have been `hijacked' by the three main parties (the PRI, PAN and PRD). Castañeda, addressing the inaugural gathering, said that he shared this objective: `The current leaderships of the PRI, PAN and PRD have kidnapped democracy, pursuing only their partisan interests, even against the common good.They have annulled our political rights by preventing citizen candidacies.'

That last assertion is the key one: current electoral law does not allow an independent, unaffiliated citizen to put himself forward as a candidate. Hence the creation of México Ciudadano - which, Castañeda's aides insist on underlining, `is not Castañeda's party'. Castañeda intends to run as the candidate of an alliance of groups built around one duly registered political party, México Ciudadano. Now the new party has to tackle its first big task: collecting 200,000 endorsements to support its registration.

Much of Democratic candidate John Kerry's advice regarding Latin American affairs is said to come from a man who defected from the Bush administration over the Iraq war after having served under Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr and Bill Clinton: Rand Beers. His main connections with the region come from his expertise in the drugs trade and terrorism.

After a stint at the State Department, Beers moved on to the National Security Council. His career peaked in 1998, when Clinton made him assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement affairs. He had considerable influence on the drafting of Plan Colombia and its 'upgraded' version under Alvaro Uribe. He attracted considerable attention when he had to retract testimony under oath that Farc guerrillas had trained in Afghanistan. 

Like Richard Clarke, he became disenchanted with the Bush administration's policy towards Iraq, but unlike Clarke, he left quietly. He established a rapport with Kerry based on their common experience as Vietnam veterans. Beers is considered responsible for John Kerry's hardline pronouncements on Cuba and Venezuela, which have appeared to be at odds with the candidate's spontaneous utterances on both countries. Worth noting: Kerry has yet to deliver a full outline of his policies towards the region.

Campaigning for the 31 October elections has entered its last leg without bringing an answer to the key question: will Tabaré Vázquez, candidate of the leftist Encuentro Progresista-Frente Amplio (EP-FA), win in the first round, or will he run the same risk as in 1999, when he was defeated in the runoff? The polls show findings that are too close to judge.

Of the six most recent opinion surveys, only two show Vázquez attracting more than the required support for a first-round win. Only one of these, conducted by Ipsos-Mora y Araujo (a French-Argentine concern making its Uruguayan debut), shows him not only clear of the 50% threshold but also of the poll's margin of error. On the other hand, the three that show him under 50% give him shares of the vote that could be falling short of the actual mark (see table below).

A retrospective viewing of all the polls suggests that Vázquez is very close to his plateau: support for him has varied only minimally over the last few readings. The other candidates - Jorge Larrañaga of the Blancos and Guillermo Stirling of the Colorados - have been swinging around; the former has seen support receding after an early rise, and the latter has experienced in at least one poll a late resurgence.

Beyond the first round
What matters in the case of Vázquez's two rivals is not whether Larrañaga may be able to close the gap in the first round (that seems highly improbable), but whether their combined strength can swing behind Larrañaga in the runoff - a system the Blancos and Colorados agreed to introduce after the 1994 elections, when Vázquez came within a little more than a percentage point of defeating the Colorado candidate, Julio Marí­a Sanguinetti (Vázquez attracted a whisker less than 31% of the vote, Sanguinetti a whisker more). In 1999, having raised his share of the vote to 39%, Vázquez was defeated in the newly introduced runoff.

Two things are worth highlighting. The first, picked up by Ipsos-Mora y Araujo, is that over the last month the proportion of people convinced that Vázquez will not win in the first round has risen from 56% to 66%. The other, noted by Nery Pinatto, director of MPC-Iumop, is that most polls leave out of their reckoning some 200,000 voters from rural towns with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, which is where the Blancos have traditionally been strongest. Add to this the fact that in the last election few of the undecided seem to have swung towards Vázquez, and this means that Larrañaga at least stands a chance in the runoff.

At her confirmation hearings last week Condoleezza Rice, the incoming US Secretary of State, made more references to Latin America than she had in the past four years combined, underlining that the western hemisphere is 'extremely critical' to the US and that the second Bush Jr administration will work on relationships in the region 'in a very aggressive way'. When she went into detail, it was Venezuela about which she sounded most aggressive. All told, though, her offerings did not promise any major departure.

The following are excerpts from the main issues she touched upon:

Venezuela
Rice said it was unfortunate that the government of President Hugo Chávez has not been constructive, but rather a source of difficulties for its neighbours. She added that the Bush administration will closely monitor the situation - particularly Venezuela's close association with Cuba, as well as any breaches of democratic institutions within Venezuela. 

'We are very concerned,' she said, 'about a democratically elected leader who governs in an illiberal way, and some of the steps that have been taken against the media, against [political] opposition, I think are really very deeply troubling.' Despite these concerns, Rice said she hoped that the Venezuelan government would continue to recognise what has been a mutually beneficial relationship on energy and also participate in counter-narcotics activities in the Andean region.

Rice kept well clear of the current row over Colombia's recent abduction of a Farc guerrilla leader in Caracas [WR-05-03], which the State Department has also been avoiding (see page 4).
Colombia

In that region, Rice said, the US supports Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's successful efforts to combat the challenges of terrorism and narcotics trafficking. 

Of Uribe's 'demobilisation' of the paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) she said the US 'would like to be in a position to do whatever we need to do to help' but, because the State Department has designated these illegal armed groups as Foreign Terrorist Organisations, 'obviously, there are some things that we can't do'. 

Rice emphasised that the Uribe administration must not offer paramilitaries immunity from prosecution: 'The one thing that we've made clear is that while the AUC needs to be demobilised [and] demilitarised, and while [Uribe has] talked about reconciliation with certain aspects' this should not be granted to those 'with blood on their hands'.

Central America & threats to democracy
The closest Rice came to dwelling on Central American issues other than trade was to state that there are 'very grave' challenges to some Central American governments. This has been interpreted as related to the conflict of powers in the Nicaraguan government, where the US has openly been trying to wean the Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) away from its power-sharing entente with the Sandinistas.

Rice said that the US wants to avoid a repeat of the unnecessary Latin American cycle of democratic developments followed by authoritarian ones. To this end, she said that while certain Central American and Latin American nations have very high growth rates, more must be done to improve the ability of these countries to deal with their problems: enhancing the region's ability to meet the demands of its people is 'the next step'.

At the same time, Rice said she also hopes to work with the OAS to ensure the enforcement of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. 'I would hope,' she said, 'to really spend some time with the Organisation of American States, making certain that the agenda of promoting democratic development, holding accountable leaders who do not govern democratically, even if they are democratically elected - that that would be an agenda that we could mobilise around. We are going to have to, as a hemisphere that signed a democracy charter, be devoted to making sure that those who signed that charter live up to it.'

At present, only Nicaragua's President Enrique Bolaños has been threatening to invoke the charter, in a situation which is hard to fit within the letter of its provisions. In the recent past, however, the Venezuelan opposition has called for its application against President Chávez , and Rice's mention of 'leaders who do not govern democratically, even if they are democratically elected' sounds close to her characterisation of Chávez .

Cuba
Rice said very close attention will be paid to the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission to Assist a Free Cuba. She said that the Castro régime needs to be isolated in the hemisphere, and added that progress is being made towards limiting the Cuban government's ability to siphon off monies intended for humanitarian purposes, funds spent on travel to Cuba, or remittances sent by US residents to family members on the island. 

'The day that the people of Cuba are finally free is going to be a great one for the western hemisphere,' she said. 'The Commission's recommendations were intended to try and hasten that day and also to try to prepare the ground for a peaceful transition [...] it's a very important goal, and you can be certain that we'll pay extremely close attention to it.'

Mexico
Rice dodged a question on why nothing had been done regarding an immigration agreement with Mexico, directing her remarks instead to the 'progress with Mexico and Canada on a number of issues, including the Smart Border Initiative which employs technology that facilitates legitimate commerce, but defends the United States from those who might harm it'. 

One cryptic remark was that seeing how European Union countries had integrated their economic policies had raised questions on the future of Nafta and the broadening of relations between its member states.

VENEZUELA | End to operating oil contracts. The 32 operating contracts signed with private firms, local and foreign, to extract oil will be scrapped within six months, after which the current contractors will have to enter joint ventures with the state oil company PDVSA, in which the latter will have a 51% stake. Energy minister Rafael Ramí­rez says this is because the contracts are lossmakers: last year alone, he said, the losses amounted to US$260m.

Production under these contracts, signed between 1992 and 1997, is running now at 500,000 barrels per day, and the oil they yield costs on average US$14 per barrel, as against US$4 for the oil extracted by PDVSA itself. Ramí­rez says that, furthermore, 'most' of these contractors have not been paying income tax, since they have been declaring losses year after year. 'If with the price of oil at US$40 per barrel they continue to declare losses,' he said last week, 'we cannot figure out in what circumstances they will declare a profit.'

ECUADOR | Tourism expanding apace. Tourist arrivals in Ecuador in the first quarter of the year totalled 225,380, or 16% more than in the comparable period of 2004. Tourism minister Gladys Eljuri says that this is largely the result of a strong promotional campaign conducted by the government, built around the establishment of 'Ecuador Offices' - of which there are already five in the US and 10 in Europe. Eljuri's target is to double the number of visitors and treble the country's earnings from tourism by 2007.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | Fears for future of textiles. The association of textile manufacturers of Cibao, in the north of the country, predicts that, barring a radical change in current conditions, the Dominican textile industry will be unable to compete within Cafta-DR. It notes that while Dominican textile workers earn US$250 a month, their Central American peers are paid US$118 on average. Similarly, while Dominican textile firms pay US$0.26 per kilowatt of electricity, the cost in Central America averages US$0.05.

The Cibao association reports that its members have shed 9,000 jobs in the first half of this year, and puts most of the blame on the end of the textile quota system in world trade. However, the other cost factors have also made an impact. Since 2001 the Dominican textile sector has shed 34,000 jobs and this year it has led the league of factory closures and job losses in the free zones [WR-05-13].

CUBA | Electricity rationing to continue. Daily blackouts are likely to continue at least until the end of July, according to Basic Industry Minister Yadira Garcí­a. The electricity crisis, which has been dragging on since last year, led to the replacement of Marcos Pontal last October as minister by Garcí­a, a member of the Communist party's politburo - a move meant to signal the government's determination to overcome the problem.

PANAMA | Step back on social security reform. President Martí­n Torrijos has bowed to the month-long strikes and protest actions against the social security reforms approved by congress in May [WR-05-22]. The reform law's implementation has been suspended for 90 days, to give time for a 'national dialogue' on the matter, which will include the umbrella protest body, Frente Nacional por la Defensa de la Seguridad Social, formed by unions and civic associations.

Fugitive former president Alberto Fujimori announced last week that he will be running for president in 2006, despite the suspension of his political rights and the 21 court actions pending against him. The government has dismissed this as 'media bluff', but Fujimori does have a substantial following and could become a major nuisance factor. For now, though, the government (and other parties) are worried by the rise of Lourdes Flores in the opinion polls.

The announcement of Fujimori's candidacy on 6 October in Tokyo, where he remains shielded from extradition, was followed by the presentation of a remarkable scenario in Lima by his lawyer, César Nakasaki. He said that the law does not require the candidate to register in Peru, so Fujimori could do so from Tokyo and conduct his campaign from there. Once elected he would enjoy immunity from prosecution and could return a free man to Peru.

Justice Minister Alejandro Tudela promptly reminded everyone that in 2001 congress rescinded Fujimori's political rights for 10 years, a move which was ratified by the constitutional tribunal in 2005. There are 21 arrest warrants against Fujimori, one for each suit brought against him on charges ranging from crimes against humanity (the massacres of Barrios Altos and La Cantuta) and criminal conspiracy to embezzlement.

Some fairly recent polls have shown Fujimori attracting 20% of voters; the same, at the time, as Lourdes Flores, candidate of the conservative Unidad Nacional (UN). Indeed, in the first half of the year several polls showed him well in the lead, though since then most pollsters have left him off the list on the assumption that he would be barred from running.

The most recent opinion survey, released last week, shows Flores's support up to 28.1%, versus former presidents Alan Garcí­a (Partido Aprista Peruano) with 15.6% and Valentí­n Paniagua (Acción Popular) with 10.3%. It is worth noting that Flores readily admits that a share of perhaps as much as 5% of voting intentions have drifted towards her from the pro-Fujimori camp.

Commentators have been having a hard time explaining Flores's appeal to an electorate which they consider largely to her left. One interpretation that has been gaining ground is that her stance has remained well-defined and clearly distinguishable from those of her rivals. Garcí­a has been wavering: one day appearing to lean towards the 'Chilean model', the next towards the formation of a 'broad social front'. Paniagua, meanwhile, seems reluctant to express an opinion on any major current issue.

Flores's position may be strengthened by the fact that another potential rival, Lima Mayor Luis Castañeda (Solidaridad Nacional), decided on 8 October that he would not be stepping down from his post to run for the presidency. It must be noted that all current polls are highly speculative in that candidates have not yet been formally nominated (they have until 8 January), so the choices presented to the public are strictly speaking only potential contenders.

One big absence is that of the ruling Perú Posible (PP), which has not got anywhere near selecting its standard-bearer. President Alejandro Toledo has seen his popularity rating creeping up from single digits to about 15%, but much will depend on what Prime Minister Pedro Pablo Kuczynski can deliver. Then, of course, there is always the possibility that, close to the registration deadline, Sí­ Cumple might nominate a proxy for Fujimori.

 

The Fox administration has launched a massive, high-profile deployment of troops along key roads leading to the border with the US, which appears intended to intercept northward-bound drugs and southward-bound arms. Details of the operation have been sparse but the roadblocks set up by the military have clearly been designed to draw attention.

A typical feature is a billboard boldly announcing: 'The army is here to protect society and combat organised crime.' In some cases the signs are in English, which suggests that the message is aimed at two audiences: the voters at home and US nationals who have been calling for stronger security measures along the border.

The roadblocks are being manned round-the-clock. Cars and trucks are routinely stopped and searched. While the officers in charge are tightlipped about what they are seeking, the Spanish news agency Efe cites an unnamed military source as explaining the operation as a response to the spreading interconnections between drug traffickers and the coyotes who smuggle illegal migrants across the border - the latter being hired to use their migrants as 'mules'. Civilian officials have been attributing to this alliance of interests many of the deaths of migrants reported in the last few years.

The military are obviously not trying to halt or dissuade those travellers who are evidently on their way to attempt an illegal border crossing. Action in that regard is left in the hands of the Grupos Beta, who mainly provide advice on the dangers that lie in wait on the other side of the border.

Yasin Abu Bakr, leader of the Jamaat al Muslimeen, has been released on bail on medical grounds after having spent almost eight months behind bars, charged with breaching the country's anti-terrorism law by promoting sedition and inciting violence in a sermon - after the authorities had failed to prove any connection between him and a string of bombings last year [WR-06-05].

The government's charges have been construed from his listing of the ills - including social breakdown - which could follow from his followers' failure to pay zakaat, a tithe required of all Muslims. This kind of rhetoric is common among the Muslim equivalent of 'hellfire and brimstone' preachers.

Abu Bakr had been confined in the maximum-security Arouca prison in eastern Trinidad. His lawyers successfully argued that he was suffering from a critical health condition which could become life-threatening in prison conditions. Upon his release he refrained from addressing the crowd of followers who had gathered to celebrate, and refused to make any public statement.

The Jamaat al Muslimeen have periodically been suspected of involvement in subversive plotting since their abortive coup attempt in 1990 in which one government minister was killed and several, including the prime minister, ANR Robinson, were held hostage. Abu Bakr is the first person to have been charged under the anti-terrorism law.

No sooner did it seem that the prospects for peace in Colombia had been dealt another blow by the collapse of talks over a humanitarian exchange between the government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) then they were revived by the news of a breakthrough in talks between the government and the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Havana. The Farc later announced that it was still prepared to carry out a humanitarian exchange with the government.

The exploratory phase of talks between the government of President Alvaro Uribe and the ELN ended after the fourth round on 26 October in an agreement to begin formal peace talks on an unspecified date in December. It is the first time since the demobilisation of a faction of the ELN, the Corriente de Renovación Socialista (CRS) in 1994, that an agreement to begin formal peace talks has been reached between the government and a guerrilla group. 

The ELN might have been encouraged by the success of the Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA), which includes former M-19 guerrillas and labour and union leaders, in the political arena in the last three years: Luis Eduardo Garzón won the mayoral elections in Bogotá and the PDA won nine seats in the lower chamber and 11 in the Senate in March's legislative elections.

Antonio Garcí­a, the leader of the ELN, said there were still a number of outstanding issues to resolve but that the involvement of civil society and the international community helped to get peace talks further than any attempts under the governments of César Gaviria (1990-1994) and Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002). 

In an interview with the Revista Cambio on 17 September entitled "Process with the AUC (paramilitaries) is failing", Uribe made the interesting comment that, "a peace process with the ELN or the Farc will need totally benign legislation. What today seems like benevolence to the paramilitaries would be so tough for the Farc or the ELN that it would frustrate any process with them. And this will mean that the paramilitaries will demand the same treatment_ Colombia and the international community have to be prepared for that."

For this reason talks are likely to be long and tortuous but the ELN gave the first sign of its goodwill on 29 October when it announced that it was prepared to work with international NGOs to defuse mines in the rural districts of Samaniego in the south-eastern department of Nariño. This is exactly the kind of gesture that Uribe is demanding of the Farc as proof that it is serious about working towards peace talks. He does not consider sufficient a communication from the Farc high command to the Colombian news agency sympathetic to the Farc, Anncol, on 28 October saying that it was still prepared to carry out the humanitarian exchange. 

The Senate, however, approved a resolution on 24 October demanding that the government reestablish contact with the Farc and work towards the prisoner and hostage exchange. It also urged the government not to attempt a military rescue. The resolution was backed by the Partido Liberal and the PDA. The government paid it no heed: the interior minister, Carlos Holguí­n, said it was unconstitutional because security matters were the exclusive remit of the executive. 

A day later Uribe refused to offer evidence to support his claim that the Farc carried out the bombing outside the military school in Bogotá (which it denies). He announced that he intends to go on a month-long peripatetic tour of the military garrisons across Colombia to bolster the morale of the armed forces. "I need to be closer to the armed forces, to be by the side of the commanders and to accompany soldiers for a few weeks," he said.

US pressure brought to bear
Uribe's decision to buoy up the armed forces comes as the US confirmed that financial support under Plan Colombia will not go on indefinitely. During a high-level visit to Colombia on 26 October the US undersecretary of state for political affairs, Nicholas Burns, told the national daily El Tiempo that the US would continue to provide Colombia with financial assistance of some US$600m a year for the next two years, but that after that period "we would like to see Colombia taking the greatest possible responsibility." He also said there were "big concerns raised about possible human rights violations" involving the demobilisation of the AUC.

Burns added that Washington and Bogotá were in the process of setting up a joint committee that would shape a new initiative to supersede Plan Colombia. He said this would retain the anti-drug component of Plan Colombia in addition to providing "reinforcement and help for the justice, peace and military programmes." On paper this sounds no different to Plan Colombia.

Venezuela's Rosales presents proposals
The main opposition candidate, Manuel Rosales, sent a letter to President Hugo Chávez on 30 October asking him to participate in a televised debate. He said he had laid out his proposals and wanted to contrast his vision for Venezuela with that of Chávez . Chávez expressed no interest. The Vice-President, José Vicente Rangel, tongue firmly in cheek, appealed to Rosales not to abandon the presidential contest so that the opposition could become a credible democratic force again.

Rosales' campaign proposals consisted largely of dismantling initiatives set in motion by Chávez : he said he would rejoin the Andean Community (CAN) which Chávez pulled out of in April; transfer more power to Governors and mayors by promoting decentralisation; reduce the presidential term from six years to four years; reduce the value-added tax (IVA) that is fixed at 14% and exempt the basic basket of goods from IVA altogether; and depoliticise the state oil company Pdvsa. He said he wanted to improve and increase production at Pdvsa. He provided no details on how he would achieve this. 

Rosales also called for a constituent assembly to be convened to elect a new national assembly. This is a tactic that increasing numbers of presidential candidates across Latin America are proposing since Chávez called one in 1999. Bolivia's Evo Morales, Peru's defeated presidential candidate Ollanta Humala and Ecuador's run-off candidate Rafael Correa positioned the idea of a constituent assembly at the centre of their campaign strategies. 

Rosales has little other choice than to propose a constituent assembly for if he were somehow to defy the polls and win the elections he would be confronted with an entirely hostile legislature due to the opposition's misguided decision to boycott the legislative elections in December 2005.

His chances of winning, however, remain slim. Seven separate opinion polls released in the last two months give Chávez an average lead of 29 percentage points over Rosales. Chávez 's support ranges from 47% in a Hinterlaces poll to 61% in a poll by Opinión Pública Consultores (OPC); Rosales' backing ranges from 17% in a Datanálisis poll to 30% in the Hinterlaces poll. The abstention rate was as high as 35% in some polls.

MEXICO | Pemex. The oil monopoly, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) will invest M$140bn (US$12.73bn) in 2007, its president, Jesús Reyes Heroles said. Reyes Heroles also admitted that the country's main oilfield, Cantarell, would see its average production decline by 262,000bpd in 2007. This is a rather bigger drop than the company was forecasting just two months ago.

Reyes Heroles said that Pemex needed to invest at least US$15bn a year to maintain production at between 3.1m bpd and 3.3m bpd. He added that Pemex would also like to spend a further US$3bn to US$4bn over the term of the current government, which ends in 2010, on a plant to extract usable oil from the residues of heavy oil which are currently ignored. 

Reyes Heroles said that Cantarell would produce an average of 1.52m bpd in 2007. This implies that by the end of 2007, Cantarell's production may be as low as 1.2m bpd. In 2006 the field produced an average of 1.78m bpd.

President Néstor Kirchner won the provincial elections in Rí­o Negro on 20 May. To be more precise, he could not lose. The winning candidate, the incumbent governor, Miguel Saiz, was a K Radical; his opponent, Miguel Pichetto, a member of Kirchner's Frente para la Victoria. Kirchner could claim a victory whatever the outcome. Elections in the Capital Federal on 3 June will be very different. In a close race, the government candidate, Daniel Filmus, the education minister, lies in third place. Defeat would be a setback ahead of October's presidential elections. It also looks even more likely now: the Skanska corruption scandal has claimed its first victims among officialdom and Kirchner is fighting hard to stop it claiming more.

Saiz took Rí­o Negro with 53% of the vote, six points clear of Pichotto. He was clearly gratified that neither Kirchner nor his wife Senator Cristina Fernández campaigned for Pichotto. This underlines the importance of the K Radicals to Kirchner's transversal project. It is likely to precede Kirchner's announcement, possibly on May Revolution Day on 25 May, that Julio Cobos, the Governor of Mendoza and the most pre-eminent K Radical, will be either his or Cristina's running mate in October. Another K Radical won in Catamarca in March and a third won the Corrientes constituent assembly elections in February. 

It is less clear whether Kirchner will choose to reveal on 25 May whether he will be seeking re-election or allowing his wife to stand instead. He might want to see the result of June's elections in the Capital Federal. Mauricio Macri, the leader of the centre-right opposition Propuesta Republicana (PRO) topped the latest poll, released by Opinión Autenticada on 22 May, on 32.3%, followed by the incumbent governor, Jorge Telerman, on 22.1% with Filmus bringing up the rear on 18.9%.

How many Ks are there in Skanska?
What is certain is that the Skanska corruption investigations [WR-07-18] will not help Filmus' cause. Kirchner made a point of denouncing the prevailing sleaze in the Menem administration and he is desperate to avoid his government becoming embroiled in a corruption scandal just before Argentines go to the polls for key elections. So far investigations into the alleged payment of kickbacks by the Swedish company, which was subcontracted by Transportadora de Gas del Norte (TGN) to expand the Gasoducto del Norte pipeline, have claimed only two middle-ranking officials. However, one of them, Fulvio Madaro, was the president of the state gas regulation body Enargas, which was under the jurisdiction of the powerful planning minister, Julio de Vido.

There is no evidence (yet) of any wrongdoing on De Vido's part but the opposition has him in it's sights and there is no doubt that he has been weakened by the scandal. His chief rival in the cabinet, the prime minister, Alberto Fernández issued a decree on 21 May placing Enargas under trusteeship for six months while a probe into its involvement in the Skanska scandal is carried out. Juan Carlos Pezoa, a close confidant of Fernández, was appointed as director of Enargas. To compound De Vido's problems, his number two, Raúl Rodrí­guez, resigned this week over the scandal making Kirchner's insistence that the corruption case is "between private companies, irrespective of whether public officials were involved" ring increasingly hollow. 

 

p>With the elections barely two weeks away, efforts to improve the transparency of the electoral process are in evidence, albeit with imperfect results. On a more general level, the official entry into force of the law establishing the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Cicig) has raised concerns as to the scope of its power and potential for investigating organised crime.

On 9 August, the NGO Acción Ciudadana (AC) presented a report which ranked the Guatemalan parties according to transparency, on the basis of financial information submitted to the supreme electoral court (TSE). Unsurprisingly, the main parties performed best in the rankings and included right-wing Partido Patriota (PP), the electoral platform of former general Otto Pérez Molina, currently second in the polls, and the centre-left Unidad Nacional de Esperanza (UNE), the party of presidential favourite Alvaro Colom.

On 13 August, for the first time in Guatemalan history, the TSE published a list of the political parties' funding sources, in response to calls for improved transparency. Local analysts maintain that while certain figures are open to question, the act of publishing the names of donors is a "big step" in strengthening the democratic process. They emphasise the importance of establishing the principle that the public has access to information about who is financing political campaigns. 

The report was nevertheless incomplete and four parties - Unión Democrática, Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) and Alianza Nueva Nación, (ANN) - failed to submit the information at all. 

The local press also reported discrepancies in the information submitted by the different parties to the TSE compared with that tracked by different watchdog organisations: while the UNE reported donations of Q1,681,000 (US$219,452) to the TSE, Mirador Electoral (ME), an umbrella group of academic institutions and civic organisations acting as electoral observers, reported this figure was Q22,755,000 (US$2,970,627) and another watchdog, Media Guru reported funds of Q22,213,124 (US$2,899,886); the PP reported funds of Q4,682,000 (US$611,227) to the TSE while ME and Media Guru tracked this as Q17,075,000 (US$ 2,229,112) and Q18,778,263 (US$2,451,470) respectively; in its report to the TSE, the ruling coalition, Gran Nacional Alianza (Gana), claimed spending of Q9,476,000 (US$1,237,076) while ME recorded this as Q17,075,000 (US$2,229,112) and Media Guru Q20,101,000 (US$ 2,624,151).

As well as questions over the information submitted, TSE president, Oscar Bolaños also termed "ridiculous" the sanctions within the TSE's remit to punish those who fail to provide the information. The heaviest fine it can levy is Q1,000 (US$131).

Meanwhile further problems with the electoral process came to light with the presentation by the Indigenous Observation Mission to the TSE of its report, also on 14 August. Among the many serious deficiencies highlighted, the document underlined the lack of information available in indigenous languages (the indigenous population accounts for around 60% of the population with over 20 indigenous languages spoken). The report also criticised the high level of ignorance on the part of many communities regarding the elections and raised questions as to the democratic nature of the process. 

Cicig enters into force
Efforts to improve transparency in the electoral sphere were also echoed on a general level with the launch on 16 August of the law which establishes Cicig, following its approval by congress on 1 August. 

With an initial two-year mandate, the law stipulates that Cicig will be an independent body with headquarters in Guatemala City, although its commissioner will be appointed by - and report periodically to - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. The commission will investigate crimes committed by "criminal structures and clandestine security organisations that threaten civil and political rights and undermine the rule of law in Guatemala."

While the move to create Cicig was applauded by human rights organisations, the international community and the government alike, one concern that has emerged in the local media involves a statement by attorney general, Juan Luis Florido that the foreign ministry and the executive will decide which cases will be investigated. He explained that the attorney general's office and Cicig will sign an agreement clearly detailing what the commission's remit will be. This has provoked concerns that many cases involving government officials or threatening elite interests may consequently never come to light.

A further criticism that has also emerged involves the fact that Cicig will not be able to investigate crimes retroactively - meaning that those behind the war crimes committed during the internal conflict (1960-96) will not be investigated. This has been mitigated to a certain extent by the hope that at least forced disappearances will be investigated by the new institution as long as the whereabouts of the missing person is unknown. 

Esso embargo tests US-Nicaragua relations
A recent embargo issued by Nicaraguan authorities against US oil company Esso is proving a serious threat to relations between the US and Nicaragua. It also represents the latest example of a seemingly inconsistent approach towards the US which is currently employed by President Daniel Ortega. Ortega recently accused the US of conspiring against his Sandinista government while at the same time declared himself prepared to discuss a possible handover of Sam-7 missiles.

The Esso dispute began on 17 August when a judge in Nicaragua's western province of Chinandega ordered a goods embargo against the US transnational in Corinto, Nicaragua's main Pacific port. The local press reported that the embargo followed an accusation by the national customs authorities (DGA) that Esso - which controls 47% of the domestic hydrocarbons market in Nicaragua - owes the DGA nearly US$3m in taxes. 

The embargo against US investors of such clout as Esso has inevitably provoked much speculation. The opposition is suggesting that Petronic, Nicaragua's state oil company, is behind the decision, with the ultimate aim of using the installations to import Venezuelan oil, a theory fuelled by rumours that the security guards controlling the oil deposits are on the Petronic payroll. 

The US was quick to respond to the embargo and on 20 August, the US ambassador in Nicaragua, Paul Trivelli, told Nicaragua's foreign minister, Samuel Santos, that the matter could damage economic relations with Nicaragua. Santos responded that the issue was not a matter for the executive but for the judiciary and added that "some companies" - without providing names - are used to not paying taxes and when pressed for payment by the authorities resort to threats. The US is a key trade partner for Nicaragua; last year Nicaraguan exports to the US totalled US$333m, excluding products from duty free zone

COLOMBIA | Tourism. Colombia hosted the general assembly of the World Tourism Organization (WTO) in Cartagena de Indias between 23 and 29 November. Some 800 delegates from 120 different countries attended. President Alvaro Uribe delivered a stark message: "because of terrorism, we have not received tourists." He said the nadir was 2001, the year before he was elected, when Colombia received 534,000 visitors. In 2007, this will have more than doubled to 1.35m, he said, setting the ambitious target of 4m tourists by 2010. The secretary general of the WTO, Francesco Frangialli, said that Colombia was "a stable and peaceful country". The tourism minister, Luis Guillermo Plata, concurred although he conceded that "there are places where you cannot travel".

ECUADOR | Manta. "Ecuador could be China's gateway to Latin America," President Rafael Correa said during an official visit to China last week where he met his counterpart, Hu Jintao. Correa said that a Chinese company had been awarded a concession to operate the port of Manta while the airport could be used to welcome Chinese passenger planes in the future. Ecuador is studying Dubai airport as a model for its conversion of Manta once the agreement with the US Southern Command to use the airbase as a "Forward Operating Location" for counter-narcotics surveillance expires in 2009. Correa argued that Manta was uniquely positioned to serve as a hub for trade between China and Latin America, and to provide a direct flight to China, rather than relying on trade links through Houston in the US. Correa also insisted that the corridor scheme between Manta and Manaus (and then on to Belém) would provide an onward link to Brazil and the Atlantic coast, creating an interoceanic alternative to the Panama Canal. Roads to Manaus are often posited, but it still remains largely inaccessible because of the inhospitable terrain.

President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela said this week that he would organise a meeting between Presidents Alvaro Uribe of Colombia and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua to resolve their dispute over a shared maritime border in the Caribbean. The Venezuelan leader said that he rang Uribe on 15 March and Ortega to fix a meeting. Both presidents said that they would be prepared to meet each other, though it is not clear what role, if any, Chávez would have, especially given the tension between him and Uribe over his mediation between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc).

Ortega recently set a record for severance and re-establishment of diplomatic relations: on 6 March he broke off ties with Colombia in light of the Colombian incursion into Ecuador [WR-08-09], only to re-establish them the following day. While Ortega maintained that the decision was taken in solidarity with Ecuador, the opposition was quick to condemn the act as "irresponsible" and evidence of his "unconditional" alliance with the Chávez , who had also severed ties with Colombia, particularly as Nicaragua "had nothing to do" with the dispute in the Andean region.

Then, on 7 March, with the conflict apparently resolved following an apology by Uribe to his Ecuadorean counterpart Rafael Correa at the Grupo Rio summit, Chávez declared that ties between Colombia and Venezuela were restored and Ortega similarly followed suit. Both countries will officially restore relations on 19 March.

Maritime dispute

While reflecting his personal rapport with Chávez , Ortega's improvised foreign policy also focused attention once again on the ongoing maritime dispute with Colombia over sovereignty of an area of the Caribbean, a source of mounting tension in recent weeks.

Indeed, Ortega explicitly acknowledged this as a factor in his decision to break off relations, asserting that the restoration of ties with Colombia depended in part on its "respect for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling". The ICJ had ruled in December that San Andrés, Providencia and Santa Catalina, three islands Nicaragua claimed, were Colombian under a 1928 treaty - trumpeted by Colombia as a victory.

However, according to the ICJ verdict, the maritime boundary set by that treaty (the 82nd meridian) referred only to the archipelago and was not, as claimed by Colombia, an overall maritime boundary. The court also announced that it would continue to study the case, in order to eventually determine a future boundary. Nicaragua hopes to gain sovereignty over the cays surrounding the archipelago - Roncador, Quitasueño and Serrana.

While Ortega initially accepted the ICJ verdict, he became increasingly belligerent and changed his position, insisting that, by maintaining military vigilance in the disputed zone, Colombia was "defying" the ruling. At the Grupo Rio Summit, Uribe reportedly agreed to withdraw Colombian navy warships along the 82nd meridian. However these promises proved short-lived. In response to a decree issued by Ortega on 12 March authorising a special fishing zone in a maritime area considered by Colombia to be its own, beyond the 82nd meridian, Colombia's foreign minister Fernando Araújo once again invoked the 1928 treaty and called on Nicaragua to "respect national territory".

• ICJ ruling

President Daniel Ortega's rhetoric over the maritime dispute seems to wax and wane in intensity according to the current state of Venezuela's relations with Colombia. His decision to ratchet up his rhetoric over the dispute from January onwards coincided with Venezuela's escalation of verbal hostilities with Colombia and its proposal for an Alba Defence Council, along the lines of the South American Defence Council mooted by Brazil's President Lula da Silva during a visit to Caracas in December, to form a collective defence strategy. His restoration of ties followed the "normalisation" of Venezuela's relations with Colombia.

It is a noteworthy occurrence when Latin American governments speak with one voice. A directive approved by the European parliament on the return of illegal immigrants elicited such a response: a unanimous and emphatic rejection from governments of different political hues across the region.

Under the new directive, which follows measures by the US to tighten immigration laws, illegal immigrants can be detained for up to 18 months and blacklisted for re-entrance to the European Union (EU) for up to five years. If the directive is approved at a European Council meeting in July, member states will have two years in which to bring it into effect.

In a long and emotive open letter to the European Parliament just before the vote on 18 June, Bolivia's President Evo Morales said the “directive of vengeance" violated the principle of reciprocity. Morales said that Latin Americans had historically welcomed tens of thousands of Europeans fleeing persecution and financial crisis “without visas or conditions imposed on them" while the EU had repaid this kindness by “drastic hardening of the detention and expulsion conditions for undocumented immigrants, regardless of the time they have lived in European countries, their work situation, their family ties, or their ability and achievements to integrate."

Morales especially criticised the clause in the directive which stipulates that undocumented immigrants could be held in custody for up to 18 months before their expulsion as a violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. He questioned why Bolivia should confer “judicial protection" in areas such as trade liberalisation and financial services under the association agreement being negotiated between the EU and the Andean Community (CAN) when “judicial protection" is being denied Bolivian migrants. He threatened to impose visa obligations on Europeans.

Morales said that expelling the migrants would be detrimental, both to the interests of EU member states, from a demographic and financial perspective, and Latin American countries, primarily by severing the economic lifeline provided by remittances. These account for more than 10% of Bolivia's GDP (US$1.1bn) or a third of natural gas exports.

Bolivia's Vice-president, Álvaro Garcí­a Linera, backed up Morales saying that the EU had regressed 1,000 years to the time of “obscurantism", which Nietzsche claimed sought “to blacken our picture of the world and darken our idea of existence." With characteristic hyperbole, Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega said the directive amounted to “state terrorism".

Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez picked up where Ortega left off. He said the guidelines showed “signs of fascism" and that EU member states would have to “build concentration camps" to hold illegal immigrants. He said he would cut off oil exports to any member state that applied the directive and reconsider that country's investment in Venezuela. He added that Venezuela would apply its own “return directive", taking over given European companies and “returning" their investment. The EU's foreign policy chief Javier Solana said that Chávez 's threat was “totally disproportionate".

Disproportionate response?

The “return directive" is not as draconian as it is portrayed. First, it is not obligatory for member states to deport an illegal immigrant. If they choose to do so, the immigrant will have a “voluntary departure period" of up to 30 days whereupon a “removal order" would be issued. They would only be placed in custody if a judicial authority adjudges that they might try to abscond.

The maximum period of custody is six months and can only be extended to 18 months in exceptional cases. Illegal immigrants can currently be held indefinitely in some EU member states, including the UK, although 18 months is a longer period than in two-thirds of the 27 member states. Furthermore, while member states will not be permitted to apply harsher rules to illegal immigrants they are allowed to maintain or adopt more generous rules. Spain, which receives a large percentage of Latin American emigrants, made it clear that nothing would change as a result of the directive; it will merely extend its custody period from 40 to 60 days.

The Spanish Prime Minister, José Luis Rodrí­guez Zapatero, who has only just patched up relations with Venezuela after the notorious “ ¿Por que no te callas?" episode involving King Juan Carlos I and President Chávez in November 2007, said the directive had been misunderstood. He said he would ensure that it was explained to Chávez and other Latin American heads of state.

Setback for EU-CAN association agreement

Ecuador's President Rafael Correa was distinctly unimpressed despite Spanish assurances that thousands of Ecuadorean immigrants would be unaffected. He said there was no point in negotiating an association agreement with “a union of countries that criminalises emigrants" and threatened to pull out of negotiations with the EU altogether. He said it was pointless to talk about free trade if free movement of people was clearly off the agenda. He also called for a “regional front" to respond to the “shameful" initiative.

Peru, while eschewing such confrontational rhetoric, is leading the campaign to forge a regional consensus against the directive. It managed to ensure that the permanent council of the Organization of American States will convene to discuss the issue at an extraordinary session on 26 June.

It is a sign of just how incensed Latin American countries are about the EU's action that Peru, which is much keener on an association agreement with the EU than Ecuador is, should take such an active role against the directive. Peru's President Alan Garcí­a said it was surprising that a continent which faces a falling birth rate and an aging population and needs a fresh, young population should “turn its back on history".

The country's foreign minister, José Antonio Garcí­a Belaúnde, who complained that the EU had not once consulted Peru about the directive despite the association agreement including articles on immigration, said the new measures were discriminatory. He said that Peru would lobby individual EU member states not to implement them.

• Southern Cone reaction

Mercosur sent a note of protest denouncing the “tough law" as violating human rights. Uruguay's senate advocated taking the issue to the UN in the face of “the flagrant incongruence of the EU that has been nourished by Latin American immigrants and benefited from their hard work and honesty". The Argentine foreign ministry released a statement criticising the restrictions and periods of detention. Brazil's Itamaraty condemned the law which it said created a “negative perception of immigration" while Chile's foreign office said it “tends to criminalise irregular migrants, subjecting them to procedures that could damage their basic rights."

Hopes for a breakthrough in the talks between the government of President Evo Morales and the opposition prefects have once again foundered, despite initial optimism regarding an agreement [WR-08-38]. After further deadlock over the new constitution, Tarija prefect Mario Cossí­o announced that talks were “temporarily" suspended following the arrest of a Tarijan citizen, accused of instigating an attack on a gas pipeline. With interior minister Alfredo Rada declaring that the security forces are “on alert" for further possible outbreaks of violence, an immediate solution to the political crisis looks increasingly remote.

Even the most vehement opposition prefect, Rubén Costas, had optimistically floated the possibility that a “first accord" would be signed by 5 October [WR-08-38]. This now looks unlikely. The sticking point is the issue of reconciling the prefects' autonomy demands with the new draft constitution, although the government once again showed itself willing to negotiate.

In a move which did not go down well with Morales' more radical supporters, Vice-President Alvaro Garcí­a Linera declared that autonomy was the one aspect of the new constitution which awaited modification. He was clear, however, that no other issues were up for debate, stressing that it was “unacceptable" that the constitutional text be modified at the behest of “small minorities".

The unwillingness of the prefects to play ball soon became apparent, with demands that at least 34 points of the new constitution be debated, including those relating to private property and re-election. Then on 1 October, Cossí­o declared, on behalf of the other opposition prefects, that talks were “temporarily suspended" on the pretext that the government was “persecuting" citizens and leaders from their regions. His claim followed the arrest of a Tarijan, accused of perpetrating attacks on the Yacuiba-Rí­o Grande gas pipeline during the attacks on state property last month [WR-08-36]. At the time of going to press, the government's response was to express “concern" for the “unilateral rupture" in talks, and to urge the prefects to return to the negotiating table.

• Parties divided

The prospect of changing the new draft constitution is reportedly dividing both the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and the opposition alliance, Podemos. For example within the MAS, politicians such as minister for rural development, Carlos Romero and deputy minister for decentralisation, Fabián Yaksic have declared themselves open to amending the draft constitution, while interior minister, Alfredo Rada, and nationalisation minister, Héctor Arce,  resolutely oppose any such changes. 

In the case of the opposition, the leader of the Podemos bench in the senate, Roger Pinto, said on 29 September that Podemos would respect agreements made between the government and opposition prefects during talks in Cochabamba. The announcement came as a fillip to the government given that ultimately a law calling for a referendum on the new constitution will have to be approved by two-thirds of congress, which implies an agreement between both parties. However, another faction of Podemos, which includes the president of the senate, Oscar Ortiz, insists that the draft constitution should be discarded altogether, on the grounds that it was approved “illegally".

The ruling Concertación faces a stern challenge from the Left in December's presidential elections, perhaps stern enough to allow the Right to come to power for the first time since the return to democracy in 1990. The challenge is being spearheaded by a veteran politician from the Partido Socialista (PS), Jorge Arrate, who quit the party last week to set up a broad leftwing coalition, including dissident Socialists and the Partido Comunista, shortly before the PS leadership became the second of the four constituent parties of the Concertación to nominate former president Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) as its presidential candidate. Frei already has the support of his party, Democracia Cristiana (DC).

Arrate, a former education minister under Patricio Aylwin (1990 to 1994), and a former president of the PS, announced last week that he was leaving the party after 46 years to set up a united leftwing movement. Arrate said that it pained him to leave the PS but he could not in conscience stay while the party hierarchy sold out on its Socialist ideals in order to prop up an increasingly centrist Concertación. He said that the PS, the party of President Michelle Bachelet, should have put forward its own presidential candidate to compete in the Concertación's primary elections in April rather than just meekly supporting Frei.

The PS party leadership confirmed Frei as its candidate days after a young PS deputy, Marco Enrí­quez-Ominami, announced his intention to stand in the primaries. There was scant turnout for Frei's nomination, and Enrí­quez-Ominami said he would persevere with his intention to run for president even if it meant leaving the PS and standing in the primaries as an independent. He said that the PS was immersed in a profound crisis and that Arrate was an expression of this.

Frei did his best to reach out to the PS by extolling the achievements of several of the party's past luminaries, but the unity which he called for as a prerequisite for the Concertación to triumph over the right-wing coalition Alianza por Chile in December's elections was conspicuous by its absence. The day after Frei's nomination, some 200 PS dissidents belonging to the Socialistas Allendistas faction of the party decided to back Arrate as their presidential candidate. The faction is on the radical fringe of the PS, taking its name from former president Salvador Allende.

Arrate had clearly been contemplating his exit for some time. He had already drawn up an electoral manifesto, including a new constitution; the “second nationalisation of the copper industry"; an end to the political exclusion entrenched by the binominal system; greater environmental protection; and a minimum wage of Ch$250,000 (US$400) a month, nearly 60% more than the current level.

Several other party grandees also left the PS out of disillusionment with the party's political direction. These included Carlos Altamirano, one of the most influential politicians in the PS who feld into exile in Cuba after the coup in 1973. Last November, senator Alejandro Navarro, another party heavyweight, left the PS to form his own leftwing political outfit, Movimiento Amplio Social (MAS). Navarro was one of the senators who received most votes in the last congressional elections.

A modern Left
Arrate said that his main ambition was to unify the Left so that voters would have more choice than just a Right-wing candidate (Sebastián Piñera of the Alianza) or a centrist candidate (Frei). He said he had tried to persuade the PS party leadership to push for primary elections in the Concertación to include the leftwing Juntos Podemos Más (JPM), comprising the Partido Comunista (PC) and Partido Humanista (PH), which left the Concertación more than 15 years ago, but to no avail. He argued that the presence of the JPM in the primary elections would have shaken up the Concertación by broadening the political spectrum.

Arrate immediately proposed primary elections to choose a candidate to lead his left-wing movement. He sounded out Navarro, as well as the leader of the PH, Tomás Hirsch, who won 5.4% of the vote in the 2005 presidential elections as the JPM candidate, and the head of the PC, Guillermo Teillier, who was nominated as a presidential candidate last September by his party.

Hirsch welcomed Arrate's proposal, while the MAS released a communiqué last week praising Arrate for leaving the PS. It predicted that either he or Navarro would lead a united Left against “the political centre represented by Eduardo Frei, […] responsible for installing the deeply unequal model of neoliberalism, and Piñera, a rightwing businessman and one of the biggest speculators in Latin America."

If the left-wing coalition takes shape, it will take votes away from the Concertación, just as another dissident from the coalition, Adolfo Zaldí­var, will. Zaldí­var was recently nominated by the Partido Regionalista de los Independientes (PRI) as its presidential candidate [WR-09-02]. This will play into the hands of Piñera, provided he can maintain the unity of the Alianza, composed of his Renovación Nacional (RN) party and the Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and further exploit the divisions in the Concertación.

Frei downplayed the significance of the divisions in the Concertación, and is already on the campaign trail. He accused the Alianza this week of being out of step with the times by opposing an increase in fiscal spending. He said the Bachelet administration was following the example of the developed world in “confronting the (present financial) crisis with more state."

Binominal obstacle
Frei's insouciance in the face of the threat from the Left is based on one assumption and one fact. The assumption is that he will be capable of forcing a run-off in the presidential elections, at which point the Left will have to support him. The PC, interestingly, this week denied any agreement to back the Concertación in the event of a second round.

The fact, and the biggest hurdle facing a left-wing coalition, is the binominal electoral system. A relic of the Pinochet era, this is purpose-built to exclude third parties from obtaining congressional seats. There has long been talk about replacing this system with proportional representation but any move in this direction has ultimately foundered on the lack of political will within the Alianza and the Concertación to change a system which benefits them.

• Primaries

The presidents of the four parties that make up the ruling Concertación said this week that there would be separate primary elections held across Chile, starting with Region VI O'Higgins and Region VII Maule on 5 April and finishing with the metropolitan region on 17 May. Eduardo Frei, of the Democracia Cristiana (DC) is still hopeful of avoiding the necessity of primaries but José Antonio Gómez, of the Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD), is still determined to stand in the contest. Party presidents agreed that pre-candidates would take part in a debate on 30 March.