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Crime has once again moved to the top of the agenda in Antigua and elsewhere following the murder of a British honeymoon couple at their hotel on 27 July. However with no political consensus on how best to tackle the scourge, the situation is unlikely to improve in the near future.

On 30 July, Prime Minister Baldwin Spencer announced that the government intended to revise the Magistrate's Code of Procedure Act in order to restrict magistrates' power to grant bail for certain offences such as robbery, murder and attempted murder.

However, chairman of the main opposition Antigua Labour Party (ALP), Gaston Browne, dismissed the proposal, arguing that all it would do would “incarcerate innocent people for extended periods in the sense that they will be denied the option of bail […] What they should be focusing on is to increase the penalties for certain types of grievous offences."

Coupling his support for stiffer penalties with the need to protect “the civil liberties and rights of the people", he argued that without bail, innocent citizens could be held in jail for up to two years.

The opposition's objections also undoubtedly have a political tinge, with former ALP prime minister Lester Bird accusing the ruling United Progressive Party (UPP) of failing to engage with the opposition over its anti-crime strategy.  He complained: “The ALP is staggered that instead of summoning a national consultation on crime and security involving all the stakeholders in our country, the UPP leader is continuing to behave as an emperor and is pursuing his own agenda."

The ALP has been more supportive of a proposal to amend the Firearms Act in order to provide stronger penalties for gun-related offences. Browne has said the ALP will back this, but he has also called for increased funding for anti-crime efforts so that the government can recruit more police officers and purchase equipment for surveillance.

Meanwhile the leader of the ALP in the House of Representatives, Steadroy “Cutie" Benjamin, is currently under pressure to resign over his endorsement of a fraudulent passport application by a Jamaican.

Alberto Guevara, the finance minister, forecasts that the economy will average real annual GDP growth of 2% between 2009 and 2013. He expects inflation to average between 4% and 5%. The government is trying to gloss over the unwelcome fact that the economy will contract by 1% in 2009, thanks to weaker exports, investment and remittances. In the 2010 budget, the government is hoping for 1% GDP growth. This will be followed by 2.5% growth in 2011 and 3.5% in 2012 and 4% in 2013. The government is forecasting that inflation this year will be around 2.6% and 3% in 2010.  In 2008 the economy grew by 3.2%, but inflation was 13.8%.

Trade: In the first 10 months of 2009 export receipts fell 9.2% year-on-year according to figures from the Centro de Trámites de las Exportaciones (Cetrex). Exports were valued at US$1.24bn in the first 10 months, down from US$1.36bn in the same period of 2008.  In calendar 2008, exports rose 24% on 2007 to reach US$1.54bn.

Budget: The budget for 2010 was set at C$25.2bn (US$1.2bn), though spending will be C$31bn (US$1.5bn). The proposed deficit of US$282m will be covered by aid and loans. The budget has to be approved by congress by 15 December. The rightwing opposition say that the proposal is far too optimistic.

Jamaica has both a serious debt problem (with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 130%) and a serious growth problem.   Constrained by a US$1.27bn IMF Stand-by Agreement, Jamaica is struggling to improve its growth prospects and is hinting at moves that will be opposed by the international lender.

The latest economic indicators suggest that the Jamaican economy declined by 1.1%-1.3% in 2010 (after falls of 2.7% in 2009 and 0.4% in 2008), although there were some signs of slowing decline in the fourth quarter - and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) is now suggesting a return to growth in the first quarter of 2011.

This anaemic return to growth has done nothing to alleviate fears about Jamaica's continuing propensity to lag behind its competitors.   The IMF is expecting Jamaica to grow by just 1.3% per annum over the next five years, a third of the projected average growth of the world economy.

The IMF, however, is not doing much to help.   The current stand-by agreement, signed in February 2010 does little to address the growth problem.   And in February this year, the IMF began to express concerns about Jamaica possibly not meeting all the performance targets set by the loan agreement.   The IMF warned, inter alia, about delays in the public-sector rationalization plan.   It also warned about mounting spending pressures and delays in some fiscal reforms.

Prime Minister Bruce Golding continues to assure that the tight economic measures stipulated by the loan agreement will be adhered to, but the local daily, Jamaica Gleaner has also reported that Golding is discussing a new economic strategy with Finance Minster Audley Shaw.   Golding is reported as saying: “I am hoping that we can allow enough fiscal space to put some money back into the economy, so that people can start working again and start spending again because we think that it is critical to support the investments that we want to see."

At the beginning of March, the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) published a “Growth Inducement Strategy for Jamaica" aimed at overcoming the constraints that have led to 35 years of “near stagnation".   The report specifically looks at measures to boost short-term growth, and it argues that “aggressive front-loading and implementation" of short-term growth projects could add up to 3.1 percentage points to 2011 growth projections of 2.1%.   With the government facing elections by September 2012, such an immediate boost in growth must look attractive.   The PIOJ says implementing these short-term measures would need a total expenditure of J$14.4bn, about 1% of GDP.  

A strange episode in October has revealed that there are still within the Brazilian army, in influential positions, elements who remain unrepentant of the criminal activities they engaged in during the period of military rule that followed the 1964 coup. This forced Lula and the army high command to dissociate the government from them. After the event, hints have emerged that the incident was staged for this purpose.

On 17 October the newspaper Correio Braziliense published a photograph purportedly showing the journalist Vladimir Herzog, naked and bearing signs of ill treatment, shortly before he was reportedly found, in October 1975 hanging from his neck in his cell. At the time his death was ruled to have been suicide. That same day the army's information office, the Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército (CCSE), issued a communiqué which started out by justifying the methods used at the time by the security forces as 'a legitimate response to the violence of those who eschewed dialogue, opted for radicalism and illegality and took the initiative of rising in arms and unleashing criminal actions'.

This included the 'structure created to support, in operations and intelligence, the activities needed to de-structure the radical and illegal movements.' The communiqué goes on to say that the action of the military, 'the fruit of public clamour, undoubtedly created the conditions for the construction of a new Brazil, in an atmosphere of peace and security' - and that this rendered the repressive apparatus 'obsolete'. As to the deaths that resulted, it adds, the defence ministry has repeatedly noted that there is no documentary evidence, since all operational and intelligence records were - quite legally - destroyed. 'Any testimony disseminated by the media, third parties or documents perhaps stored in personal archives,' it says, 'is not the responsibility of the armed forces.'

An irate Lula summoned defence minister and the commander of the army, General Francisco Roberto de Albuquerque, for explanations. Even before the meeting, the offending communiqué was removed from the CCSE's website; after it, Albuquerque issued a new one. He said the publication of the first 'inappropriate' document had been the result of 'the absence of a deep enough internal discussion on the subject'. He expressed regret, on behalf of the army, for Herzog's death, noting that even at the time it had led to the dismissal of the commander of the second army, General Eduardo Dávila Mello. 'For the good of democracy and committed to the laws of the land, the army does not wish to revive events of a tragic past that Brazil underwent,' he added.

Twist in the tale
This did not suffice to stifle calls already circulating in congress for a full inquiry into the circumstances of Herzog's death. But an unexpected twist in the tale surfaced on 21 October, when human rights secretary Nilmário Miranda announced that the photo published by Correio had been in the public domain since 1997, when an army corporal handed over to congress three boxes of documents proving the extent of the military's illegal domestic intelligence operations. This had been reported to Miranda by the Agência Brasileira de Inteligência (Abin), which had had no trouble tracking the photo back to the archives of the lower chamber's human rights committee. The photo appears to date back to a 1974 investigation conducted by the SNI, Abin's predecessor. It was the only one that showed a naked person, and the only one not carried by the media in 1997. While all other photos were identified, this one was not linked by anyone to Herzog at the time. So was it all a setup?

The Argentine and Uruguayan dispute over the construction of two cellulose plants near the Uruguayan town of Fray Bentos and on the banks of the River Uruguay has now reached its first anniversary.

For Uruguay, the project represents the biggest foreign investment in the country to date. Two European firms, Finnish Botnia and Spanish ENCE, are constructing the paper mills with a combined budget of some US$1,800m.

Protestors on the Argentine side of the river, in the province of Entre Rí­os, argue that the paper mills will irreversibly pollute the river, causing extensive ecological damage and affect their own tourism-dependent economy.

The dispute has now been taken to two separate international bodies in an attempt to break the deadlock.

At The Hague

Argentina presented its case at the International Court of Justice at The Hague on 8 June. Their lawyers argue the environmental case and accuse Uruguay of breaking the 1975 Uruguay River statute which included a pollution clause. Under the terms of this agreement, the two nations pledged to consult each other on matters affecting their river border.  

A definitive ruling from this body could take as long as five years, although Argentina is looking for a temporary halt to construction while further, independent environmental studies can be carried out.  

The NGO Centro de Derechos Humanos y Medioambiente (CEDHA) has also been presenting the Argentine case at various departments of the European Commission and even to representatives of the European banks financing the investment, including Spanish BBVA. CEDHA argues, furthermore, that Europe maintains "double standards" and that no such mills would be approved within the EU.

Uruguay, on the other hand, attempted to take the case to Mercosur for a direct resolution, but Argentina blocked its neighbour's access to the dispute-settlement body. Mercosur is currently involved in the settlement claim, but on a side issue, rather than on the central question of the paper mills themselves.  

Uruguay maintains that protestors in Entre Rí­os province illegally blocked the international bridges across the waterway for 40 days and thus contravened the terms of the customs union. The Argentine government did not take measures to prevent the road blocks and damage to Uruguayan trade and tourism has been estimated as high as US$500m.  

On 5 June Gustavo Fernández Saavedra, an ex-Bolivian foreign minister, joined Argentine Héctor Masnatta and Uruguayan José Marí­a Gamio to form the panel that will be responsible for Mercosur's mediation from Asunción . They have yet to announce their verdict, but their decision will not be subject to appeal.  

From Uruguayan opinion polls, it has become clear that the country perceives the dispute as an encroachment on its internal affairs by a domineering larger neighbour. National pride, as well as profit, is at stake. A mid June survey reveals 80% of Uruguayans to be in favour of the project, with a mere 8% opposing it. The figures from December 2005 were 62% and 11% respectively. Uruguayan President Tabaré Vázquez asserted on 21 June that Uruguay was "not a province or state of any other country; it is a free, independent and sovereign country".  

The dispute has raised fundamental questions about Mercosur's ability to resolve disputes between its members. Vázquez expressed his dissatisfaction with the organisation by allegedly threatening on 1 May to downgrade Uruguay's status to that of associate member. He also rejected further dialogue with Argentina as fruitless.  

Mercosur's failure

Part of Mercosur's difficulty lies with the current president of the committee of permanent Mercosur representatives, Carlos 'Chacho' Álvarez. An ex-Argentine president close to Kirchner, he has kept his distance from the conflict. As a result, Mercosur has not played the central role that it might have done in resolving the two members' clash.  

On 17 June Álvarez denied that Mercosur was suffering from a "terminal crisis" although he did admit that it was "facing problems". However, he pointed to the impending admission of Venezuela as a full member as a sign of Mercosur's continued viability. Venezuela is not only South America's third-largest economy, but it is also an oil producer, Álvarez added.  

Paraguay, the other small nation of the Mercosur bloc, was quick to defend the organisation. The foreign minister, Leila Rachid, said on 20 June that Paraguay would not leave Mercosur "under any circumstances".

For the time being, both Argentina and Uruguay remain at loggerheads and await a response from Mercosur and from The Hague. At the Botnia mill, construction continues apace, with the company preparing to almost double its workforce, from 2,500 to 4,500, between July and August. Construction on the ENCE plant has yet to begin.  

However, it is unclear whether a ruling will silence protest, and activists in Gualeguaychú, a city in Entre Rí­os across the river from Fray Bentos, have already threatened to continue their campaign if building continues past July.

On 17 October British newspaper The Guardian reported that the government of the United Kingdom is planning to claim sovereign rights over a vast area of the seabed off the Antarctic. The report was later confirmed by the British foreign office. The reports on London's ambitions raised concerns in Santiago and, as expected, Buenos Aires. 

Just a quarter of century ago Argentina and the UK fought a war in the South Atlantic Ocean over the sovereignty of the Falklands Islands. Last month we reported the angry Argentine response to UK plans to submit a bid to the United Nations proving that thousands of extra square miles of the ocean floor surrounding the Falklands are geographically part of the islands.

The UK claim over the Falklands' seabed is based on international legislation stating that a nation's legitimately-held territory can extend up to 350 miles from its coast; if it can verify that it is part of the shoreline's underlying continental shelf. The UK plans to claim sovereignty over more than 1m square kilometres of Antarctic seabed on the same premise. 

Falklands
Argentina and the UK fought a war in 1982, after Argentine forces invaded the Falklands Islands, a British Overseas Territory. The UK won but sovereignty over the islands, which the Argentines call Malvinas, is still passionately contested by many in Argentina - in spite of, or perhaps because of, two-thirds of the 907 people who lost their lives in the conflict were Argentine youths.

The Falklands issue has long been used by Argentine politicians to find support among the masses and this has been no different during the current administration of President Néstor Kirchner [RBS-07-04]. The UK prospective claim over the islands' seabed, however, has certainly not helped to soothe the Argentine mood. Kirchner and his officials seized the opportunity created by the seabed claim to press the UK government to negotiate sovereignty over the Falklands. 

However, the Argentine demand for a complete reversal of the status quo remains as unrealistic as ever. Despite the fact that the Falklands are inhabited by descendents of English and Scottish settlers, who speak English and have remained loyal to their mother country for over 170 years, the Argentine government still claims the islands' sovereignty.

For many Argentine nationalists, however, the Falklands' proximity to Argentine territory is strong enough argument to claim sovereignty over the islands. Furthermore, the prospective UK claim for its seabed has also now increased suspicion among other, more cautious, Argentines, who have started to wonder whether the UK is determined to secure long-term strategic and resource-based interests in the South Atlantic which could be detrimental to Argentina.

Antarctic Treaty
Significantly, the prospective UK claim over the Antarctic seems to have provoked the same reaction also among the even more cautious Chileans. Indeed, the Chilean government issued a statement on 18 October "making public [its] reservations" to the confirmed preparation of the UK claim for the Antarctic seabed.

While the UK sovereignty over the Falklands should not be contested, the same cannot be said of its claim over the British Antarctic Territory. This is a triangular wedge, with its apex at the South Pole, which covers 666,000 square miles. The territory was first claimed in 1908 and the UK maintains two permanently-manned scientific stations there. 

Both Argentina and Chile also claim sovereignty over parts of the same sector of the Antarctic claimed by the UK and, therefore, could also claim sovereignty over the Antarctic seabed. Significantly, both countries are geographically closer to the Antarctic and also have scientific stations there. The Chilean government has settled a few families in the Antarctic at Villa las Estrellas, and there are Argentine and Chilean children who have actually been born in the continent. 

Furthermore, in order to avoid hostilities Argentina, Chile and the UK - together with four other countries that also have territorial claims over the frozen continent (Australia, France, Norway and New Zealand) - signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. Crucially, the Antarctic treaty did not recognise or established any claims to territorial sovereignty in the frozen continent. 

A further treaty, the Environmental Protocol, agreed in 1991, was supposed to have eased any remaining hostility, especially after the Falklands war, by forbidding all mineral activity other than for scientific research. Therefore, the UK claim would be in defiance of the spirit of the Antarctic Treaty, not least because it specifically states that no new claims shall be asserted over the continent, and subsequently over Antarctic seabed and its resources. 

Triggers and prospects
The prospective UK claims seem to have been triggered by the ticking clock set by the 1982 UN convention on the law of the sea, which requires all coastal states to notify the UN of the outer limits of their continental shelves by May 2009. Indeed, the British foreign office declared to the BBC that the claim over the Antarctic sea bed was "a safeguard for the future". Moreover, Australia and France are rumoured to be preparing claims to the UN for the Antarctic seabed.

In an article in The Guardian Alan Boyle, a law professor at the University of Edinburgh, argued that the UK claim would not necessarily mean a violation nor a threat to the Antarctic Treaty. Boyle said that "defining the outer limits of the shelf changes nothing and confers no new rights to anyone", adding that the extraction of oil, gas and minerals is forbidden under the treaty's Environmental Protocol. He concluded that the claim would actually serve to "reinforce [the UK's] ability to enforce commitments" under the treaty and the protocol. 

Yet for the editors of The Guardian, other commentators and, significantly, for environmentalists, the UK move "is likely to signal a quickening of the race for territory around the South Pole in the world's least explored continent". Indeed, the Argentine foreign minister, Jorge Taiana, confirmed to the Buenos Aires Herald that Argentina was also preparing to submit a claim for the Antarctic seabed "in defence of national interest and sovereign rights". 

The Chilean government, meanwhile, asked Argentina and the UK government to continue to "comply with the Antarctic Treaty". Jorge Tarud, a Chilean congressman from the governing coalition, however, was quoted as saying that on 25 October a congress committee would be visiting Antarctica to "make use of the usual and natural sovereignty Chile has always had over that territory". 

This view has been confirmed by a declaration by Chile's foreign minister, Alejandro Foxley, who said on 22 October that "nobody can infringe Chile's rights over its Antarctic territory". In any case, Foxley said that the confirmation that the UK was planning to present a claim for Antarctic seabed had prompted the Chilean government to do the same. The race for the Antarctic is on. 

• Protecting the Antarctic
  The Antarctic is regarded as the first place that will see big impacts from global warming according to scientists. Temperature in the continent has risen by as much as three degrees centigrade in the past fifty years in some places. This had adverse effects in the environment, especially the wildlife, which is under threat from non-native species. WWF, a UK-based environmental NGO, has asked for the creation of protected areas in the Antarctic, especially large parts of its surrounding oceans. 
  
• Ozone hole
  Chilean scientists claimed the hole in the ozone layer in the southern pole has decreased from the 26m square kilometres it was a year ago to 22m square kilometres now. Scientist, however, warned people in the Punta Arenas and Magallanes region in the extreme south of the country that the danger levels from extreme sun radiation were still very high and could reach the maximum 7UV measure as the hole annually moves from the heart of the Antarctic to South America. 
  

Although the slowdown is accelerating, the economy should still register some growth in 2009. The consensus is that real GDP growth will reach 1.5% annually in 2009, down from 8.9% in 2008. Interestingly, none of the independent analysts polled by the central bank expect the economy to contract in 2009.  Most expect the first quarter to be the most difficult. Further out, analysts remain cautious about 2010. The consensus is for real GDP growth of only 1.1% next year.

According to the central bank president, Mario Bergara, the country's GDP now stands at about US$32.2bn. Although Bergara said that last year's growth rate was exceptional. It was, in fact, slightly disappointing: independent analysts had expected a double digit result. The big problem was the final quarter when growth withered to just 0.8% year-on-year. Bergara argued that this was actually a success, as neighbouring economies contracted in the final quarter. By quarter, the GDP growth rates in 2008 were: 7.8%; 10.3%; 9.9% and 0.8%. The central bank also revised its annual GDP figures for 2006 and 2007 to 4.6% and 7.6% respectively.

On 24 November, the finance minister, Guido Mantega, confirmed in his post for another term by President-elect Dilma Rousseff, said he would oversee some R$20bn (US$11.6bn) in budget cuts in 2011 and said he had been given a mandate by Rousseff to take an axe to public spending. Rousseff's economic team suggests strong continuity with the existing market-friendly policy tripod of inflation targeting, primary fiscal surpluses and a (managed) free-floating currency. A confident and assured Rousseff is saying all the right things.

Mantega also said the new government would reduce its transfers to the national development bank, Bndes, by some R$50bn (US$29bn). Mantega has been painted as a free spending statist, but for weeks now he has been signalling a shift away from the recent expansionary fiscal policy, with the state stepping back to allow the private sector to take up the economic running. In 2008 and 2009 the federal government transferred some R$200bn (US$116bn) annually to Bndes in order to prop up domestic credit during the global economic crisis. Rousseff has now acknowledged that public spending needs to come down in order to lower the pressure on interest rates (and the currency) and these latest moves represent the first clear signal of fiscal retrenchment in 2011. It comes at an opportune moment - latest data put mid-November inflation at a five-month high of 5.2% year-on-year, on surging food prices. Moreover, the latest (October 2010) primary fiscal surplus result was the weakest since December 2001 (see sidebar).

Dilma had promised to retain the current fiscal targets and aims to reduce the public debt burden to 30% of GDP by 2014, from the current 40%. On 18 November, however, the Lula government sent down to congress a bill to reduce the primary surplus target to 3.1% of GDP, from 3.3%, in 2010 and 2011. The proposal follows a treasury decision to remove the state firm Eletrobrás from the primary surplus calculations. It previously stripped out Petrobras. The idea is to gradually remove all state firms. Investments by these entities count as primary expenses and so weigh negatively on the fiscal result. By removing them, the government can thus reduce its primary surplus target. Opposition economists reject the official argument that this allows for greater transparency and dismiss it as 'creative accounting'.

These same critics are equally concerned about Mantega's proposal to “purge" the national IPCA consumer price inflation index of some food and energy items. Mantega argues that such a move (which would reflect the US Federal Reserve) would allow for a reduction in the central bank's targeted inflation range and thus reduce the pressure for high interest rates. He has long argued that the bank is forced to overreact to transitory price movements triggered by external shocks; global food prices are regularly impacted by temporary climactic conditions for instance. Mantega accepts that the reform might make it more difficult to identify structural changes in food and fuel prices, but he points out that the central bank's monetary policy committee, Copom, works with multiple inflation indices. Notably, Mantega will sit along with the new central bank president Alexandre Tombini, the new planning minister Miriam Belchior (and five others) on the Copom. The Dilma government will set the 2012 and 2013 inflation targets in June 2011. Meanwhile, Tombini may be forced to risk Mantega and Dilma's wrath by lifting the benchmark Selic interest rate from its current 10.25% as soon as he takes office in January. Tombini said on 24 November that Dilma had promised him “full autonomy" to control inflation.  

• Fiscal decline continues

According to the central bank, the consolidated public sector primary surplus was R$9.738bn in October, giving an accumulated result of R$86.67bn, the equivalent of 2.99% of GDP, below the recently downwards revised target of 3.1% of GDP. That result excluded Eletrobrás, as per the new methodology. Moreover, accumulated debt payments in the first ten months came to R$157.31bn, a series high (dating to 2001), and the equivalent of 5.42% of GDP.   The nominal deficit was R$70.63bn in the same period (2.5% of GDP).

Following two massive demonstrations, the resignation of the interior minister and the opposition's threat to set up a parallel congress-in-exile, the government has invited the UN to examine the legality of the country's reconstituted supreme court. At present the country is in political gridlock, thanks largely to the government's decision to replace 27 of the supreme court's 31 judges in December 2004. 

On 16 February tens of thousands of demonstrators marched on Quito. The overwhelming majority of demonstrators were protesting against the Gutiérrez administration's increasingly authoritarian tendencies. Despite the cries of "Fuera Lucio!" ("Get out, Lucio"), however, the demonstration was less an attempt to bring down the government than to demand the repeal of its more controversial legislation and in particular, the changes to the supreme court. Twenty-four hours after the march, the protest leaders, the so-called "Quito Assembly" began work on a document detailing the steps the government should take to reinstate institutional democracy. Although the opposition is united in its outrage at the pro-government majority's tampering with the judiciary, it has not yet been able to agree on a way of establishing a new supreme court.

Another resignation
Less than a week later Jaime Damerval, the interior minister, resigned. Damerval, who played an important part in undermining the opposition's attempts to impeach the president in November 2004, is the fourth interior minister to quit the government. The choice of the respected lawyer and columnist on the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC)-leaning daily El Universo initially proved inspired. Having no overt party political links and an aversion to Gutiérrez's personal bête noire, PSC leader León Febres Cordero, on taking up office Damerval announced his purpose was to "try to divide the opposition so that it fails to gather the necessary votes in congress to continue with the impeachment process". 

He succeeded handsomely, along with the help of the president's estranged wife, Ximena Bohorquez, Xavier Ledesma, who now takes over as interior minister, and Óscar Ayerve, Ledesma's replacement as minister of the presidency. The two men are credited with forging the government's alliances with the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) and Partido Renovador Institutional Acción Nacional (Prian). Considering Damerval's centre-right political outlook, his position at the heart of the Gutiérrez administration always seemed incongruous; he had tried to resign once already, at the end of January, but the president had refused to accept it. Unlike his predecessor, Raúl Baca, who stepped down to appease the government's allies, Damerval's letter of resignation attacked the government for its failure to resolve the judicial crisis, to push through its proposal for a referendum on political reform and to pay the local (PSC) government in Guayaquil the money allocated for law and order. Damerval comes from Guayaquil.

While the judicial crisis remains unresolved, Gutiérrez has reiterated his willingness to resort to a "Plan B", involving the stretching of a couple of procedural points dating from the presidency of Gustavo Noboa (2000-2002), to force a referendum on his proposed political reforms if congress refuses to accede to his requests. Damerval's resignation letter expressed his frustration that the government did not turn to that method earlier in order to speed up a referendum on such issues as the reduction in size of congress and the re-election of the president.

Commentators in the local press considered the appointment of Ledesma to the interior ministry and Ayerve to the ministry of the presidency to be a sop to the opposition Izquierda Democrática (ID), which led the march on Quito. Both men were former ID party members and retain links with the party. 

As shrewd political operators, both attracted criticism from the pro-impeachment bloc for their authorship of the alliances that have kept the government afloat. Ayerve has even been described as Gutiérrez's "bagman", following rumours that he bribed a number of opposition deputies to abandon the impeachment bloc. One disgruntled former minister, Patricio Acosta, even accused Ayerve of having ordered some hitmen to take him out.

How effective Ledesma will be in the key government post is open to question. His political star had seemed on the wane over the past few months and he has kept a low profile, partly because of some health problems. According to the rumours emanating from Carondolet, the presidential palace, President Gutiérrez had trouble persuading him to take up the position. 

• Opinion polls
  In a survey conducted by the company Opinion Profiles of 509 people in Quito and Guayaquil, 94.7% of those questioned had "little or no" trust in the country's political parties and 55.3% blamed the government and the opposition equally for the political impasse the country has reached since the government reconstituted the supreme court. As regards Gutiérrez himself, 30.6% described him as "incapable", 16.1% as a "dictator", 7.6% as "intelligent" and 3.3% as "efficient". More than 90% of respondents considered the 100 deputies of the Ecuadorean congress to be doing a bad job.

ECONOMIC OVERVIEW: ECUADOR

Domestic demand is booming, judging from the import figures for December and January. Banks are also beginning to lend again. All this economic brightness helps to explain why the political chaos has had few consequences. The problem is that the political crisis must, inevitably, start to tell on the economy. One early sign of this is that investment expectations, indicated by companies, are beginning to wilt. What is clear is that the economy is unlikely to repeat its performance of December 2004 and January 2005. Imports were up by 37%, year-on-year in December and the demand of fuel and electricity hit a new peak. Electricity demand was 10% up on December 2003 and this rate continued into January. If this continues the country's generating capacity will not be able to cope. Unusually, sales held up in January: usually they fall away after the Christmas boom. In December credit was a thumping 9% up on the amount for the end of November. For a dollarised economy 12% interest rates look excessive, but Ecuadoreans are used to much worse. Trade: Despite the surge in imports in December the country ended 2004 with a trade surplus of US$260m. This was the first time the country had run a trade surplus for four years. Exports were US$7.55bn in 2004, up from US$6bn in 2003. Oil exports in 2004 came to US$3.9bn in 2004. Banana exports were worth US$1bn. China: Exports to China rose 123% year-on-year in 2004, to US$92.2m, the foreign relations ministry said. Unemployment: The rate rose to 11.5% in January from 9.9% in December, the central bank said.

Tension between the government and the opposition, always simmering, is coming to the boil. There are three core issues at stake: the power of the prefects (governors) vis-í -vis the central government; voting procedures in the constituent assembly; and land reform, which we deal with separately on page 9). Things are unlikely to get out of hand, as Bolivia tends to muddle through, but the run-up to the end of 2006 could shape the rest of the mandate of President Evo Morales.

The conflict between the central government and the departmental prefects representing the opposition (six out of nine) is all about power. The government wants congress to have the power to monitor, censure and dismiss prefects; the prefects claim they were elected separately and should not have to be held accountable to the government for their actions. 

The bone of contention is a bill, designed by Fabián Yaksic, the deputy minister of decentralisation, which would empower congress to summon prefects to face questions and remove them from their post. Yaksic argues that the new bill is rendered necessary by the fact that departmental revenues are set to soar over the next few years due to increased revenues from gas exports under the new hydrocarbons law. 

He said that they will increase to Bols$8bn (US$1bn) in 2007, from Bols$5.9bn this year and Bols$3bn in 2004. Yaksic explained, for instance, that Tarija's earnings had quadrupled in the space of two years from Bols$676m (US$84m) in 2004 to Bols$2.4bn (US$300m) in 2006. 

Power clash
The opposition claims that the government is merely seeking to assert its hegemony over the regions. The president of the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia, Roberto Mustafá, warned that the decision to "hold them (the prefects) hostage" ignored the fact that the people voted for them in democratic elections on 18 December 2005 and could lead to confrontation and, ultimately, the fragmentation of Bolivia as the prefects provided the only resistance to the growing power of the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). It is not unusual, it is worth noting, for the opposition to conjure up such apocalyptic visions of Bolivia's future whenever it feels that the government is trying to curb its powers.

José Luis Paredes, the opposition prefect of La Paz, responded to Yaksic's bill by presenting one of his own: the censure of the president. If Paredes's proposal were adopted five prefects would be able to censure the president and compel him to resign. This reduces the government's proposal to the absurd and will clearly gain no headway in the lower chamber where the MAS enjoys a solid majority. 

The opposition prefects held an eight-hour meeting in Cochabamba on 27 November to define their strategy for tackling the government. Before the meeting Paredes called for the formation of a "comité de defensa de la democracia" to act as a counterweight to the government. He said this would include people from "civil society". In practice this would mean opposition politicians, landowners and businessmen from the prosperous east of the country.

Unsurprisingly, the three MAS prefects, of Oruro (Luis Aguilar), Potosí­ (Mario Virreina) and Chuquisaca (David Sánchez), said they had no concerns whatsoever about being censured and urged their peers to share their attitude. Morales said the prefects did not want to be controlled, "assuredly because they are stealing". 

Defining moment for constituent assembly
At the same time as the dispute between the prefects and the government was evolving, the constituent assembly was reaching the most momentous decision since it convened on 6 August. The MAS managed to push through a vote in the constituent assembly on 17 November under which only a simple, not a two-thirds, majority would be needed to approve individual clauses in the new text of the constitution. This means that the opposition in the assembly will effectively be sidelined until the vote on the final text which would then require a two-thirds majority.

The opposition Unidad Nacional (UN) joined its leader, the cement magnate Samuel Doria Medina, in going on a hunger strike to protest against the MAS vote on voting procedures. The UN was joined by the influential (but unelected) Comités Cí­vicos for three of the four Media Luna departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando. 

The leader of the Comité Pro Santa Cruz, Germán Antelo, invited cruceños to go on hunger strike in defence of democracy on 23 November, while the president of the Comité Cí­vico del Beni, Alberto Melgar, declared a state of emergency. Melgar said that Beni would hold a referendum on whether to accept the conclusions of the constituent assembly after the "totalitarian and anti-democratic" MAS vote. But the signs are that in the constituent assembly, like the senate, the opposition is being outmanoeuvred. On 28 November 10 opposition or independent constituent assembly members defected to the government. More could follow suit.

The nine prefects
The nine prefects were elected on 18 December 2005. Six belong to opposition parties and three to the ruling Movimiento al Socialismo:

• Chuquisaca - David Sanchez (MAS)
• Oruro - Luis Alberto Aguilar (MAS)
• Potosí­ - Mario Virreira (MAS)
• Beni - Ernesto Suarez (Podemos)
• Cochabamba - Manfred Reyes Villa (AUN)*
• La Paz - José Luis
• Paredes (Podemos)
• Pando - Leopoldo Fernández (Podemos)
• Santa Cruz - Rubén Costa (APB)**
• Tarija - Mario Cossí­o (CC)***

*Alianza de Unidad Nacional
**Autonomí­a Para Bolivia
***Camino al Cambio

In February inflation hit its highest monthly rate since President Alan Garcí­a took office in 2006. The rate in February was 0.91%, bringing the lagging 12-month rate to 4.82%.

The rise in inflation is taking the gloss off strong economic growth. The February figure means that the inflation rate over the first two months of the year is 1.13%, pretty much identical to the 1.14% recorded in the first two months of 2007. For 2007 as a whole inflation came to 3.93%.

The current level of inflation is double what the government expected and is largely the result of the heavy rains which have led to shortages, and higher prices, of fresh foods. The price of vegetables rose by 11.6% in February powered by a 71% jump in lettuce prices and a 35% risen in pea and cauliflower prices. Edible oil and meat prices also rose sharply. The government is aiming for inflation of between 2.5% and 3.5% in 2008.

Growth: The GDP growth rate in the fourth quarter was the fastest for 12 years, led by construction and manufacturing at 9.1%. Year-on-year growth in the third quarter was 8.9%. Domestic demand, at 12%, rose faster than overall growth suggesting that the economy is overheating. This means that the central bank is likely to increase rates to keep inflation under control. The economy grew by 8.9% in 2007.

The referendum that would pave the way for President Alvaro Uribe's re-election for an unprecedented third term in May 2010 has cleared its final congressional hurdle. Uribe's third term bid now hinges on the decision of the constitutional court.  Legally, the timetable is extremely tight and, in constitutional terms, the measure highly controversial; Uribe, however, has in his favour massive popular support and mounting political momentum. In recent weeks, the government's row with its regional neighbours, and most prominently with Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez , over Colombia's proposed military base deal with the US has only boosted Uribe's cause.

Estado de Opinión
On 1 September, some 12 months after the measure was first introduced to congress, the lower house voted narrowly to approve the final text of the bill - with 85 votes in favour to five against, only one more than the simple majority of 84 the government needed. The two main opposition parties, the Partido Liberal and the Polo Democrática Alternativo, abstained. Uribe's supporters called the result a triumph for democracy. The Uribista line is that the referendum, and the important constitutional reform it implies, is legitimate because it is backed by a majority of Colombians. Colombia, the government holds, is an 'Estado de Opinión' or 'Opinion State', a concept to which Uribe has repeatedly referred in recent months [the local politics monitor, La Silla Vacia, has counted a total of 103 public references by Uribe to the so-called Estado de Opinión since the referendum bill was introduced to congress, although never in direct reference to re-election].

Public opinion is certainly overwhelmingly in the president's favour. For thousands of Colombians Uribe has become synonymous with security and public order as a result of his government's successful campaign against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) and - in the short term at least - its taming of paramilitary violence. Uribe has also astutely, and successfully, channeled a resurgent sense of national pride into support for his political movement. Every time Chávez , whose disapproval rating in Colombia hovers around 90%, lashes out at Colombia, Uribe benefits domestically. Recent polls show that Uribe's approval rating has climbed from 71% to 74% since the latest row with Venezuela kicked off (it has averaged 72% over his two terms in office). Around 50% of Colombians say that they would vote in favour of his re-election if a referendum is held, while there is talk of mass protests if the court fails to approve the initiative.

Fierce opposition to re-election is, however, increasing among Colombia's so-called ruling classes - its political, business and church leaders, academics, NGOs and the media.  Meddling with term limits for the benefit of one person, opponents argue, represents a dangerous erosion of the country's constitutional checks and balances, which have traditionally been highly skeptical of executive power. The government's exaltation of participative democracy - and the 'Estado de Opinión' - could easily be interpreted as a byword for populism, which would put Uribe in the same camp as Venezuela's Chávez , who has succeeded in abolishing term limits entirely. 

A third term for Uribe would also likely do little to endear him to the US President Barack Obama administration, which appears more inclined to deal with President Lula da Silva of Brazil (who, despite high approval ratings, has very publicly eschewed amending the constitution to allow for his third consecutive re-election). When Obama met Uribe back in June he gently reminded him that, although “each country...has to make these decisions on their own",  “our experience in the United States is that two terms works for us and that after eight years, usually the...people want a change".

What next?
The constitutional court now has three months to rule on the measure. The electoral authorities have said that they will then need at least a further three months to organise the vote. This means that the uncertainty surrounding Uribe ´s re-election is likely to drag on for another six months. There is certainly no way that Uribe can adhere to the legal deadline for declaring his presidential candidacy: according to the so-called Ley de Garantí­as, he should register by 30 November, or six months before the elections. Uribe's supporters are likely to argue that a referendum vote outranks common legal stricture.

The opposition will now focus on derailing the referendum on just such legal grounds. The constitutional court will be expected to scrutinise both the text of the bill itself and various irregularities in the way in which it was passed by congress. This will include the change made by the upper house to the ambiguous wording of the text to clarify that the it referred to re-election in 2010, rather than 2014 (as approved by the lower house). The court is also awaiting the results of an investigation by the electoral authorities into alleged abuses in the financing of the petition calling for the referendum. Perhaps most controversially, it must consider whether to ignore a ruling by the constitutional court judges who were responsible for approving the reform which allowed Uribe's re-election for a second term in 2006. At the time, the court decided that although re-election for two terms would not be damaging to the constitution, a president should be prevented from serving more than two consecutive terms.

The opposition complains that the court is in Uribe's pocket. After his near eight years in office, he has had a say in nominating all nine of its judges, one of whom, Jorge Pretelt Chlajub, has published a book entitled “Why I voted yes in the referendum" (in relation to the 2003 referendum on 15 reforms proposed by Uribe, which was actually defeated). Nevertheless, while the court's support is likely, it is by no means guaranteed. With such an important - and high profile - issue at stake, its judges are under pressure to demonstrate their independence from Uribismo.

If the court gives the green light to the referendum, the government must then persuade 25% of the electorate - or 7.3m people - to turn out to vote, at least 50% of whom must be in favour of re-election. Should Uribe run again, he will almost certainly win. As the Farc continue to be pushed back, he will then be under pressure to demonstrate that his 'Democratic Security' policies are able to respond to pressing social and economic as well as military challenges. 

• Exodus to Uribismo

Thanks to a package of political reforms passed by congress in July, legislators had until 14 September to change political party without incurring penalties. This arrangement has significantly swelled the membership of the two main Uribista parties. A total of 20 legislators changed party to join the fervently Uribista Partido de la U (the 'U'), making it the largest party in congress (with 72 seats). A further 10 legislators have joined the Partido Conservador (PC), the second coalition force (now with 58 seats). Crucially, the two main Uribista parties have secured the membership of hundreds more regional and local politicians (the 'U' with some 830 new adherents, the PC with at least 350). It is these representatives who mobilise Colombians to vote at a local level, and who are therefore often pivotal to the outcome of the national vote.

 

International agencies regularly flag up the importance of education as a tool for redressing social inequality, particularly in Latin America, the world's most unequal region. A May 2010 World Bank report notes that overall, the Andean countries compare favourably to other sub-regions in terms of offering access to basic education; however, the 2011 Unesco Education for All Global Monitoring Report, released in February, suggests room for improvement.
 
The World Bank 2010 Human Opportunity Report for Latin America and the Caribbean puts the Andean region second only to Mexico in terms of achieving universal provision of basic education, which it measures on the basis of two criteria: timely completion of sixth grade (13 years old) and school attendance for ages 10-14. The World Bank expects Mexico to universalize basic education services by 2017 followed by the Andean countries in 2023 (although Bolivia was excluded from the analysis due to lack of representative data). Brazil and Central America are set to achieve this target by 2037 and the Southern Cone by 2048.
 
The Unesco report points to discrepancies within the sub-region with regard to progress in specific indicators. As regards basic adult literacy, only Venezuela and Colombia beat the 92% Latin American average in the period surveyed (2005-2008), with rates of 95% and 93% respectively. Bolivia - which received the most of any Latin American country in total aid disbursement for basic education (US$47m of US$303m) in 2008 - registered 91% literacy over the same period. This was an increase on the 80% recorded in the previous period cited by the report (1985-1995), eclipsing both Peru (90%) and Ecuador (84%) - the latter notably saw its rate worsen, from 88% in the previous period.
 
Aside from receiving the most foreign aid, Bolivia stood apart from its Andean neighbours with regard to another indicator considered crucial to progress in education: government expenditure on education as a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP). While the Latin American average for 2008 was 4% of GNP (down from 4.5% in 1999), Bolivia spent 5.8% of GNP according to the latest available data (2006). In line with the rest of Latin America, the other Andean countries failed to record any real improvement while Colombia and Peru registered drops - the former spent 4.1% of GNP on education in 2008 compared to 4.5% in 1999 and the latter, 2.9% in 2008 down from 3.4% in 1999.

• Other indicators

Aside from literacy, Venezuela topped the sub-region with regard to the average pupil/teacher ratio in primary education. According to the Unesco report, Venezuela had a ratio of 16 pupils/teacher in 2008, far below the 23 average for Latin America. Venezuela did, however, show a decline in another area: drop-out rates. The same report showed that Venezuela's drop-out rate at all education levels in 2007 was 19%, up from 12% in 1999. This was above the 18% Latin American average. The other Andean countries fared little better, with the exception of Colombia, which managed 12% in 2007, a significant improvement on the 33% recorded in 1999.

Los indí­genas de Veracruz, del Movimiento de los 400 Pueblos, hallaron una novedosa manera para presionar por el cumplimiento de las promesas del gobierno. Los hombres han marchado por las calles de ciudad de México y se quedaron montando guardia, desnudos, frente al congreso. Esto atrajo a un considerable número de espectadores durante el mes pasado, pero ninguna acción sobre sus exigencias de tierras que se les habí­a prometido durante el gobierno del Presidente Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94).

Intentando estimular la acción de las autoridades, las mujeres del movimiento se unieron a la protesta la semana pasada, superando a los guardias de seguridad y corriendo por los corredores del congreso -también desnudas. Al menos tuvieron éxito en atraer el apoyo de las mujeres polí­ticas que estaban celebrando el 50 aniversario del otorgamiento del voto a las mujeres.

Aparte de un ambiguo prestigio, Ecuador parece haber obtenido un beneficio claro de su captura del lí­der de las Farc 'Simón Trinidad' [IL-03-22]: el compromiso de Colombia de desplegar fuerzas militares y policiales para controlar la frontera común. Mientras, la pregunta que ha venido inquietando a funcionarios de seguridad y diplomáticos es cuál, precisamente, fue la razón de la presencia de Trinidad en Ecuador.

La inicial y más directa explicación, que visitaba Ecuador desde hace un tiempo para recibir atención médica, es todaví­a fuerte, pero plantea varias preguntas. Una es la naturaleza de su condición: primero, identificada como leishmaniasis, luego cáncer (testicular o de próstata). La otra es dónde fue tratado: diferentes clí­nicas y el Hospital Eugenio Espejo fueron mencionados. Se ha afirmado que Trinidad habí­a estado en Ecuador al menos tres veces en la segunda mitad del año pasado, que concuerda con la noción de tratamiento regular de cáncer (al parecer corroborado por un desertor de las Farc que informó que el 1er Frente recibió a mediados de 2003, la orden de proveer medios en uno de sus campamentos para su recuperación). Esto, sin embargo, no encaja mucho con el hecho que recién en su última visita Trinidad habí­a tratado de obtener falsa documentación ecuatoriana.

La conexión ONU-Francia
Las Farc, luego de no convencer a nadie que Trinidad no era un prominente lí­der, la semana pasada lo describí­a como 'un prominente cuadro polí­tico [quien] en el proceso de paz suspendido hace dos años se desempeñó con solvencia, primero en la comisión temática y más tarde en la mesa de diálogo.' Esto está en lí­nea con lo que conocen los funcionarios colombianos acerca de Trinidad, y provee los antecedentes a la explicación de las Farc de lo que hací­a en Ecuador.

El comunicado de las Farc dice que buscaba una ví­a para una reunión con Kofi Annan, el secretario general de la ONU, el enviado de la ONU en Colombia, James Lemoyne y representantes del gobierno francés 'para hallar una solución definitiva al cautiverio de [la ex candidata presidencial] Ingrid Betancourt y otros prisioneros de guerra a través de un intercambio humanitario.' Esto parece tener relación con dos hechos el año pasado: el giro de las Farc aceptando la idea de una reunión con la ONU, y el fallido intento de liberar a Betancourt por un equipo francés de oficiales y soldados que volaron secretamente a Brasil en un avión militar con ese propósito. Cuando fue arrestado, se informó que Trinidad dijo a la policí­a ecuatoriana que entró al paí­s para obtener documentos falsos e iniciar un intercambio de prisioneros -y sobre esa base pidió asilo polí­tico. Pero la ONU negó que se estuviera preparando una reunión de ese tipo.

Llevando la guerra al exterior
Una historia que ronda los cí­rculos de inteligencia, dice que la visita de Trinidad estaba conectada con el establecimiento de un 'Comando Internacional' para unir a las Farc e insurgentes o aspirantes a insurgentes de otras partes. Una variante, afirma que Trinidad fue designado coordinador de ese 'Comando', y que el propósito de su visita a Ecuador fue obtener documentos falsos para poder viajar de incógnito a Brasil para una reunión con aliados extranjeros.

En esta explicación, Trinidad habrí­a sido precedido por varios otros cuadros de las Farc, que sólo estuvieron dos o tres dí­as en Ecuador: Trinidad fue atrapado debido a que obtener sus documentos llevó más tiempo de lo esperado.

Secuestro
Una explicación adicional, originada en Colombia, es que Trinidad habí­a ido a Ecuador para coordinador un secuestro por rescate de alto perfil. Esto no coincide con lo que se conoce sobre sus antecedentes como negociador -pero él también estaba involucrado en el manejo de las finanzas de las Farc, y una de sus importantes fuentes de financiación es el secuestro.

El director de la unidad anti-secuestros de Ecuador, UNA, Edmundo Vera, desechó esa idea diciendo que el secuestro en Ecuador declinaba, y que de los 122 presuntos secuestradores arrestados en el par de años pasado, sólo 35 eran colombianos. Pero admitió que organizaciones armadas de Colombia habí­an 'subcontratado' antes a bandas criminales ecuatorianas para secuestros.

Control fronterizo
El episodio Trinidad fortaleció la campaña de Ecuador para persuadir a los colombianos que eleven el control en su lado de la frontera, un punto sensible desde las recriminaciones mutuas del año pasado por los cohetes que Colombia afirmaba habí­an salido de arsenales militares de Ecuador y fueron a manos de las Farc. Ecuador amenazó con exigir que colombianos de visita debí­an tener visas -una medida molesta, pues se aplicarí­a sólo al tránsito legí­timo en Ecuador, no en Colombia y, probablemente una ruptura punible de las normas de la Comunidad Andina sobre libre movimiento.

Luego del arresto de Trinidad, el canciller colombiano hizo saber que tropas y personal de inteligencia militar serí­an desplegados a lo largo de la frontera con Ecuador, y en consecuencia, Ecuador no implementarí­a su requerimiento de visa. El canciller ecuatoriano, Patricio Zuquilandia, ha dicho que el acuerdo aún no es firme, pero se espera que sea anunciado formalmente un acuerdo sobre este tema en la reunión bilateral de cancilleres, sobre seguridad fronteriza, el 23 de enero.

Vale señalar que cualquier decisión de esa clase por Colombia, va a ser tomada por Venezuela como precedente, que insisten desde hace largo tiempo que muchos de los problemas en sus fronteras con Colombia se deben a la ausencia de cualquier control por las fuerzas de seguridad colombianas. El argumento de Colombia es que su prioridad militar es ganar la guerra interna.

“No debemos adoptar sistemas de otros paí­ses porque México tiene sus propias caracterí­sticas."

Orlando Paredes, senador del PRI, sobre la propuesta de adoptar juicios orales.


“Que se integren dentro de la policí­a o del ejército, el nombre no importa, toda vez que ellos puedan imponer la seguridad."

El rebelde haitiano, Guy Philippe, sobre lo que debe hacerse con sus camaradas de armas.


“Estamos cansados de aguardar mientras el gobierno sólo hace promesas y no las mantiene."

Jaime Amorim, lí­der del movimiento de campesinos sin tierras de Brasil, sobre la lentitud de la reforma agraria.

Informe Latinoamericano (Online) ISSN 1741-73017 Un servicio electrónico de cartas informativas (50 por año) de Intelligence Research Ltd, 61 Old Street, London EC1V 9HW, UK. Teléf: +44 (0)20 7251 0012, Fax +44 (0)20 7253 8193, Email: [email protected]. Web: www.latinnews.com EDITOR: Eduardo Crawley, [email protected]. Las tarifas de suscripción serán enviadas a pedido. COPYRIGHT © 2004 en todos los paí­ses. Todos los derechos reservados. Ninguna parte de esta publicación puede ser reproducida, archivada en sistemas de clasificación o recuperación de datos, retransmitida en modo alguno, electrónico o quí­mico, mecánico, óptico, fotográfico o cualquier otro, sin el premise previo, por escrito, de Intelligence Research Ltd. REFERENCIAS: Las referencias a números previos se harán así­ [ver IL-04-01]: Informe Especial 2004, No.1.

Mercado	Indice	28.06.04	02.07.04	Variación (%)
Buenos Aires	Merval	931.76	967.68	3.86
São Paulo	Bovespa	20750.23	21601.01	4.10
Santiago	IPSA	1477.01	1482.44	0.37
Bogotá	IGBC	3010.53	2998.76	-0.39
San José	BCT	8829.12	8949.99	1.37
Quito & Guayaquil	Interinvest	73.83	74.21	0.51
Mexico	BMV	10128.79	10236.44	1.06
Lima	ISVBL	2875.64	2881.17	0.19
Caracas	BC	25386.60	25196.46	-0.75
Source: Daily market reports.

No debe tomarse en serio al gobierno de Fox cuando afirma que sólo un grupo de guerrilla, el Ejército Popular Revolucionario (ERP) sigue activo en México, y que todos los otros supuestos grupos son ficticios, parte de una estrategia dirigida para crear la impresión que el paí­s confronta una gran amenaza de guerrillas. Esa es la opinión de Jorge Lofredo, un periodista que se ha especializado en el estudio de los grupos armados de México.

Lofredo, que trabaja como editor de noticias en el diario La Hora de Oaxaca, dice que al menos dos organizaciones, el EPR y el Comando Jaramillista Morelense 25 de Mayo [IL-04-20] desarrollan en la actualidad acciones polí­ticas y armadas, pero existen otras que pueden describirse como en estado 'latente'.

Entre esas, dice, hay varias divisiones del EPR: Tendencia Democrática Revolucionaria (TDR); Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo Insurgente (ERPI); Comando Justiciero 28 de Junio (CJ28J); Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias del Pueblo (FARP) y el Ejército Villista Revolucionario del Pueblo (EVRP) -aunque algunos de estos pueden haberse desvanecidos.

También hay alguna evidencia, dice Lofredo, que grupos como el Movimiento Revolucionario Lucio Cabañas Barrientos y la Nueva Brigada Campesina de Ajusticiamiento son reales.

Además de eso, agrega Lofredo, lo que debe tenerse en mente es que en áreas campesinas e indí­genas del paí­s, la persistente violencia es un caldo de cultivo para nuevos grupos armados. Emergen como grupos armados de 'autodefensa' para confrontar a los 'ejércitos privados' de caciques locales, madereros y traficantes de drogas. Él dice que varios grupos que fueron identificados como guerrillas en el estado de Guerrero, son una 'fase más elevada' de esos grupos de autodefensa. Otros están 'trabajando' polí­ticamente en movimientos de protesta como los que están contra la globalización y el Plan Puebla-Panamá (el esquema para enlazar los estados del sur de México con Centroamérica).

Raí­ces de las guerrillas de hoy
La semana pasada marcó el 39no aniversario de un evento que se toma de manera convencional como la primera aparición de las guerrillas en México: el ataque sobre los cuarteles de Madera, en el estado de Chihuahua, por un grupo de jóvenes inspirados en la revolución cubana. La represión de estudiantes, las protestas campesinas y sindicales a fines de los '60, hizo que muchos tomaran las armas. Entre las primeras organizaciones que pueden considerarse precursoras de los grupos armados de hoy, están dos del estado de Guerrero (liderada una por Genaro Vázquez Rojas, y la otra por Lucio Cabañas Barrientos) y la Liga Comunista 23 de Setiembre, que tiene una presencia casi nacional.

El final de los '60 y los '70 fueron testigos de la aparición de una cantidad de nuevos grupos. Entre ellos, el más conocido fue el Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN); Movimiento de Acción Revolucionaria (MAR); Brigada Lacandones, Frente Urbano Zapatista (FUZ); Asociación Cí­vica Nacional Revolucionaria (ACNR); Unión del Pueblo (UP) Partido de los Pobres (PdlP). Algunos desaparecieron pronto, otros se fusionaron y pasaron a la clandestinidad -un caso puntual es el Partido Revolucionario Clandestino-Unión del Pueblo-Partido de los Pobres (PROCUP-PdlP), una parte del cual resurgirí­a en 1994, transmutado en el Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) y otro, poco después, como el EPR.

Aunque Lofredo admite que un número de grupos sólo llegaron a producir manifiestos incendiarios y luego se desvanecieron, haciendo difí­cil discernir si fueron totalmente ficticios o un falso inicio que puede resurgir más tarde como algo más amenazador.

Se debe decir que una parte del argumento de Lofredo es engañosa. Mientras el gobierno considera al EPR como el único grupo de guerrilla verdaderamente activo, es difí­cil minimizarlo como una amenaza. Recientemente, a principios de setiembre, la unidad de inteligencia y planeamiento de la oficina del fiscal general, el Centro Nacional de Planeación, Análisis e Información para el Combate a la Delincuencia (Cenapi), emitió un informe afirmando que el EPR habí­a establecido cinco organizaciones 'frente' se infiltró en otras cuatro, estos últimos incluyen a algunos que estaban presentes entre los manifestantes frente al congreso mientras el Presidente Vicente Fox desarrollaba su mensaje anual sobre el estado de la nación.

Cenapi identificó esos 'frentes' como: Frente Popular Revolucionario, Frente Popular Francisco Villa, Comité por la Liberación de los Hermanos Cerezo Contreras y Movimiento de Lucha Popular. Las organizaciones que dijeron que habí­an sido infiltradas son la Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT), el Comité General de Huelga de la Universidad Autónoma de México (que estuvo detrás de la reciente acción de huelga en la Unam), Unión Popular 28 de Octubre, y Unión Popular de la Juventud Revolucionaria.

López Obrador mantiene a Fox a la defensiva

El alcalde ciudad de México, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, ha decidido no aguardar y ver si el Presidente Vicente Fox lo invitaba a una reunión para limar asperezas [IL-04-37]: el 20 de setiembre tomó la iniciativa y formalmente solicitó una audiencia con Fox. López Obrador ya habí­a logrado poner a Fox, a la oficina del procurador general (PGR) y la corte suprema a la defensiva -todos ellos sintiéndose compelidos a expresar que no habí­a nada impropio en que se reunieran para discutir la eliminación de la inmunidad del alcalde para que pueda ser procesado. Fox fue aun más lejos y prometió públicamente 'imparcialidad completa' en esa cuestión. La nueva movida de López Obrador pone a Fox en la posición de tener que responder de nuevo. La estrategia del alcalde es atraer al gobierno, lo más abiertamente posible, en una maniobra para desechar los procedimientos legales en su contra. Leonel Godoy, lí­der del Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), ha dicho que se prosigue en dos ví­as legales para eso: uno, a través de la legislatura de ciudad de México, que afirma que la cuestión cae en su jurisdicción, no en la del congreso; el otro, buscando rechazar el caso sobre bases de procedimientos (un cargo de desacato, arguye el PRD, requiere previa notificación a las partes que están bajo riesgo de ser declaradas en desacato, y eso no ocurrió: la persona notificada no fue el alcalde sino uno de sus subordinados involucrados en el caso). Una tercera posibilidad es el argumento que la acción contra López Obrador fue iniciada en ausencia de cualquier orden judicial (un juez emitió la orden sólo dos meses después de iniciarse los procedimientos). Ese argumento parece justificar la afirmación del alcalde que recurrir a la corte fue sólo una maniobra inspirada por el gobierno para eliminarlo de la carrera presidencial de 2006. Pero puede haber otra posición: en todo caso, no fue López Obrador, sino un subordinado, que emitió la orden que se dice que constituye desacato a la corte.

MEXICO-EU | Plan para limpiar la deuda del agua. El 10 de marzo, el Departamento de Estado de EU anunció que se alcanzó un acuerdo por el cual México limpiará su deuda pendiente (por el uso de cursos de agua de la frontera) para fin de setiembre de este año. La deuda (o déficit, como cortésmente la llaman) llega a 716.670 pies/acre (p/a), habiendo sido reducido del acumulado déficit de más de 1,3m p/a registrados a fines de 2002. México incrementará su provisión del tratado mí­nimo anual promedio de 350.000 p/a, para así­ eliminar el déficit por completo para fines de setiembre.

MEXICO | Más turistas que gastan más. El número de turistas que visitaron México en enero se elevó a 1,8m, o 10,1% más que en igual mes de 2004. El gasto de los turistas creció 15,4%, a US$1,05bn. El número de visitantes en cruceros, en enero, contabilizado por separado, subió 23,2% a 878.830.

MEXICO | Inversiones crecen más rápido que la economí­a. La inversión fija bruta creció el año pasado en 7,5%. El PBI creció 4,4% en 2004. La inversión en máquinas y equipos se elevó 9,5% en 2004, y la construcción creció 5,3%. La tendencia es a la suba: en diciembre la inversión fija bruta fue de 11.9% año en año, con máquinas y equipos subiendo 16,8% y la construcción 6%.