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  • RASTREANDO TENDENCIAS

    LatinNews 23 October 2015 Hits: 408

    CUBA | Préstamo de Rusia. El gobierno de Rusia ha otorgado a su contraparte de Cuba un préstamo de €1,2mm (US$1,36mm) para construir una nueva planta de generación de electricidad, reveló el 19 de octubre la agencia de noticias estatal de Rusia (RIA). De acuerdo con el informe de RIA, los fondos serán utilizados para construir unidades de generación de electricidad con una capacidad de hasta 200MW para alimentar las estaciones de energía termoeléctricas de  ‘Máximo Gómez’ y Este Habana. El proyecto es parte de un plan de desarrollo de US$10mm  del gobierno cubano para elevar al doble la capacidad de producción de electricidad de Cuba, de los actuales 18.746 gigawatts por hora a 30.299 gigawatts por hora para el 2030.

    El préstamo fue acordado por los dos gobiernos durante la visita del Presidente de Rusia, Vladimir Putin, a Cuba el año pasado, cuando él también acordó perdonar el 90% de la deuda de US$32,5mm que Cuba tiene pendiente con Rusia. De acuerdo con el informe de RIA, luego de la liberación de los fondos para el préstamo, el consejo de ministros de Rusia también aprobó una nueva línea de crédito para la modernización y expansión de la fundición de acero, ‘José Martí’, de Cuba.

    PANAMÁ | Dudas sobre fecha de concreción de las obras de expansión del Canal de Panamá. La Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP) se ha visto forzada a abordar las dudas acerca de si la fecha de concreción del proyecto de expansión del Canal de Panamá, de abril del 2016, será cumplida. En una declaración, la ACP dijo que había recibido “información actualizada” del Grupo Unidos por el Canal (GUPC), el consorcio compuesto por Sacyr Vallehermoso de España; Impreglio de Italia; Jan de Nul de Bélgica; y la local Cusa, responsable por el diseño y la construcción del tercer conjunto de esclusas (el proyecto más grande bajo el plan de expansión del Canal de US$5,2mm) con relación a “la filtración localizada hallada en el alféizar de hormigón entre la baja y media cámara de las expandidas Esclusas del Pacífico del Canal.”

    El mismo comunicado de prensa de la ACP señala que “en una reciente carta, el GUPC escribió que la filtración localizada era resultado del insuficiente reforzamiento de acero en el área, la cual fue sometida a pruebas de tensión bajo condiciones extremas. Después de un cuidadoso examen de todos los otros alfeizares en ambos complejos de esclusas, el GUPC afirma que además de reforzar el alféizar que tuvo el problema, ellos también reforzarían el primero y segundo alféizar en las Esclusas Cocoli y los primeros tres alféizares en las Esclusas Agua Clara frente al Atlántico, como una medida preventiva, aunque estos alféizares no han presentado ningún problema”.

    La declaración de la ACP también señala que “el GUPC también ha indicado verbalmente que la fecha de terminación para el proyecto de expansión permanecerá siendo abril del 2016, como estaba planeado; sin embargo, la ACP está aguardando una confirmación formal del GUPC, en la forma de un exhaustivo informe que debería incluir también la causa profunda de las filtraciones detectadas”.

    La fecha de terminación del proyecto de expansión, que está completado en un 95%, ya fue retrasada después de la disputa a fines del 2013 con el GUPC por sobrecostos [IL-14-01].

    REGION | Unión aduanera Centroamericana. Una unión aduanera centroamericana podría convertirse en realidad para el 2021, la secretaria general del Secretariado de Integración Centroamericana (Sieca), Carmen Gisela Vergara, dijo la semana pasada. El establecimiento de una unión aduanera subregional que abarque Belice, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, y Panamá, es uno de los compromisos asumidos  por estos países durante la firma de una asociación económica con la Unión Europea (UE) en el 2013. En septiembre de ese año, la UE asignó €10m (US$11,3m) para ayudar a establecer régimen de adunas conjunto en estos países para así para ayudar a facilitar el comercio bilateral. Pocos progresos visibles han sido hechos desde entonces sobre la materia. Sin embargo, hablando en la conferencia  Euroforo Guatemala 2015, celebrada en la Ciudad de Guatemala, Vergara dijo que durante una cumbre en junio del Sistema de Integración Centroamericano (Sica), Sieca le presentó a los miembros del Sica un “mapa de ruta” para establecer una plena unión aduanera dentro de seis años.

    Vergara también señaló que la adopción de un régimen común de aduanas entre Guatemala y Honduras, está programado para el 1 de diciembre. El congreso nacional de Honduras, sin embargo, ha recomendado posponer esto hasta después de que un nuevo presidente asuma el poder en Guatemala en enero del 2016.

    • El Canal de Panamá

    El 9 de octubre la Autoridad del Canal de Panamá (ACP) emitió un comunicado de prensa, afirmando que el Canal de Panamá cerró el año fiscal 2015 habiendo pasado un récord de 340,8m toneladas PC/UMS (el Sistema de Tonelaje Universal del Canal de Panamá), subiendo un 4,3% sobre el año fiscal del 2014. Esta cifra representa un incremento de 7,1m de toneladas comparado el récord anterior de 333, 7m toneladas PC/UMS establecido en el año fiscal 2012.

  • Chile’s military embroiled in tax fraud scandal

    LatinNews 14 January 2016 Hits: 280

    Development: On 13 January Chile’s tax authorities (SII) filed a criminal complaint against (Ret.) army Colonel Clovis Montero and Corporal Juan Cruz Valverde for alleged tax fraud to the tune of some Ch$153m (US$210,000).

    Significance: This is the first criminal complaint presented by the SII in relation to a tax fraud scandal involving the military (locally known as ‘Milicogate’) which broke last year. The allegations relate to a ring involving officers and other military personnel who allegedly embezzled millions of pesos of state funds from 2010 to 2014 (although the media cites some sources suggesting this could go back as far as 2008). The latest charges come as the credibility of Chile’s political and business establishment remains in tatters as a result of other corruption cases such as the illegal campaign financing scandals involving the financial group Penta (‘Pentagate’) and the mining company Sociedad Quimica y Minera S.A. (SQM).

    • According to a local weekly, The Clinic, which broke the scandal in August 2015, and other local media, the army first detected the fraud in the armed forces support command (CAF) unit in April 2014, at which point Montero and Valverde were detained in a military prison where they have remained ever since. Under the scam, the officials in question claimed that they were using funds from the Ley Reservada del Cobre (the law, first passed in 1958 and since amended, under which the military receives 10% of all export revenues from Chile’s state-owned copper firm, Codelco) for the acquisition and contracting of services and supplies to repair military vehicles, which never took place.
    • The reports of the alleged scam led the military in October 2015 to announce for the first time in 205 years that it would be subject to an external audit, by company Surlatina.
    • According to the local press, yesterday the SII also requested legal action against two contractors, Raúl Fuentes and Francisco Huincahue, as well a number of other military officials who are also under investigation in relation to the case. These include Sergeant Millaray Simunovic, Sergeant Miguel Escobar, and non-commissioned officer Claudio González.

    Looking Ahead: Milicogate has upped calls for the Ley Reservada del Cobre to be repealed – a move which previous governments have tried but failed to achieve. In December 2015 Interior Minister Jorge Burgos told reporters that he will seek to relaunch discussions in the national legislature regarding a legislative initiative which would repeal the law.

  • POINTERS

    LatinNews 10 March 2016 Hits: 744

    TRINIDAD & TOBAGO | “Significant increase” in suspicious funding. On 23 February, Trinidad & Tobago’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIUTT) issued its sixth annual report. FIUTT director Susan Francois noted that the report reveals a “significant increase” in suspicious financial transactions that could be linked to terrorism.

    Francois said: “Analysis revealed that the number of reports of financial transactions suspected of being linked to terrorism has tripled over the past year. During this reporting period, the number of terrorism-related suspicious-transaction reports [and] suspicious-activity reports jumped from five in 2013/2014 to 16 in 2014/2015.” Furthermore, the director said, “the FIUTT has received and analysed information from other local and international sources on over 100 persons who are suspected of participating in terrorist activities”. The monetary value of the suspicious transactions is said to have declined from TT$698m in 2013/14 to TT$354m in 2014/15, but under-reporting is said to be “a concern”.

    As part of her recommendations, Francois called for less use of cash by society. She said: “It is commonly acknowledged that cash is the mainstay of criminal transactions. Therefore, cash-intensive environments, which foster a lack of transparency in transactions, facilitate criminal activities. Thus the FIUTT will also recommend that the authorities give serious consideration to instituting limits to the use of cash for the purchase of goods and services, as well as in the collection of revenue at government offices.”

    GUYANA | Stepping up Venezuela defence fund. The government of Guyana has allocated GY$200m for the payment of international consultants to prepare for the referral of the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). This is up from GY$166.6m in the 2015 budget and GY$30m in 2014.

    When queried by the opposition on this increase, Guyana’s Foreign Affairs Minister Carl Greenidge explained: “The increase here is determined almost exclusively by the cost of retaining international lawyers to assist us in this exercise…together with the need also to retain lawyers.”

    Greenidge added: “In September 2015, President David Granger had urged the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to use his office to send Venezuela’s case for a final, legal settlement at the International Court of Justice. Venezuela has claimed that the 1899 arbital award which defined the two countries’ borders is null and void. The claim was raised 50 years ago on the eve of Guyana’s independence from Great Britain. An agreement signed in Geneva in 1966 provides the Secretary-General to take action to bring a resolution to the contention of Venezuela. Guyana has the fullest confidence in the judgement and capacity of the United Nations, through the Office of the Secretary-General, to identify solutions that will validate the ‘just, perfect, and final nature of the award’.”

    GUYANA | Guyana to investigate allegations against anti-drug unit. A Guyanese drug trafficker called Barry Dataram has told local media that the Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) is “the most corrupted, rogue security force in this country. They are the biggest drug dealer the country has. The same drug they seize, half of it goes back on the street.” The allegations were discussed at a National Security Committee meeting on 1 March, and following that meeting President Granger announced that it had been decided to set up a Board of Inquiry to investigate the allegations.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    LatinNews 04 August 2016 Hits: 1694

    COLOMBIA | Central bank increases interest rates. On 31 July Colombia’s Central Bank (Banrep) decided to increase the benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points to 7.75%. Banrep’s board of directors explained in a press release that this decision was taken because of persistently high levels of inflation. Two of the main inflation indicators, the consumer price index and the average core inflation, sharply increased in June respectively reaching 8.6% and 6.5%, well above Banrep’s target of 3%.

    The press release suggests that the high levels of inflation were partially the result of a lagged variation in food prices caused by the recent ‘El Niño’ weather phenomenon, which produced a severe drought in Colombia earlier this year, as well as the depreciation of the peso against the US dollar. However, the rate increase also came after President Juan Manuel Santos publicly asked Banrep not to increase interest rates so as not to affect domestic economic growth and job creation.

    Banrep has been increasing interest rates almost consistently since September 2015 as it attempts to contain inflation and defend the peso. But there are signs that the contractionary monetary policy adopted by Banrep is negatively impacting economic activity, not least the decision taken at its latest board meeting to reduce its domestic economic growth forecast for 2016 from 2.5% to 2.3%.

    Banrep attributed its decision to reduce its GDP growth forecast to weak global economic activity and a domestic demand that is still adjusting to the deterioration of national income. On a positive note for foreign trade, Banrep said that the external deficit continued to fall in the second quarter of 2016, saying it expects a further reduction this year, bringing the total deficit to US$15bn or 5.3% of GDP.

    ECUADOR | Chevron. Ecuador had to pay Chevron US$112m on 22 July to satisfy an arbitration award related to a long-running commercial dispute in order to prevent the US oil giant from “bankrupting” Ecuador, President Rafael Correa has claimed.

    “If we had not paid Chevron…[it] would have destroyed Ecuador,” Correa told journalists in the coastal city of Guayaquil on 2 August. “They were already looking for all of Ecuador’s assets, all of its foreign accounts to block them and bankrupt Ecuador because Chevron hates us,” Correa added.

    The Correa administration was able to pay Chevron directly after indigenous communities represented by the Frente de Defensa de la Amazonía (FDA) lifted an embargo which had been won in a local court against the arbitration award. The FDA is seeking US$9.5bn from Chevron, in a separate lawsuit related to environmental damage in the Amazon.

    The FDA, which won the multi-billion dollar environmental judgement in 2011, being appealed by Chevron, subsequently announced that it was “stunned” to discover that its lawyer, Pablo Fajardo, had “illegally lifted the embargo on Chevron, without the approval of the FDA…apparently at the request of individuals in Ecuador’s government”.

    The FDA went on to announce that it had severed all links with Fajardo, and hired a new lawyer, Patricio Salazar, to replace him.

    PERU | Record copper production. On 27 July Peru’s mining & energy ministry (MEM) released new figures suggesting that the Andean country could see a record production of copper (one of Peru’s main exports) this year. According to the MEM figures, during the first quarter of 2016 the production of copper reached 1.2m tonnes (t), 51.4% higher than the same period last year, when production reached 740,000t, and the highest figure for five years.

    The MEM noted that this increase was partly driven by the coming on-stream of the ‘Las Bambas’ copper mine, located in the south-central region of Apurímac, at the start of the year.

    Peru also saw an increase in the first quarter on the production of other precious metals such as gold and silver, which increased by 7.38% (from 71t to 77.1t) and 15.7% (from 1.8m t to 2.1m t) respectively.

    • Latam Airlines suspends operations in Venezuela

    On 30 July Latam Airlines, Latin America’s largest air carrier, indefinitely suspended all its flight routes to and from Venezuela. The airline had temporarily suspended these flights on 30 May until 1 August, attributing the decision to the “current complex macroeconomic situation affecting the region”. Latam, which said that it would resume its operations in Venezuela once “conditions in the country allow it”, is the fourth international air carrier to suspend flights to Venezuela this year, following in the footsteps of Brazil’s Gol, Germany’s Lufthansa, and Mexico’s Aeroméxico.

  • EL SALVADOR: Mayor faces trial for mara collaboration

    LatinNews 09 November 2017 Hits: 378

    A former mayor and member of El Salvador’s right-wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena) will face trial accused of having planned and coordinated the murder of two men, one of them a police officer, with leaders of a mara street gang. The attorney general’s office (FGR) has uncovered growing evidence of the active complicity of municipal authorities and mara gangs, raising serious questions about the infiltration of state institutions.

    José Elías Hernández, the mayor of the municipality of Apopa in the department of San Salvador, who was arrested in June 2016, is the first municipal official to face trial for criminal complicity with mara gangs, although others are in prison awaiting trial. The mayor of the country’s fifth largest city of Usulután, Miguel Ángel Jaime, was arrested on 20 June accused of paying US$39,000 to Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) in exchange for electoral favours.

    Hernández will stand trial along with 14 other municipal officials. He is accused of conspiring with the Barrio 18 Revolucionarios to kill a police officer and a local leader of MS13. He is also charged with siphoning off between US$5,000 and US$10,000 from public funds to make monthly payments to the maras.

  • Demographic change

    LatinNews 22 December 2017 Hits: 309

    The expansion of the middle class has taken place against the backdrop of significant demographic changes in Latin America, which are important to examine in some detail. Perhaps the most important feature of these changes is that the Latin American population is now beginning to age. The region has been enjoying an important long term ‘demographic dividend’ – a fall in the dependency ratio (the proportion of the total population that is not of working age). But by the mid-2020s or early 2030s, this demographic dividend will go into reverse: the number of dependents relative to the total population will start increasing again. How societies react to that major turning point will have profound implications for the nature of the Latin American middle class.

    According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), by the middle of 2016 there were 625m people in the region. This was nearly double the population in 1975. The number of inhabitants will continue growing, but the pace is slowing from 2.5% a year from 1970-1975 to an expected 0.3% from 2045-2050. What is also happening is that the composition of the population by age groups is changing. In the 1970s most populations could be represented as a pyramid structure, with the younger age groups being the most numerous at the base of the pyramid, and the older groups becoming progressively smaller as you move higher up towards the apex of the pyramid. Very slowly, however, the pyramid has begun to mutate its shape. For many countries it is now pear shaped: the ‘bulge’ represented by the numerically largest age group has moved up from the base – it is no longer formed by the very young, but by teenagers and twenty-somethings. Over a period of decades as that generation moves in to its thirties and forties the pyramid shape is in fact in the process of being turned almost completely upside down. There will be a time later in the 21st century when the elderly will eventually become the largest group of all.

    What this does is create a U-shaped dependency ratio over time. As recently as the 1990s the dependency ratio was just under 70%, meaning that of every ten Latin Americans only three were of working age (defined as between 14 and 65 years old). Those three had to earn their own living but also produce enough economic output to care for the remaining seven. At that stage the vast majority of the dependents were the very young – under the age of 14. But as members of that generation began to complete their schooling and enter the world of work, the dependency ratio began to fall. Since the 1990s the ratio has come down progressively, reaching 50.3% in 2015. ECLAC expects it will continue dropping to 48.4% in 2025, which will be its lowest point. This means that in the current and following decade, out of every ten members of the population, five are dependent, and the other five are of working age. After that point, the dependency ratio will begin to increase again, largely driven by the growing number of people who will be over the age of 65. As we go into the 2030s and 2040s, the proportion of Latin Americans of working age will reduce. According to ECLAC’s projections, the dependency ratio will start pushing upwards, reaching 59.2% in 2050. At that point for every ten people in the population, six will be dependents and only four will be of working age.

    The implications of the end of the demographic dividend and the ageing of the Latin American population are multiple and far-reaching. The fundamental issue is that those in work will have to become more productive to provide for a growing proportion of elderly dependents. Different countries are beginning to grapple with this issue. The costs of defined-benefit, pay-as-you go publicly funded pension systems are already rising in an unsustainable fashion in many countries in the region. This has led to waves of pension reforms and a move to defined contribution private pension systems. Whether public or privately provided, it is clear that existing pension coverage across Latin America is inadequate and needs to be expanded. Governments have had to begin considering unpopular remedies such as increasing pension contribution rates and/or raising the minimum age of retirement.

    More generally there is a big difference between public and private provision for a ‘young’ middle class on the one hand, and for an ‘older’ middle class on the other. As the middle class ages, there will be less demand for young family homes and more for retirement apartments. The balance between owning and renting accommodation may change. Demand for ‘third age’ managed housing estates may rise. Entirely new industries may come to Latin America – for example care-home provision (traditionally, the elderly in the region have been cared for by their extended families, but this may change). In the financial sector the need for retiree-focused saving and investment products will increase. Less public investment will be required for primary education, but demand for other types of education and training may rise. The balance of retail product offers – from supermarkets through to department stores – may also shift.

    Also part of the equation is the issue of where the Latin American middle classes will live. Latin America is already the most urbanised region in the world, with around 80% of the total population living in cities. The ageing process will play out at different speeds in different cities. According to estimates cited by Horacio Terraza, a World Bank expert on urbanism, Mexico City, already one of the world’s most populous cities, will reach its peak population by 2050, and begin to decrease after that date. The population of Santiago de Chile will peak in 2041. It is calculated that San Juan de Puerto Rico has already peaked – in 2012. Other cities will keep on growing for much longer. Manaus in the Brazilian Amazon and Panama City in Central America will not reach their population peaks until sometime in the decade starting 2070. It follows that at faster or slower rates, within each city the age profile and the demand for services and housing will change accordingly. According to a World Bank calculation, for every 100 residents under 15 years of age, the typical Latin American city currently has between 30 and 70 people aged 60 years or over. By 2050 that range will rise to between 80 and 180. On average, there will be more over-60s than under-15s. The up-ending of the traditional urban demographic pyramid, will change many of Latin America’s cities.

    The middle classes may re-asses the desirability of living in the region’s mega-cities (those that have populations of over 10m). It is evident that once cities exceed a certain size, economies of scale may reverse and become diseconomies of scale. The diseconomies or ‘externalities’ include high levels of crime, long commuting journeys, traffic congestion and pollution. Some argue that at a certain stage in the development process mega-cities begin to lose their appeal and a second wave of smaller cities start offering a more attractive environment and better productivity gains. According to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) there are 645 “intermediate” cities in the region (with populations ranging between 100,000 and 2m), which are home to over 200m people (around 35% of the regional population). Of these, the IDB says 242 (over a third) are “emerging” locations, meaning they are making a dynamic contribution to national economies. Their populations and output growth rates are above the national average. For that reason they are of particular interest to a wide range of companies selling consumer goods and services.

  • CHILE: From new normality to Battle of Santiago

    LatinNews 07 May 2020 Hits: 4545

    Just days after President Sebastián Piñera announced a phased return to a “new normality” in Chile, to avert an economic crisis, a spike in coronavirus (Covid-19) cases in the metropolitan region of Santiago has compelled his government to tighten rather than loosen restrictions. This underscores the difficulty facing all governments in striking a balance between sustaining the economy and suppressing the virus.

    “We have to get our society moving again because if we all stay quarantined in our homes we are going to have a social crisis from unemployment and bankruptcy, which will be hugely detrimental to the quality of life,” President Piñera argued in a speech marking International Workers’ Day on 1 May. Piñera said that the government had decided to lift the country’s lockdown progressively in order to protect the labour force and initiate an economic recovery. Piñera said that unemployment in the first quarter of 2020 had reached 8.2%, up by one percentage point on the final quarter of 2019. Not only was this the worst figure for a decade, Piñera argued, but it would also be much higher now as a result of the coronavirus-induced economic disruption since the end of March.

    Piñera touted the imminent return to a “new normality” a week earlier, presenting a ‘Plan Retorno Seguro’ to restore economic activity gradually through a phased return to work while seeking to keep infection rates low [WR-20-17]. But just as Piñera enlarged upon this on 1 May, Chile’s national total of confirmed Covid-19 cases leapt by 985, the highest daily figure since testing began, to 17,008. By 5 May this record had been broken again as the number of cases jumped to 22,016. Some 85% of these new cases were concentrated in the capital.

    These figures appeared to give the Piñera administration cold feet and it decided to impose additional restrictions, placing the whole of metropolitan Santiago under lockdown rather than just selected communes. The health minister, Jaime Mañalich, rebuked the public for “failing to respect the quarantine”, especially in Santiago’s communes. The government said there had been a surge in car use at the weekend in the capital, and singled out a clandestine party in the commune of Maipú. Mañalich cautioned that “we are going to lose this war” without a concerted effort to wage what he dubbed the “Battle of Santiago” successfully.

    Mañalich rejected the suggestion that, having heralded a “new normality”, the government was to blame for a relaxation of social-distancing measures. He contended that the government had always been clear that any easing of the lockdown must be combined with “control of the pandemic”. The deputy health minister, Paula Daza, said that the country’s ‘strategic and selective quarantines’, which vary in intensity from municipality to municipality in accordance with the perceived infection rate, would be enforced with greater rigour.

    The government insisted that the ‘Plan Retorno Seguro’ had not been mothballed but that far greater emphasis would henceforth be placed on its gradual and targeted implementation. It might have been relieved that the quarantine was still in place on 1 May, which habitually produces significant protests by the main trade union movement Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT); protests that would have been larger than normal given the sustained social unrest since last October. Around 200 people gathered in the central Santiago square of Plaza Italia to mark International Workers’ Day but they were swiftly dispersed by a large contingent of Carabineros militarised police, firing water cannons and pepper gas, for contravening the restrictions on large gatherings of more than 50 people.

    Labour Day

    The CUT president, Bárbara Figueroa, argued that the trade union should be entitled to stage some sort of protest on “such an important day”. She said that the union had informed the government in advance that it would be staging a 15-minute protest to mark International Workers’ Day with small protests around the country, respecting social-distancing regulations. After at least 57 of the participants were arrested in Santiago, she denounced the response of the Carabineros as “absolutely inexplicable”. General Enrique Bassaletti, the force’s commander of the eastern metropolitan region, said that Carabineros were merely enforcing the law and that one of the arrested protesters had tested positive for Covid-19 and should have been in self-isolation.

  • REGION: Fiscal pressures intensify due to coronavirus pandemic

    LatinNews 22 June 2020 Hits: 758

    The coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic has elicited a range of responses among Central American nations but increased fiscal pressures due to the health emergency is one thing that many have in common. Two countries facing such pressures but for different reasons are Costa Rica and Guatemala. In Costa Rica, the fiscal concerns were already rife amid a rising fiscal deficit due to high government spending. Meanwhile international credit ratings agency Fitch Ratings and local think-tank Central American institute of fiscal studies (Icefi) have warned of Guatemala’s “fiscal vulnerability” due to low tax take - a perennial weak point.

    Costa Rica

    While Costa Rica has been widely praised for its response to Covid-19 in terms of public health, the pandemic looks set to intensify existing worries over fiscal policy. Even before the outbreak, experts were concerned about mounting fiscal deficits, and a forecast economic contraction will make things worse.

    President Carlos Alvarado has implemented a number of policies to help workers and companies during the pandemic. They include an interest-free three-month moratorium on value-added tax (VAT), customs duties and business income tax charges, as well as pegging social security contributions proportional to time worked, and deferral of contributions; a four-month moratorium on taxes paid by companies in the tourism sector to the Costa Rican tourism institute; a freeze on salary increases for public sector workers; and a ₡100,000- ₡200,000 (US$175-US$351) payment to 375,000 vulnerable households every month for three months. The government will also make ₡3.1bn in public investments in 2020-2021.

    These policies add to the troubling fiscal panorama for Costa Rica given the economic shock of the pandemic. At the end of April Costa Rica’s central bank predicted a GDP contraction of 3.6% this year. However, a week later the economic sciences research institute (IICE) at the Universidad de Costa Rica forecast a 4%-5.8% GDP contraction this year. Fitch Ratings is one agency that believes there is choppy water ahead for Costa Rica. On 12 May it downgraded the country’s long-term foreign-currency issuer default rating from ‘B+’ to ‘B’, with a ‘negative’ outlook. Fitch cited increased risks of financing stress in the near term due to widening fiscal deficits, combined with an economic contraction. “The ongoing health crisis comes at a time when Costa Rica’s fiscal space is limited and rapidly narrowing, raising risks to post-crisis debt sustainability”, wrote the agency in a briefing note. “The interest bill is climbing rapidly, and the debt burden is on a relatively steep upward trajectory”.

    Pre-coronavirus Costa Rica was grappling with a number of fiscal challenges. In November 2019 Icefi published a worrying analysis which looked at the reasons behind uncertainty about fiscal sustainability. This is not a new problem for Costa Rica; indeed, the country passed a fiscal reform in 2018 designed to relieve these pressures. However, Icefi believes the reform is “insufficient to solve Costa Rica’s fiscal sustainability problems” due to stagnant tax revenues and insufficient spending cuts to close, or even maintain, the fiscal deficit. “The 2020 budget initiative reaffirms Costa Rica’s need to build a comprehensive fiscal agreement that effectively addresses its structural fiscal problems”, wrote Icefi, with a failure to do so endangering the social protection model that makes the country stand out among its Central American neighbours. Structural problems include stagnating incomes; stubbornly high levels of inequality, with a Gini coefficient score of 48 in 2018 almost unchanged since the country scored 46.7 in 1989; and increasing consumer debt, with total credit card debts up 14.6% in 2020 compared with 2019, according to figures from the economy, industry & trade ministry released in May. Low birth rates and low death rates make for an ageing population that places increased demands on social services as tax take stagnates.

    Icefi has previously criticised Costa Rica’s tax take projections as “extremely optimistic” as the 2020 budget plans for tax revenue of 13.3% GDP, but the think-tank predicts 12.9%. Icefi says the government needs to prioritise fiscal justice and the closing of loopholes. Now Fitch Ratings predicts the fiscal deficit will widen to over 9% of GDP due to the pandemic, which it says will cause government revenues to decline more than 3%. The agency reports the government will temporarily activate an emergency escape clause in the fiscal responsibility law, which will affect all those public institutions affected to the health crisis, in order to give itself some more wiggle room.

    Prior to the pandemic Costa Rica had seen signs of social discontent with strikes involving health and education workers as well as students, fishermen, and transport unions. It seems likely that these sectors will remain restive as the government will have fewer resources to deal with their demands and will likely have to make some further cuts. Another problem for the Alvarado administration is the fractured congress, which means reforms are subject to complicated negotiations.

    However, despite these apparent problems on 15 May Costa Rica was invited to become the 38th member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the fourth member from Latin America and the Caribbean. “As part of its accession process, Costa Rica successfully completed in-depth technical reviews by 22 OECD Committees and has carried out important reforms that have allowed the country to align its legislation, policies and practices to OECD standards in areas such as competition, statistics, anti-bribery, corporate governance of state-owned enterprises, financial markets, tax transparency and industrial chemicals management”, an OECD statement said. 

    While many will celebrate the accession, there are more problems at home. On 19 May congress voted to allow local authorities to break spending limits set by the 2018 public finance law to deal with the pandemic. Finance Minister Rodrigo Chaves sent a letter to President Alvarado asking him to partially veto the initiative. However, Alvarado refused, and Chaves resigned on 28 May. Chaves only took up the post in November 2019, replacing Rocío Aguilar, who also resigned. Elian Villegas, executive director of the national insurance institute (INS), has taken over as the new finance minister. Turmoil at the finance ministry does not bode well for Costa Rica’s ability to deal with the crisis while increased spending by local authorities would make reducing the fiscal deficit harder.

    Guatemala

    Guatemala’s President Alejandro Giammattei has prioritised economic concerns over public health in his response to Covid-19. Lockdown measures have been less stringent than other nations, with a 5:00pm – 5:00am curfew and a full lockdown only in force on weekends, while certain businesses, including maquila textile factories, have been allowed to stay open.

    In terms of fiscal policy, congress approved three economic rescue packages worth around 3.4% of GDP. Those packages include extra resources for healthcare as well as support for economic sectors through cash transfers, salary subsidies, and payments to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Other measures include increased electricity subsidies and support for low income households, as well as deferring income tax payments and social security contributions for one quarter; and waiving taxes on medical supplies and streamlining tax credit refunds to exporters.

    As with Costa Rica, these measures add extra stresses to an already complicated fiscal situation. This was set out by Fitch on 3 April, when the agency downgraded Guatemala’s long-term foreign-currency issuer default rating to ‘BB-’ from ‘BB’. Fitch cited “diminishing fiscal flexibility due to the government's low tax collection amid continuous political gridlock preventing forceful fiscal measures, as well as a downward revision to growth prospects related to the global pandemic”. While Guatemala is known for running small fiscal deficits, Giammattei inherited a public finance crisis from his predecessor, Jimmy Morales (2016-2020), under whose watch social spending remained around a paltry 8% of GDP, but the military budget ballooned thanks to purchases of weapons and a new ship. The fiscal deficit rose from 1.1% of GDP in 2016 to 2.5% in 2019, according to Icefi. Guatemala has the third-lowest government revenue/GDP ratio of any country rated by Fitch, after Bangladesh and Nigeria. This is due in part to weak tax collection, which Fitch blames on institutional challenges at the tax authority (SAT), high levels of tax evasion, a narrow tax base, and corruption.

    Icefi estimates that VAT evasion stands at around 37% of the potential collection while the SAT itself has estimated that income tax evasion is at around 80%. Reforms are desperately needed to reduce these figures. But an institutional crisis at the SAT- which was involved in huge corruption scandals such as ‘La Línea’ that brought down former president Otto Pérez Molina (2012-2015), has been compounded by the difficulty of passing reforms through a fragmented congress, whose members have been implicated in corruption. As Icefi noted in a January 2020 report, the Giammattei government needs to pass a fiscal reform but has been hamstrung by the damage inflicted by the Morales administration. Government institutions suffered a loss of legitimacy under Morales, and Giammattei will have to overcome low levels of public trust after the 2015-2019 congress approved a number of tax amnesties and privileges.

    Giammattei will also face mounting political problems if he does decide to take on vested interests that benefit from the current taxation system. For one, there are export companies that have been traditionally afforded tax breaks, which Icefi recommends should end. Not only would this anger an influential sector, Giammattei has been consistent in his support for the export sector and appears committed to maintaining the current system. A reformed SAT also needs to improve tax take by reducing informality in labour markets and tackling forms of tax evasion such as contraband and customs fraud, according to Icefi. One visible sector to tackle is market wholesalers who avoid VAT, but this would be unpopoular and could disrupt supply chains. Investigating income tax evasion is another priority, but such a move would undoubtedly anger powerful business lobbies. Whichever way Giammattei tries to go he will upset people, and he arguably isn’t in a strong enough political position to drive through reforms.

    Fitch predicts a “further erosion of government revenues” and forecasts a fiscal deficit of 3.8% by the end of 2020, up from 2.3% in 2019. One problem is Giammattei’s commitment to liberal trade policies such as offering tax breaks to attract foreign investment. These policies do nothing to encourage individuals or other business to pay their taxes, contributing to a widespread culture of avoidance. If he can’t increase the tax take Icefi suggests Giammattei could cut military spending in favour of social spending, but that seems even less likely given the armed forces’ continued influence in Guatemalan politics. Giammattei’s own cabinet includes figures with links to old military networks dating back to the 1960-1996 civil war. Giammattei has previously spoken of a desire for reform, but only to change the date of the new fiscal year from 1 January to 1 July. He will have to do far more than that to deal with mounting problems.

  • CARIBBEAN POINTERS

    Patrick de Courcy 03 March 2023 Hits: 3884

    ***PROGRESS ON FOOD SECURITY. On 3 February, at the first Caribbean Community (Caricom) Ministerial Taskforce (MTF) on Food Production and Food Security meeting, it was announced that member states had achieved 57% of the target of reducing the regional import bill by 25% by the year 2025. It was reported that a number of key products had achieved especially good progress towards their production targets for 2025, namely cocoa (96.13%), dairy (84.36%), meat (72.28%), root crops (70.91%), fruits (70.77%), and poultry (70.19%).

     

    ***THE BAHAMAS IN BIG PUSH IN 2023 TO REDUCE CORRUPTION. In Transparency International’s latest Corruptions Perception Index (CPI), The Bahamas ranked as the 30th least corrupt nation, and the second least corrupt in the Caribbean after Barbados, retaining its score of 64 out of 100, when the higher the score means the lower the incidence of corruption. Nevertheless, Nassau intends to implement reforms during 2023 to further improve the country’s ranking.

    The measures planned for this year include reforms to the Public Procurement Act and the Public Disclosures Act. Also planned is legislation to create an Integrity Commission and an Ombudsman, both of which were 2021 manifesto pledges by the ruling Progressive Liberal Party (PLP).

  • Economic slowdown has upside potential

    Ira Lee 26 March 2024 Hits: 1075

    During his first year back in office, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva got a solid boost from the economy to help appease his political foes and finance his social welfare programmes. On the back of a bumper crop, GDP expanded almost 3% last year, nearly quadruple initial projections.

    This year the shoe is on the other foot. The farming sector has lost some of its shine and the economy is projected to slow to nearly half the pace of 2023. Agriculture GDP is set to stagnate this year, after expanding an exceptional 15.1% in 2023. The farm lobby CNA foresees a contraction of up to 1%. That’s largely because of a smaller grain harvest and lower global food prices.

    Lula, who has a high rejection rate in rural areas in part because of his policies favouring the environment and indigenous peoples, is now touring agricultural fairs and events across the country and hosting a string of his traditional “power barbecues” to please farm lobbies. The idea is to help gain political support, but the outcome may well boost output as well.

    “I am aware that their problem with us is ideological. It's not about money,” Lula said. “We’re going to present a good harvest financing plan because we want the farm sector to continue producing, planting more so we can export more.”

    But it’s not just a weaker farm sector that has slowed the economy. The feel-good effect of initial wage and welfare increases, and relatively high borrowing costs of 6% in inflation-adjusted terms, are weighing on consumer consumption. Industrial output also decreased, by 1.6% in January from the month prior. That comes on top of two consecutive quarters of no economic growth at all. Some observers argue that 2023 was the anomaly, and that now Brazil’s economy has returned to a pace more in line with its capacity.

    Brighter outlook

    And yet there are signs that the economy may have bottomed out already, starting with an improved inflation outlook, which should help bolster household purchasing power and may allow the central bank (BCB) to cut interest rates more aggressively. The Selic benchmark rate is to fall from 11.25% to 9% this year, according to the BCB’s latest Focus bulletin, a weekly survey of economists.

    At the same time the Lula administration has been seeking to stimulate economic growth by offering tax stimulus and other incentives to companies that invest in green and energy-efficient technologies. In the auto industry in particular such incentives seem to be having an impact, as manufacturers are pouring fresh capital into their plants.

    • Auto-makers are investing

    Stellantis NV, the group that owns brands like Citroën, Fiat, Jeep, and Peugeot, said it will invest R$30bn (US$6.1bn) to boost production of flex-hybrid models for domestic and foreign markets. Japan’s Toyota Motor Corp has earmarked R$11bn for Brazil through 2030. Volkswagen and General Motors will invest R$9bn and R$7bn, respectively, to help retool their plants.

    One line of thought is that Brazil is benefitting as many Western economies are resourcing raw materials, energy, and, to a lesser extent, manufacturing away from China and Russia for geopolitical reasons and increased supply chain security. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Brazil last year was the third-highest in the world, after the US and China, and is projected to grow by some US$2bn this year to around US$70bn. Indeed, FDI in January came in at US$8.7bn, more than double the consensus forecast.

    Economists seem to have noticed and are beginning to increase their growth projections for 2024. Since December, the median forecast for GDP growth in the Focus report jumped from 1.5% to 1.8%. There could be a potential repeat of last year’s consecutive growth upgrades.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    Abbi Dicker 27 March 2025 Hits: 2337

    MEXICO | CCE reveals job offerings for returned migrants. Mexico’s leading business lobby, the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (CCE), announced on 24 March that 211 companies had reported some 59,657 job vacancies for Mexicans deported from the US under the México te Abraza (Mexico embraces you) programme. Launched by President Claudia Sheinbaum in January, México te Abraza is part of a comprehensive strategy that seeks to reintegrate Mexicans sent back to the country as part of the mass deportation drive of the administration of US President Donald Trump.

    According to the CCE, the Mexican state with the highest number of job offerings is the northern border state of Nuevo León (8,287), followed by Mexico City (7,312), neighbouring Estado de México (4,757), the western state of Jalisco (4,634), the central states of Guanajuato (2,965) and Querétaro (2,844), and the border state of Coahuila (2,833).

    The CCE stated that the salaries offered depended on the job profile, with monthly salaries ranging from around M$8,400 (US$417.81) to M$16,800 for operational positions; M$16,000 to M$32,000 for specialised technical positions; and over M$40,000 for professional positions.

    Among the business groups with the highest number of vacancies are Mexican multinational beverage and retail company Femsa; local conglomerate Grupo Carso; US retail giant Walmart; Mexican department store Coppel; national dairy company Grupo Lala; and Mexican food company Grupo Bimbo. In the case of Grupo Carso, there are more than 5,700 job openings from various companies, including hydrocarbon company GSM Bronco, with 402 offers for engineers and technicians in the south-eastern state of Tabasco.

    The CCE president, Francisco Cervantes Díaz, announced that a platform is being developed to allow companies to manage their vacancies and see those interested in their jobs.

  • RASTREANDO TENDENCIAS

    LatinNews 26 March 2012 Hits: 699

    MEXICO | Resolución de la Corte Suprema. El 21 de marzo, la corte suprema votó 3:2 para no liberar de la prisión a la ciudadana francesa Florence Cassez –aunque ordenó una nueva investigación sobre su caso. Los jueces de la corte suprema aceptaron que hubo fallas en el proceso que condujo a la condena de Cassez por secuestro, pero resolvió que estas fallas no justificaban la liberación de Cassez, como había exigido su equipo legal.

        El presidente de la corte suprema, Juan Silva Meza, pidió a los otros dos poderes en la constitución que respeten el fallo de la corte suprema. El ejecutivo había sido fuertemente crítico del intento de Cassez de cuestionar su condena y sentencia a 60 años en prisión. El mismo Presidente Felipe Calderón había aludido al caso, pidiendo a la corte suprema que defiendan a las víctimas del delito y que no tolere que tecnicismos legales permitan la impunidad.

        Cassez ha estado en prisión desde diciembre del 2005. Genaro García Luna, entonces titular de la ahora desbandada Agencia Federal de Investigación (AFI) pero ahora ministro de seguridad pública, ha admitido que su arresto, y el de su novio en el rancho del último en Morelos, fue montado para las cámaras de la TV. A Cassez también le fue negado el inmediato acceso al consulado francés después de su arresto.

    • Anti-dumping

    Brasil y Argentina no son los únicos países que resienten la renovada competitividad internacional de México. El 19 de marzo, EU aplicó impuestos anti-dumping de entre 6% y 30,3% a heladeras-congeladoras de construcción mexicana. Y el 21 de marzo EU también aplicó impuestos anti-dumping sobre alambres de acero galvanizado hecho en México.

    • Turismo

    En el 2011 el número de turistas internacionales que visitaron México se había incrementado un 2%, año en año, a un record de 22,7m. El incremento se produjo a pesar de la oleada de violencia relacionada con las bandas criminales. Los escépticos señalan que, globalmente, el turismo internacional se había incrementado un 4,4% en el 2011. Los optimistas señalaron que Malia Obama, la hija de 13 años del Presidente Barack Obama, fue a Oaxaca, México para sus vacaciones de primavera durante la semana del 16 al 23 de marzo.

  • Bogotá gets new secretary of government

    LatinNews 03 May 2012 Hits: 1435

    Development: On 2 May the mayor of the Colombian capital, Gustavo Petro, appointed Guillermo Asprilla as his new city government secretary.

    Significance: The appointment came exactly one month after the resignation of the former secretary, Antonio Navarro Wolff (http://www.latinnews.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=51024&period=2012&archive=787851&Itemid=6&cat_id=787851:bogot%C3%A1-loses-star-cabinet-member), the star cabinet member. The secretary of government is effectively the chief of cabinet. Petro’s choice of Asprilla indicates continuity; Asprilla and Wolff are both former M-19 guerrillas who, like Petro, demobilised and entered politics in the 1990s. Asprilla’s main challenge will be to secure city council approval for the mayor’s ambitious urban development plans.

    Key points:

    • Asprilla was previously serving as the director of the administrative unit of public services (Uaesp). His sister, Selma, resigned as advisor to the secretary of government (also on 2 May)

    • Petro and Asprilla have been friends for over two decades. After demobilising from the M-19, they helped found the Alianza Democrática M-19 (AD M-19) and later, the Pólo Democrático Alternativo (PDA). When Petro left the Polo in 2011, Asprilla was accused of double militancy for promoting Petro’s mayoral candidacy for Movimiento Progresistas (MP) while serving as a PDA city councillor. The PDA’s ethics committee suspended him for three months and Asprilla quickly left the party to join Petro’s MP.

    • Asprilla is a lawyer with an MA in the analysis of economic and political problems. He was a member of the 1991 constitutional assembly and has held several posts in public ministries, including the ministry of health and the administrative department of public service. He has also worked as a consultant for multilateral organisations, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

  • NICARAGUA: Ortega poised for municipal victory

    LatinNews 31 October 2012 Hits: 2613

    With less than a week until the 4 November municipal elections, the highly questioned supreme electoral court (CSE) has done little to provide much in the way of reassurance ahead of the vote, which is widely expected to see President Daniel Ortega’s Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) – which currently holds 109 of the country’s 153 municipalities - strengthen its local presence.

    As was the case for the controversial November 2011 general elections, which saw Ortega win with 62% of the vote, amid widespread allegations of fraud, the build-up to the municipal vote has been characterized by concerns regarding the electoral process. Following its exclusion of some political parties from the municipal contest [RC-12-09], the CSE, which the European Union (EU) in its final observation report for the November 2011 election, described as displaying a “regrettable lack of neutrality”, has also failed to address a chief complaint of the beleaguered opposition: the composition of candidate lists. In response to complaints by the opposition Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI) and Partido Conservador that party lists included “ghost candidates” – i.e. dead people – CSE Magistrate José Luis Villavicencio denied that the court bore any responsibility for addressing these concerns, insisting this lies with the judiciary (which also remains under Ortega’s thumb). He said that the CSE acted “under the principle of good faith”, trusting that candidates registered by the various parties, fulfilled all the legal requirements.

    Civil society groups also continue to flag up doubts about the accuracy of the electoral register. With some 3.74m Nicaraguans registered to vote, according to the CSE’s head and a close Ortega ally, Roberto Rivas, Mauricio Zúñiga, the director of a leading electoral watchdog, Instituto para el Desarrollo y la Democracia (Ipade), highlights continued anomalies in the process of issuing cédulas (national identity cards required to vote). This same complaint surfaced in last year’s general election, when Zúñiga estimated that more than 40,000 people were unable to vote because they had no cédulas. Zúñiga recently told a local analysis weekly, Confidencial, that 9.2% of those registered to vote still lacked the necessary papers ahead of the municipal election.

    As was the case for the November 2011 general election and the November 2008 municipal vote, neither of the two main electoral watchdogs – Ipade or Ética y Transparencia - have been accredited to observe the election. While Ortega’s invitation to the Organization of American States (OAS) to “accompany” the municipal vote provided a boost to the credibility of the process, the OAS has since announced that its delegation would be reduced to 25, from the initial 65, for lack of budget.

    Yet, it is worth pointing out that Ortega remains popular, in large part due to state-run social schemes, such as the flagship Hambre Cero (Zero Hunger), made possible by aid from Venezuela. According to the latest poll by pollster M&R Consultores, published on 10 October, Ortega has 60.2% approval rating – in line with the 62% who re-elected him as president last year. The survey, which was carried out between 15 and 23 September, showed that 55.9% of respondents identified themselves as pro-FSLN, a considerably higher fraction than the third of the population that has traditionally identified itself as Sandinista. Meanwhile, 68.6% of respondents said they would vote for the FSLN in the municipals and just 9.1% for the opposition. The survey interviewed 1,600 people and had a 2.5% margin of error.

    • Saving energy

    On 15 October the government of President Daniel Ortega also announced a US$17m energy saving plan, which aims to save up to 35 MW/hour – 6.1% of the current total, through introducing energy-saving florescent bulbs in 36,000 public street lamps around the country.  The government also announced plans to use solar panels to heat water in hospitals and reduce energy consumption in agricultural plants.

    • Electoral violence

    The final stages of the campaign have also been marked by violence. On 27 October Evaristo Luna Alfaro, a candidate for the opposition Partido Liberal Constitucionalista (PLC) in Siuna, in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (Raan), was shot dead. Sources cited by local media attributed the death of Luna (known as ‘Comandante Catala’ when he was in the former Contra group Resistencia Nicaragüense), to José Tinoco, a municipal councillor for the other main opposition group, Partido Liberal Independiente (PLI). Tinoco denies the allegations.

  • ECONOMY: Rousseff and Mantega stay resolutely on message

    LatinNews 24 January 2013 Hits: 2327

    President Dilma Rousseff refuses to be bullied by the markets into removing her finance minister Guido Mantega, presidential sources told local media in mid January. Mantega arrived back from his summer break on 21 January to a full in-tray, amidst signs that Brazil’s consumer boom is coming off the boil fast, hastened by sticky consumer price inflation and high levels of household debt. The industrial sector also remains stagnant.

    Some international commentators have called for Mantega to be removed, arguing that the markets have lost confidence in his policy making (and in the mixed signals he emits). His original 4.5% GDP growth forecast for 2012 was way out; Brazil grew less than 1.0%, on most estimates. Unfazed, Mantega insists that the worst of the industrial downturn is over and that Brazil will recover in 2013. He also points out that consumers are still enjoying full employment, rising real wages and cheaper credit. President Rousseff on 20 January said that Brazil would post “serious, sustainable and systematic” growth in 2013. However, local economists cut their growth forecasts and lifted inflation forecasts in 18 January central bank consensus report, with annual GDP forecasts down to 3.1% from 3.3% a month earlier, and inflation up to 5.65%, from 5.5% previously. Inflation has been over 4.5% for the last 28 months now, and private economists expect it to break the 6.5% ceiling as soon as April. The central bank target is 4.5% +/- 2.5%.

    Nonetheless the central bank’s monetary policy committee (Copom) opted to hold the benchmark Selic interest rate at its record low of 7.25% on 16 January. The Copom reiterated its belief, for the third consecutive month, that “stable monetary conditions” for a “prolonged period” was the “most suitable strategy”. Many commentators think the central bank needs to update this message.

    The government is now resorting to unusual measures to boost growth and limit the rising cost of living. The mayors of both São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro have been asked to hold off on planned rate rises for public transportation, a key factor in the official inflation index. Another tactic was revealed by the newspaper Valor Econômico, which claimed that the central bank was trying to implement an interest rate cut by stealth. According to Valor, Copom is failing to enforce its interest rates by allowing the Interbank Deposit Certificate (CDI) rate, normally tied closely to the Selic, to fall. The difference between the two rates is now double the average over the past decade. Analysts assume that by this undeclared measure Tombini hopes to add impetus to the faltering economy, without announcing another interest rate cut. Many economists are concerned, however, that this will not be enough to keep inflation around the 4.5% target.

    There is also concern that the finance ministry is resorting to ever more creative accounting to meet the primary fiscal surplus target of 3.1%. Commentators point out that there is room for a more flexible target and suggest that the Rousseff government should just come out and formally relax the target. That, they argue, would be much healthier than tinkering in the background, which creates uncertainty and mistrust. Writing in Valor, the former finance minister Delfim Netto urged the government to be more transparent about its financial management. “It was never more necessary than now for there to be a relationship of complete confidence between the government and the private sector,” he wrote. “From that will come growth in 2013 and 2014.

    • Tax

    The federal government’s tax take was BRL1.03trn in 2012 (US$0.5trn), up 0.7% year-on-year and so a real-terms decline.

  • In Brief - Cuba

    LatinNews 27 March 2013 Hits: 2112

    ECONOMY | New anti-corruption agency. The Cuban council of State led by President Raúl Castro has set up a new anti-corruption institute known as the State commission for control (Comisión Estatal de Control [CEC]), which will function at the national and provincial level and will be tasked with eliminating “administrative corruption”, according to a decree (dated 14 March 2013) published in the daily gazette on Monday (25 March). The CEC will be headed up by the current (and Cuba’s first ever) comptroller general, Gladys Bejerano, now also a vice-president on the council of State. She will nominate a new deputy comptroller general to assist her. The CEC also comprises Lina Olinda Pedraza (the minister of finance & prices) and María Esther Reus (justice); along with representatives of the prosecutor general’s office, the interior ministry, the army, the economy & planning ministry, the foreign ministry, the external trade & foreign investment ministry, the labour ministry, the central bank, the national statistics office and the customs office, according to the decree. The CEC effectively substitutes a governmental commission set up by President Castro in July 2008 to advise the cabinet on official corruption, which has become a real bugbear of Castro’s as he oversees a process to slim down Cuba’s bloated and inefficient communist State. “Control is part of work and not an additional task”, the State daily, Granma, intoned on Monday.

  • In Brief – Venezuela

    LatinNews 23 September 2013 Hits: 1866

    POLITICS | US responds to Maduro’s latest complaint. On 19 September Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro flew to China after a tiff with the US over his flight path. On 20 September Roberta S. Jacobson, the US assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere affairs, rejected that the US had ever denied Maduro’s plane permission to use US airspace over Puerto Rico and stressed that in fact Venezuela had not followed normal procedures in submitting its request but that the US had worked to expedite it anyway. A US State Department note said that Venezuela had made its request on Wednesday 18 September, just a day before Maduro’s scheduled departure, when such requests are supposed to be made three days in advance. It added that Maduro was flying in a Cubana Airlines jet and that diplomatic flight requests were supposed to involve official State aircraft.  The statement said that, despite all of that, the US had worked with Venezuelan officials to get the approval done quickly. “This whole thing is absurd”, Jacobson said.  “This was a request that came in very late for an aircraft that is not a Venezuelan State aircraft and therefore would not normally get diplomatic clearance, and we got it done as quickly as we could so we don’t understand this reaction”. An airline industry analyst consulted by The New York Times, Robert W. Mann Jr., said that the most direct route from Caracas to Paris was over the Lesser Antilles and that flying over Puerto Rico, farther north, adds about 100 miles to the flight path. He admitted that there could be valid reasons to travel the extra distance, including wind forecasts or technical issues associated with the type of aircraft being used.

  • HONDURAS: Getting the means to enforce shoot-down

    LatinNews 01 April 2014 Hits: 4447

    This month Honduras was scheduled to take delivery of three radars purchased from Israel, which will become the basic source of intelligence on unauthorised flights liable to be intercepted by the air force under the ‘shoot-down’ law that came into effect on 3 February. President Juan Orlando Hernández, who took office in late January and was the main promoter of that law, has said that he fully intends to apply it.

    The Ley de Exclusión Aérea (‘Aerial Exclusion Zone’), approved by congress on 17 January, provides for the interception of aircraft detected flying in the designated exclusion zones between 18:00 and 06:00 and subjecting it to the ‘progressive use of force’ — which means going through the following steps: questioning, interception, persuasion and ultimately ‘the definitive neutralisation of the threat’.

    Initially three exclusion zones had been designated: the departments of Gracias a Dios, Colón and Olancho (the first two in the northeast facing the Caribbean, the third abutting them both inland) where most suspected drug-laden flights have been detected. However, the final draft of the law empowered the national defence and security council to designate new zones and vary the curfew times without congressional authorisation.

    The purchase of the radars — one with a range of 402 kilometres, two with ranges of 31 km — was a step taken in response to the US suspension of intelligence sharing (basically radar-detected suspect flights) between September and November 2012, after the Honduran air force shot down two suspect aircraft. After meeting President Hernández and members of his cabinet in Tegucigalpa on 11 February, the US Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, William Brownfield, played down the importance of the radars, saying, ‘It would be a mistake to talk about the radar as the solution; if you have the radar, but not the capacity to respond to the coordinates indicated by the radar, then it’s not much help.’ [Honduras has announced the upgrading of its fleet of A-37s, F-5s and Tucanos.]

    He went on with a broad hint that the Honduran government was looking in the wrong direction, saying that the number of suspect flights over the previous 18 months had fallen substantially: ‘We are talking about a reduction of more than 80%.’ He said that the use of sea routes by the traffickers had been increasing.

    The Honduran government provides different figures. It cites intelligence reports showing that airborne drug shipments to Honduras rose since 2011 from 114 to 120 a year. It also says that 89% of all drug-carrying flights that take off in South America have violated Honduran airspace, and that 80% of all US-bound cocaine passes through the country. Of this, the government says, 20% is shipped in by air or overland, and the rest by sea.

    President Hernández said on 21 February, ‘If the drugs headed for the US did not pass through Honduras, we would not have the present levels of insecurity.’ The Honduran authorities say that about 70% of all homicides in the country (the total of which ran at 17-20 a day in 2013) are connected with the drugs trade. Though neither Brownfield nor the Honduran government say so, their figures regarding the volume of cocaine shipment flows are most probably projections from the amounts intercepted. As regards hard data the government has reported the seizure of 22 tonnes of cocaine in 2011 and just over 20t in 2012. Up to the time of writing it had not published figures for the whole of 2013.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    LatinNews 26 June 2014 Hits: 1200

    MEXICO | Road infrastructure investment drive continues. President Enrique Peña Nieto announced on 24 June that his government is going to invest M$1.3trn (US$99bn) with the aim of building 3,000km of new roads this year.

    According to Peña Nieto, the government will develop at least 250 highway construction and improvement projects this year using resources that are currently at the government’s disposal to modernise the country’s infrastructure. This is all part of the Peña Nieto administration’s ambitious plans to overhaul Mexico’s infrastructure radically over the next four years as announced by the government back in April [WR-14-17].

    Peña Nieto made the latest announcement during the inauguration of the M$468m (US$35.9m) expansion of the highway linking the cities of Texcoco and Calpulalpan in the central state of Tlaxcala.

    In a speech Peña Nieto said that the expansion of the highway would increase traffic capacity to an average of 15,000 vehicles a day, benefiting some 280,000 local residents by reducing the time to travel from Texcoco to Calpulalpan. He said that this was important because “98%” of Mexico’s population regularly use the country’s highway system to travel.

    More significantly, Peña Nieto added that the expanded Texcoco-Calpulalpan highway will also improve transport links between Mexico’s north-central and south-eastern areas as this highway is connected to the Mexico City-Puebla highway, one of central Mexico’s main roads.

    Peña Nieto concluded by saying that the continued development of Mexico’s highway system was crucial as it would help improve regional productivity and the country’s overall competitiveness.

    MEXICO | Economic activity slowly picking up. Economic activity in April increased by 0.5% over the same period last year, Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) maintained on 24 June in its monthly report on the global economic activity indicator (Igae).

    According to Inegi, the increase was driven by the agricultural and service sectors, with the primary and tertiary sectors growing respectively by 1.3% and 1.1%.

    By contrast activity in the manufacturing or secondary sector shrank by 0.6%. The report also shows that the seasonally adjusted Igae figure increased by 1.25% between March and April.

    • ‘Lady Telecom’

    On 24 June a recording was released on social media on which Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) deputy, Purificación Carpinteyro, can be heard discussing potential business dealings with Jose Gutiérrez Becerril, a former manager at Telefónica México. Carpinteyro is a member of the federal chamber of deputies’ radio, television & film commission and the incident has raised serious concerns about whether the deputy may have fallen into a conflict of interests. Carpinteyro has sought to justify her actions claiming that she was looking to increase competition in Mexico’s highly concentrated telecoms market: “I’m not the enemy; the enemies are the monopolies”. This has led to Carpinteyro being derided in Mexican social media sites where she is now mockingly being referred to as ‘Lady Telecom’.

     

  • Brazil: Bye, bye, investment grade?

    LatinNews 16 December 2015 Hits: 26

    Overshadowed by the political crisis triggered by the attempt to impeach President Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s economy has continued to deteriorate. The latest setback was the announcement on 9 December that Moody’s Investors Services was placing Brazilian debt on review for a possible downgrade to junk status.

    Standard & Poor’s (S&P), one of the other global ratings agencies, has already reduced Brazil to sub-investment grade (it did so in September 2015). A Moody’s review usually takes 90 days, so there could be a decision in February or March 2016. Separately, there have been reports that a third ratings agency, Fitch, may change its Brazil rating as early as January. The significance of this is that it is highly likely that either Moody’s or Fitch will over the next couple of months join S&P in downgrading Brazilian debt. Many global investment funds have internal rules that require them to pull their money out of a country if two or more ratings agencies withdraw investment grade status. Analysts suggest that if this happens to Brazil – something that is looking increasingly likely – there could be immediate consequential capital flight at some point early next year of US$2bn-US$5bn.

    More important than the short-term financial impact of a debt downgrade will be the negative signal it sends about the general state of confidence in the Brazilian economy. There could be a further blow as rumours that finance minister Joaquim Levy may resign have once again reappeared. Levy is seen as a market-friendly figure committed to reducing Brazil’s large fiscal deficit, which in the eyes of many investors is one of the root causes of the country’s economic difficulties.

    The latest data is not encouraging. The economy is stagflating, caught between a tight monetary stance and a loose fiscal one (the equivalent of stepping on the brakes and the accelerator at the same time). Inflation was above target at 10.3% in mid-November. The Selic interest rate, currently at 14.25%, is one of the world’s highest, and the signs are that it may go even higher, as to combat inflation the Central Bank is considering another 25bps hike. That would deepen the recession. The overall public sector deficit meanwhile was 9.5% of GDP in the 12 months to September. GDP has fallen for three consecutive quarters. The contraction in the third quarter was 4.5% relative to year-earlier levels, leading some to claim Brazil is now experiencing the worst recession since the 1930s. Industrial production slumped alarmingly by 11.2% in the 12 months to October.

    The IMF is forecasting a 3% GDP contraction in 2015, followed by a further 1% fall in 2016. Other analysts expect this year’s GDP fall to be sharper, at around 3.5%. Alejandro Werner, director of the IMF’s Western Hemisphere department, summed up the situation in December by saying “In Brazil, the political crises and corruption scandals have generated an ‘impasse’ in which the issues of economic policy could not be processed and have delayed the expectations of recovery”.

    It is hard to see an easy way out of the stagflationary trap in which the economy finds itself. Levy has argued that a reduction in the fiscal deficit is key, as it will stabilise debt levels, rebuild confidence, and thereby eventually pave the way for recovery. But he faces daunting political and procedural obstacles, not least the fact that there is a major political crisis over the attempt to impeach the president. The minister tried – and ultimately failed – to secure a small primary fiscal surplus (before debt interest payments) in 2015. The latest figures suggest 2015 will close with a primary deficit equivalent to at least 0.7% of GDP. In early December, Levy was reported to be insisting on achieving a 0.7% primary surplus in the 2016 budget plan, and to be threatening to resign if this was not agreed. But achieving it looked unlikely, and Levy subsequently denied issuing any ultimatums.

    The draft Lei do Orçamento (LDO) approved by Congressional committee in December formally set a 0.7% target for 2016, but the necessary measures to achieve it were simply not in place. The LDO numbers assumed that a financial transactions tax, known as the CPMF, would be re-introduced, but Congress is unlikely to support such a move. The draft also assumes BRL27.5bn (US$7.1bn) in revenue from privatisations that are unlikely to happen in the current political climate. According to deputy Ricardo Barros (of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB) even with these assumptions in place there is a BRL10bn (US$2.63bn) primary shortfall for 2016, not a surplus. Other items may widen the deficit. Struggling to fend off the impeachment threat, in late December the government tried to gain support by promising greater funding next year to state governors, another commitment not yet included in the budget numbers. PMDB Senator Rose de Freitas told the Wall Street Journal she expects the final version of the LDO to target a primary budget balance of zero, instead of the 0.7% surplus.

    In addition, attempts to reduce the proportion of mandatory spending within the budget and lower the financial burden of pension payments (for example by increasing the age of retirement for public servants) are unlikely to prosper. Planning minister Nelson Barbosa has been attempting to modify the existing mechanism for upwards adjustments in the minimum wage (inflation + the last two year’s GDP growth rate) to something less costly, but was overruled by the president.