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PERU | Clashes in the VRAEM. After a protracted lull, since late August there have been several clashes between the government forces and Sendero Luminoso (SL) guerrillas in the Apurímac-Ene-Mantaro valley (VRAEM). According to official sources, the government forces have been gaining the upper hand, though an SL communiqué paints a different picture.

On 24 August military patrols clashed with guerrillas in the Río Tambo area of Satipo, Junín. The army reported one NCO injured and two guerrillas killed. Three days later the military raided a guerrilla camp in the Pitirinkini area of Pangoa, Junín, and seized several rifles and 2,500 rounds of ammunition. They reported signs that several guerrillas may have been injured.

On 2 September army and police patrols clashed with guerrillas in the Llochegua district of Huanta, Ayacucho. Five members of the military were reported injured and five guerrillas killed. The authorities later said that a top-ranking SL leader known as ‘Antonio’ was probably killed in that engagement.

An SL communiqué delivered to analyst Jaime Antezana claimed that on that occasion the guerrillas had thrice ambushed military patrols and once ambushed a police convoy, and that the outcome had been eight soldiers killed and another eight injured. The authorities have dismissed this communiqué as misleading SL propaganda.

On 29 September the authorities reported that in the Río Tambo district of Satipo they had captured 10 suspected SL members who had been tracked down by a local self-defence committee (CAD) based in Kutiverini. Rifles, grenades and ammunition were seized.

BOLIVIA | Crackdown on the airbridge. The special antidrugs force, FELCN, reported on 13 September that since the beginning of the year it had seized 33 aircraft used to transport drugs, six more than in the whole of 2014. Most of the seizures were made in the last three months, in operations that focused mainly on Beni, north of La Paz and Santa Cruz. FELCN director Santiago Delgadillo said that most of the clandestine airstrips found and destroyed this year had been built on private estates or on fiscal land in rural areas. Of the aircraft seized, 15 were destroyed in the course of the on-ground interdiction operations.

Delgadillo lamented the lack of radars, which could enable FELCN to carry out better surveillance of Bolivia’s borders and track drug lights. On 3 September Interior Minister Carlos Romero reported that a Bolivia air force captain had been arrested in the attempt to fly a load on 362 kilos of cocaine to Brazil on a privately owned light aircraft. Paraguayan media reported on 7 September that a retired Bolivian military officer and six Paraguayans had been arrested in the act of receiving a load of 420 kilos of cocaine. Bolivia’s deputy social defence minister Felipe Cáceres had claimed last July that the cocaine airbridge had been ‘eliminated’.

The Bolivian government announced on 13 September that it had formally asked the governments of Peru, Brazil and Paraguay to provide information on registered light aircraft, pilots and flight plans to track down drug-carrying flights. Interior minister Romero said that Bolivia had already received ‘strategic information’ from Peru and was processing it. Between May and July Peru’s antidrugs agency, DEVIDA, had managed to track 175 ‘irregular’ flights across the Bolivian border, mostly in the VRAEM.

In all of its interdiction operations since the beginning of the year FELCN seized almost 60 tonnes of cannabis (almost entirely originating in Paraguay) and 16.6t of cocaine, of which 80% came from Peru.

BOLIVIA | Aumenta la deuda con China. El 16 de octubre el Presidente de Bolivia, Evo Morales, anunció que China había acordado proveer una línea de crédito de US$7mm para financiar proyectos de infraestructura, energía eléctrica, y transporte en el país andino. Hablando en la inauguración de las nuevas oficinas centrales de la Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) en el departamento de Santa Cruz, Morales saludó “la buena noticia traída a nosotros desde China por nuestro camarada [el Vicepresidente] Álvaro [García Linera]”.

García Linera realizó una visita oficial de tres días a China, entre el 14 y el 17 de octubre, que apuntaba a impulsar los lazos económicos bilaterales. De acuerdo con Morales, el préstamo será utilizado para financiar la construcción de una nueva carretera uniendo a la municipalidad de Santa Rosa de la Roca en Santa cruz, con la municipalidad de Remanso en el departamento adyacente de Beni; y una línea férrea vinculando las municipalidades de Motacusico y Puerto Busch, ambas en el departamento de Santa Cruz.

Morales enfatizó que esto ayudaría a impulsar el crecimiento económico futuro de Bolivia. Y también señaló que la decisión de buscar el préstamo no respondía a la incapacidad de Bolivia para financiar estos proyectos, sino más bien al hecho de que esto proveen fondos disponibles más fácilmente: “No es un problema de crédito. Si necesitamos dinero debido a que nuestra economía está creciendo, nosotros tenemos un importante colchón financiero de US$15mm de reservas internacionales y depósitos”, dijo Morales.

Sin embargo, el anuncio fue recibido con preocupación en algunos círculos de que la deuda de Bolivia con China está creciendo a una tasa muy alta, lo que incrementa sus niveles generales de deuda externa. De acuerdo con cifras del Banco central de Bolivia (BCB), la deuda externa del país es actualmente del 17% del PIB. Sin embargo, los analistas locales han señalado que el nuevo préstamo de China elevaría está cifra a un 39% del PIB.

La Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) aconseja a todos sus países miembros que sus niveles de deuda externa no deberían sobrepasar el 50% del PIB. La relación de deuda externa con PIB de Bolivia no pasará ese umbral con el nuevo préstamo chino, pero se está acercando.

El ex ministro de finanzas, Flavio Machicado Saravia (1983-1984), dijo que si el préstamo no logra promover el esperado crecimiento económico, esto podría socavar la capacidad de Bolivia para repagarlo, y que el país podría encontrarse en un círculo vicioso: “más endeudado y sin crecimiento”.

Esta visión es compartida por el analista local, Julio Alvarado, quien señaló que “nuestra economía creció gracias a los altos precios de las materias primas, que han caído y continúan cayendo”. Alvarado también señaló que el país nunca había asumido una deuda tan grande, agregando que Bolivia también debe tener en mente su deuda interna, “la deuda externa más la deuda interna, ambas deben estar en alrededor de US$20mm”.

Tales preocupaciones hicieron que García Linera declara al retornar a Bolivia el 19 de octubre, que los niveles de la deuda externa del país permanecerán “manejables” incluso con el desembolso de este nuevo préstamo. Señalando que el actual nivel de la deuda externa de Bolivia es “uno de los más bajos en América Latina”, García Linera insistió que el tema no era causa de preocupación.

García Linera agregó que en todo caso, el préstamo no se pagaría “de una vez en su totalidad” sino más bien sobre la base “proyecto a proyecto”. Aún así él también reveló que China había prometido ofrecer un crédito adicional de US$10mm, una vez que el primer proyecto de desarrollo de la infraestructura sea completado.

• Oferta de apoyo de Suecia

El 20 de octubre la ministra de infraestructura de Suecia, Anna Johansson, ofreció al Perú la asistencia del gobierno sueco para ayudar a afrontar el fenómeno climático de ‘El Niño’, que causa inundaciones extremas en el norte del país andino, y severa sequía en el sur. Johansson hizo la oferta después de reunirse con el ministro de defensa de Perú, Jakke Valakivi, y miembros del alto comando de las fuerzas armadas peruanas en Lima, como parte de la visita oficial a Perú de la Princesa Victoria de Suecia, la heredera del trono sueco. Después de haber sido informada de los esfuerzos de las fuerzas armadas para prepararse para la llegada de El Niño, Johansson dijo que “Suecia es un aliado de Perú en la confrontación al El Niño […] y estamos preparados para ayudar a las autoridades peruanas con lo que necesario”.

Once again the finance minister, Joaquim Levy, is rumoured to be on the verge of leaving the government. Given such rumours are an almost weekly event, it is worth taking them with a pinch of salt. However, in a departure from previous occasions, markets and traders now appear to be more enthused by his possible replacement, Henrique Meirelles, the former central bank president under Lula da Silva (2003-2011). The Real strengthened slightly against the US dollar, and the market rose on the rumours. Whereas once Levy was believed to be all that stood between the government and another credit ratings downgrade, now Meirelles appears to be an acceptable substitute who would stick to the government’s austerity programme while also keeping the left-leaning base of the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) onside.

Over the past few days, Meirelles has been giving increasingly strong endorsements of the government’s fiscal adjustment strategy. At an industry event in Brasília on 11 November, both Levy and Meirelles spoke. Introducing the former central bank president with warm words, Levy said, “I agree with everything he is about to say. We have done many things together and I have complete affinity with his thoughts.” While Meirelles was at the central bank under Lula, Levy was the secretary of the national treasury.

In his speech, Meirelles was remarkably upbeat, insisting that Brazil is in a much better position than it was 20 years ago. He said that Brazil had a consumer market the size of Britain or France and claimed that the country’s basic economic infrastructure was in good shape. Meirelles also pointed to the country’s strong judiciary and free press as an example of the maturing of Brazilian institutions. While acknowledging that inflation was high, he said that it was “controlled” and pointed to Brazil’s healthy stock of foreign reserves, currently valued at US$370bn.

Interestingly, he did accept the criticism that taxation in Brazil was “high” and equivalent to more developed countries. He also argued that the high cost of energy in the country was a brake on growth. Improving infrastructure and the quality of national education would be vital to making Brazil internationally competitive. Still, he has made it abundantly clear in interviews that he believes the government must cut public spending.

The night before, Levy reportedly faced criticism from both Right and Left at a dinner with senators. In particular, the finance ministry’s attempts to introduce a financial transactions tax (CPMF) was rubbished. Though Levy himself has studiously avoided saying anything about his future, President Dilma Rousseff has previously insisted he would stay in place. Asked whether he would be interested in a job in government, Meirelles insisted that he “did not waste time thinking about hypotheticals”.

• Truckers block roads

On 9 November, a group of truckers not aligned to any of the main trade unions began partial blockades on interstate roads in around 15 states across Brazil. Though the group has a few practical demands, it has declared it has no interest in negotiating with the federal government and wants to see the removal of President Dilma Rousseff from power. In response, on 10 November, the government increased the penalties for blocking roads.

With the government facing large scheduled debt repayments before the end of 2017 and the economy mired in deep recession, there has been rising speculation, once again, about a possible external debt default.

Reflecting the severe liquidity concerns, the government is trying to restructure several of the bonds held by the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), asking investors to exchange instruments set to mature in 2017 for a new bond that will mature in 2020. Essentially an effort to buy time, the left-wing government led by President Nicolás Maduro is gambling that oil prices will have recovered by then, putting the company in a better economic position to make the repayments. Yet bondholders are likely to remain sceptical and take-up may well be low, sustaining concerns about creditworthiness in the medium term.

With US$1.1bn in interest and capital debt repayments falling due in October and a further US$2.9bn in November this year, there has been rising concern about the Venezuelan government's ability to make these scheduled payments. The repayment schedule is also heavy in 2017, with a total of US$10bn falling due, including large repayments in April (US$3.6bn) and November (US$2.9bn).

The government announced early in 2016 that it was seeking to restructure these liabilities, but a prolonged silence on the issue since then prompted many to assume that concerns about sovereign creditworthiness had precluded a possible deal with bondholders. Attention switched to the authorities' much-diminished international reserves, and whether they actually had enough cash to make the payments.

Against this backdrop, the last-minute announcement that the government plans to restructure the public sector's short-term debt liabilities is positive, in that it provides hope that the sovereign will avoid a costly default on its external debt. The government unveiled terms of the initial offer on 16 September, which in essence proposed exchanging Pdvsa bonds falling due in 2016 and 2017 with a new 2020 bond. The offer involved swapping the instruments at parity, so not increasing the net present value, aside from a slight increase in interest repayments. To incentivise bondholders to accept the exchange offer, the Venezuelan authorities offered shares in Citgo – the US-based refining arm of Pdvsa – as collateral.

Markets responded negatively, with Pdvsa bond prices dropping following the government's announcement. Many questioned the true value of Citgo's holdings and the likelihood of securing a pay-out in the event of an eventual default. The lack of incentive for bondholders to accept the offer prompted speculation about a low take-up from investors.

In response, on 26 September the government sweetened the terms of the offer. Instead of offering a straight swap, the government offered an extra US$170 for each US$1,000 of bonds maturing in April 2017 and an additional US$220 for each US$1,000 maturing in November 2017, provided that investors accept the offer before 6 October. If bondholders accept the swap after that date, but before the 14 October cut-off, the incentive will fall to an additional US$120 and US$170, respectively. The fact that no extra incentive was offered for 2016 bonds implies that the government does not expect bondholders to accept an exchange deal given the proximity of the maturity date, but that it is instead trying to alleviate liquidity problems next year.

This, in turn, reflects the reality that the authorities are believed to have the funds to make the payments falling due in October and November. International reserves held at the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV, the Central Bank) stood at US$11.8bn on 23 September, down sharply from US$16.3bn at the start of the year. In theory, this provides ample funds to meet short-term repayments, but Venezuela has in recent years held a fairly large proportion of this (around two-thirds) in gold. The BCV has been selling gold over the course of the year to boost liquid reserves, which is likely to cover near-term repayments.

The key question is what proportion of bondholders will accept the exchange offer and if, by choosing not to participate, they might lose their initial investment if the country subsequently defaults next year. The government has indicated that they are hoping for over half of investors to swap their debt instruments for the new 2020 bond, but private financial analysts estimate an acceptance rate of only around 20-30%.

Given that the government has so far shown a steely determination to continue servicing debt, cutting back sharply on imports of essential basic items like medicines and food in order to conserve foreign currency, bondholders might hold out on the assumption that they will be paid regardless. In addition, the critical economic problems facing the country and a deep-seated pessimism that conditions will be any better in 2020 has led many to question whether the government's repayment capacity will be any stronger in four years' time.

A related question is which government will be in office at that time. At the moment, President Maduro is clinging on to power, attempting to fend off opposition efforts to oust him by means of a recall referendum. Even if the government averts these efforts, by pushing back a referendum date past 10 January (meaning that even if the public voted to recall him, Maduro would simply be replaced by his vice president), it appears highly unlikely that the ruling Partido Socalista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) would win the 2018 election. If the opposition wins power, there is a significant risk that they would not recognise debt incurred by the PSUV government, on the principle that it represents “odious” or illegitimate debt that was incurred for purposes that did not serve the country's best interests (and is therefore not enforceable). So, by agreeing to exchange 2017 bonds for 2020 instruments, investors might risk not being paid at all.

This is a particular concern, because the current government has racked up large amounts of debt, taken on by Pdvsa, which would significantly hamper the next government's ability to recover from the deep economic recession. If the opposition does take power before 2020, either as a result of a recall referendum, a period of social unrest or the 2018 presidential election, the new government would require significant external assistance to address the economy's deep-seated structural problems that have caused hyper-inflation, a prolonged recession and a liquidity crisis.

Such assistance would be likely to take the form of an IMF loan package and would require several domestic reforms. At the same time, the new government would be likely to seek a restructuring deal, either pushing back the maturity on the 2020 bond and/or securing a haircut on its liabilities.

Like many of the PSUV government's decisions, this latest announcement is driven by a desire to delay having to confront the economy's severe problems, proposing a stop-gap measure that pushes an immediate problem into the future, albeit worsening the likely impact. At no point has the Maduro administration demonstrated that it is willing to tighten fiscal policy to reduce the need to take on additional debt. It is completely unwilling to address the budget deficit, which is so large that the authorities have simply stopped publishing fiscal data, in fact expanding spending in an attempt to bolster its plummeting approval ratings. Meanwhile, it has continued to print money to help plug the deficit which, combined with reduced imports, has fuelled eye-watering levels of inflation. So with little sign that the government is even considering altering its policy stance, bondholders will have little confidence that they would be paid in full in 2020, even if the PSUV remains in power.

This leaves investors with a somewhat depressing conclusion: even if current holders of 2017 bonds agree to the terms of the government's exchange offer, eventual payment in 2020 is highly uncertain, regardless of who is in office at that point. However, if the vast majority reject the offer currently on the table, the government might default next year. The only certainty is that the government's economic difficulties remain pressing, with no perceptible way of avoiding a further downward spiral.

The leading opposition presidential candidate ahead of general elections next February, Guillermo Lasso, set out his economic stall this week. Lasso, a former banker who is running for the centre-right Movimiento Creo (Creando Oportunidades), said that he would take Ecuador into the Pacific Alliance trade bloc with Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru (and presumably out of the Venezuela-led regional bloc Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América [Alba]).

Lasso said that Ecuador must become a free and open economy. He promised to scrap 12 taxes, including a tax on foreign assets, inheritance tax, a tax on remittances, and a tax on rural land, reducing the overall fiscal burden by US$3bn on the public and the business sector in a bid to stimulate the domestic economy. Lasso also said he would reduce value added tax (VAT) from 14% to 12%.

Lasso said he would make the northern coastal provinces of Manabí and Esmeraldas, devastated by an earthquake in April this year, free trade zones to attract investment and economic growth. Lasso said he would create a free trade zone for tourism where new hotels would not pay taxes for 30 years. He explained that this would help meet his ambitious goal of creating 1m jobs over the course of his four years in power. He presented his job creation proposal while visiting a tuna processing plant belonging to the Ecuadorean firm Asiservy in Manta, the seventh largest city in the country, in the province of Manabí.

• Free healthcare

Guillermo Lasso also had a message designed to appeal to low income earners, the demographic most supportive of the left-wing government led by President Rafael Correa. Lasso said that he would attract private investment to help construct and run new clinics and hospitals by promising not to tax profits in exchange for the use of 25% of their capacity to provide free healthcare to the most vulnerable sectors of society.

Bolivia’s former president Evo Morales (2006-2019) is now in Argentina where he has been granted refugee status. His arrival, two days after his ally Alberto Fernández was sworn in as Argentina’s new head of state, was followed by some mixed messages from the new Argentine government as to whether he would be able to make political statements. This is serving as one source of strain on relations with Bolivia’s interim government led by President Jeanine Áñez, which has ordered an arrest warrant for Morales on charges of terrorism and sedition: the Fernández administration has already rejected any possibility of extradition.

Having initially been denied asylum by Fernández’s predecessor Mauricio Macri (2015-2019), Morales went to Mexico following his resignation on 10 November over Bolivia’s electoral crisis [WR-19-45]. However, he pushed to go to neighbouring Argentina on the basis that many of his family and friends were already there. Given Argentina’s relative proximity to Bolivia, this unsurprisingly attracted concern from the Áñez administration, the legitimacy of which President Fernández has refused to recognise.

Argentina’s foreign minister Felipe Solá did initially request that Morales, who was accompanied by his former vice president Álvaro García Linera, avoid making political statements. However, in an interview with Argentine daily La Nación, published on 14 December, Argentina’s cabinet chief Santiago Cafiero appeared to contradict this statement, claiming that “the refugee has the same rights as an Argentine citizen in terms of freedom of expression. We are not going to restrict his freedoms”.

Since then Morales, who has been named as campaign chief for his Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) ahead of the election, the date of which has yet to be confirmed, has been clear about his intention to play a role in it, even from Buenos Aires. His endorsement will be critical when it comes to the MAS selecting its candidate from possibilities which include Andrónico Rodríguez, the vice president of the Cochabamba-based coca producers’ organisation Seis Federaciones del Trópico; former foreign minister David Choquehuanca (2006-2017); and former economy minister Luis Arce (2006-2017, 2019).

While the date of the election has yet to be set, on 18 December the bicameral legislature picked six justices for the electoral authority (TSE), in addition to Áñez’s choice of Salvador Romero, a former head of the electoral court (2006-2008). The TSE now has 48 hours to approve an electoral calendar and formally call elections to take place within 120 days, although the legislature has agreed to permit an extension until next month, citing insufficient time before the end of the year.

Arrest warrant issued

In line with a request by the Añez government, on 18 December prosecutors issued an order for Morales’ arrest. The order relates to charges of sedition and terrorism, linked to his alleged role in coordinating protests against the interim government which took place following his resignation – claims which he has vehemently denied [WR-19-47].

Morales is also facing the threat of legal action from other sources. On 14 December former presidential candidate Oscar Ortiz, a senator for the Movimiento Demócrata Social (MDS), announced the possibility of bringing legal action against a conglomerate of companies, linked to Morales and García Linera in relation to financial crimes. These include TV channels ATB and PAT, La Paz-based national daily La Razón, agro-industrial company Gravetal, and ProVida, an administrator of pension funds.

OAS issues final report

The Organization of American States (OAS) has presented its final report of the audit conducted on the 20 October general elections which concluded that there was “intentional manipulation” and “serious irregularities” that “make it impossible to validate the results originally issued by the Bolivian electoral authorities”.

According to the OAS report, intentional manipulation of the elections took place in two areas. Firstly, it detected changes in the minutes and the falsification of the signatures of poll officials. Secondly it was found that in the processing of the results, the data flow was redirected to two hidden servers and not controlled by electoral court (TSE) personnel which “made it possible to manipulate data and falsify minutes”.

• OAS report

The OAS report also cites “serious irregularities”, such as the “lack of protection of the acts and the loss of sensitive material”, as well as a significant number of errors and indices. The report’s conclusion is that “the manipulations and irregularities indicated do not allow for certainty about the margin of victory” of Evo Morales over his chief rival, former president Carlos Mesa (2003-2005), of the Comunidad Ciudadana (CC). On the contrary, it argues that “based on the overwhelming evidence found, what can be affirmed is that there has been a series of intentional operations aimed at altering the will expressed at the polls”.

On 8 April, the ninth meeting of the Colombian council for the ‘orange economy’ (creative and cultural sectors) took place in the country’s capital, Bogotá. Among the measures proposed for boosting the recovery of the creative industries in Colombia was a commitment to provide Col$6.5trn (US$1.72bn) in funding for the sector in 2021. A two-year recovery plan was also announced, offering a joint strategy incorporating both the public and private sectors. This would include Col$7trn in government-backed loans, Col$2.8trn leveraged through tax incentives for the private sector, and Col$2.4trn of public investment at a national and regional level.

A week later, on 15 April, Francisco Ramos, the vice president of Latin American content at Netflix, announced that the global streaming company would be opening its first office in Bogotá. Netflix launched its services in Colombia in 2011 and several well-received series have been filmed in the country over the past few years; Netflix has invested US$175m in local content since 2014.

This latest announcement will be seen as a major boost to the creative sector in Colombia, as it was accompanied with a commitment to filming 30 new productions in the country over the course of 2021 and 2022. Colombia is increasingly looking to position itself as a destination for international film and television production. The government has invested an estimated US$118m in 2020 and 2021 to fund 18 international audiovisual projects, 17 of which have been filmed in Colombia, directly generating approximately 2,300 jobs, with another 10,000 jobs indirectly created. Moreover US$91m has been made available for similar projects over the next 12 months.

In Colombia, as elsewhere around the world, the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic saw a massive increase in viewing figures across a range of Netflix programmes. The decision to open a more permanent base in Colombia, a major producer and consumer of Netflix content in Latin America, is therefore unsurprising.

Colombia’s President Iván Duque greeted the announcement with a tweet in which he reasserted his commitment to turn Colombia into the ‘Silicon Valley of Latin America’.  At the meeting of the council for the orange economy, the Culture Minister Felipe Buitrago was keen to emphasise the work done prior to the pandemic to incorporate the creative sector into plans to regenerate urban areas, and that this work would continue with the recovery plans for the creative industries. As part of this, 535 businesses have been offered a seven-year rent holiday, whilst an investment of US$38m is expected to generate 4,780 new jobs in the sector. In addition, the culture ministry has reported that almost 100,000 businesses in the cultural sector (72% of them small and medium-sized enterprises) have received loans from the state-owned bank, Bancóldex, for a total of Col$2.8trn. The culture ministry’s goal for 2021 is that Col$2.7trn be made available in business loans to support the orange economy.

As well as the financial support proposed, the culture ministry has announced its intention to hold a 2021 programme of cultural events, including theatre performances, orchestral music, and support for the Batuta music education system in those communities most affected by Colombia’s internal armed conflict. This is alongside the investment by the ministry of information technology & communications (Mintic) in media, developing digital skills, and strengthening the creative digital industry.

Uruguay’s interior minister, Luis Alberto Heber, said on 20 September that a scandal over the kidnap and torture of a prisoner was “shameful” for the country.

According to press reports, later confirmed by the interior ministry, the victim was a 28-year-old first time offender who was kidnapped, tortured, starved and sexually abused inside a Montevideo jail by a group of other prisoners, for an extended period of between 40 and 60 days, without prison guards apparently realising what was going on. The victim was also subject to extortion. Heber said he was “ashamed something like this could happen in our country”.

The case highlights poor conditions and low staffing in Uruguay’s prisons. After a tour of various prisons in 2018, members of the United Nations Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture said conditions in some Uruguayan jails were “deplorable and insalubrious”. Juan Miguel Petit, the congressional commissioner for prisons, said he had been warning of conditions in the country’s prisons for years. He described the prison system as suffering a “catastrophic structural failure”. 

The interior ministry has responded by sacking the head of Modules 10 and 11 in the prison. Three separate investigations have begun. Weekly health checks have been ordered and the ministry has transferred 56 additional police officers to strengthen prison guard duties. Heber will appear before a congressional committee to answer questions on this and other cases (including prisoner escapes) on 28 September.

General strike

Uruguay’s umbrella trade union movement Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores–Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (PIT-CNT) held a one-day general strike on 15 September, the third since President Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou took office.

The strike was called to support calls for a referendum to reject the government’s economic reforms contained in the omnibus law, known as Ley de Urgente Consideración (LUC), as well as to support state-owned enterprises and oppose privatisation. The PIT-CNT particularly objects to labour reforms contained within the LUC making the occupation of workplaces and employer premises during a strike illegal, and public security reforms, which it argues expose people to police repression.

Approval rating

An opinion survey conducted by local pollster Opción shows President Lacalle Pou’s approval rating, which was above 60% last year, falling to 46% at the start of the third quarter of this year, down from 55% at the start of the second quarter. The disapproval rating stands at 26%, with 27% of respondents judging his performance to be ‘neither positive nor negative’. 

Protesters in the town of Aquila in Mexico’s southwestern Michoacán state brought operations to a halt at an iron mine owned by a local subsidiary of the international steel manufacturer Ternium on 22 January. The protests were prompted by the disappearance of two local activists who had been critical of mining activity in the area. The case has highlighted the tensions that exists between mining companies and many local communities in Mexico.

The human rights lawyer and activist Ricardo Lagunes and Aquila indigenous community leader Antonio Díaz disappeared on 15 January after attending a community meeting in Coahuayana municipality, Michoacán, at which issues related to the operation of the Las Encinas mine in Aquila were reportedly discussed. The vehicle in which they were last seen was found riddled with bullet holes in the community of Cerro de Ortega, Tecomán municipality, in neighbouring Colima state. Lagunes has collaborated in the defence of human rights with various national and international organisations, while Díaz is a teacher and human rights defender who has vocally opposed the development of the Aquila mine, which has been in operation since 1998.

The plight of Lagunes and Díaz has garnered international attention, with organisations including the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and Amnesty International condemning the disappearances and calling on Mexican authorities to find the missing pair. In a statement issued on 17 January, OHCHR’s representative in Mexico, Guillermo Fernández-Maldonado, said that the disappearance of the two was “a terrible and alarming incident”. Fernández-Maldonado went on to say that: “This crime not only undermines the human rights of both defenders, but also seeks to generate fear in those who defend the rights recognised by law. It is not acceptable that those who defend our rights have to do so at the cost of their freedom, their integrity or their lives.” He also noted that at least one of the activists was enrolled in a State protection mechanism which “failed to prevent his disappearance”.

The families of Lagunes and Díaz have demanded that Ternium take responsibility for the search for the missing activists. In a press conference on 19 January, Lagunes’ sister, Ana Lucía Lagunes, stated that Ternium was “one of the actors with the most power in the region”, noting that the impacts of its operations “have not only affected the environment, but also the social fabric, generating conflicts and violence.” She went on to say that the company had relations with different local actors and “therefore we think possibly with the perpetrators of the disappearance.”

In a statement released the same day, Ternium expressed its condolences to the families of the activists and said it hoped the case would be solved soon. The company refuted any potential involvement in the crime, stating that it was “against any type of violence and categorically rejects all speculation and/or defamation that attempts to link [Ternium] with any type of illegal activity.” It added that its mining operations in Aquila had all the necessary permits from relevant authorities and that the company worked “with a wide sense of social responsibility in all our activities.”

According to the Ireland-based human rights organisation Front Line Defenders, the disappearances of Lagunes and Díaz come “in the context of negotiations between members of the community and a local mining company”. The NGO states that Lagunes had “played a fundamental role” in legally representing the community of Aquila in negotiations over the mine’s environmental, social and health impacts on the community. Lagunes had reportedly also been working with community leaders in disputes with Ternium over the failure to deliver on the payment of royalties and other benefits.

Aquila is far from the only place where environmental activists and indigenous community leaders have sought to challenge mining concessions. For example, an investigation published by regional independent media outlet Avispa Midia on 16 January detailed how mining concessions granted in Oaxaca in 2020 to Minera Zalamera, a local subsidiary of the Canadian mining company Minaurum Gold, extend into areas of biodiversity and cultural heritage for the indigenous Chontal people. Local NGO Tequio Jurídico and Chontal community groups are filing lawsuits with the aim of suspending Minera Zalamera’s concessions. Similar stories can be found across many other Mexican states, including in Jalisco, where José Santos Isaac Chávez, an indigenous leader and lawyer, was murdered in April 2021 after opposing the Peña Colorado mine, a joint venture between Ternium and fellow multinational steel corporation ArcelorMittal. 

Such incidents reflect the wider dangers that environmental and land rights activists face in Mexico [SSR-22-10]. Mexico was the deadliest country in the world for such activists in 2021, according to a September 2022 report by international NGO Global Witness, with anti-mining activists among the worst affected. Global Witness noted that the dominant drug trafficking organisation, Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG), had taken a particular interest in illegal mining activities in recent years. Indeed, according to reports from the local press and community groups, the CJNG has been expanding its control of illegal mining in Michoacán, which contains significant reserves of gold, silver, iron, lead, and zinc.

According to fieldwork conducted by specialist website Insight Crime, the CJNG controls most of the illegal mines in Aquila and the neighbouring towns of Cohuayana and Lázaro Cárdenas. Locals consulted during the investigation stated they suspected the groups send the iron ore extracted from such mines to China, in exchange for the precursor chemicals needed to make synthetic drugs, such as the highly profitable and deadly synthetic opioid fentanyl. The CJNG is suspected of being behind a recent series of attacks, including the murder of three community guards from the town of Santa María de Ostula, just south of Aquila, on 13 January, as well the disappearance of Lagunes and Díaz. However, authorities are yet to find firm evidence to prove that the CJNG was responsible for disappearing Lagunes and Díaz. In the meantime, the search for the activists, and those responsible for their fate, continues.

Environmental damage

In a 2007 report released by Mexico’s environment ministry (Semarnat), several measures were recommended to minimise the ecological risks posed by the Aquila mine, including the construction of thick boundaries to prevent water pollution as well as reforestation to cope with the inevitable loss of vegetation and habitat.

2022 murder statistics

On 20 January, Mexico’s federal public security ministry (SSPC) released crime figures for 2022. Although the figures showed a slight improvement in homicide numbers – part of a gradual decrease in annual murders under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador – violent crime rates remain sky high, with violence by drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) driving much of the bloodshed.

According to the figures, 30,968 homicides were registered last year, an average of 85 a day. This is a 7.1% decrease on the 33,350 murders recorded last year and 15.5% lower than the 36,661 homicides recorded during the first year of López Obrador’s presidency. Femicides, which are measured separately [SSR-23-01], also registered a drop from the year before, with 968 recorded in 2022 compared to 1,017 in 2021.

Taken together, these figures equate to 31,936 murders (both homicides and femicides) last year. This represents a murder rate of 25.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. Although better than last year’s rate of 27.1 per 100,000, this rate still places Mexico in the top five deadliest countries per capita in the region according to specialist website Insight Crime. Venezuela (40.4), Honduras (35.8), Colombia (26.1) and Ecuador (25.9) were the only Latin American countries to record higher rates last year.

Almost half of the homicides in Mexico were registered in six states: Guanajuato (3,260), Baja California (2,728), Estado de México (2,604), Michoacán (2,423), Jalisco (2,071), and Chihuahua (1,974). These were the six most deadly states in 2021, too, with Guanajuato once again recording the highest death toll [SSR-23-01]. These states include two key flashpoints in the Mexican drug war: one in Jalisco and the neighbouring states of Michoacán and Guanajuato, where the CJNG is battling with rivals; and the other in the northwest of the country (Baja California, Chihuahua), where the Sinaloa DTO is fighting other groups over control of the border.

While these six main states all registered decreases in yearly murders, several others recorded significant increases. These include the small state of Colima, which saw a 67.6% increase in homicides, from 518 in 2021 to 868 in 2022. Colima has a population of only 731,391, according to Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi), making it Mexico’s least populous state. It is now also the deadliest per capita, with 118.7 killings per 100,000 inhabitants in 2022. DTOs are fighting for control of Colima’s Manzanillo port, where many of the precursor chemicals needed to produce synthetic drugs arrive from Asia, fuelling violence.

Other states to record an increase in murders last year include Nuevo León, up 32.4% to 1,328; Puebla, up 17.7% to 1,024; Oaxaca, up 17.0% to 968; and Hidalgo, up 17.9% to 330.

Presidential comparisons

When López Obrador’s government presents violent crime rates, it makes sure to draw comparisons with the previous administrations led by Enrique Peña Nieto (2012-2018) and Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). Although both presidents oversaw lower yearly murder figures than López Obrador (with the exception of the final two years of Peña Nieto’s presidency), both saw large increases in annual murders over the course of their time in office. Murders increased by 59% between the first and last years of Peña Nieto’s term and by 192.8% between the first and last years of Felipe Calderón’s administration, something which López Obrador’s government – currently on track to see a double-digit decrease – is keen to stress.

MEXICO | Combatting inflation. President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has touted Mexico’s financial stability in the face of a brewing banking crisis in the international financial system after the failure of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) and Signature Bank in the US, and the collapse of Switzerland’s Credit Suisse, which was forced into a fire-sale to its Swiss rival UBS.

Addressing the national banking convention in Mérida, the capital of the south-eastern state of Yucatán, on its opening day on 16 March, López Obrador focused primarily on the economic achievements of his government, including GDP growth of 3.1% in 2022, outstripping “the US and China”.

There has been some speculation that the difficulties being faced by banks globally might prompt central banks to slow down or even reverse a cycle of interest rate increases set in motion to try and drive down stubbornly high inflation. But the central bank Banco de México (Banxico) has reasserted its primary focus on controlling inflation. López Obrador has been critical of interest rate increases, which he says could hurt the economy.

Meanwhile, the new head of the private banking sector Asociación de Bancos de México (ABM), Julio Carranza, stressed the importance of continuing with the “crusade” against inflation. Speaking on the second day of the banking convention on 17 March, after replacing Daniel Becker at the helm of the ABM, Carranza said that it was pivotal to bring inflation down. Annualised inflation in February stood at 7.62%.

Race is never far from the surface in Guyanese politics, where the ruling People’s Progressive Party-Civic (PPP-C) is generally supported by the country’s Indian-origin population (37% of the total) while the opposition A Partnership for National Unity-Alliance for Change (Apnu-AFC) generally draws its support from the country’s African-origin population (34%). A visit to Guyana from 13-19 November by a 14-member US delegation to investigate alleged discrimination against Afro-Guyanese by the PPP/C administration has once again stirred racial animosities and sparked accusations that the opposition is recklessly undermining national unity at a time of external threat.

The US delegation was made up of current and former state legislators from a number of southern states, including Texas, Georgia, and North and South Carolina. It was headed by a former chair of the Georgia Black Caucus, Dee Dawkins-Haigler, who is the founder of a group calling itself the Organisation of World Leaders (OWL). One of the catalysts for the visit seems to have been a forum organised in Washington DC in early September by the New York-based Guyana Caribbean Institute for Democracy (GCID), headed by Rickford Burke, although the mission denied that it had had any direct contact with the GCID.

The GCID vociferously accuses the PPP/C administration of discrimination against Afro-Guyanese. Ahead of the mission, Dawkins-Haigler said that the allegations her mission would be investigating included discrimination in the disbursement of funds; prejudicial award of contracts based on race, political affiliation, or public criticism of authorities; unfair treatment in the court system; and educational disparities. Dawkins-Haigler said that the post-mission report is to be complied and distributed to the United Nations, and within the US to the White House, the State Department, congress, the Congressional Black Caucus, and the National Black Caucus of State Legislators.

President Irfaan Ali refused to meet the delegation, and his government issued a statement condemning the GCID-organised Washington forum that took place in September. The statement said that the forum “presented the platform for opposition politicians to spew concocted and fabricated narratives about the government of Guyana, including their usual diatribe about racial discrimination and extra-judicial killings, without any fact-checking mechanism and without the government being afforded a hearing or the facility of a response.” It added that “it is obvious that these jaundiced, baseless, and unfounded narratives of these opposition politicians, unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, have influenced this delegation…This is a clear interference in Guyana’s domestic politics with a bias toward the political opposition in Guyana.”

An advisor to the president, Randy Persaud, wrote an opinion piece for the news website Demerara Waves in which he used the controversy over the US delegation to berate the opposition for seeking to divide the nation at a time when it needs to be united in the face of a Venezuelan threat to the country’s territorial integrity. Rather than supporting national unity “at a time when our national security is under grave threat”, Persaud wrote, the Apnu-AFC is undermining that security. He accused opposition leader Aubrey Norton of “shunning” his responsibilities to protect the country’s territorial integrity. As for the mission itself, Persaud wrote: “You will come here and look extremely hard to find evidence of what you were told by the Apnu-AFC and their instrument in the US… Allow me to share a remarkably simple fact with you. Some skilful political operatives have duped you.”

Essequibo dispute heats up

Long-running tensions between Guyana and Venezuela over the Essequibo region, which comprises two-thirds of Guyana’s territory but is claimed by Venezuela, are flaring once again. Venezuela’s government has announced plans to hold a referendum on 3 December to assert the country’s sovereignty over the Essequibo, in a move which Guyana has claimed amounts to a planned annexation of the territory.

Seven magistrates in Nicaragua’s supreme court (CSJ) have resigned within a matter of weeks since 20 November. The departures are in line with a purge of the judiciary (which like all of the country’s institutions is controlled by co-presidents Daniel Ortega and First Lady Rosario Murillo) which began in October 2023 [SSR-24-02]. This in turn has been attributed to efforts by Murillo to appoint allies loyal to her at the CSJ as she positions herself in the line of succession to take over from her 80-year-old husband, who reportedly suffers from lupus and kidney failure.

The resignations began on 20 November, when two justices, Yadira Centeno and Ellen Lewin, quit citing health reasons. Five days later, three others tendered their resignations – Virgilio Guardián, Armengol Cuadra López, and José Manuel Martínez Sevilla – also purportedly for health reasons or for having reached retirement age. Then on 28 November a sixth justice, Armando Juárez, resigned citing old age while on 3 December, the seventh, Marvin Aguilar, the former acting head of the CSJ (2023-2025), tendered his resignation. The resignations were immediately accepted by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN)-controlled unicameral 92-member legislature without question.

Reportedly, over 1,600 judicial officials have been dismissed since the start of the purge in what is seen as an attempt by Murillo to strengthen her position. This has been bolstered by the constitutional reform package which took effect last year, which promoted her from vice president to co-president and also reduced the judiciary and legislature to entities “coordinated” by the co-presidents [SSR-25-01]. Notably the reforms also reduced the size of the CSJ from 16 to 10 magistrates, presumably making it easier to control the court.

The Ortega-Murillo executive has acted swiftly in naming replacements which were rubber-stamped by the legislature. Five were sworn in on 27 November: Ana Julia Guido Ochoa, who was serving as the country’s attorney general; two appeals court magistrates Octavio Rothschuh and Ernesto Rodríguez Mejía; Shura Bonilyn Welcome Crawford, a district judge in Bluefields, the capital of the South Atlantic autonomous region (Raas); and José Manuel Fuertes Toledo  who Costa Rican-based Nicaraguan investigative outlet Confidencial reports is a member of the departmental electoral council in Boaco department and had served as the FSLN’s political secretary in Boaco up to June 2025. On 28 November and 4 December appeals court judge Rosa Argentina Solís Dávila and María Elsa Frixione Ocón, a prosecutor, were then sworn in, respectively.

According to a 2 December article published in Confidencial, the appointments represent the establishment of a new ‘Murillista’ CSJ that will directly answer to Murillo. Local jurists interviewed by Confidencial said the new court would continue to lack any independence to carry out its functions. One explained that things will remain as they are currently and there will only be a “change in face, Rosario Murillo is now going to centralise and decide on absolutely everything”.

Several of the new justices have previously been blacklisted by the US for human rights violations. Guido was sanctioned in 2020 for fabricating cases against political prisoners as well as being identified by the United Nations-appointed panel of human rights experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) in a report last year as being among 54 top officials responsible for alleged grave human rights violations, abuses, and other crimes in Nicaragua. Meanwhile Rothschuh, Rodríguez, and Solís were blacklisted by Washington in 2023 over decisions which stripped Ortega opponents of their citizenship [SSR-23-04].

Political prisoners

On 5 December the US Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs demanded the release of political prisoners detained in Nicaragua. In a post on social media, it stated that “This holiday season, too many Nicaraguans will look across their tables and see empty seats where loved ones should be, women and men unjustly detained or arbitrarily disappeared by the Murillo-Ortega dictatorship. Their pain and uncertainty are daily reminders of the regime's inhumanity. Release all Nicaraguan political prisoners now. The United States is watching.” According to data from local human rights observatory Mecanismo para el Reconocimiento de Personas Presas Políticas (MRPPP), as of 23 December at least 62 government critics were currently incarcerated within Nicaragua, with the MRPPP having recognised a total of 1,485 political prisoners since 2018, when the government began its brutal crackdown on dissent.

President Rafael Correa’s aggressive attitude to press criticism has attracted the attention of international campaigners for press freedom. At the beginning of November Christoph Riess, the chief executive of the World Association of Newspapers & News Publishers (Wan-Ifra), visited Ecuador to discuss the reforms going through congress that affect the media. Reiss met congressional and government figures.

Even some government supporters, such as Mauro Andino, head of the assembly’s justice committee, say that they oppose some specific bits of the government’s proposed reforms while supporting most of the rest. Andino opposes Article 119 of the new media law which makes libellers of the authorities liable to up to three years in jail and stipulates fines of up to 10 times the minimum wage (US$264 a month). Andino argues that such a regulation breaks the constitutional rule that all Ecuadoreans are equal before the law.

Reiss said that he was concerned about the hefty fines that had been levied on El Universo, a Guayaquil newspaper, which alleged that President Rafael Correa had ordered soldiers to shoot in order to rescue him from a police mutiny on 30 September 2010. El Universo was fined US$40m. Correa is also suing the authors of El Gran Hermano. This book makes what Correa claims are unwarranted accusations of corruption against him and his elder brother Fabricio, who, the authors allege, won several lucrative government contracts following Correa’s election victories, starting in 2006. Reiss pointed out that the highest amount of compensation ever paid by the Ecuadorean government was US$2m to the father of the Restrepo Arismendi brothers, who were disappeared by the police in 1988.

Andino asked Reiss to comment on a Unesco study, published this year, which claimed that eight families effectively controlled Ecuador’s private radio and TV channels. Reiss replied that the state also had a strong position in broadcasting.

Fernando Alvarado, the presidency’s communications secretary, met Reiss and argued that the Organization of American States’ Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH) did not need an official invitation to assess the state of freedom of expression in Ecuador because there was a standing invitation from 2008.

César Ricaurte, the director of a local NGO, Fundamedios, claims that without a formal invitation the CIDH cannot send a mission.  Fundamedios, and other media organisations in Ecuador, claim that the Correa government is systematically undermining and intimidating the press in Ecuador.

At the end of October, Correa himself said that the government reserved the right to choose what CIDH recommendations to adopt and that it would only accept what was not based on “lies”.

Yasuní fund hits US$70m

Ivonne Baki, the official responsible for raising the money to allow Ecuador to leave 800m barrels of oil lying under the Yasuní-Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (ITT) national park unexploited, said on 6 November that the fund now stood at about US$70m. President Correa has said that unless the fund gets to US$100m by the end of this year, drilling will start. Baki admitted that she was including promises as well as money that had already been committed. The biggest single contribution is US$50m from a debt swap with Italy: instead of paying Italy back, the money is going into the Yasuní-ITT fund.

• Deadline not set in stone

President Correa has been hinting recently that he might relax the deadline for getting to US$100m in the Yasuní-ITT fund, if there were substantial promises. Baki said that she was confident that the fund would get to US$100m.

En una decisión sin precedentes, el ministerio público federal ha presentado cargos penales contra 17 empleados de las compañías de EU, Chevron y Transocean, por un derrame de petróleo en la cuenca de Campos, frente a la costa del estado de Río de Janeiro, en noviembre del 2011. Los fiscales federales dijeron que los 17, entre los que está incluido el jefe local de Chevron, George Buck, podrían enfrentar sentencias de prisión de hasta 21 años por estar a cargo de una “bomba de tiempo de contaminación”. Chevron rechazó los cargos –por delitos medioambientales y daños al patrimonio público– como “atroces y sin méritos”. El caso ha puesto en zozobra a toda la industria, que está operando en territorio offshore inexplorado en las aguas Brasileras ultra-profundas en el Atlántico.

Chevron y su socio Transocean, que fue responsable por la perforación –y que también estaba, incidentalmente, en el centro del desastre de derrame de petróleo de British Petroleum (BP) en el Golfo de México en el 2010– ya están enfrentando un juicio civil de US$11mm y una serie de multas oficiales.

El gobierno federal está tomando una línea dura, sobre la base de que aunque el derrame actual fue relativamente pequeño, Chevron estaba en efecto conduciendo una potencialmente peligrosa operación en el único yacimiento que opera (como socio mayoritario) en Brasil, el Frade. Chevron tiene una participación de 52% en el yacimiento; la compañía petrolera del estado Brasiler, Petrobras, tiene un 30%; y una empresa conjunta Frade Japan, tiene un 18,3%. Chevron ha invertido más de US$2mm para desarrollar el yacimiento. Entre 2.400 y 3.000 barriles de petróleo se escaparon del lecho del mar en el incidente de noviembre, lo que ha provocado la suspensión de los derechos de perforación de Chevron en el país.

Incómodamente, la semana pasada, Chevron fue forzada a suspender completamente la producción en el Frade, después de que se descubriera una nueva filtración de petróleo. Chevron negó haber causado la segunda filtración, sugiriendo que podría ser un escape natural, típico del área. Fabio Scliar, el jefe de la división del medioambiente de la policía federal en Río de Janeiro, concluyó en un informe a fines del 2011, que el yacimiento en el centro del derrame de noviembre “no debía haberse perforado”.

Los fiscales federales alegaron, por tanto, que Chevron sabía que estaba operando en el mismo borde de los estándares de las normas de seguridad aceptables. El escape se produjo después de que la pared del pozo se rompió, presumiblemente como resultado de la indebida presión producida por la perforación. En su alegato, el ministerio público también dijo que la agencia nacional del petróleo (ANP) había detectado “muy serios defectos” en el equipamiento en la plataforma SEDCO operada por Transocean y usada por Chevron para actividades de perforación. Chevron insiste en que operaba el yacimiento en línea con los estándares de seguridad todo el tiempo, señalando que las autoridades, incluyendo la ANP, dieron su aprobación en cada una y todas las etapas.

Un juez ahora dictaminará si proceder o no con un caso formal, que probablemente se arrastrará por años, obligando a las compañías a desembolsar miles de millones en honorarios legales. Mientras tanto, el juez ha ordenado la incautación de activos y estableció una fianza de R$1m (US$549.000) para cada uno de los 17 ejecutivos. Más tarde en la semana, el fiscal federal que conduce el caso, Eduardo Santos de Oliveira, instruyó a los ejecutivos que entreguen sus pasaportes y sugirió que también podría requerir sus detenciones preventivas si es que proceden los cargos penales. Chevron también enfrenta un caso de US$18mm en Ecuador, lo que hizo que algunos analistas del sector especulasen que los altos costos podrían forzar a Chevron a repensar sus operaciones en América Latina.

Petrobras ha enfrentado sanciones mucho más leves en casos de filtraciones más grandes, lo que ha llevado a algunos a sugerir que el caso federal no es solamente una advertencia para toda la industria, sino que también podría estar políticamente motivado.

• La clase media se enamora de Dilma

De acuerdo con detalles filtrados del último (marzo) sondeo nacional de la opinión pública realizado por Ibope para la Confederación Nacional del Transporte (CNT), que será publicado a inicios de abril, el rating de aprobación de la Presidenta Dilma Rousseff continúa subiendo. En diciembre, el rating de aprobación era del 56% en el sondeo de Ibope, un record para cualquier administración a fines de su primer año en el poder. Lo más notable es que el apoyo para Rousseff se ha elevado más entre la clase media, lo que en verdad es una mala noticia para la debilitada oposición  del Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB) ante la elección general del 2014. Esto también subraya el hecho que la principal oposición a Rousseff en un futuro previsible continuará proviniendo desde adentro.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has called Ukraine’s election, apparently won by President Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, a backward step for democracy marred by “the abuse of power and the excessive role of money”.

Out of the 450 parliamentary seats being contested, 225 will be decided by a proportional system among the parties that achieve over 5% of the vote.  The other half of the seats were contested in first-past-the-post races in 225 single-mandate constituencies.  At the time of writing, Yanukovych's Party of the Regions has just over 34% of party list votes, compared with just over 22% for the main opposition Fatherland party headed by the jailed former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko.  The Party of the Regions is also predicted to take 114 of 225 single-mandate seats, which would secure a majority in the 450-seat assembly.

The Party of the Regions stood on a platform of “stability”, which it contrasts to the years of “chaos” under the Tymoshenko premiership of 2007-10.  It says that it will get rid of Ukraine’s dependence on energy imports by increasing the production of oil, coal, and shale gas.  It has also pledged to make Russian a second language.  The opposition, on the other hand, has talked of the “enormous evil” of the Party of the Regions and has called for the impeachment of the president and the cancellation of immunity for all officials.  Tymoshenko wants to “resolve the crisis” in relations with the European Union.

The surprise of the election, however, has been the rise of the far-right Freedom party which looks set to comfortably surpass the 5% threshold for representation in parliament.  This is up from just 1% in 2007.

The party was founded in 1991 under the inauspicious name of the Social-National Party of Ukraine, and its emblem was swastika-like.  It is led by Oleh Tyahnybok who was expelled from President Yushenko’s Our Ukraine party following a speech in 2004 in which he said that the country was ruled by a “Muscovite-Jewish mafia”.  Freedom’s motto is “Ukraine for the Ukrainians”.  It insisted that a singer of Congolese descent should not represent Ukraine at the Eurovision song contest in May 2012.

Its election campaign concentrated on the theme of fighting the “oligarchic dictatorship” and protecting the Ukrainian language.  With regard to Russia, Freedom stresses the need for "a policy of equality, and not one guided by the principle of 'big brother' or 'small sister'”.  Freedom also calls for the cancellation of the Kharkiv agreements, which extended the stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine's Crimea until 2047 in exchange for a discount on imported gas. When asked about Ukraine's possible joining the Russia-led Customs Union, Tyahnybok said: "We think that our country should head for Europe”, overlooking the fact that far-right parties are not looked upon with favour by the European Union.

Tyahnybok attributes the relative success of Freedom in the election not just to his clear policies for Ukraine but to a general “rising popularity of nationalism in Europe”.

On 3 December Paraguay’s congress approved a general 2013 budget of G$58.1bn (US$13.4bn), much higher than the US$12.7bn proposal submitted by the administration led of President Federico Franco.

The approval of the new budget is a qualified blow for the Franco government, which had pleaded with congress not to make any radical increases to its budget proposal, pointing out that it already represented a 9.9% increase on 2012 and that since the Paraguayan economy is still suffering from the effects of the disastrous 2011/2012 season, real GDP is projected to contract 1.5% in 2012.

However, congress largely ignored the government’s recommendations and on 15 November the lower chamber approved a modified plan which featured an increase of some US$820m, the majority of which to accommodate proposed increases in salaries for government officials, with the budgets for the judiciary, in particular the electoral tribunal (TSJE), receiving a generous increase ahead of next year’s general elections.

The Franco executive heavily criticised the congressional draft and urged the senate to reduce drastically, warning that otherwise the government would be forced to increase the rate of value-added tax (VAT) from 10% to 15%, which would affect the general population and for which congress would have to assume full responsibility.

The government’s warnings were quickly backed up by business and civil society groups, which warned that they would not tolerate “having to be punished” with higher taxes as a result of the unbalanced proposal put forward by congress.

This political pressure had some effect, and on 26 November the senate made important modifications to the draft, including a general cut of US$156m. However, in defiance of the government, the senate draft also reduced the government’s sovereign bonds allowance by US$50m to US$500m. Faced with a current cash shortage, the Franco administration has recently resorted to issuing bonds in a bid to make up the shortfall.

The changes made by the senate were quickly approved by the lower chamber on 4 December and although the proposal is now lower, it is still US$678m higher than the government’s proposal. It is not clear whether President Franco will risk vetoing it or just make do with it.

En semanas recientes ha habido choques en el departamento de Santa Cruz, en el este, entre partidarios del Presidente Evo Morales y aquellos alineados con su antiguo oponente, el gobernador departamental Rubén Costas. Las familiares escenas en lo que anteriormente fue un bastión de la oposición a Morales fueron provocadas por una tradicional causa de tensiones –los esfuerzos por aprobar el estatuto de autonomía de la región, un requerimiento central de la constitución plurinacional del 2009.

Tres incidentes de violencia han tenido lugar durante las dos últimas semanas en las municipalidades de Warnes, Montero, y Portachuelo, en medio de esfuerzos de funcionarios locales del gobierno de presentar el estatuto de autonomía del departamento a los habitantes locales. La ley de autonomía del 2010, que da cuerpo al sistema de descentralización como está previsto en la nueva constitución, establece que los estatutos deben ser aprobados por dos tercios de los votos en las asambleas departamentales de cada una de las nueve regiones y luego sometido al Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional (TCP). Hasta ahora, solamente Pando y La Paz han sometido sus estatutos al TCP para su consideración –en octubre del 2012, y el mes pasado, respectivamente.

Santa Cruz, donde las tensiones entre ‘cambas’ (mestizos Cruceños) y ‘collas’ (indígenas andinos) fueron particularmente pronunciadas en el pasado, notablemente inducidas por un intento de autonomía en el área opositora de la ‘Media Luna’ (que también incluye a Tarija, Pando y Beni) en el 2008, antes de la nueva constitución. El documento que ahora se presenta para ser discutido es el estatuto aprobado en una votación que tuvo lugar en mayo del 2008, desafiando a una resolución de la corte electoral [IL-08-18] –un claro intento en ese entonces del lobby Cruceño liderado por Costas para anticiparse a los esfuerzos del gobierno de aprobar la constitución.

Desde que obtuvo la reelección en diciembre del 2009, Morales ha hechos gestos hacia Costas y la elite agrícola Cruceña, sin duda motivado por el peso económico y la influencia de la región, que en ocasiones han demostrado ser controversiales entre sus partidarios del ala izquierda. Los ejemplos recientes incluyen una ley de enero del 2013 (337) para apoyar la producción de alimentos y la restitución de bosques [IL-13-13] y una ley de desarrollo agrícola de junio del 2011 permitiendo el uso extendido de semillas Genéticamente Modificadas (GM) en el país. Sin embargo, con el gobierno de Morales, rápido en hacer responsable a Costas por la última violencia, el resurgimiento de estas familiares tensiones arroja dudas sobre este reciente acercamiento. Los partidarios de Morales reiteran las preocupaciones expresadas durante la votación sobre la autonomía en mayo –de que el estatuto, que entre otras cosas le daría a Santa cruz la capacidad de crear su propia fuerza policial y negociar sus propios acuerdos de royalties con las compañías de energía a fin de retener una proporción más alta de los ingresos producidos por el gas natural de la región, es separatista. Mientras tanto, una fuente más de potencial tensión entre instituciones regionales y nacionales, es el hecho de que un estudio realizado por una consultoría para la asamblea departamental, completado en noviembre del 2012, halló que 46 de los 168 artículos del estatuto de autonomía son inconstitucionales.

TSE rechaza alianza de la opositora

Rubén Costas sufrió otro revés más cuando, el 1 de agosto, el Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE) de Bolivia rehusó registrar al Movimiento Demócrata Social (MDS), el último intento de la oposición para formar una alianza antes de la elección presidencial del 2014. Lanzado por primera vez el pasado abril, el MDS está compuesto del partido político de Costas, Verdad y Democracia Social (Verdes); y otras dos autodenominadas agrupaciones de ciudadanos: Libertad y Democracia Renovadora (Líder), una organización con base en Chuquisaca, y Consenso Popular, encabezada por un ex presidente del senado, Oscar Ortiz (2008-2010), también con base en Santa Cruz. Mientras los líderes opositores como Costas criticaron la decisión del TSE como la última evidencia de la falta de independencia del tribunal –una ya antigua queja de la oposición– la presidenta del TSE, Wilma Velazco Aguilar, insistió en que la decisión estaba acorde con la Ley de Partidos Políticos de 1999, que no permite la “fusión” de grupos ciudadanos.

• Censo

El 31 de julio la ministra de planeamiento y desarrollo, Viviana Caro Hinojosa, y el director del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), Ricardo Laruta, presentaron los resultados finales del censo del 2012, que ha resultado ser controversiales. Las últimas cifras contradicen los hallazgos preliminares, develados a comienzos del año, que mostraba que Santa Cruz había superado a La Paz en términos de magnitud de la población: los resultados finales muestran que La Paz tiene 2,71m habitantes (de un total de la población nacional de 10,03m), mientras que Santa Cruz tiene 2,66m. Los resultados finales, que han sido endorsados por instituciones internacionales como el Banco Mundial y la ONU, también provocaron controversia al revelar que solamente el 41% de la población adulta (de más de 15 años) se identifica como indígena, cayendo del 62% en el último censo (2001). Esto ha provocado un debate acerca de las razones para estas diferencias.

El congreso de Perú ha programado tratar de nuevo esta semana para decidir sobre la formación de un comité investigador sobre el escándalo de la protección oficial de la policía nacional (PNP) de un hombre condenado por grabaciones telefónicas ilegales y actos de corrupción, y que ha sido un participante en la red del mal reputado Vladimir Montesinos, ex asesor y jefe de inteligencia del ex presidente Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). Por otro lado, se han puesto en marcha otras tres investigaciones que podrían conducir a un conflicto de jurisdicciones –y, que algunos sugieren, a un encubrimiento.

El escándalo siguió a la revelación que las casas de Oscar López Meneses y su padre habían estado disfrutando una total protección policial por algún tiempo, sin una autorización oficialmente reconocida. Tres generales, dos coroneles, y un mayor, han sido relevados de sus cargos, y el asesor de seguridad del Presidente Ollanta Humala ha renunciado –aunque Humala ha negado tener cualquier conocimiento de la situación [IL-13-47].

Un debate en el congreso para establecer un comité investigador tuvo que ser suspendido el 29 de noviembre cuando el acalorado intercambio lo volvió inmanejable. Las diferencias principales fueron sobre cuán lejos hacia atrás debía profundizar la investigación (desde que los orígenes de la situación parecen ser anteriores a la actual administración), y si la gobernante coalición Gana Perú debía participar en el comité investigador.

El fiscal general, José Peláez Bardales ha iniciado una investigación por el servicio de la fiscalía pública, concentrándose en la posible comisión de tres delitos por los oficiales de la policía: malversación de recursos públicos, “falsedad genérica”, y abuso de autoridad

Una investigación separada ha sido lanzada por el General de la PNP, Julio Bueno Tirado, de la PNP, fiscal supremo del Fuero Militar Policial (FMP, la formalmente autónoma jurisdicción militar-policial, que trata las faltas cometidas por miembros de las fuerzas armadas o de la fuerza policial en el curso del cumplimiento de sus deberes oficiales). Bueno ya ha comenzado a interrogar a oficiales de la policía que han sido relevados de sus tareas. Él ha dicho que está buscando evidencias de tres delitos: desobediencia, exceso en el ejercicio del mando, y uso indebido de los recursos del servicio. Una tercera investigación administrativa ha sido lanzada por el inspector-general de la PNP, Héctor Dulanto Arias.

El General Bueno ha dicho que podría requerir el levantamiento del secreto de las comunicaciones (en la jerga, significa examinar las comunicaciones telefónicas de los sospechosos), y que él no vacilaría en convocar al Presidente Humala para que testifique.

El multi-premiado periodista Ricardo Uceda, escribió en La República el 3 de diciembre que Bueno “tiene una idea excesiva de su poder: un fiscal militar no tiene el poder de obtener información telefónica de aquellos a los que él está investigando.” Sin embargo, Uceda agrega que esta es la primera insinuación pública que el affaire podría llegar más allá del hecho que los oficiales de policía hayan actuado más allá de sus competencias al proveer protección injustificada –por ejemplo, si las dos casas habían sido utilizadas como bases para vigilancia electrónica ilegal.

Uceda también pide tener en mente que el FMP ha sido utilizado en el pasado por cada gobierno electo desde 1980 como “un mecanismo para proteger a aquellos uniformados en casos de delitos comunes, particularmente violaciones de los derechos humanos.” [Aunque estos últimos no son delitos tan comunes]. En su visión, “la investigación real no es acerca del uso indebido de algunos vehículos de la policía, sino acerca de determinar si dos jefes del comando conjunto de las fuerzas armadas [el actual, José Cuervo Aservi, y su predecesor Luis Howell] estaban involucrados en la autorización de la protección [como] sostienen ex jefes de la policía”.

Following Vice-President Juan Carlos Varela’s unexpected victory in the 4 May presidential election [WR-14-18] negotiations between his opposition Partido Panameñista (PPA) and the other main opposition party, Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), are underway. A deal of some sort looks to be essential to Varela when he takes office on 1 July given that his PPA (as part of the El Pueblo Primero [EPP] alliance which includes the small Partido Popular) looks to have just 13 seats in the new 71-member unicameral legislature.

While the electoral authorities have yet to announce the final legislative results, on 7 May the local press reported that of the remaining seven seats being disputed (all in the San Miguelito district of Panamá province), three went to President Ricardo Martinelli’s Unidos Por Más Cambios alliance (comprising his Cambio Democrático [CD] and the smaller party, Molirena) and one to the EPP. This means the UPMC will have 33 seats in the new legislature, just three short of controlling it, while the PRD will have 24 and the EPP, 13.

Given the hostile state of relations between Martinelli and Varela, following the break-up of the PPA-CD alliance in August 2011 [WR-11-35], Varela has reached out to the PPA’s traditional rival, the PRD, phoning the party’s defeated presidential candidate, Juan Carlos Navarro, on 9 May. The same day, Navarro, whose PRD remains weak (registering one of its worst-ever performances in the election, despite remaining Panama’s biggest party), issued a statement confirming his willingness to enter talks with the new government regarding a national legislative agenda.

It remains to be seen whether these negotiations will translate into cabinet posts. So far Varela has confirmed his picks for three ministries – foreign affairs, interior and economy & finance, all of which have gone to allies. Continuing the tradition whereby the Vice-President doubles up as foreign minister (a post Varela held until the deal with the CD came unstuck), Vice-President-elect Isabel Saint Malo will take up the post. An independent and expert consultant to the UN development programme (UNDP), Saint Malo served as Panama’s alternate ambassador before the Organization of American States (OAS) under the PPA government of Guillermo Endara (1989-1994) and is known as a consensus-building figure – for example she played a role in national dialogue in 2010 aimed at addressing the crisis caused by the approval (and subsequent repeal) of a law which would have weakened union and environmental legislation.

A leading PPA member, Dulcidio de la Guardia will head up the economy & finance portfolio. He served as deputy finance minister under Martinelli until, like Varela, he was replaced following the unravelling of the PPA-CD deal. Varela also named as interior minister, PP president Milton Henríquez, brother of current minister of the presidency and vice-president of the ruling CD, Roberto Henríquez. One of the new interior minister’s key tasks will be to oversee the process of convening a constituent assembly which Varela has declared necessary to boost transparency and strengthen the country’s institutions (see sidebar). President Martinelli has notably given his backing to the process, which Varela has said will begin in July 2015.

• Another boost for Varela

President-elect Varela has been able to claim a further triumph in the 4 May general elections - the Panama City mayoralty – the country’s second most important political post. (Of the 3.4m national population on the 2010 census, 1.7m is concentrated in the capital and its environs). After a close race, a PPA national deputy, José Isabel Blandón, defeated José Luis Fábrega, a PRD national deputy, by 35.69%-34.4%. The incumbent, Roxana Méndez, of the ruling CD, took third place, managing 29.2% of the vote. Blandón will not have an easy ride once in office, however, given that of the 23 local councillor seats, 10 went to the PRD, eight to the CD, and just five to the PPA.

• Constituent assembly

According to Panama’s 1972 constitution, a constituent assembly can be called by the executive (if ratified by an absolute majority in the legislature); the legislature (with a two-thirds vote); or local citizens backed by a document signed by 20% of the electorate as registered up to 31 December of the previous year. The electoral authorities then have between three and six months after receiving the formal request to convene the assembly which comprises 60 delegates who may be independents or members of political parties. The constituent assembly then has between six and nine months to draw up the constitutional changes which are then voted upon in a national referendum

President Nicolás Maduro has announced the disruption of the most elaborate coup conspiracy so far, engineered by a number of opposition leaders and businessmen and supported by a number of air force officers — many of whom are already under arrest — and the US embassy in Caracas.

He made the announcement on 12 February, the day the coup, codenamed Operación Jericó, was meant to take place. The military ringleader of the plot was named as retired former General Maximiliano Hernández Oswaldo. Following him were a colonel, a major, eight first lieutenants, two lieutenants, and a sergeant-major. Ten of the officers have been arrested and three are said to have fled the country.

Among the politicians accused of involvement are Julio Borges, a legislator of the Primero Justicia party, María Corina Machado and Diego Arria, to whom must be added Caracas mayor Antonio Ledezma, who had earlier been accused of conspiring against the government and was arrested on 19 February. Ledezma dismissed the allegations of a conspiracy, noting that this would be the 12th coup ‘unveiled’ by Maduro since he took office. Also said to have been involved in the plot was the businessman Parsifal de Solá Crespo.

The US State Department immediately disavowed any participation in the plot, saying that it did not support political transitions that were not democratic. Maduro took the use of the word ‘transition’ as proof that a conspiracy was under way, since no transition was taking place in Venezuela.

According to the government the conspirators, who had at their disposal a Tucano, presumably one of the EMB-312s bought from Brazil in the late 1980s, maybe refurbished recently, which they intended to bomb seven targets in Caracas: the Miraflores palace, the defence ministry, the interior & justice ministry, the national electoral council (CNE), the state intelligence headquarters, Telesur and the national assembly. Also among their objectives was the capture of Maduro, assembly president Diosdado Cabello, CNE president Tibisay Lucena, Libertador mayor Jorge Rodríguez, justice minister Tarek El Aissami, ‘and others’.

The identification of the plotters, according to the authorities, came from the confession of retired air force lieutenant-colonel José Gustavo Arocha, arrested and charged with having organised and funded the protests of early 2014.

Maduro continued to expand on the scope of the conspiracy. On 19 February he ‘revealed’ the existence of ‘a Madrid-Bogotá-Miami axis’ devoted to ‘spreading lies about Venezuela’ with the purpose of fostering discontent within the country and creating the conditions for a ‘humanitarian’ foreign intervention. On 24 February he told a rally of supporters in Yaracuy that the opposition had been planning to create a situation of ‘major perturbance’ in January, and that when this had failed to materialise, they had ‘activated a coup plan to generate death and paid, and justify the plan of the US to intervene in Bolívar’s fatherland.’

The following day he told a gathering of workers in Bolívar that he had ordered the defence minister, General Vladimir Padrino López to ‘place all police and military forces on maximum alert because I have information that from Colombia they are trying to infiltrate a group of paramilitaries wearing civilian clothes’ to stage acts of violence in the border states of Zulia, Táchira and Apure and then ‘infiltrate towards the centre of the country.’