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Brazil’s congress has begun its inquiry into the 8 January riots, when supporters of right-wing former president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023) attacked government institutions in the capital. In a boost for the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)-led coalition government of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the joint select inquiry committee (CPMI) chose as its chair on 25 May federal deputy Arthur Maia, a member of centre-right party, União Brasil (União), rather than a far-right legislator aligned with Bolsonaro and his allies, who may have sought to shift blame for the riots onto the current government’s alleged incompetence in protecting the capital. The CPMI has 180 days to carry out its investigation.

As part of a congressional-level accord between União and the Lula government ahead of Lula’s assumption of office in January, the centre-right party received a ‘quota’ of three ministerial positions: communications, tourism, and integration & regional development. However, in the factional blocs of the houses of congress, União is not part of the same bloc as Lula’s PT-led coalition or Bolsonaro’s Partido Liberal (PL). It is part of the large unofficial grouping of centrist and conservative parties, known as the ‘centrão’, which support the government whenever it suits their needs.

These ‘centrão’ parties hold great sway in both houses and successfully pushed for one of their own to chair the CPMI, as the allocation of the committee seats is proportional to how many congressional seats a party or bloc holds. União is the largest ‘centrão’ party in the lower house, with 59 out of 513 seats. While the PT does not hold the CPMI chair, the political arithmetic of the committee’s composition may bring President Lula some relief, as around half of its 32 seats are held by leftist or ‘centrão’ parties allied with his government at an executive or congressional level.

With the CPMI comprising deputies and senators from over a dozen different parties, the PT and PL each have four seats. Left-wing parties in the ruling coalition, such as Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) and Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdoB), have one seat each, as does the right-wing Novo party, a congressional ally of the PL. The rest of the seats are held by parties known to be part of the ‘centrão’; some of which, like União, negotiated with Lula to snag a few cabinet-level ministries in the federal government, such as Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB) and Partido Social Democrático (PSD). MDB and União each have three seats on the CPMI committee, while PSD (the largest ‘centrão’ party in the senate) has the highest share with five seats. The CPMI’s rapporteur, Senator Eliziane Gama, also hails from the centrist PSD – a role which will allow her great influence over the CPMI’s procedures, by tabling material for the committee to analyse and drafting the inquiry’s proceedings.

Gama’s appointment has not been without controversy, however. Senator Marcos do Val, a CPMI member from the centre-right Podemos party, one of the ‘centrão’ parties which does not have members in Lula’s cabinet or support PT in congress, criticised it, alleging a lack of impartiality – claims which Gama has rejected. During the 25 May session, do Val highlighted that Gama was a senator of Maranhão state and a good friend of Maranhão’s former governor (2015-2022) and current minister of justice & public security, Flávio Dino, who right-leaning committee members may push to be summoned to testify at the CPMI.

Hearings

While the CPMI investigates the 8 January attacks, Brazil’s supreme court (STF) has been continuing its hearings of the rioters. As of 30 May, 1,175 of the more than 2,000 rioters arrested on the day had already been indicted with crimes ranging from vandalism to attempting a coup d’état. The STF has announced that another batch of 70 rioters will have their cases heard on 2 June. 

Congress inquiry into MST

On 30 May Brazil’s lower house of congress invited Nelcilene Reis, a former member of the landless workers’ movement Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), to testify before a parliamentary inquiry committee (CPI) which on 23 May began investigating land occupations carried out by the MST in recent months.

The CPI’s rapporteur is Ricardo Salles (Partido Liberal, PL), a former environment minister (2019-2021) under Bolsonaro, and a well-known opponent of the movement. Its chairman is Lieutenant-Colonel Luciano Zucco of the right-wing Republicanos party who is similarly unlikely to be sympathetic to the movement, a traditional part of Lula’s political base.

Reis was damning about MST’s leadership, describing how the families who live in the land occupation encampments were subject to harsh punishments if they disobeyed MST leaders, and testimony denigrating the MST is likely to be a regular feature in the inquiry.

News website G1 reports that MST carried out 33 occupations during the first four months of President Lula’s current term, which is higher than the annual tally of occupations of any year over the past five years. This spike in MST activities had contributed to the opening of the inquiry.

During his presidential campaign last year, Lula had spoken in defence of the movement, describing it during a TV interview in August as no longer a destructive, violent force, “the MST of 30 years ago doesn’t exist anymore”. However, members of Lula’s current government such as Agriculture Minister Carlos Fávaro, have expressed concern about MST’s land seizures.

The Honduran government held the first round of negotiations regarding a free trade agreement (FTA) with China on 7 July. The talks follow the country’s decision to switch diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China in March and President Xiomara Castro’s first official visit to China last month [WR-23-25].

According to the Honduran foreign ministry, a high-level government delegation met a Chinese delegation headed up by China’s trade minister, Wang Wentao, which included 30 business representatives. The first meeting covered the terms of reference of the talks, a working methodology, and a timeframe of meetings, with a view to concluding the FTA in a year.

As well as the first round of FTA talks, the two sides also attended the first meeting of a mixed commission regarding China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), which enables cooperation on major infrastructure projects, to which the Honduran government announced last month it would sign up. According to the foreign ministry the two sides discussed cooperation in areas including infrastructure, technology, telecommunications, agriculture, and agroindustry among other things.

The handover ceremony of the leadership of Brazil’s supreme court (STF) took place on 28 September, when Luís Roberto Barroso assumed the presidency from Rosa Weber. In his inauguration speech, the new chief justice stated the priorities during his presidency, including calls for “harmony” between the branches of power – comments which come amid recent tensions between the judiciary and legislature.     

Barroso’s term is due to last until October 2025, and he said that under his leadership the country’s top court will serve all Brazilians, listening to the interests of “workers and businessmen, indigenous communities and farmers, rural producers and environmentalists, people in the city and in the countryside” as well as “conservatives, liberals, and progressives”. He added that “in a democracy there is no hegemonic [branch of] power” and highlighted the constitutional guarantee of the executive, legislature, and judiciary’s independence.

Barroso’s calls to overcome the country’s social divide, as well as the emphasis on cooperation and respect between political institutions, were a tacit response to the tensions between the STF and congress inflamed last week when the senate approved a bill on 27 September to impose new regulations and obstacles for the indigenous land demarcation process.

The bill went against a supreme court ruling the previous week (21 September) which deemed one of the bill’s key provisions to be unconstitutional. In recent months, the STF has also been hearing cases regarding the decriminalisation of abortion and the possession of marijuana, among other issues incurring the wrath of conservative parties in congress, which accused the STF of ‘legislating’ through its rulings.

Last week, right-wing parties associated with the agribusiness lobby expressed their intention to limit the powers of the STF. As the judiciary’s authority is enshrined in the constitution, conservative lawmakers have begun the push for constitutional amendments.

On 4 October the senate’s justice committee (CCJ) approved a constitutional amendment legislation (PEC 8/2021) which would place restrictions on ‘monocratic’ or individual decisions by STF justices; forcing the STF to make more ‘collegiate’ decisions, as well as prohibiting individual magistrates from requesting more time to review a case – a procedure which can be used to strategically delay cases or trials.

Barroso criticises proposed amendments

In response to the efforts from congress to amend the constitution to impose limits on the authority of the supreme court (STF), Chief Justice Luís Roberto Barroso said that now is “not the time to mess with the STF”. Speaking at a press conference on 4 October, Barroso also disagreed with a proposed constitutional amendment (PEC 16/2019), currently stalled in the senate, which aims to impose eight-year limits for STF justices.

Part of the disinformation toolbox contains or overlaps with the idea of hate speech. As with many other online concepts, there are different definitions for what exactly hate speech is. However, the United Nations defines hate speech as “any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or to a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or any other identity factor.”

Recent years have seen a major and ongoing debate about how to distinguish between hate speech or other forms of online harm on the one hand, and the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression on the other. If anything, the debate became more polarised after October 2022 when US/South African entrepreneur Elon Musk made the surprise purchase of social media platform Twitter for US$44bn (later renaming it ‘X’), reducing staffing levels and moderation of content while promising to make it a bastion of free speech. The acquisition was broadly welcomed by conservatives and viewed with concern by the left.

In April this year a joint study of posts on X carried out by US universities USC, UCLA, Oregon State, and UC Merced concluded that daily use of hate speech by those who had previously made similar posts nearly doubled as a result of the takeover. The researchers compiled a hate lexicon of 49 racist, antisemitic, homophobic, and transphobic terms, using an artificial intelligence programme to weed out non-hateful use of those terms, and then comparing total usage numbers before and after the company’s takeover. While the researchers said they could not prove a direct causal link, their approach might help understand how and why people can be radicalised online through what has been called stochastic terrorism, the use of hate speech to incite violent acts. Other academics also say hate speech has increased, while Musk has strongly rejected the claims. Observers of the renewed Israel-Gaza crisis which broke out in October 2023 also spoke of a surge in “misinformation and falsehoods” including “mischaracterised content, misleading captions, false images, out-of-context-and-old videos, and video game footage”.

La Presidenta Dilma Rousseff brindó esta semana con sus ministros y aliados de la coalición en una recepción celebrada en el palacio presidencial Alvorada para marcar los seis meses en el poder para el nuevo gobierno. Rousseff avanzó para calmar las recientes riñas en la coalición, esperando tranquilizar a sus seguidores antes de salir para su receso legislativo de dos semanas.

Las opiniones en Brasil parecen muy divididas sobre el desempeño de la nueva Presidenta hasta la fecha. La importante prensa conservadora abiertamente adora a esta ex radical guerrillera de izquierda, elogiando su tecnocrático y firme enfoque igual al empresarial para manejar el país (en contraste con su habitual ataque sobre su predecesor y mentor Lula da Silva [2002-2010]), aunque aún así el humor político en Brasília es más inestable y en algunos casos incluso amargo.

Mientras estos seis meses pasados han sido una empinada curva de aprendizaje para la presidenta –comenzando con las grandes inundaciones en Río y terminando con la segunda crisis ministerial en igual cantidad de meses con costosas batallas sobre la represa de Belo Monte, el código forestal y entre medio el secreto oficial de documentos de estado– es también el caso que Rousseff ha ganado importantes batallas que más importan para el ejecutivo, notablemente un acuerdo de compromiso sobre el salario mínimo y un corte del presupuesto de US$30bn. Aunque su administración parece necesitar  unas pocas lecciones de relaciones públicas. La mayoría de los anuncios de política social de Rousseff –y hubo varios, incluidos medicamentos selectivos gratis, mejoras en la salud de la mujer, una promesa para erradicar la pobreza extrema y más cambios al plan de educación nacional– han sido ensombrecidos por los chanchullos políticos en el congreso. Y a diferencia de Lula, que lograba obtener crédito de todo y ninguna culpa por nada, el estilo de Rousseff de meter las manos la pone a ella en el centro de cada crisis.

Se puede decir que la mayoría de las dificultades de Rousseff hasta la fecha han sido un legado de la manera que Lula condujo su administración de ocho años. Al mantenerse con su prolongada experiencia sindical, él trató con políticos de la coalición en el teje y maneje detrás de la escena, con un más afianzado y ya cálido sistema clientelista. Rousseff desea barrer con ese sistema.

La presidenta está aprovechando cualquier ventaja de cada crisis ministerial para surgir limpia, en un valiente esfuerzo por sacar a Brasília de la política del cuarto trasero para llevarla a la de43l siglo 21. Un comentarista adulador en el diario O Estado de São Paulo elogió su preocupación “con el estado, ella tiene valores de nacionalismo y democracia que difiere de las de sus aliados [...] Dilma conducirá su gobierno centrado en la idea de ‘Brasil el Estado’ y no ‘Brasil, una oportunidad para políticos’.

Algunos politólogos sugieren que Rousseff  puede prestar de su vecino Chile, donde en los 20 años de gobiernos de la alianza de centro-izquierda de la Concertación, el gobierno estaba lleno de tecnócratas bien educado, de mentalidad seria y en gran medida apolíticos que intentaban modernizar el Estado Chileno. Eso probó ser bastante exitoso pero al final del día los políticos volvieron para morder, en la medida que el electorado comenzó a sentirse desconectado del aparato del gobierno y exigía más representación política y responsabilidad, y una más equitativa porción del milagro económico de Chile.

Igualmente, los esfuerzos de Rousseff (en el más vasto y complejo Brasil) son costosos políticamente, y corre el riesgo de afectar la agenda del gobierno, con algunas propuestas clave, incluida una reforma fiscal orientada hacia las empresas, está frenada en el congreso. A pesar de su envidiable mayoría legislativa, el gobierno tendrá que trabajar para guiar su presupuesto 2012 a través del congreso antes que llegue el receso (18 de julio-1 de agosto) y Rousseff probablemente tendrá que ceder a más demandas para liberar fondos a cambio. Rousseff que ha insinuado recientemente tener ambiciones para un segundo mandato, deberá elegir cuidadosamente sus batallas. Si piensa en serio en la reelección en 2014 y la economía declina, ella podría tener que aceptar y volver al viejo orden de nuevo, simplemente para mantener en movimiento los proyectos de su gobierno.

• Nuevas palancas políticas

Los esfuerzos por conducir la economía a un suave aterrizaje están probando ser difíciles y complicados, en medio de la dura combinación de una moneda recalentada y una inflación impulsada por los salarios. Con el Real  fijado a una incómoda altura de R$1,57/US$1, y la inflación anual de junio aún por encima de la meta techo de 6,5%, el banco central de nuevo  elevó los requerimientos selectos de reserva (en bancos con posiciones cortas en dólar). El banco ha intervenido fuertemente, comprando dólares e un esfuerzo por debilitar el Real, y el ministerio de finanzas ha insinuado una extensión del impuesto sobre las transacciones financieras para compras en el extranjero de moneda local para contratos a futuro. Sin embargo, gran parte del problema es externo, en la forma de un dólar débil y bajas tasas internacionales de interés.

BOLIVIA | Gas exports to neighbours reaches peak.  According to Bolivia’s state-owned oil company, YPFB, Bolivian natural gas exports to Brazil and Argentina reached their peak in May with an average of 49.7m cubic metres (mcm) being exported a day. This figure is 26% more than the amount of exports in the same period of 2011. In a statement YPFB said that it sold on average some 30mcm of gas a day to Brazil, the largest market for Bolivian gas. This amount was very close to the contractual limit of 31mcm that regulates the gas exchanges between the two countries.

    Exports to Argentina were on average 11.35mcm a day YPFB said. The company explained that the increase in exports answers to an increase in demand in both of its neighbours due to the beginning of the winter season in the Southern Cone. Natural gas has become Bolivia’s main export product in recent years. YPFB did not provide any figures on the value of these exports, but last year total gas exports to Brazil and Argentina totalled US$3.83bn, which represented of 40% of Bolivia’s total exports for that year.

BOLIVIA | Quinoa plantations double ahead of UN Quinoa year. On 12 June the head of Bolivia’s national forestry and agricultural innovation institute (Iniaf), Lucio Villca said that this year some 69,972 hectares (ha) of quinoa had been planted in the country, almost double the 35,000 ha planted back in 2005. Quinoa is known as the ‘golden grain of the Andes’ due to its high nutritional value. In recent years international organisations such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have recognised quinoa, a gluten-free whole protein, as an important and healthy source of a number of essential nutrients for the dietary needs of humans such as phosphorus, magnesium, iron and calcium.

As a result of this, global interest in the grain increased, causing its price to consistently increase too making it more commercially attractive to farmers. According to Iniaf, quinoa prices are now between US$2,500 and US$3,000 a tonne (t) which allowed Bolivia, by far the world’s largest quinoa producer and exporter, to obtain some US$63.4m in quinoa exports last year. According to Villca, total production this year will be 44,000t also roughly double the 20,366t produced last year. The government expects to export some 26,000t of this which could earn it up to US$75m. Figures from Bolivia’s vice ministry for internal trade and exports show that the US is currently the main quinoa export market accounting for 54% of exports, followed by Europe with 30%, and Canada with 7%.

Encouragingly for Bolivia, quinoa’s international profile is set to rise even higher as the UN has already declared 2013 ‘international quinoa year’ at its sixty-sixth general assembly session. On 11 June in an official ceremony in Rome, the FAO named President Evo Morales as its special quinoa ambassador. The FAO has also announced that it intends to make Peru’s First Lady Nadine Heredia a second special quinoa ambassador given that Peru is the world’s second largest producer of the grain. Meanwhile, Morales has already asked his ministers to develop a policy agenda to further promote quinoa production and trade.

VENEZUELA | Pushing for Opec to restrict supply. Ahead of this week’s Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec) meeting, President Hugo Chávez said that Venezuela was concerned with the current “violations” of the organisation’s own quotas which was bringing down international oil prices. According to Chávez, these ‘violations’, which some Opec countries openly admit to, have pushed Venezuelan crude prices to US$94.05 per barrel, below the US$100 per barrel mark which Chávez’s government considers to be the “just price for oil”. Chávez said that he has instructed his energy & mining minister, Rafael Ramírez, to ask fellow Opec members at its meeting, which began on 12 June, to adhere to the 30m barrel per day production quota agreed in the last meeting. According to unofficial figures published by Opec in May the group’s daily production was 31.5m barrels as the Gulf countries have increased their production.

    Interestingly over in Ecuador, the only other Latin American Opec member, the government also appears set on increasing its oil production. On 11 June the state-owned oil company Petroecuador announced that its sister company, Petroamazonas, had managed to bring into production a new well in the Orellana province which may prove to be Ecuador’s most productive. According to Petroamazonas the Oso B-54H well was drilled in April and began production on 6 June with an average production of 7,500 barrels per day, which will increase Petroamazonas’ production to 150,000 barrels per day. Ecuador produces some 500,000 barrels per day, Petroecuador producing around 60% of these.

• Peru gets Merkel’s backing

On 12 June Peru’s President Ollanta Humala arrived in Berlin as part of his official tour of Europe and was received by German chancellor, Angela Merkel. After holding a working lunch they offered a joint press conference in which Merkel said that advancing in the negotiations of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Latin American countries such as Peru was a “positive” way of strengthening commercial ties at a time of economic uncertainty in Europe. The endorsement of the leader of Europe’s largest economy was a boon for Humala ahead of his appearance at the European Parliament to discuss the FTA negotiations. Merkel also revealed that the two countries signed a new cooperation promotion agreement in the areas of infrastructure and education.

El Presidente Evo Morales ha reclamado recientes victorias con relación a su política sobre las drogas de coca sí, cocaína no (que se basa en la diferencia entre la cocaína y la hoja cruda de la coca –un símbolo importante de la cultura indígena). Estas incluyen el anuncio de la ONU de enero del 2013, que permite a Bolivia volver a unirse a la Convención Única de Viena sobre Estupefacientes, con una dispensa especial reconociendo el mascado de coca (acullicu) como legal en Bolivia [IL-13-02]. Sin embargo, desde entonces estas victorias han sido eclipsadas por recordatorios de los continuos retos para Morales por asegurar la legitimidad de su política.

Una estrategia empleada por el gobierno y que apunta a eliminar el estigma que pesa sobre la coca ha sido promover sus usos industriales no narcóticos a través del lanzamiento de productos cuya base son las hojas de coca, tales como bebidas gaseosas –Coca Colla y Coca Brynco– que aparecieron en el 2010 y el 2011. Sin embargo el mes pasado, Dionisio Núñez, el viceministro para la coca, admitió que los esfuerzos  para expandir el mercado legal de la hoja de coca fueron un fracaso.

Núñez le dijo a los periodistas que una planta procesadora de coca de US$2m, construida en el 2008 con una donación de Venezuela de US$900.000, en Villa Tunari, en el Chapare –una de las dos principales regiones productoras de coca del país, junto con Yungas– esta prácticamente inoperante. Él atribuyó esto a problemas financieros y a la mala administración, pero también a una "sorprendente falta de interés" de parte de los bolivianos por productos basados en la coca. De acuerdo con informes de la prensa local, la planta produjo 1m de bolsas de "chizitos" (bocaditos cocidos de pasta de coca) en el 2011 y 2012, pero los únicos consumidores fueron niños de edad escolar, quienes los recibieron sin costo. Otra planta productora de té de coca en La Paz, construida con una inversión de aproximadamente US$500.000, también está sin funcionar. Javier Valda, el director de una oficina del gobierno responsable de ayudar a las organizaciones económicas indígenas, culpó la "sorprendente falta de interés" a la mala publicidad y al hecho de que los productos ecológicos no son populares.

El gobierno de Morales, que tolera 20.000 hectáreas de cultivo de coca, está bajo presión para frenar la producción considerando las preocupaciones de que los cultivos estén siendo usados para el negocio de la droga. Los fallidos esfuerzos para promover la industria legal también coincidieron con informes recientes de que los productores agrícolas están rechazando otros cultivos como el café en favor de la coca. A comienzos del mes pasado, Susana Lima, la secretaria general de la Federación de Caficultores - Exportadores de Bolivia (Fecafeb), dijo a los periodistas que Bolivia ahora está exportando 70.000 bolsas de café por año, comparado con 110.000 en el 2005, y la cifra continúa cayendo. Atribuyendo esto a la falta de incentivos del gobierno y al bajo rendimiento, Lima dijo que los productores, en cambio, se estaban volcando crecientemente a la coca (aunque no proveyó cifras). Al mismo tiempo, cabe señalar que a pesar de esto, el último informe de la Oficina de la ONU sobre Drogas y Delitos (UNODC), difundido en septiembre del 2012 revela que la producción de la hoja de coca seca cayó un 13% entre el 2010 y el 2011, a 48.100 toneladas en el 2011, lo que representa el 15,3% del PIB agrícola de Bolivia, y el 1,5% del PIB general, cayendo del 15,5% y el 1,6% respectivamente en el 2010.

Morales también ha enfrentado recientes desafíos a los esfuerzos de erradicación de la coca. El 28 de mayo tuvieron lugar choques en Apolo, una municipalidad en la región norte de La Paz (una de las más pequeñas áreas de cultivo de coca), entre productores de coca (cocaleros) y miembros de la Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta (FTC) que fueron desplegados cuatro días antes para erradicar cultivos ilegales de coca. Los choques, que ocuparon titulares en la prensa nacional, dejaron 19 personas heridas, 15 de ellas campesinos. Las tensiones se elevaron aún más cuando seis agentes de la FTC fueron secuestrados, aunque luego fueron liberados. Con el gobierno aún por concretar un acuerdo con los cocaleros, las tensiones destacan la resistencia en otra área donde Morales recientemente dijo tener éxito: el informe de la UNODC reveló que hubo una caída del 12% año en año en el cultivo de la coca en Bolivia en el 2011 –la primera reducción desde que Morales asumió el poder en enero del 2006. El informe reveló que el cultivo de coca en el 2011 cayó a 27.000 hectáreas (ha) de 31.000ha en el 2010.

• Presión para difundir el estudio sobre la coca

Mechthild Dyckmans, la comisionada antidrogas de Alemania, fue la más reciente funcionaria de la Unión Europea (UE) en urgir al gobierno del Presidente Evo Morales a que haga público el largamente esperado estudio exhaustivo sobre los usos legales de la coca. El trabajo en el estudio, financiado por la UE, comenzó en el 2009 y su terminación estaba fijada para el año siguiente. Desde entonces, la UE ha urgido al gobierno del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) para que publique los hallazgos, pero esto ha sido retrasado en la base a que se necesitaban más estudios complementarios.

El gobernante Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) se está quedando sin tácticas dilatorias para evitar una investigación del congreso (CPI) sobre la mala administración y la corrupción en la compañía petrolera estatal, Petrobrás. El 23 de abril, la jueza de la corte suprema, Rosa Weber, decidió limitar la CPI a Petrobrás, rechazando el pedido del gobierno de que la investigación sea ampliada para incluir una investigación sobre el metro de São Paulo y el puerto de Suape en el estado de Pernambuco. El resto de la corte suprema debe aprobar la decisión de Weber y el gobierno aún puede apelar; la oposición quiere que la CPI comience de inmediato.

La ampliación de la investigación habría tenido dos efectos. Principalmente, hubiese vuelto cualquier investigación tan pesada para los investigadores, que les habría sido improbable hallar mucha nueva información. Además también podría haber dañado a los principales rivales de la Presidenta Dilma Rousseff. El partido de Aécio Neves, el Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), enfrentaría preguntas sobre el metro; el Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB) de Eduardo Campos, sobre Suape. Faltando pocos días de actividad parlamentaria para el inicio de la Copa Mundial de al Fifa, el gobierno esperará frenar la investigación por el mayor tiempo posible, pero el peligro es que podría ser aprobada durante la etapa previa para la elecciones de octubre.

La Presidenta Rousseff está bajo fuego por su manejo de la compra por Petrobrás de una refinería en Pasadena, Texas, en el 2006. Petrobrás pagó masivamente de más por la refinería; Rousseff, quien en ese entonces estaba en la junta asesora de la compañía aprobó la compra. Rousseff ha justificado su decisión diciendo que estuvo basada en información incompleta. Es probable que un escrutinio más de cerca del acuerdo ponga en riesgo la reputación de la Presidente relacionada con su competencia gerencial. El CEO de Petrobrás en ese entonces, José Sergio Gabrielli, dijo a O Estado de São Paulo la semana pasada que ambos, él y Rousseff, fueron responsables por la compra, y que ella debería asumir parte de la culpa. Alguna vez vista como la estrella del crecimiento de Brasil para convertirse en un gran exportador de petróleo, Petrobrás es hoy en día la compañía petrolera más endeudada del mundo, y ha perdido la mitad de su valor de mercado en los tres años de Rousseff en el poder.

Operación ‘Lava Jato’ intensifica la velocidad

Se han presentado cargos formales contra el financista Alberto Yousseff y otros seis acusados del lavado de R$10mm (US$4,5mm). Ya existe evidencia de lavado de dinero por parte Yousseff, para canalizarlo a las campañas electorales de partidos políticos. Por otro lado, Paulo Roberto Costa, el ex director de refinación y aprovisionamiento en Petrobrás, ha sido acusado de impedir una investigación policial. Aún no se han presentado cargos formales en su contra por su relación con Yousseff, pero la policía cree que los dos hombres colaboraron para exigir pagos de compañías que querían asegurar contratos con Petrobrás.

El ‘Marco Civil’ se convierte en ley; el debate no ha terminado

La Presidenta Dilma Rousseff inauguró NETMundial, la conferencia global sobre la gobernanza del Internet en São Paulo, convirtiendo en ley el ‘Marco Civil’, un marco de derechos civiles para el uso del Internet. Mientras los activistas de Internet han saludado la movida, existen preocupaciones de que podría haber más libertad de acción de lo previsto en una de las provisiones clave de la ley: la neutralidad de la red.

El 24 de abril, Alessandro Molon, el diputado del PT en gran medida responsable de impulsar el proyecto de ley para su aprobación por el congreso, negó las afirmaciones hechas por las compañías de telecomunicaciones, de que estas podrían cobrar a los clientes diferentes montos por diferentes tipos de contenidos en Internet. Según Molon, las compañías de telecomunicaciones no podrán vender velocidades más rápidas a clientes quienes quieran tener acceso a sitios web específicos, tales como el sitio web de filmes y TV, Netflix, por ejemplo. Pero las compañías de telecomunicaciones alegan que de acuerdo con la redacción del texto aprobado, ellos pueden hacer esto toda vez que vuelvan disponible el mismo servicio para todos. Mientras tanto, los activistas de derechos de Internet se han quejado por el hecho de que otra la provisión de la ley que obliga a los proveedores de servicio Internet a almacenar los datos de usuarios por seis meses después de su generación, compromete su privacidad.

• Refugiados

Las estadísticas publicadas el 24 de abril muestran que Brasil es el país anfitrión de 5.208 personas que buscan estatus de refugiados. La mitad de ellos son colombianos o angoleños. Los pedidos de asilo en Brasil han crecido exponencialmente en los últimos años. En el 2013, 5.256 personas solicitaron asilo; en el 2010, ese número fue sólo de 126.

MÉXICO | Continúa el esfuerzo de inversión en infraestructura de carreteras. El 24 de junio el Presidente Enrique Peña Nieto anunció que su gobierno invertirá M$1,3bi (US$99mm) para construir 3.000kms de carreteras nuevas este año.

Según Peña Nieto, el gobierno desarrollará la construcción de al menos 250 autopistas y proyectos de mejoramiento este año, usando recursos que actualmente están a disposición de su gobierno para modernizar la infraestructura del país. Todo esto es parte del ambicioso plan de la administración Peña Nieto para radicalmente mejorar la infraestructura de México durante los próximos cuatro años como fue anunciado en abril [IL-14-17].

Peña Nieto hizo el último anuncio durante la inauguración de la expansión de M$468m (US$35,9m) de la autopista vinculando a las ciudades de Texcoco y Calpulalpan en el estado central de Tlaxcala.

En un discurso, Peña Nieto dijo que la expansión de la autopista incrementaría la capacidad del tráfico a un promedio de 15.000 vehículos por día, beneficiando a unos 280.000 residentes locales, reduciendo el tiempo de viaje entre Texcoco y Calpulalpan. Él dijo que esto era importante porque el “98%” de la población mexicana regularmente utiliza el sistema de autopistas del país para viajar.

Más significativamente, Peña Nieto agregó que la expansión de la autopista Texcoco-Calpulalpan también mejorará los lazos viales entre las áreas norte-central y sudeste del país, pues esta autopista está conectada con la autopista Ciudad de México-Puebla, una de las principales carreteras de México.

Peña Nieto concluyó diciendo que el continuado desarrollo del sistema de autopistas de México es crucial pues ayudara a mejorar la productividad regional y la competitividad general del país.

MÉXICO | Se eleva lentamente la actividad económica. En abril, la actividad económica se incrementó un 0,5% comparada con el mismo periodo del año pasado, sostuvo el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de México (Inegi) el 24 de junio en su informe mensual sobre el Indicador de la Actividad Económica Global (Igae).

De acuerdo con el Inegi, el incremento fue conducido por los sectores agrícola y de servicios, con los sectores primario y terciario creciendo un 1,3% y un 1,1% respectivamente.

En contraste, la actividad en las manufacturas o sector secundario se contrajo un 0,6%. El informe también muestra que la cifra ajustada estacionalmente del Igae se incrementó un 1,25% entre marzo y abril.

• ‘Lady Telecom’

El 24 de junio fue difundida en las redes sociales mexicanas una grabación en la cual la diputada del Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Purificación Carpinteyro, puede ser escuchada discutiendo potenciales negocios con José Gutiérrez Becerril, un ex gerente de Telefónica México. Carpinteyro es miembro de la comisión de radio, televisión y filmes de la cámara federal de diputados, y el incidente ha planteado serias preocupaciones acerca de si la diputada ha caído en un conflicto de intereses. Carpinteyro ha buscado justificar sus acciones afirmando que ella estaba buscando incrementar la competencia en el altamente concentrado mercado de las telecomunicaciones: “Yo no soy el enemigo; los enemigos son los monopolios”. Esto ha llevado a que Carpinteyro sea ridiculizada en las redes sociales mexicanas, donde ella ahora está siendo burlonamente llamada como ‘Lady Telecom’.

A recent prison clash which left four people dead and 11 injured has exposed the failure of the government led by President Evo Morales to make good a key promise ahead of the 12 October general elections – overhaul of the prison service. The violence comes just over a year after the deadliest riot took place in Bolivia’s history, at the country’s largest jail – Palmasola, Santa Cruz – in which 35 people died, leading the government to promise to carry out a complete overhaul of the sector. It also comes as the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government is facing more general criticism over justice, following the suspension of two top judges in July [WR-14-32].

The violence broke out on 14 September at Cochabamba’s El Abra prison, the director of which, Dennis Mejía, was fired three days later. Mejía has since been arrested, accused of “concealing extortion” after inmates claimed that he was due to receive US$30,000 from one of those killed in the fire-fight, Edgar Ariel Tancara Sandóval.

Tancara had reportedly been extorting money from other prisoners by levying both a “rite of passage” tax on each new arrival at the prison and a monthly “life insurance” tax which offered inmates security. Mejía was allegedly overlooking the practice in return for payments. Attorney General Ramiro Guerrero Peñaranda has called for a full investigation.

The violence and corruption has again brought to the fore the dire state of the prison service and congested nature of the justice system – concerns which emerged in a March 2014 report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Bolivia and, more recently, in a report released on 8 September by the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF).

According to official figures cited in the OHCHR report, Bolivia’s prison population exceeds 13,000 in facilities built for approximately 4,900 while it notes that “pre-trial detainees represent [...] 83.3 per cent of the prison population”. In its 2014 Economy and Development Report (RED, in its Spanish acronym) the CAF points out that the percentage of pre-trial detainees in Bolivia is the highest for the whole of Latin America.

• UN expresses concern about justice

Last week the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Bolivia issued a statement raising concerns that the trial against two constitutional court (TCP) justices, Ligia Velásquez and Zoraida Chanez, could jeopardise due process and affect judicial independence. Velásquez and Chanez, who were suspended by the 130-member lower chamber in July to face trial in congress for negligence of duties and malfeasance [WR-14-32], are due to appear in the 38-member senate (where the MAS has 28 seats) on 21 October. Under Articles 159 and 160 of the 2009 constitution, the lower chamber of congress can present accusations against senior justices for failing to carry out their duties and it is up to the senate to evaluate these and hand down sentences if found to be guilty.

Cutting growth forecasts (again): In a consensus report released by Chile’s central bank (BCCH) on 12 January, private economists forecast real annual GDP growth of 2.6% in 2015, down one percentage point on their December 2014 consensus forecast. In its 15 December 2014 quarterly monetary policy report, the BCCH estimated growth in 2014 at 1.7%, down from its September forecast of 1.75%-2.25%. According to the latest BCCH’s economic activity indicator index (Imacec), published on 5 January, economic output rose 1.3% year on year in November 2014, with a 12-month rolling rate of 1.6%. The bank said that the result “reflected mainly the higher value added from services, which was partly offset by the drop in mining, manufacturing, and retail trade activity”.

The central bank kept its key policy rate unchanged at 3.00% at its meeting in mid-July. It will have scope to ease further in coming months if actual and expected inflation slips.

The general softness in the global economy, and minerals prices in particular, has had a parlous impact on Chile. On 6 July, Finance Minister Rodrigo Valdés announced that the government had cut its forecast for real annual GDP growth this year to 2.5%, down from 3.6% previously. Annual growth in 2014 was just 1.9%.

The Banco Central de Chile’s monetary policy board was similarly downbeat eight days later when it released a statement following a regular monetary policy meeting. “Output and demand have been weaker than assumed in the Monetary Policy Report’s baseline scenario, and private growth expectations have dropped for this and next year. Confidence indicators have not recovered. In the labour market, job creation remains [curtailed] and nominal wages have decelerated”, it noted. The central bank’s monthly index of economic activity (IMACEC), was unchanged (in seasonally-adjusted terms) in May and rose by just 1.3% over the previous 12 months. Growth in services was just enough to offset a contraction in activity in the manufacturing, mining and wholesale trading sectors.

The key policy interest rate was reduced to its current 3.00% in October 2014. At the June 11 meeting, the Board had suggested that the general weakness of the economy would require the maintenance of easy monetary policy settings at least until the end of 2015.

However, “the option of further cuts to the rate had to be overruled again, in a context where inflation had been in the upper boundary or above the tolerance range for over a year; and where it was believed that it did not seem wise to heighten the already significant monetary impulse. This, especially considering that, as confidence grew, the economy should also grow more strongly towards the end of this year”. The central bank runs monetary policy in order to maintain projected inflation at 3% over the policy horizon.

Consumer price inflation in Chile was 4.4% over the year to June. In the month of June alone, inflation was 0.48%, above than the consensus (of 0.3%). The rise was due to higher prices in three areas. Increased transport costs contributed 19 basis points to the rise in consumer prices in June. Higher accommodation and basic services costs added another 14 basis points; and increased power tariffs, nine basis points.

Analysts at Spanish bank BBVA argue that these factors are largely ‘one timers’, which will not be repeated in July. Transport costs, in particular, were driven up by the weakness of the Chilean peso (which has slipped from CLP600US$ in mid-May to CLP660/US$ in mid July), and by increased transport demand on the part of tourists in the country for the Copa América regional soccer tournament. BBVA is looking for consumer price inflation of 0.1%-0.2% (or less than consensus) in the month of July.

BBVA argues that the likely reduction in inflationary pressures in the coming months will enable the central bank to cut rates further prior to the end of 2015. We agree. Developments – and official commentary – since the central bank’s policy meeting in mid-June indicate that the economy is decelerating, not accelerating. Moreover, the main constraints on a further easing in policy are likely to disappear.

ARGENTINA | IMF praise. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has just completed a country visit, had positive words for Argentina in its October global forecast update, noting that the country had begun “an important and much needed transition to a more consistent and sustainable economic policy framework”.

The IMF acknowledged that the adjustment process this year has “proven costlier than envisaged”, and, as such, GDP is now projected to contract by 1.8% in 2016 (down from 1% in April). However, it expects a rebound to 2.7% GDP growth in 2017, on the back of moderating inflation and “more supportive monetary and fiscal policy stances”.

Argentina’s Finance Minister Alfonso Prat-Gay is optimistic that 2017 will see the strongest growth in 10 years, with a GDP result potentially in the region of 3.5% and inflation of 17%, which would be the lowest in 10 years. Prat-Gay also said that up to 250,000 new jobs could be created once the private sector is back at full throttle. He said that the poverty rate inherited from the previous government, of about 32%, was “scandalous”.

COSTA RICA | New law blocking cell phone services in prisons. On 31 July Costa Rica’s 57-member unicameral legislature passed a law forcing cell phone operators and providers to block cell phone service to all prison facilities in the country. Enrique Sánchez, a deputy for the ruling Partido Acción Ciudadana (PAC), told reporters that official statistics reveal a large number of crimes are committed in Costa Rica from prisons with the use of cell phones, specifically telephone scams, extortion, and organised crime.

Some institutions such as the ombudsman’s office have backed the new law. However, others, like the telecoms business lobby Infocom, have raised serious concerns. In particular, Infocom argues that the law has two obligations that will be impossible to fulfil: guaranteeing that 100% of cell phone signals are blocked in prisons; and ensuring that neighbouring communities are not affected. Infocom also argues that the law, in its current state, leaves operators open to repeated sanctions if they are unable to effectively block cell phone signals in prisons, and also that effectively blocking cell phone signals in prisons would affect nearby communities. Instead, critics call for a more comprehensive approach that would address the design and infrastructure of prisons, including the installation of detection and confiscation equipment.

GUYANA | Turning to China. At the end of July, Guyana became the 74^th nation to sign up to China’s ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ linking China and Central Asia to Europe and the Indo-Pacific rim. What was interesting about the move was the way in which Guyana’s Prime Minister Moses Nagamootoo professed to see special opportunities for Guyana opening up as a result of the US-China trade war.

The prime minister said: “With the unilateral declaration by the United States of a so-called ‘tariff war’ against China, there would be more than enough room on the shelves of Chinese shops for Guyana’s rice, wood, fish, shrimp, sugar and assorted fruit and vegetables…. With some 1.4bn people, there is no doubt that China could gobble down all of our rum and, of course, all of our gold.” He also pointed to the opportunities for collaboration with China over the development of Guyana’s infrastructure as the oil economy begins to take-off.

JAMAICA | Decline in number of reported major crimes. In mid-August, the Jamaica Constabulary Force reported that major crimes – that is murder, shooting, rape, and aggravated assault – were down by 17% year-on-year for the period 1 January to 11 August. The total number of murders was 797, 16.8% down on the 958 committed during the same period in 2017. The less good news is that this figure is still 55 more than in the same period in 2016, 68 above the figure for 2015, and 99 higher than the same period in 2014.

At the same time, the opposition People’s National Party (PNP) in parliament has been questioning whether the imposition of a state of emergency in St James since January has represented value for money as for seven months it has cost the taxpayer $210m. Opposition leader Peter Phillips has pointed out that only 138 of the 2,672 people detained under the state of emergency have been charged with an offence.

Speaking on 22 July, Phillips said: “All we are saying is, given that it’s only 20 gang members that have been charged, given that there is the anti-gang legislation in pace, and given that we are using 600 police a week in operations who are not available to go elsewhere, are we getting the best value for the country’s anti-crime effort from the state of emergency?”

National Security Minister Horace Chang responded by saying: “No government can place a value on any Jamaican life. It is immoral and unethical to try and put a money value on any citizen’s life.”

BRAZIL | Airport concessions. On 15 March, Brazil’s civil aviation agency (Anac) successfully completed the sale of 12 airport concessions (split into three blocks), generating R$2.38bn (US$623m). The infrastructure ministry says that over the planned 30-year period, these concessions will generate a total of R$4.2bn (US$1.1bn) in income for the federal government.

Spanish airport services operator Aena won the bidding against five other initial bidders for the operating rights to the six airports making up the north-eastern block, which include Recife in Pernambuco state, with a R$1.9bn (US$498m) offer. Swiss firm Flughafen Zurich acquired the south-eastern block (two airports) for R$437m (US$114m). The bid for the four airport terminals in the mid-western block was won by local consortium Aeroeste for R$40m (US$10.5m).

Following the successful outcome of the auction, on 18 March, the infrastructure ministry announced that a sixth round of airport concessions would encompass 22 airports and take place in mid-2020. The 22 airports will be divided into three blocks: a southern block (nine airports), a northern block (seven airports) and a central block (six airports).

• Airport auctions

This is the fifth round of public auctions for airport concessions in Brazil, and the first under the government of President Jair Bolsonaro. Infrastructure Minister Tarcísio Gomes de Freitas celebrated the outcome of the auction as “a show of confidence in the country” which demonstrated “Brazil’s great potential.”

CHILE | Mining drives GDP growth. On 18 March, Chile’s central bank (BC) released its annual national accounts report, in which it revealed that GDP grew by 4% in 2018. GDP growth for the fourth quarter totalled 3.6%, up from 2.6% in the third quarter.

The BC’s report highlights that all sectors reported positive results, and that annual growth was driven in particular by the mining sector, personal services, and retail. The mining sector posted 5.2% growth after contracting for three consecutive years, spurred by an increase in copper production. The retail sector grew by 5%, and personal services by 4%.

Trinidad and Tobago has brokered a major liquid natural gas (LNG) deal with two long-standing regional rivals, Venezuela and the US, which will also benefit Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.

After a round of regional diplomatic talks, including interventions by US Vice President Kamala Harris, Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Keith Rowley announced the deal on 24 January. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) which enforces economic sanctions against Venezuela, has issued a licence allowing Trinidad to do business with Venezuela’s state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), to develop the Dragon gas field. Dragon is in Venezuelan waters, but there is a long-standing proposal that its natural gas should be pumped by pipeline to Trinidad’s oil and gas hub, where it will be liquefied and exported in liquefied natural gas (LNG) form to the world market. Rowley said that under the deal Trinidad would gain access to 350m cubic feet of gas per day (cfd). 

Various conditions are attached to the new, two-year Dragon development licence. One is that part of the eventual LNG output should go to Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and potentially other Caribbean states, to improve their energy security. Another is that PDVSA should receive no cash payments from the deal. That would normally be a complete deal-breaker, but the proposal is that Trinidad could pay Venezuela in kind, with humanitarian aid supplies such as food and medicine. It could therefore fit with recent talks between the Venezuelan government and the opposition, which have floated the idea of a United Nations (UN)-supported programme to use US$3bn of disputed overseas Venezuelan assets to meet humanitarian needs. Rowley commented: “We have done that before. So we buy the gas and we pay for it in a variety of ways.”

PDVSA owns and operates the Dragon project, which has been inactive over the last decade, largely because of a lack of investment funds. An earlier development proposal envisaged that investment of US$1bn-plus would be needed to get the gas flowing.  Oil company Shell is the operator of the neighbouring Hibiscus field in Trinidadian waters, and Rowley said he hoped Shell would become the operator of Dragon. Oil industry analysts say financially troubled PDVSA is unlikely to be able to raise the capital needed. Francisco Monaldi, a Latin American energy specialist at the Baker Institute for Public Policy, says Trinidad and Venezuela would have to reach agreement on how to compensate PDVSA for past exploration and infrastructure spending

Analysts have also pointed out that increasing gas supplies into the Caribbean would improve the region’s energy security as well as assisting the transition to cleaner and renewable energy sources. Trinidad would make significant gains. It is Latin America’s largest LNG exporter but is operating at below full capacity. The country can process 4.2bn cfd into LNG, petrochemicals, and power, but its current gas production is only 3bn cfd. There is therefore significant room for expansion. If the Dragon project meets the politically diverse objectives of the US, Venezuela, and Trinidad, it might be possible to extend it to another Venezuela-owned project, the Loran-Manatee gas field. A downside however is that developing these fields is a multi-year, billion dollars plus commitment, with investors sensitive to ongoing political risks.   

US-Caribbean Partnership

A 24 January press release by the US embassy in Trinidad highlighted that OFAC’s action is in line with efforts to strengthen the energy security and climate resilience of the Caribbean, pointing out that at the US-hosted Summit of the Americas in June 2022, Harris launched the US-Caribbean Partnership to Address the Climate Crisis 2030 to “support the region’s long-term energy security and climate resilience priorities”.

A proposed oil exploration project of Brazil’s state-owned oil company Petrobras to drill a well off the coast of the northern state of Amapá has been blocked by Brazil’s federal environmental enforcement agency (Ibama) – a decision which Petrobras appealed on 25 May. The proposed oil exploration licence is exposing internal tensions within the federal government led by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with some pushing to protect sensitive marine ecosystems, while others back oil extraction to drive economic development.

According to figures from local consultancy group Centro Brasileiro de Infraestrutura (CBIE), cited in national media such as CNN Brasil on 30 May, the oil deposits in the waters near the northern coast of Brazil, Guyana, and Suriname could provide up to 1.1m barrels per day (bpd) at the peak of oil production. According to CNN Brasil this is about the same amount of oil as Brazil’s largest known offshore oil deposits off the south-eastern coast, such as the Tupi and Búzios oil fields, where Petrobras already has oil rigs set up. 

However, on 17 May Ibama announced its decision to block Petrobras’ proposal for oil exploration in the FZA-M-59 block, near the Amazon delta, on a technicality. Ibama’s president Rodrigo Agostinho explained that Petrobras needed to have completed an in-depth environmental evaluation of the sediment area (AAAS) as part of the application for the licence to extract in that block of water. Petrobras has insisted that it has submitted all required documents and, as part of its appeal for Ibama to reconsider its decision, has said that it would include new measures to mitigate environmental risks, including an expansion of its emergency services to respond to potential oil spills or accidents.

The decision to block the project was discussed in a meeting on 23 May, attended by Lula’s chief of staff, Rui Costa, Petrobras executives, and Environment Minister Marina Silva, whose ministry oversees Ibama. Silva emerged victorious from the meeting, after the federal government upheld her demands that Petrobras comply with procedures and environmental reporting requirements.

This setback for Petrobras nonetheless came at a political cost to the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT)-led coalition. Senator Randolfe Rodrigues, who was affiliated with Silva’s party, the environmentalist Rede Sustentabilidade (Rede) party, a member the ruling coalition, announced on 18 May that he was leaving Rede over the decision.

A senator for Amapá, Rodrigues had joined Rede in 2015, having previously moved between other left-wing parties such as the Partido Socialismo e Liberdade (PSOL) and PT. Despite his more recent affiliation with the environmentalist party, he had backed the proposed oil extraction project as a potential source of wealth for his state. In an opinion piece published on 26 May in national daily Folha de São Paulo, the now-independent senator pointed out that the extra environmental assessments required by Ibama could take around three years to complete.

• Rodrigues defends oil extraction

In his Folha de São Paulo opinion piece Senator Rodrigues tried to downplay the risk of environmental damage of Petrobras’ oil project for coastal communities, emphasising the distance between the oil deposit from the Amapá shoreline (175km away from land and 2,800m deep). However, Ibama has also pointed out that the FZA-M-59 block is located near vulnerable ecosystems on the seabed, including biodiverse reefs with corals, sea sponges, and other species which would be threatened by Petrobras’ oil exploration. 

Rodrigues’ decision to leave Rede is a setback for the ruling coalition given he was its leader in congress. It is also a blow to Rede given Silva’s party was always a junior partner in the ruling coalition and is left with only one deputy in the lower house, having lost its only representative in the senate.

Workers from the metro and rail systems in Brazil’s largest city, São Paulo, and the state’s water utility company (Sabesp) launched a 24-hour strike on 3 October to protest against plans from the state government to privatise the transport and utilities services. São Paulo state governor Tarcísio de Freitas, who served as federal infrastructure minister under the right-wing former president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023), has spoken of the benefits of further privatisation, and on 3 October he said that the workers’ strike was “illegal” and politically motivated.  

The operation and maintenance of São Paulo’s metro system is already partially privatised, but the metro workers’ union has long been campaigning against privatisation. On 13 September the union released a statement criticising a private company, S&G, a contractor which operates the ticketing service of metro lines 2, 8, and 9, for failing to pay its staff after the company declared insolvency.

The salaries of the ticketing staff were ultimately covered by the state-controlled operating company. The union claimed that “this episode demonstrates the irresponsibility of outsourced companies”.

In a press conference on the day of the strike, Governor De Freitas called for the workers to be fined for their allegedly “illegal” strike, insisting that they are legally obliged to ensure that the metro and trains operate at 100% capacity during peak travel times and at 80% during non-peak hours. He went on to praise the private operators who managed to keep some lines fully or partially operational during the strike. Regarding the prospect of further privatisations, the governor said that his administration will continue to review the “processes to provide the best possible service for the citizen”.

According to the national daily Folha de São Paulo, the state plans to privatise services are at different stages. The privatisation process for Sabesp is reportedly more advanced than that of the transport systems.

The state currently controls a 50.3% stake in the water utility company, and Folha has reported that the government could present a bill to the state legislative assembly in the coming weeks to authorise the sale of its Sabesp stake. In the rail network, the privatisation of train line 7 is currently under review and the government reportedly expects an auction for contractors to take place in February 2024.

Government addresses drought emergency

While the state-controlled oil giant Petrobras continues to push for exploration projects near Brazil’s northern coast, the country’s northern region faces an extreme drought. The state government of the northern Amazonas state declared an emergency in 55 municipalities on 29 September. The federal government has sent senior officials to Amazonas to discuss the humanitarian response to the drought crisis. The decreasing water levels of rivers has threatened the region’s food security, hydroelectric generation capacity, and shipping network, among other negative impacts.

The pace of technological change is unrelenting, with some increasingly sophisticated technologies expanding the potential for disinformation. One of these is the rise of so-called deepfakes. These are artificial intelligence (AI) programmes that use a form of deep learning to produce synthetic videos, photographs, or audio tracks that realistically mimic real people. The technique was initially used by pornographic websites to map the faces of well-known female celebrities onto the bodies of porn stars. Deepfakes have been made of Barrack Obama, Vladimir Putin, and many more international politicians. In 2019 it was reported that a deepfake audio had been used by fraudsters to impersonate the voice of a German chief executive and demand a US$243,000 money transfer. Various techniques can be used to detect whether a video of a politician is genuine or fake, but these all take time and resources.

In 2023 there have been major advances in AI with potentially revolutionary future effects on employment levels and business models in several economic sectors. Developments include the use of Machine Learning (ML) where computer programmes can learn from and adapt to new information. ML programmes rely on algorithms which can use patterns in past data to make predictions or recommendations. Deep Learning (DL) is a subset of ML which, without direct human intervention, can use analysis of high volumes of text, video, and other data to propose solutions to complex problems. In November 2022 Open AI (a company owned by Microsoft) launched chatbot ChatGPT which can produce human-like text after being trained by ingesting millions of text sources, websites, newspapers, and books. These large language models can hold billions of data sets. However, the programmes, based primarily on identifying patterns and correlations, can be subject to ‘hallucinations’ – falsehoods such as creating fake book references or, in one recent case answering “elephant” when asked which mammal lays the largest eggs.

The full impact of AI has yet to be assessed. A UK study in early 2022 showed 15% of all businesses had adopted some form of AI, with highest usage in IT, telecoms, finance, accounting, media, advertising, sales, and legal services. Efficiency gains included automating data analysis, improving and automating customer service, and supporting decision-making. Research by the University of Pennsylvania in early 2023 suggested that AI driven by large language models (LLMs) was likely to impact 80% of the US workforce with “at least 10%” of their work tasks affected.

An August 2023 report by the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) concluded that AI can contribute greatly to transforming regional economies, making them “more productive, inclusive and sustainable” but that it is also necessary for there to be “reflection, a strategic vision, regulation and regional and multilateral coordination” to “harness its opportunities and minimise its potential threats”. Eclac Executive Secretary José Manuel Salazar-Xirinachs called for a “watchful” stance on ethical issues involving AI, attention to data privacy, and a focus on “the biases and discrimination in decisions based on intelligent algorithms”.

From the point of view of this report, increasing AI adoption creates both opportunities and risks. Consultancy McKinsey notes that generative-AI models “will confidently produce inaccurate, plagiarised, or biased results…because the models have been trained on the internet, which is hardly a universally reliable source”.

El palacio presidencial confirmó al ministro de transporte interino, Paulo Sérgio Passos, como permanente, en abierto desafío al aliado Partido da república (PR) el 11 de julio. Passos reemplaza a Alfredo Nascimento (del PR), que renunció la semana pasada sobre alegatos que él había supervisado un gran círculo de corrupción en el ministerio, que involucraba sobornos de contratistas privados para contratos de obras públicas. Rousseff se había quejado recientemente que el ministerio, que había estado controlado por el PR desde 2003, estaba usando fondos del presupuesto a una tasa alarmante.

Passos es un tecnócrata de carrera en el ministerio de transporte. El ganó la confianza de Rousseff cuando los dos colaboraban en esquemas de infraestructura bajo el programa insignia del gobierno federal, el Programa de Aceleración del Crecimiento (PAC), que fue supervisado por Rousseff en su ex capacidad de ministra de la presidencia. Passos se unió al PR el año pasado, pero no es un incondicional del partido. Como otros nuevos designados en el gabinete, su lealtad será con Rousseff, no con la dirección de su partido.

El PR es pequeño pero influyente, con 40 (de 153) diputados y seis (de 81) senadores. El presidente del partido, el diputado Valdemar da Costa Neto, él mismo implicado (por el semanario Veja) en el círculo de corrupción –había insinuado que un grupo de 20 diputados del PR podrían retirarse de la coalición en protesta. El importante senador del PR, Blairo Maggi, que rechazó la invitación de Rousseff de encabezar el ministerio, luego pareció alentar a su asociado Luiz Antonio Pagot, el también implicado director de infraestructura nacional y departamento de transporte, para dar testimonio parlamentario sobre ministerios clave conducidos por cercanos asociados de Rousseff del gobernante Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), incluido Paulo Bernardo, ex ministro de planeamiento bajo Lula y ahora ministro de comunicaciones de Rousseff. Bernardo también está casado con Gleisi Hoffman, que recientemente reemplazo al número dos de Rousseff, Antonio Palocci.

En todo caso, Pagot no hizo nada de todo eso e incluso rogó para mantenerse en su puesto. Al parecer, Rousseff, Hoffman y la nueva ministra para relaciones institucionales, Ideli Salvatti, conforman un formidable trío. Salvatti explicó al PR las realidades de dejar la coalición (incluido abandonar el control sobre proyectos de infraestructura en unos 10 estados) y los rebeldes diputados del PR (y un intimidado Da Costa Neto) volvieron todos en línea para mitad de semana. Pagot, por su lado, está dirigiéndose a la salida.

¿Rumbo al fuego?
La economía aún está a toda marcha, casi está cerca del empleo total en el país y la mayoría de los brasileños, ajenos al humor político en la capital, están en un masivo festival de consumo. Brasil ahora está importando unos 4.500 autos BMW por mes, seguramente haciéndolo uno de los mercados de más rápido crecimiento en el mundo para el fabricante del lujoso auto alemán. Una serie de sondeos por las llamadas ‘consultoras internacionales’ recientemente han ubicado a Río de Janeiro y a São Paulo entre las ciudades más caras del mundo. Y no pasa un día sin que otra edición del Financial Times del Reino Unido se refiera al crecientemente obsesivo debate de si la economía se está sobrecalentando o no. El rating de aprobación pública de Rousseff, es más alto que el de Lula en un punto similar de su mandato, pero es extremadamente vulnerable a una esperada declinación económica hacia finales de año (y ante las programadas elecciones locales en 2012).

• Amores Brasil-EU

El canciller Antonio Patriota dio la bienvenida a un nuevo informe de políticas del Consejo de Relaciones Exteriores que recomienda que EU debe prestar su “apoyo total” al intento de Brasil por una banca en el reformado Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. El informe alega que un aval formal “contribuiría grandemente a superar la permanente sospecha en el gobierno brasileño que las promesas de EU de una relación más madura entre iguales es en gran parte retórica”. Este año, en Brasil, el Presidente Barack Obama fue positivo pero no comprometido sobre la cuestión, en contraste con su declaración de apoyo, en octubre de 2010, para el intento de la India para el Consejo de Seguridad.