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Development: Venezuela’s president and former foreign minister, Nicolás Maduro, spent the weekend of 3-5 May engaged in verbal spats with President Barack Obama of the US, Colombia’s former president Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and Peru’s foreign minister Rafael Roncagliolo.

Significance: In an effort to consolidate his weak legitimacy, Maduro today begins a tour of Venezuela’s regional allies in the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil (but notably not Paraguay). Maduro also says he is looking to guarantee food supplies for Venezuela. His tour is not without controversy. Not only has Uruguay’s opposition loudly slated President José Mujica for welcoming Maduro, Brazil too has looked a bit askance at recent goings on in Venezuela. President Dilma Rousseff’s adviser on regional foreign affairs, the well-known left-winger Marco Aurelio García, told Argentina’s Página 12 on 5 May that Venezuela’s close-run 14 April presidential election “should be the object of a reflection on the part of Maduro and his team". However, García also said that the Union of South American Nations (Unasur) was, “with shades”, united in its position on Venezuela. Maduro’s vitriolic reaction to Roncagliolo’s suggestion that Unsaur issue a new declaration on Venezuela in the wake of the latest political violence and the on-going row over the election results suggests otherwise.

Key points:

• On 19 April Unasur issued a statement congratulating Maduro on his election as president and called on all sectors in Venezuela to respect the results issued by the national electoral council (CNE). It also “took positive note” of the CNE decision, made just hours before, to “implement a methodology to allow a total audit of the electoral tables”.  At the time, Peruvian media reported that there was some resistance by the governments of Chile and Colombia to recognition of Maduro's victory.

• On Friday (3 May), Roncagliolo said that Peru, which currently holds the rotating Unasur chair, might ask Unasur members to evaluate a fresh communiqué on Venezuela. He said he had discussed the matter with his Chilean peer, Alfredo Moreno, at a day-earlier bilateral summit in Lima. In allusion to the recent bust-ups in Venezuela’s national assembly, Roncagliolo called on the Maduro administration for “tolerance and dialogue”. Maduro responded furiously, telling Roncagliolo he had made “the mistake of his life” and threatening to recall Venezuela’s ambassador from Lima for consultations. Peru’s opposition has again criticised President Ollanta Humala for his silence over the affair, seeking to tarnish him as an ideological ally of the radical left-wing Venezuelan government.

• More predictably, Maduro also lambasted President Obama for his latest comments on Venezuela which, it is worth noting, were not all that different in tone from those of Roncagliolo or indeed the secretary general of the Organization of American States, José Miguel Insulza. Maduro’s extreme defensiveness suggests he’s feeling the pressure. Venezuela’s opposition leader, Henrique Capriles Radonski, yesterday said he was “101% sure” that Maduro’s votes count was inflated and said he would submit more evidence of electoral irregularities to Venezuela’s supreme court.

• Elsewhere, Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos said he would defend the dignity of former president Uribe via diplomatic channels, in reference to a scheduled meeting between Colombia’s Foreign Minister María Angela Holguin and the Venezuela’s ambassador to Colombia, Iván Rincón Urdaneta, to discuss Maduro’s labelling of Uribe as a “murderer” and accusing him of being involved in plans (along with US right-wingers) to assassinate him.

HAITI | Withdrawal of Minustah. On 7 June Nigel Fisher, interim head of the United Nations (UN) stabilisation mission in Haiti (Minustah), issued an open letter ‘clarifying’ details of the plan for Minustah’s withdrawal which implicitly indicates that this will not happen at least until after 2016. Fisher recalls that in March he submitted a plan to the UN Security Council which linked the withdrawal to ‘specific objectives and key indicators for capacity building and staffing of the National Police of Haiti (PNH), strengthening the rule of law and the respect for human rights and the strengthening of judicial mechanisms and of control, the development of electoral capacity, the strengthening of the local governance capacity and support an inclusive dialogue.’

To this he adds, ‘In close collaboration with the government, we are now in the process of refining this plan to ensure that it is feasible and it contains clear indicators for the strengthening of national institutions and the reduction of the presence of the Minustah. For example, the plan includes a key indicator relating increasing strength of the Haitian National Police (PNH) to 15,000 agents by 2016.’

HAITI | Toll of violent crime. On 19 June the Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH), a campaigning rights NGO, published a report which reveals that in the year that ended in May 2013, ‘more than 1,041 people were shot, stabbed, stoned or lynched’ in Haiti — 97.5% of them in Port-au-Prince. The victims included foreigners, UN Blue Helmets, Haitian police officers and minors. Casualties in the Haitian police force included 23 officers killed and 27 injured.

The report also tallied 72 kidnappings and 972 cases of sexual violence, with minors among the victims in both categories. The full report is available at http://rnddh.org/content/uploads/2013/06/Rapport_DH_2013.pdf/ .

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC | Main port militarised. A decree issued by President Danilo Medina on 8 June placed the Puerto Multimodal Caucedo, 31 kilometres east of Santo Domingo, under military control, following the seizures of a large quantity of cocaine there. The port is the biggest in the country and one of the biggest in the Caribbean and is capable of handling more than 1,000 containers at any one time. It has become an important staging point for cocaine shipments from South America to the US and Europe. Puerto Caucedo has been operated for the past 10 years by DP World, which administers 49 ports worldwide.

PANAMA | Cocaine processing plant found. With the assistance of Colombia, Panamanian forces located in early June in Chucurtí, in the Guna Yala (San Blas) indigenous territory a two-hectare plantation of coca and a small lab for the processing of cocaine basic paste. It is estimated that it had the capacity to produce 20-30 kilos a month — clearly a pilot plant.

This is the latest instance of attempts to establish both coca planting and cocaine processing in the Central American isthmus. The Colombian Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) guerrillas were until recently present in the area.

REGIÓN | Frenando al hongo del café. El brote de la roya, un hongo que afecta al café, la mayor exportación de Centroamérica, ahora está bajo control, de acuerdo con Víctor Villatoro, el titular del Instituto Interamericano para la Cooperación en Agricultura (IICA) [IL-13-04]. Villatoro dijo que el brote –el peor que ha impactado a Centroamérica– ahora era “perfectamente manejable con las apropiadas prácticas agrícolas”. Sin embargo, advirtió que los países deberán continuar con sus esfuerzos para prevenir que el hongo se extienda más en el futuro, especialmente cuando replanten café después de las cosechas.

Villatoro atribuyó el éxito en la contención del hongo a un coordinado esfuerzo regional, que involucró a gobiernos, el IICA, y organizaciones internacionales tales como la organización de alimentos y agricultura de la ONU (FAO), y el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID). En agosto la FAO anunció una inversión de US$500.000 durante dos años,  para programas que apuntan a ayudar a los países centroamericanos en el fortalecimiento de su capacidad técnica con relación a la detección temprana de las futuras crisis del sector del café, así como también mejorar su respuesta y prevención.

De acuerdo con un informe de mayo del 2013 de la Organización Internacional del Café (OIC), el daño total en la región para la cosecha 2012/2013 está estimada en 2,7m de bolsas, con un costo aproximado de US$500m. El informe advierte que el impacto será aun más severo en la próxima cosecha (2013/2014).

En promedio, más del 50% del área de cultivo de café en Centroamérica ha sido afectada por la peste. Las tasas de la incidencia son como siguen: El Salvador 74%; Guatemala 70%; Costa Rica 64%; Nicaragua 37%; y Honduras 25%. La OIC también destaca que la mayor parte del café en Centroamérica es cultivado por pequeños productores, que encontrarán difícil absorber las esperadas pérdidas. Se estima que unos 374.000 empleos se perderán entre el 2012 y el 2013, debido a la roya, pues los trabajadores utilizados para la cosecha del café no serán necesarios.

Con relación al mercado mundial del café, Centroamérica (excluyendo México) produjo 15,8m de bolsas en 2011/2012, representando aproximadamente el 12% de la producción mundial. Las pérdidas esperadas se estiman en 2,7m de bolsas en el 2012/2013 lo que representaría una caída del 17,1% sobre el año anterior.

China and the United States continue to trade barbs over territorial disputes in the South China Sea between China and the Philippines.  But US strictures are having limited effect and some are arguing it is time for a change of tactics

In early February, the US’s Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Danny Russel made some exceptionally forceful remarks to a congressional committee about China’s actions in the South China Sea.  Amongst other things he said US concerns about Chinese behaviour “include…pressure on the long-standing Philippine presence at the Second Thomas Shoal”.  This had no effect on China at all.

Referring to it as Renai Reef, on 17 March China issued another statement against the Philippines’ “occupation” of the Second Thomas Shoal, saying that China “will never tolerate the Philippines’ occupation of Renai Reef” and that it is “resolved to safeguard our sovereignty”.

The trading of remarks continues, but with similar lack of effect.  On 1 April Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei was asked to comment on remarks made in Washington by US State Department official Marie Harf, who had accused China of provocative and destabilizing” actions.  According to Xinhua news agency, Hong Lei said that the US should “stop its irresponsible remarks” on Renai Reef and “its encouragement of provocation by countries involved in disputes over the sovereignty of the reef”.

China has been particularly infuriated by the Philippines seeking to submit its disputes with China in the South China Sea to international arbitration.  China wants to keep all its disputes on a bilateral footing where its bullying power is maximized.

One of the countries that watches these disputes closely is Australia, and there is a perennial debate in Australia about how far it should go in challenging China.  Prime Minister Tony Abbott, for instance, has been criticized by some for his apparently pro-Japan orientation, and some officials tend to take the view that Australia needs to show more sensitivity towards China.  But that view no longer seems to be in the ascendancy, and it has been interesting to see this week a commentary from the influential Lowy Institute arguing for a significantly more robust – albeit different – approach to China.

The commentary begins with the assertion that China will continue “to ramp up the pressure on  the disputed islands” in the East and South China Seas and that China is clearly not being deterred by the current US and Japanese policies, which Australia supports.

China is continuing with its assertive behaviour, it is argued, probably because it knows the US and its allies are very unlikely to risk their economic well-being by going to war for “these barren islands and coral atolls”.

What is suggested is that instead of relying on military deterrence, a strategy of exploiting China’s domestic weaknesses should be adopted.  A linkage should be made between “future Chinese actions over the disputed islands and external prying into Chinese domestic politics and internal matters”.

MEXICO | Unemployment. The national unemployment rate in February fell to 3.3% of the economically active population (EAP), compared with 3.5% in the same month a year earlier, Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) reported on 27 March. The underemployment rate, defined as those working for fewer hours than they would like, fell to 6.6% in February from 7.3% in the same month in 2017.

Overall, the employment rate reached 96.8% of the EAP in February; according to the survey responses, 42.2% of employees work in the service industry, 18.5% work in sales, 16.7% in manufacturing, 12.9% in agriculture, 8.4% in construction, 0.8% in other industries, and 0.5% gave no response.

The state of Tabasco had the highest unemployment rate in February with 8.2%, up from 7.3% in February 2017, and the state of Oaxaca had the lowest unemployment rate at 1.3%, a decrease from 2.6% in February 2017.

MEXICO | Trade surplus. Mexico registered a trade surplus of US$1.06bn for the month of February, a significant increase from the January trade deficit of US$4.41bn, the national statistics institute (Inegi) reported on 27 March.

An Inegi report stated that the value of exports in February reached US$35.21bn, a 12.3% year-on-year increase; oil exports were worth US$2.58bn, while non-oil exports were worth US$32.63bn. In the non-oil sector, the biggest growth compared with February 2017 was found in exports of manufactured and agricultural products, exhibiting a 10.5% and a 17.3% increase, respectively.

Imports in February were valued at US$34.15bn, increasing by 11.7% on the same month in 2017: oil imports were valued at US$3.93bn; and non-oil imports were valued at US$30.22bn. Mexico’s accumulated trade balance for the first two months of the year remains at a deficit of US$3.35bn.

Uruguay’s incumbent left-wing Frente Amplio (FA) coalition can claim to have outperformed neighbours like Brazil and Argentina, delivering uninterrupted year-on-year GDP growth for the last decade and a half. Whoever wins the October general elections, however, will need to deal with a steadily widening fiscal deficit.

According to the economy and finance ministry, efforts to reduce the fiscal deficit have so far failed to show results. On its own data, the 12-month deficit, adjusted for modifications of the pension system, was unchanged in August relative to the previous month of July, at 4.8% of GDP. Taking into account exchange rate movements, the deficit edged up to US$3.042bn in August from US$2.994bn in July. The minister, Danilo Astori, recognised that as economic growth had slowed this year, narrowing the deficit has become more difficult, because government revenues have weakened. Reducing the deficit, in his words, has become a task that is “neither short nor easy”.

Yet Astori continues to argue against the proposals of opposition parties who advocate immediate action to cut government spending. He contends that Uruguay’s “tremendous financial strength” will give the next government the necessary breathing space to attack the deficit gradually by increasing revenues, rather than by cutting spending. Recent analysis gives some qualified support for this assertion. For example, the country runs a small current account surplus, equivalent to around 1% of GDP, and has enough foreign currency reserves to cover 15 months’ worth of imports. The announcement in May that Finland’s UPM is investing over US$3bn in building a second pulp plant in the country [EB-19-05] will give growth a boost. In the context of those positives, Astori favours what he calls “acting with austerity, controlling spending, and incentivising public and private investment, so that we increase economic growth and therefore boost public revenues.”

There is, however, also a debate over whether the use of incentives is appropriate. A recent report by the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) written with anti-poverty lobby group Oxfam, suggests that the widespread use of incentives such as tax breaks in Latin America has not been submitted to any serious cost-benefit analysis. The report says that in Uruguay last year, incentives had a total cost of US$4bn or around 7% of GDP in terms of tax revenues foregone. The latest incentives, announced in September, introduced asset and corporate income tax breaks for companies offering ‘global services’ or setting up in the country’s new industrial parks. The report highlighted the widespread use of value-added tax (VAT) exemptions in Uruguay. It suggests that some of the incentives used may be inefficient in economic terms.

Political outlook

Despite a degree of public weariness with the ruling coalition which is now completing its third consecutive five-year term in office, its candidate, former mayor of Montevideo Daniel Martínez, is still leading in the opinion polls, ahead of the main centre-right contender, Luis Lacalle Pou of the Partido Nacional (PN). At the end of September pollster Radar gave Martínez a 40%-22.4% advantage over Lacalle Pou; another pollster, Cifra, envisaged a tighter race with 33% for Martínez and 28% for Lacalle Pou. The race remains very open, however, as after the first round on 27 October, it is likely that opposition parties will come together to back Lacalle Pou in a second-round run-off due on 24 November. The PN candidate has said that if he is victorious, he will appoint Azucena Arbeleche, an economist with experience of public sector debt management, as his minister for economy and finance. Both say it is possible to reduce public sector spending by around US$900m a year. The PN has also talked of introducing a fiscal responsibility law. 

President Luis Abinader is facing growing demands to decriminalise abortion in the Dominican Republic, one of the few countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, along with El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, and Jamaica where there is a total ban, even when a pregnancy is life-threatening, unviable, or the result of rape or incest. The lower chamber of congress is debating the issue amid discussions regarding a new criminal code.

According to the gender studies unit at the Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo private university, unsafe abortions are the fourth-leading cause of maternal death in the Dominican Republic. While President Abinader, who took office in August 2020, has publicly backed decriminalising abortion under the three aforementioned circumstances, the issue remains deeply sensitive in a country where 49% of the population identify as Catholic and 26% Evangelical Protestant.

A presidential advisory group recommended last month that abortions under the three circumstances should be permitted. This suggestion was made in the context of discussions about updating the Dominican Republic’s criminal code, which imposes prison sentences of up to two years on those who have abortions and up to 20 years for medical professionals who provide them.

The proposal was backed by a women’s rights movement known as ‘LasCausalesVan’, which has been camped outside the presidential palace and congress since 11 March. The US-based NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW) also recently warned that the current ban is “incompatible with…international human rights obligations”. Meanwhile, a suggestion that Adinader floated that the issue could be decided by popular vote has already met with rejection from LasCausalesVan and HRW, which argue that fundamental human rights should not be subjected to a referendum.

The lower chamber finally approved the new criminal code in a first reading on 28 April by 146-14, but it only agreed to decriminalise abortion in the event that a pregnancy is life-threatening. The changes must pass a second reading in the lower chamber and receive approval by the senate to take effect.

Abortion ban

A new constitution took effect in the Dominican Republic 11 years ago stating the inviolability of the right to life “from conception to death”. The chamber of deputies approved a revised criminal code in 2014 that included the decriminalisation of abortion in the three circumstances. However, a December 2015 ruling by the top court rejected this, leaving the 1884 criminal code in place.

After a bruising three years of falling activity levels there are early signs that Argentina’s economy is bottoming out. But the recovery is very fragile.

According to Argentina’s national statistics institute (Indec), GDP in the first quarter of this year was up by 2.5% year-on-year, and by 2.6% quarter-on-quarter. These modest signs of growth came after four successive quarters of contraction. With the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic coming on top of deep structural imbalances, GDP crashed by 9.9% last year. Aided by a low basis of comparison and the reopening of the economy at the beginning of this year, construction activity soared 21.3% in the first quarter, with manufacturing up by 11.4%. However, hotels and restaurants, still affected by pandemic restrictions, plunged by 35.5%. The monthly economic activity index (Emae) for April also indicated strong growth of 28.3% year-on-year, although it was down 1.2% compared with March. Unemployment fell to 10.2%, down from 11% in the fourth quarter.  

Growth in consumption was modest, and exports only edged up marginally (despite strong international soya prices). Among other positive signs, tax collection rose 69% year-on-year in June, ahead of the inflation rate (estimated at 49.3%). The economy ministry says tax receipts in the first half of this year have come back up to pre-pandemic levels. The ministry has become more optimistic about growth. The 2021 budget was built on the hypothesis that the economy would expand by 5.5%, but that prediction has since been raised to 7%.

That said, there are various clouds on the horizon. One is a new surge in Covid-19 infections which has forced the government to impose new and controversial international travel restrictions. It is feared that the new wave of infections could once more derail the economy. In second place, business sentiment has been weakened by a decision on 24 June by investment index provider MSCI to downgrade Argentina from ‘emerging market’ to ‘standalone’ status. MSCI said the change reflected the negative impact of continuing capital and exchange controls in the country. The change will take effect in November and is expected to lead investors to withdraw as much as US$610m from the three remaining companies in the MSCI Argentina Index (these are Globant, Adecoagro, and state-owned oil company YPF).  

BRAZIL | Lula meets business leaders. Brazil’s left-wing former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2011) held a private lunch with business leaders from the Federação das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp) on 5 July to assuage concerns about his proposed economic policies. He was accompanied in this endeavour by his centre-right business-friendly vice-presidential candidate, Gerardo Alckmin.

Lula told the assembled executives in São Paulo that he would move to end the fiscal spending cap if he were elected in October but maintained that he would adopt fiscally responsible economic policies, bring in foreign capital, and bring down the high rate of inflation. In an indirect swipe at President Jair Bolsonaro, Lula also called on those present “to be on the side of defending democracy”.

A business leader at the lunch who spoke to the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo on condition of anonymity, said the candidate was “difficult to read” because he was addressing two different audiences, the wider electorate on the one hand, and business leaders on the other. Nevertheless, this executive from the infrastructure sector said he did not expect Lula to radicalise his economic policies, commenting: “He is very open to dialogue. I believe there is indeed a different discourse for his supporters, but the agendas will align.”

President Gustavo Petro’s attempt to negotiate a ‘total peace’ agreement continues to be undermined by violent incidents around the country, with some armed groups warning that they would attack politicians ahead of regional elections in October.

Petro’s ‘total peace’ programme has always faced two major threats. One is that existing armed insurgent groups may simply fail to agree to ceasefires and the associated peace settlements. The other is that the existing groups may splinter or be replaced by new ones coming into being and thriving on drug trafficking and other illicit economic activities such as unregulated mining. In recent weeks there has been some evidence of both those things happening.

On 27 May leaders of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) – the largest grouping of dissident units of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) guerrilla group – launched a series of threats.

The EMC, led by Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández (‘Iván Mordisco’), was angered by a government decision to suspend a bilateral ceasefire that had been in place since January. The decision, affecting four departments – Caquetá, Meta, Guaviare, and Putumayo – came after the government accused the EMC of killing four indigenous teenagers who had tried to escape after being forcibly recruited [WR-23-21]. The guerrillas said only one of the four, all of whom it described as government spies, was underage. The EMC announced it would retaliate by resuming armed operations. It also said it would forcibly expel any politicians from “traditional and war-mongering parties” seeking to campaign in the four departments in the run-up to Colombia’s 29 October regional elections.

In another development the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) guerrilla group claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on 24 May in the municipality of Tibú, Norte de Santander department, which killed three people (two police officers and a civilian woman) and injured ten. 

Norte de Santander is part of the violent Catatumbo region which spans the border with Venezuela. Government negotiations with the ELN, Colombia’s largest insurgent group, have stopped and started. Under the latest extension both the government and the rebels have agreed to continue ceasefire talks in Cuba with an 8 June deadline.

Other sources of conflict remain active. On 28 May it was reported that 300 Afro-Colombian and indigenous families had been evacuated from their homes near the San Juan River in the north-eastern department of Chocó as a result of armed clashes between the ELN and the Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest drug cartel. Security forces separately arrested 18 illegal gold miners in Antioquia, allegedly members of a smaller criminal organisation. Chinese-owned mining company Zijin-Continental Gold, which operates the Buriticá gold mine, also in Antioquia, has meanwhile demanded an “immediate intervention” by the security forces to repel “constant criminal attacks” which it says have left two workers dead and 14 wounded.

• Zijin-Continental statement

In a statement released on 30 May, Zijin-Continental Gold said that one worker had been shot on 29 May and two operational vehicles had been targeted on 30 May, resulting in workers having to be evacuated. This followed a 17 May attack at the mine in which explosives were used, killing two people and leaving 14 injured. In a statement on its website, Zijin-Continental condemned the “heinous actions of the criminals” and described the attack as a “serious crime against the international mining industry”. Zijin-Continental mentioned that illegal mining activities are ongoing in the area, and it expressed concerns over the intensification of aggression being used in the form of explosives and weapons.

The government’s hope has been that its various peace initiatives will cause a drop in the different metrics used to measure levels of violence. At best the picture remains mixed, but with no clear downward trend. Defence Minister Iván Velásquez has highlighted some good news, saying that the murder of former Farc members – those who demobilised under the terms of the 2016 peace agreement – has dropped by 41% during Petro’s presidency. However, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos (Cerac), an NGO, says that monthly deaths caused by all forms of political violence rose consecutively in each of the previous three months to reach a total of 17 in April.

Trouble in congress

Petro’s political position has recently suffered as a result of a partial break-up of the pro-government coalition in congress.

The centrist Partido de la U (PU) said on 16 May that it was withdrawing its 11 senators and 15 deputies from the coalition, following a similar decision by the Partido Conservador (PC) at the beginning of the month.

Alianza Verde Senator Ariel Ávila, who is part of the pro-government coalition, warned that “if President Petro’s government doesn’t rebuild the ruling coalition, all his reforms will sink”.

Most at risk are bills to legalise marijuana and to provide legal recourse to rural families that have suffered eviction (known as the agrarian jurisdiction bill). Since they affect the constitution both pieces of legislation require eight separate readings across two consecutive sessions.

Ávila says that because congressional committees have been inquorate, the two bills may ultimately fail to get the required number of readings before the congressional recess begins on 21 June. In that case the whole process would have to go back to the starting point.

The labour, health, and pension reform bills could also be at risk. PU deputy Manuel Salcedo has accused the government of disrespecting and failing to negotiate with congress, by demanding rapid approval of its own bills while giving little priority to legislative initiatives launched by the deputies or senators themselves.  Newspaper El Colombiano said that as a result congress is “showing the government its teeth” and leaving key committees inquorate to force the president to compromise.

On 26 March Chile’s government led by President Gabriel Boric announced the promulgation of the country’s ‘Ley Marco sobre Ciberseguridad e Infraestructura Crítica’ (law for a framework on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure), which will create a new regulatory body for cybersecurity, the Agencia Nacional de Ciberseguridad (Anci). Although challenges in the implementation of a new cybersecurity strategy are expected, the law has been widely welcomed, as Chile becomes the first country in Latin America to create a specialized government agency dedicated to cybersecurity.

According to a government press release, Anci will set the rules and directives for the prevention and reporting of cybercrimes and penalise non-compliance with fines. It will be responsible for applying regulations to “all public and private organisations that provide essential services”, with the government defining these as services “that are fundamental to the functioning of the country and the quality of life of our society, such as services related to health, security, energy, water, fuel, sanitation, transportation, banking or financial services, among others”.

In a speech following the law’s promulgation, Boric said that the country “should feel proud”, given that with the law it “becomes the first country in Latin America and the Caribbean to have a national cybersecurity agency and a cutting-edge regulatory framework in this field”. Boric said that the new law was building on his predecessors’ efforts to improve cybersecurity policies in Chile, with former president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010, 2014-2018) having formulated Chile’s first national cybersecurity strategy back in 2017. The recently promulgated law was the result of a bill first drafted in 2022, shortly before the end of the presidency of Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014, 2018-2022), and was fully approved by congress in December 2023.

On 1 April national daily La Tercera cited praise for the new law from César Pallavicini Zambrano, the director of the Alianza Chilena de Ciberseguridad (ACC), a national platform of public and private sector groups dedicated to developing cybersecurity policies. Pallavicini welcomed this law as a step in the right direction, as a means to “divert more human and economic resources” towards better governance of the digital sphere.

However, Pallavicini recognised that more needs to be done to build on this. The ACC head pointed out another piece of legislation, known as the ‘data protection’ bill, which could complement this cybersecurity law. While Anci will have the authority to enforce regulations, Pallavicini and other cybersecurity experts believe that the regulations themselves need to be strengthened through bills such as the data protection bill, which is currently being reviewed by a joint congressional committee.

La Tercera has also cited the head of cybersecurity at the Chilean association of tech companies (Chiletec), Myriam Pérez, who flagged up several implementation challenges, such as a “general lack of knowledge” about best practices, possibly hindering Chilean companies from following the guidelines which Anci will set. She also suggested that hiring or training cybersecurity professionals and implementing policies to protect infrastructure could be costly for many public and private sector organisations in Chile and has called for a national fund to help these companies cover the costs of adopting new security measures.

Rise in cyberattacks

The new cybersecurity legislation comes amid a rise in cyberattacks in Chile. According to the Chilean telecommunications company Entel, Chile was the fourth country in Latin America most affected by cyberattacks in 2023, behind Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. Chile experienced 21 ransomware attacks on different industries and institutions in 2023, almost twice as many as in 2021 and three times more than in 2022, when there were only seven incidents recorded. Cybersecurity is also seen as such an important issue due to the high percentage of Chileans who use digital services. Entel has estimated that over 90% of Chileans (17.69m people) had access to the internet in 2023.

ECUADOR | Trepa la inflación. En 2011, la inflación se incrementó 5,41%, anunció el instituto nacional de estadísticas (Ine), la tasa más alta desde un incremento del  8,83% en 2008 y por encima del 3,33% del 2010. La inflación está levemente por encima de las proyecciones oficiales, debido a la escalada en los costos de alimentos importados, y los incrementos de salarios que estimulan la demanda del consumidor.

VENEZUELA | Chávez desafía al Icsid. El Presidente Hugo Chávez dejó enfáticamente claro durante su enérgico y decidido retorno a su transmisión de TV dominical, Aló, Presidente, después de una ausencia de siete meses, que su gobierno no pagara una indemnización al gigante de la energía con base en EU, ExxonMobil en un caso pendiente de arbitraje en el Centro Internacional de Arreglo de Diferencias Relativas a Inversiones (Icsid) del Banco Mundial.Hablando desde la faja de petróleo pesado y bituminoso del Orinoco donde tuvieron lugar muchas de las expropiaciones de la administración Chávez, para consolidar el control sobre “sectores estratégicos” de la economía, Chávez dijo que no le prestaría atención a ninguna resolución del Icsid, aunque no dijo si Venezuela dejaría o no la organización como hicieron recientemente Bolivia y Ecuador.

No se espera una inminente resolución de Icsid ya sea en este caso o en otros casos en los cuales Venezuela está involucrado, pero sus comentarios llegaron días después que un panel de arbitraje de la Cámara Internacional de Comercio con base en París, otorgara a Exxon unos US$908m en un veredicto sobre la expropiación por el estado venezolano en 2007 de los activos petroleros de Exxon en Cerro Negro. Esta fue una victoria para Chávez pues Exxon estaba buscando US$7bn. La compañía petrolera estatal de Venezuela, Pdvsa anunció prontamente que pagaría a Exxon una “justa compensación” de US$255m durante los próximos 60 días: la compañía llegó a esa cifra sustrayendo deudas existentes de Exxon, como US$191m por la compra de bonos atados a la financiación de Cerro Negro y US$300m por su cuenta de banco en Nueva York que Exxon logró congelar cuando tomó acción legal por primera vez en 2007.

State of the Union: President Barack Obama only made one tangential mention of Latin America in his state of Union address on 25 January. He noted that the US Free Trade Agreements with Panama and Colombia had now come into force.

Defence Industry: Mexico is now eyeing the global defence industry after becoming, on 25 January, the second Latin American country (after Argentina) to become a full participant in the Wasenaar Arrangement, which sets out export controls for weapons and dual-use goods.

Mexican companies are most interested in supplying the military aviation industry. The military aviation industry has sales that are four times as high as the civil aviation business, according to the Federación Mexicana de la Industria Aeroespacial (Femia). In 2008, the civil aviation industry had sales of US$450bn, while military aviation sales topped US$2trillion.

Carlos Bello, the managing director of Femia, said that the Wasenaar arrangement would allow Mexican companies to import equipment that previously was banned. The dual use equipment includes machines that could be used to manufacture bombs.

Bello said that the industry would now produce GPS equipment and other electronic products previously not manufactured in Mexico.

Flavio Díaz Mirón, the president of Femia and also managing director of Bombardier Transportation in Mexico, said that until signing up to Wassenaar, Mexican companies had been barred from the military aviation market. Currently, Mexico ranks 15^th in the world league of aerospace suppliers. Femia expects Mexico to be in the top 10 in the next decade.

Guadalajara: On 30 January President Felipe Calderón announced that Guadalajara had been chosen as Mexico’s City for Digital Creativity (Ciudad Creativa Digital). The aim is to create a hub of  digital, art, design and training companies. The government hopes that the hub will dominate the digital market for the Spanish speaking world, with US$10bn in investment in companies located in the hub and the creation of 25,000 jobs . The hub is backed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and 20 other universities. The anchor investors are the Walt Disney Company, Sony Corporation and Time Warner.

Guadalajara was chosen from 11 other Mexican cities. The construction of the 180 hectare site is due to start in August. It will be based around the Parque Morelos, in the centre of the city, and will include, besides office space, theatre sets for the media industry.

The governor of Jalisco, Emilio González, who presided over the hugely successful (and peaceful) Panamerican Games last October, said that the project would make Guadalajara the “Hollywood of the digital arts.”

Capital flight: Since 1970, US$872bn has been illegally shipped from Mexico to other countries, according to a new report by a US research group, Global Financial Integrity (GFI). This is equivalent to 5.2% of Mexico’s GDP between 1970 and 2010. As GFI’s president Raymond Baker observed, the estimate is probably on the conservative side. The GFI argues that the bulk (74%) of the money was transferred either by under-reporting exports or over-reporting imports.

Drug Trafficking Organizations tend not to use the trade account to launder their money so the actual financial loss to Mexico could easily be over US$1 trillion over the 40 year period, according to the GFI.

The GFI ranks Mexico second, behind China, and above Russia, in its list of capital flight countries.

Baker claimed that in 1970 capital flight in Mexico amounted to about US$1bn a year. In 2010, he said, it was worth US$68.5bn. The record year for capital flight was 2007, when US$97bn went missing, on GFI estimates. In GDP terms, the worst year was 1995, when 12.7% of GDP was lost. The GFI argues that the implementation of Nafta in1994 increased capital flight dramatically. From 1970 to 1994 the average loss to capital flight was 4.6% of GDP; after Nafta took effect (leading to a huge expansion of Mexico-US trade), the figure rose to 6.3%.

Baker suggested that the simplest way to curb the flow would be for the US and Mexico to share tax information. He noted that the US and Canada already share tax information.

SECURITY | More big drug seizures. On 27 May Panama’s police announced that the national aeronaval service (Senan) had confiscated 2.7 tonnes (t) of cocaine two days earlier in Caribbean waters of the indigenous Guna Yala Comarca (an indigenous political administrative region) on the border with Colombia. According to the local press, the drugs were being transported in a go-fast boat by five people who managed to get away. This is the second major drug seizure in just over a week after Senan announced on 20 May that it had confiscated 2.4t drugs in an operation which took place on 17 May in the Caribbean coastal province of Colón. Meanwhile, on 24 May Costa Rica’s judicial investigation agency (OIJ) announced the seizure of a tonne of cocaine following an operation carried out in the Caribbean waters, in the area of Westfalia, in Limón province. This also follows other recent significant seizures and drugs-related arrests in Costa Rica. These include the announcement on 19 May by the Costa Rican authorities that a Costa Rican national had been picked up on the Peñas Blancas border crossing with Nicaragua for attempting to smuggle 406kg of cocaine in a van.

HONDURAS-EL SALVADOR | New dispute in the Gulf of Fonseca. On 31 August, Flag Day in Honduras, Honduran defence ministry officials and members of the armed forces squeezed into Conejo island in the Gulf of Fonseca — an outcrop of less than one square kilometre — and staged a ‘symbolic’ ceremony of raising the Honduran flag.  The government of El Salvador, which claims the island as its own but has no presence there, dashed off a note of protest, reiterating its claim on the strength of the fact that the 1992 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) which settled long-lasting boundary disputes ‘never questioned Salvadorean sovereignty over Conejo island.’

Honduran foreign relations minister, Mireya Agüero, promptly replied in a note rejecting ‘El Salvador’s new pretensions to Conejo island’ which she described as ‘groundless and specious’. Agüero added that Conejo island had never been in dispute before the ICJ and that El Salvador had indirectly sought to take possession’ [of it] by asking the ICJ to review its dispositions regarding one sector of the gulf, a request that was turned down in 2003.

EL SALVADOR | ‘Link with Sinaloa/Pacífico cartel’. Headlines began to buzz in August with the claim that a United Nations (UN) study had confirmed the existence of links between the Mexican Sinaloa/Pacífico cartel and Los Perrones, a local gang believed to have been disrupted, though a former police chief said in April 2012 that there were indications that it might be regrouping.

The study in question was a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Unodc) report issued last September, entitled Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment. In a brief synopsis it describes Los Perrones as ‘simply a shipping company gone criminal, providing the vehicles and the drivers to move a wide range of contraband, including drugs’ and lists among its relations ‘alliances with Mexican criminal organisations, in particular the Cartel del Pacífico’.

GUATEMALA | New broom at Cicig. Former Colombian judge Iván Velázquez has been appointed new head of Cicig, the UN-backed anti-impunity commission set up in 2007. His predecessor, the Costa Rican former prosecutor Francisco Dall'Anese, who had resigned for personal reasons back in May, took leave of the post on 22 August, after presenting Cicig’s sixth report. In it he claims that since 2007 the proportion of unpunished crimes had fallen from 93% to 70% — which means that Velázquez will still have plenty to do in the two remaining years of Cicig’s mandate.

GUATEMALA | Élite force to control drugs route. The Fuerza de Tareas Maya (FTM), an élite force established a year ago, formed by selected national police agents and military officers, began to operate on 31 August from headquarters in the old military base of Santa Ana Berlín, in the western department of Quetzaltenango. Its task will be to monitor and act against drug traffickers operating along the Pacific coast and on the overland passages to Mexico. The FTM will have a forward intelligence centre in Ayutla, in the border department of San Marcos. The US has provided assistance and advice to the new unit, as well as donated vehicles and communications equipment.

The launch of the electoral campaign of Uruguay’s small Partido Independiente (PI) would not normally elicit too much interest. There is every chance, however, that the PI could soon play a pivotal role in Uruguayan politics; actively courted by the country’s three principal parties, the left-wing Frente Amplio (FA) and the right-wing Partido Colorado (PC; Colorados) and Partido Nacional (PN; Blancos).

Pablo Mieres, the leader of the PI, launched his presidential candidacy for the party on 17 November, ahead of elections in October 2014. Speaking at a national convention at the Platense Patín club, Mieres stressed that the party would be striving to win “the key” to congress in the next 2015-2020 session. This is not as far-fetched as it seems. It is obviously essential for Mieres to try and assert the political relevance of the PI but he has a valid point: the FA won just a wafer-thin majority in both chambers of congress in the last elections when the PI doubled its representation from one to two deputies in the lower chamber; if the PI were to double its representation again, which would almost certainly entail picking up a senate seat too, then the PI could well hold the decisive vote in both chambers. 

“I declare war on the absolute majority to create a country where we can debate,” Mieres said, while arguing that the main issue at stake was not whether the Blancos or Colorados finished second but whether the PI could deny the FA an absolute majority. Presenting the PI as “the other Left” in an effort to attract disillusioned FA voters, Mieres accused the ruling coalition of elevating “party discipline” above “respect for the constitution” – “and this is terrible”.

Mieres was alluding to a string of laws approved by the FA congressional majority which have been struck down by the supreme court this year: land tax, a law invalidating the ‘Ley de Caducidad’ amnesty law and, most recently, its proposal to address the bankruptcy of the Pluna airline. He also denounced growing clientelism within the government and a corrosive culture of ‘jobs for the boys’.

Después de la inesperada victoria del Vicepresidente Juan Carlos Varela en la elección presidencial del 4 de mayo [IL-14-18], las negociaciones entre su opositor Partido Panameñista (PPA) y el otro principal partido de la oposición, el Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), ya están en marcha. Un acuerdo de algún tipo parece que será esencial para Varela cuando asuma el 1 de julio, dado que su PPA (como parte de la alianza El Pueblo Primero [EPP] que incluye al pequeño Partido Popular [PP]) parece que solamente tendrá 13 bancas en la nueva legislatura unicameral de 71 miembros.

Mientras que las autoridades electorales aún deben anunciar los resultados legislativos finales, la prensa local informó el 7 de mayo que de las siete bancas que aún están siendo disputadas (todas en el distrito San Miguelito de la provincia de Panamá), tres irán para la alianza Unidos Por Más Cambios (UPMC) del  Presidente Ricardo Martinelli (que conforman su partido Cambio Democrático [CD] y el pequeño partido, Molirena) y una para el EPP. Esto significa que la UPMC tendrá 33 bancas en la nueva legislatura, faltándole solamente tres para controlarla, mientras que el PRD tendrá 24 y el EPP, 13.

Teniendo en cuentas las hostiles relaciones entre Martinelli y Varela, después del rompimiento de la alianza PPA-CD en agosto del 2011 [IL-11-35], Varela se ha acercado al tradicional rival del PPA, el PRD, llamando por teléfono al derrotado candidato del partido, Juan Carlos Navarro, el 9 de mayo. El mismo día, Navarro, cuyo PRD ahora aparece débil habiendo registrado uno de sus peores desempeños en una elección a pesar de permanecer como el partido más grande de Panamá, emitió una declaración confirmando su voluntad de entrar en conversaciones con el nuevo gobierno con relación a una agenda legislativa nacional.

Aún falta por verse si estas negociaciones se traducirán en puestos en el gabinete. Hasta ahora, Varela ha confirmado la designación de tres ministros –cancillería, interior, y economía & finanzas, todos los cuales son sus aliados. Continuando la tradición por la cual el Vicepresidente también es el canciller (un puesto que Varela retuvo hasta que el acuerdo con el CD se desplomo), la Vicepresidenta electa, Isabel Saint Malo, asumirá este cargo. Una independiente y experta consultora del programa de desarrollo de la ONU (PNUD), Saint Malo actuó como embajadora suplente de Panamá ante la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) bajo el gobierno del PPA de Guillermo Endara (1989-1994) y es conocida como una figura que construye consensos –por ejemplo, ella jugó un rol en el diálogo nacional en el 2010 dirigido a abordar la crisis causada por la aprobación (y subsecuente rechazo) de una ley que hubiera debilitado la legislación sindical y medioambiental.

Un importante miembro del PPA, Dulcidio de la Guardia, encabezará la cartera de economía & finanzas, habiendo servido como viceministro de finanzas bajo Martinelli hasta que, como Varela, fue reemplazado después de la ruptura del pacto PPA-CD. Varela también designó como ministro del interior al presidente del PP, Milton Henríquez, hermano del actual ministro de la presidencia y vicepresidente del gobernante CD, Roberto Henríquez. Una de las tareas clave del nuevo ministro del interior será supervisar el proceso para convocar a una asamblea constituyente que Varela ha considerado necesaria para estimular la transparencia y fortalecer las instituciones del país (ver abajo). El Presidente Martinelli, notablemente, ha dado su respaldo al proceso, que Varela ha dicho que comenzará en julio del 2015.

Otro envión para Varela

El Presidente electo, Juan Carlos Varela, ha podido reclamar otro triunfo más –la alcaldía de la Ciudad de Panamá– el segundo mayor puesto político del país (de los 3,4m de personas que conforman la población nacional según el censo del 2010, 1,7m está concentrada en la capital y sus alrededores). Después de una cerrada contienda, un diputado nacional del PPA, José Isabel Blandón, derrotó a José Luis Fábrega, un diputado nacional del PRD, por 35,69% - 34,4%. La actual alcalde, Roxana Méndez, del gobernante CD, ocupó el tercer lugar, logrando el 29,2% de los votos. Sin embargo, Blandón no tendrá las cosas fáciles en el cargo, dado que de las 23 bancas del consejo municipal, 10 fueron para el PRD, ocho para CD, y sólo cinco para el PPA.

• Asamblea constituyente

De acuerdo con la constitución de Panamá de 1972, una asamblea constituyente puede ser convocada por el ejecutivo (si es ratificado por una mayoría absoluta en la legislatura); la legislatura (con dos tercios de los votos); o ciudadanos locales apoyados por un documento firmado por el 20% del electorado tal como está registrado hasta el 31 de diciembre del año previo. Las autoridades electorales entonces tendrán entre tres y seis meses después de recibir el pedido formal para convocar la asamblea, que se compone de 60 delegados quienes pueden ser independientes o miembros de partidos políticos. La asamblea constituyente tendrá entonces entre seis y nueve meses para elaborar los cambios constitucionales que luego serán votados en un referéndum nacional.

ARGENTINA | Hallan depósito de gas natural no-convencional en Mendoza. El 2 de junio, la compañía petrolera controlada por el Estado Argentino, Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), anunció el descubrimiento de un depósito de ‘tight gas’ (gas de baja permeabilidad) en Paso de las Bardas Norte, una concesión de un área de 125kms2 localizada en el sur de la provincia de Mendoza.

El ‘tight gas’ es usualmente hallado atrapado en arenisca o piedra caliza, y es considerado convencionalmente como distinto al gas de esquistos bituminosos; sin embargo, ambos recursos necesitan fracturación hidráulica (un método para liberar el gas atrapado en las rocas) para ser extraído. YPF estimó el tamaño del depósito, hallado a 2,7kms de profundidad, dentro de una formación rocosa, en 70.000 metros cúbicos (m3). Si estas estimaciones son confirmadas, incrementarían el nivel de las reservas de hidrocarburos de Mendoza un 10%.

Además, la firma destacó que potencialmente también pueden existir reservas de petróleo de esquistos bituminosos en el depósito. La concesión de Paso de las Bardas Norte es exclusivamente de YPF, que también posee infraestructura completa para la producción de gas (unidades de separación y compresión, junto con un gasoducto) en el lugar.

La recientemente re-nacionalizada YPF, la mayor productora de petróleo y gas en la Argentina, está apuntando a incrementar su producción de gas natural un 14% este año. El principal sitio de extracción de gas de la compañía es el depósito de hidrocarburos de esquistos de Vaca Muerta, en la provincia sureña de Neuquén; pero otro depósito de ‘tight gas’ fue descubierto recientemente en la vecina provincia de Chubut.

Los intentos de Argentina por revertir la constante caída en su producción interna de petróleo y gas, causada por años de sub-inversión y políticas energéticas fuertemente reguladas, hasta ahora han producido resultados mixtos. Un informe de la producción en el sector en marzo, publicado el 23 de mayo, registró una caída del 0,4% en la producción de petróleo y un magro incremento del 0,5% en la producción de gas natural, comparado con el mismo periodo del 2013. El informe también muestra que el éxito de YPF en elevar su producción de petróleo un 11% en marzo, fue insuficiente para revertir la tendencia negativa.

BRASIL | Crecimiento decepcionante. Las últimas cifras del PIB de Brasil, publicadas el 30 de mayo, muestran que el crecimiento del primer trimestre en Brasil fue de sólo un 0,2% trimestre en trimestre (y un insignificante 0,8% año en año). Los economistas del mercado han reducido agudamente su panorama para el crecimiento de Brasil este año a solamente un 1,5% de un ya anémico 1,63%, de acuerdo con el sondeo semanal de unos 100 economistas, conducido por el banco central.

La Presidenta Dilma Rousseff, hablando el 3 de junio, fue incapaz de explicar el lento crecimiento. “Uno no puede explicar por qué Brasil no está creciendo más rápido. Todas las condiciones apuntan a que Brasil no solamente está creciendo, sino creciendo bien. Acá parece haber un mal humor hacia Brasil en estos días. Yo no sé por qué”.

URUGUAY | Crecen las exportaciones. Uruguay exportó US$1,12mm en bienes y servicios en mayo, un incremento del 7,8% sobre el mismo mes del año pasado, de acuerdo con el último informe del instituto nacional de promoción de las inversiones y las exportaciones, Uruguay XXI, publicado el 3 de junio. La cifra de exportaciones de mayo lleva el valor total de las exportaciones del país (excluyendo las destinadas a las zonas de libre comercio) en los primeros cinco meses del año a US$4mm, lo que representa un incremento del 5% sobre el mismo periodo del 2013.

Entre enero y mayo, la principal materia prima de exportación de Uruguay fue la soja, que representó el 23% de todas las exportaciones, seguida por la carne congelada (11%); leche y cremas (5,7%); arroz (5,4%); y maderas sin procesamiento (4,6%). Sin embargo, el informe atribuye las fuertes cifras de exportación registradas en los primeros cinco meses del año a un significativo incremento en las exportaciones de trigo (182%), gracias a una cosecha comparativamente mejor a la del año pasado.

Los destinos principales para las exportaciones uruguayas fueron Brasil (16,2%  del total); China (14,4%); y la zona de libre comercio de Nueva Palmira, un puerto comercial localizado próximo a la boca del Río Uruguay (14,2%). Cantidades pequeñas de bienes (menos del 6%) fueron embarcadas a Venezuela, Argentina, EU, y Alemania.

En cuanto a las importaciones, el informe enfatiza que también crecieron en mayo –9,9%, para un total de US$845m– y en el periodo enero-mayo (2,9%, US$3,98mm). Hasta ahora, las principales importaciones de Uruguay este año han sido teléfonos móviles (4,4%); generadores de eléctricos (4,3%); vehículos de pasajeros (4,3%); autopartes (2,7%); y vehículos comerciales (2,6%). China, Brasil, Argentina, y EU, proveyeron la porción del león de las importaciones de Uruguay (21,8%; 17,1%; 14,8%; y 8,9%, respectivamente).

• Declina la inflación en Uruguay

La inflación de Uruguay para mayo fue del 0,32%, de acuerdo con el Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE). La inflación acumulada durante los últimos 12 meses, ahora está en un 9,18%, volviendo a caer del territorio de dobles dígitos al cual los estrategas han estado desesperadamente tratando de evitar entrar, con el ministerio de economía poniendo en marcha una serie de medidas diseñadas para frenarla, incluyendo reducciones en el Impuesto al Valor Agregado (IVA) para las frutas y vegetales; y reduciendo las tarifas de electricidad y las facturas telefónicas [IL-14-15].

Habiendo logrado sofocar la amenaza de rebelión de oficiales militares de menor rango [IL-14-19], el Presidente Evo Morales está enfrentando descontento desde dentro de las filas de otra institución de seguridad –la policía. Esta semana, en el 188^vo aniversario del establecimiento de la policía, su Asociación Nacional de Suboficiales, Sargentos, Clases y Policías (Anssclapol), emitió un ultimátum al gobierno de Morales para que solucione las quejas de ya larga data con relación a los bajos salarios. Sin duda, decidido a evitar una repetición de la revuelta policial del 2012, Morales está bajo fuerte presión para actuar antes de las elecciones generales de octubre.

La ceremonia para celebrar el aniversario el 22 de junio, a la que asistieron el Presidente Morales; el Vicepresidente Álvaro García Linera; el ministro del interior, Carlos Romero; y el jefe de policía, el General Walter Villarpando, vio al gobierno reiterar su compromiso con la institución –especialmente importante dado que la seguridad ciudadana permanece como una importante preocupación de los votantes. Anunciando la entrega de equipos, incluidos 80 vehículos para patrullaje, Romero dijo a los periodistas que el gobierno estaba invirtiendo aproximadamente B$2,2m (US$318m) al año en la seguridad ciudadana. Él dijo que entre el 2006 (el año que Morales asumió el poder) y el 2013, el gobierno había entregado más de 955 vehículos y 1.6243 motocicletas a la policía (que cuenta con unos 36.602 oficiales) –lo que representa una inversión de B$42m (US$6m), subiendo de 265 vehículos y 200 motocicletas entregadas entre 1999 y el 2005.

Aún así, el líder de la Anssclapol, Pedro Ticona, conto una historia diferente, diciendo a los periodistas que la institución está en un punto bajo, con oficiales de policía declarándose a sí mismos en un “estado de emergencia” dos semanas antes, debido al fracaso del gobierno en abordar las demandas salariales. Según informes de la prensa local, los oficiales de policía recién ingresados al servicio reciben un salario mensual de B$1.800 (US$256), el cual Anssclapol se queja que es mucho menor que el de sus pares militares, los cuales Anssclapol desde hace tiempo se queja que son favorecidos por Morales.

Específicamente, los oficiales de la policía están pidiendo B$400 (US$58) adicionales por mes para sus necesidades básicas –una demanda que fue presentada al ejecutivo y al comando de la policía. Esto sigue al anuncio en abril (en momentos del malestar militar) de un acuerdo entre el gobierno y Anssclapol para incrementar las expensas diarias de alimentos para los oficiales de policía a B$7 (US$1), subiendo de B$4,50 (US$0,65). Ticona inició una huelga de hambre el 23 de junio, quejándose de que “han pasado dos años y acá no hay nada que celebrar” –una referencia a los motines montados por la policía en el 2012 en demanda de mejores salarios y condiciones [IL-12-25]. Anssclapol está amenazando con tomar acción si el gobierno no actúa antes del 26 de junio.

Morales saluda el creciente progreso sobre la coca

El 23 de junio la Oficina de las Naciones Unidas sobre Drogas y Delitos (Unodc) difundió su sondeo anual sobre el cultivo de coca en Bolivia, que revela que el área total cultivada en el 2013 fue de 23.000 hectáreas (ha), un caída del 9% con relación al 2012 y la menor área de cultivo desde el 2002.

El informe muestra que las dos áreas principales de cultivo de coca –Los Yungas y el Chapare (que en conjunto representan al 99% del área de cultivo de coca)– registraron una caída del 7% y del 12% respectivamente, de 16.900ha a 15.700ha, y de 8.100 a 7.100ha. El resto del área inspeccionada, en las provincias de Norte de La Paz, vio incluso una caída más aguda del 28%, de 320ha a 230ha.

En el 2013, la cantidad de hoja de coca comercializada en los dos mercados autorizados –Villa Fátima y Sabaca– pesó 19.150 toneladas (t), equivalente al 53% del total de la producción de hoja de coca, creyéndose que el resto fue destinado al narcotráfico. Comparado con 2012, las incautaciones de hojas de coca cayeron un 36% a 476t; la pasta base de cocaína un 37% a 20t; y la cocaína clorhídrica un 62% a 1,6t. También, entre el 2012 y el 2013, el número de fábricas de pasta de cocaína destruidas se elevó un 34% a 5.930; los laboratorios de cocaína clorhídrica  un 81%, a 67; y las instalaciones de reciclamiento de precursores químicos un 32%, a 50.

• MDS-UN concretan un acuerdo

El 17 de junio el Movimiento Demócrata Social (MDS) – que comprende al remanente del bloque de oposición de los gobernadores departamentales, el Consejo Nacional Democrático (Conalde)– y la Unidad Nacional (UN), liderada por el magnate del cemento, Samuel Doria Medina, anunciaron una alianza electoral antes de las elecciones de octubre. La nueva alianza –que será conocida como la Concertación de la Unidad Demócrata (CUD)– no incluye al otro principal partido de oposición, el izquierdista Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM), liderado por el ex alcalde de La Paz, Juan del Granado (2000-2010), a pesar de conversaciones iniciales de una alianza de tres vías. Bajo el acuerdo, la CUD presentará a Doria Medina como su candidato presidencial y el ex gobernador departamental de Beni, Ernesto Suárez, como su compañero de fórmula.

HONDURAS | TLC con Perú es ratificado. El 23 de septiembre el congreso nacional unicameral de Honduras ratificó el Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) que el gobierno liderado por el Presidente Juan Orlando Hernández firmó con su par de Perú en mayo. La ratificación del TLC allana el camino para que Honduras se una al bloque comercial de la Alianza del Pacífico. Una de las condiciones para un irse a la Alianza del Pacífico –actualmente compuesta de Perú, Colombia, Chile, y México– es que cualquier potencial socio tenga en vigencia TLCs con todos sus estados miembros.

Honduras, un país observador de la Alianza del Pacífico, expresó su interés en unirse como miembro pleno poco después de que Hernández asumiera el poder en enero del 2014. Dado que Honduras ya tiene TLCs con todos los otros miembros de la Alianza del Pacífico, esta condición ahora ha sido cumplida y Honduras podría unirse a Costa Rica en formalmente presentar una solicitud para convertirse en un nuevo miembro del bloque.

Una declaración de la legislatura hondureña expresa que el acuerdo fue ratificado luego de dos debates. Señalando que el acuerdo inmediatamente eliminará las tarifas sobre 99% de los productos hondureños exportados a Perú y del 81% de todos los productos peruanos exportados a Honduras (siendo eliminadas todas las tarifas durante los próximos 10 años), la declaración agrega que este acuerdo representa una herramienta para promover el comercio bilateral entre Perú y Honduras [que] buscará beneficiar a pequeñas y medianas empresas [Pymes], las cuales constantemente están buscando nuevos mercados para sus productos con valor agregado”.

El año pasado, el comercio bilateral llegó a los US$47m, con Honduras embarcando US$8m de productos a Perú.

COSTA RICA | La economía va bien. La economía de Costa Rica creció un 3,5% en la segunda mitad del 2015, de acuerdo con un informe difundido por el banco central (BCCR) esta semana. El BCCR dijo que el crecimiento económico podría ser atribuido a un fuerte desempeño en los sectores de la construcción y de transporte & comunicaciones.

El BCCR informó que el sector de la construcción se expandió un 17,2% año en año; el sector de transporte & comunicaciones creció un 5,3% sobre el mismo periodo del año pasado; y los servicios financieros y de seguros creció un 7,1%.

En el aspecto negativo, el sector de la agricultura se contrajo un -1,3% año en año en la segunda mitad, y las manufacturas un -1%.

El 30 de julio, el BCCR recortó su anual pronóstico de crecimiento del PIB para Costa Rica, de un 3,4% a un 2,8% para el 2015.