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Local economists now expect Panama's economy to grow strongly over the next four years, with foreign direct investment of at least US$20bn over this period. Optimists expect GDP growth of 9.2% this year, 13% in 2012, 11% in 2013 and then a slump to 4.9% in 2014. Such fast rates of growth are likely to create bottlenecks, especially in the labour market, which in turn may lead to higher-than-expected inflation. The other big inflation risk is that oil prices will rise.

The bulls reckon that inflation this year will be 3.8% rising to 4.5% in 2012 before falling back to under 4% thereafter. Even so this is high for Panama where inflation averaged 1.3% between 1997 and 2006. The strong growth should transform public finances. Debt as percentage of GDP should fall from 44% in 2010 to 30% in 2014. Debt in cash terms is around US$11bn.

The government is not as bullish. The deputy economy minister, Frank De Lima, forecasts GDP growth this year of 7.5%, bringing GDP to US$26.7bn. The government is also forecasting growth of only 7% between 2011 and 2015. De Lima is also committed to keeping the fiscal deficit under 2% of GDP.

Argentina's President Néstor Kirchner has discovered over the last month that he cannot call time on his battle to eliminate corruption just because it suits him. Just when the president was happy to settle for seeing four members of the supreme court expelled on charges of abuse of power, the chamber of deputies has started impeachment proceedings against a fifth judge, Antonio Boggiano.

Unfinished business
On 7 October the chamber of deputies' commission of political justice charged Boggiano with 11 cases of misconduct. These were the same cases they had brought against the previous four judges to have been forced out: Julio Nazareno, Eduardo Moliné O'Connor, Guillermo López and Adolfo Vázquez. All five belonged to the so-called 'automatic majority' bloc within the court that was loyal to former president Carlos Menem and was renowned for corruption.

While Kirchner was the driving force behind these previous prosecutions, however, he had made no noises about Boggiano and when the impeachment was announced he was far from happy. Kirchner does not want Boggiano to leave for a number of reasons. First, because Kirchner has already had difficulty finding replacements for the judges he has already forced out. Only two new judges have so far taken their seats on the court, with the result that the body has not been working at its full capacity. Kirchner will not relish having to find a fifth new judge. Secondly, the president views Boggiano as different from the judges whom he has forced out. Boggiano is a respected academic who has strong links to the church, and Kirchner believes he could be a very useful ally.

The president's worries are of no relevance to the deputies involved in the impeachment proceedings, however. They have said that not to go after Boggiano would represent major negligence on their part, regardless of how inconvenient the case might prove for the government, given he is as responsible as his now notorious former allies.

However, the government might yet be spared the hassle of finding a replacement. Justice Minister Horacio Rosatti admitted on 27 September that the government is analysing far-reaching reforms to the supreme court. It is chiefly is considering two major questions: how to reduce the number of cases the court has to deal with, and whether to reduce the size of the supreme court. It is this first issue that is regarded as the most important, however. The supreme court has long complained that it spends far too much time dealing with cases which could be dealt with by lower courts. The government wants to reform the judicial system so that the supreme court becomes the equivalent of the constitutional courts present in a number of Latin American countries, leaving it free to deal with major issues such as the scrapping of amnesties for those responsible for crimes against humanity committed during the 1976-1983 military government.

Compensation for Dirty War exile

The supreme court ruled on 14 October that the state should pay compensation to Susana Yofre de Vaca Nervaja, who fled Argentina during the 1976-1983 dictatorship after her husband and son were killed by the military. This landmark ruling could pave the way for a flood of such claims: between 10,000 and 50,000 Argentines are believed to have fled during the military government, but until now the state was only obliged to compensate those who left the country after being imprisoned by the junta.

Over 150 people have been killed following simultaneous riots in prisons in the state of São Paulo between 12 and 16 May. The violence spread to the streets, with gangs attacking buses, banks, government buildings and police headquarters. The police retaliated with a brutal counteroffensive. As expected, the violence provoked a public debate, but once again the wrong questions are being addressed. Instead politicians seem satisfied to fling their customary accusations of blame.

At least 150 people lost their lives and several were left wounded following numerous street-attacks by gangs of criminals and synchronised riots in São Paulo's state prisons. The Brazilian media described the riots as the worst wave of organised crime in the country's history and compared São Paulo to Baghdad. Crucially, the violence seen in the streets of São Paulo underlined the weakness of Brazil's internal-security apparatus, prompting fears that other synchronised gang attacks may happen and spread all over the country. 

This time most of the violence centred in the metropolitan region of the state's capital. Yet - worryingly - inmates in jails in five other states also staged mutinies "in solidarity" with their fellow prisoners. Schools as well as shops (including shopping centres) closed. Buses and trains did not function normally, leaving 5m people without transport and creating a 212 km-long traffic jam on 15 May. The city's domestic airport closed for two hours following an anonymous bomb threat. Most bars and restaurants did not open in the evening as paulistas decided to live under a curfew.

The PCC

The violence was triggered after inmates discovered that the state's government was planning to transfer hundreds of members of the criminal faction Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), including its leader, Marcos Willians Herbas Camacho who is better known as Marcola, to a high-security prison away from the capital. The transfer, however, was delayed by Brazil's bureaucratic court proceedings and by appeals made by lawyers representing PCC members. 

More embarrassingly, it has now been confirmed that the PCC was alerted by Marcola's lawyers about the transfer plans after they bribed a congressional employee to record the secret testimony given by public-security authorities from São Paulo to a congressional committee investigating guns-trafficking. The two lawyers denied the allegations, but the employee told the police that he handed the recording of the testimony to them after taking R$200 (US$90). 

Upon receiving the information, captive PCC leaders used their mobile phones to start the mutinies and tell reporters that the rebellions were being carried out in protest against the breach of their constitutional rights. This reveals the PCC's uniqueness among other Brazilian criminal gangs: its political appeal. The gang's aim, its leaders state, is to "humanise" Brazil's prison system. The PCC takes monthly payments from its free members to assist captive members with lawyers and aid their relatives; and even, according to some reports, to fund law students in return for a commitment to represent the PCC.

Wrong questions addressed and accusations

One could say that the riots had a positive side: it brought violence back into the public arena after it had been brushed aside in the last twelve months by the corruption scandals embroiling the government and congress. Yet, once again, the authorities seem to be addressing the wrong issues while the press is failing to bring them to the surface, playing the politicians' game instead. 

The first day after the situation was brought under control showed politicians presenting a united front against crime. The senate rushed to approve a bill to combat organised gangs, ranging from obvious measures such as the prohibition of mobile phones in prisons to the creation of a special federal unit to investigate corruption inside the Brazilian penal system. Also, prisoners may now have their assets seized and the state will be allowed to use them to pay for damages caused during future uprisings.

Very quickly, the debate turned into mutual accusations of blame, revealing that Brazilian politicians continue to be more interested in exploiting the public-security issue for electoral gains rather than to get together to address the real causes of violence. Human rights groups rightly assessed the situation: the Brazilian penal system is overcrowded, inefficient and corrupt. While the prison population has more than doubled in the last ten years, prison facilities are not being built. It is estimated that currently there are 35% more inmates than space in Brazil's jails. It is not hard then to see why the PCC has prospered as a criminal fraternity devoted to improving conditions in the prisons. 

They also argue that despite Brazil's tough laws, courts are very lenient. Authorities do not set a good example by failing to prosecute white-collar crimes. For instance, all the 40 or so accused who were arrested by the federal police recently in connexion with a corruption scheme with the connivance of congressmen were ordered to be freed. At the same time, poor petty-criminals are sent to jail and - with no other real option - quickly fall under the influence of violent criminals. Yet instead of trying to address these questions the federal government and the opposition-led government of São Paulo preferred to exchange accusations. President Lula da Silva started by publicly suggesting that his main contender in the October presidential elections, the former governor of São Paulo Geraldo Alckmin, had left the state's penal system in chaos. Alckmin's answer was swift, reminding Lula that the federal government slashed the resources allocated for public-security spending in São Paulo (from R$223m in 2002 to R$29.6m last year). 

The public spat continued with the minister of institutional relations, Tarso Genro, accusing the government of São Paulo of rejecting the federal government's proposal to send a national force to halt the riots and of "preferring to negotiate with criminals" instead. Genro referred to reports that the authorities had reached an agreement with PCC leaders to stop the violence (it indeed stopped almost simultaneously at 4pm on 15 May, only a couple of hours after a meeting between authorities and PCC leaders). The rumours have been denied by São Paulo's authorities, who pointed out that the federal government's offer could not be fulfilled since the national force does not exist and troops would have to be pulled from the police of other states, leaving a dangerous security vacuum.

Lula is well-placed to benefit from the riots. Despite the 50% fall in the murder rate in São Paulo during Alckmin's tenure, the majority of the population believes the former governor is responsible for the violence. Even the PCC believes so, declaring on its blog that Alckmin's heavy-handed line against prisoners lead to the rebellions, and instructed its members to vote for Lula in October. The latest opinion poll published by Sensus on 24 May shows that the violence has indeed helped Lula: support for him increased from 37.5% in April to 40.4%, while Alckmin lost 1.9% support, which stands now at 18.7%. 

Meanwhile authorities in São Paulo admitted that only 79 of the 110 suspects killed by the police in the riots had "known connections" with organised crime. The human rights' NGO Movimento Nacional de Direitos Humanos says at least 30 people were assassinated by police death squads avenging the deaths of their colleagues. In one case, 12 young men with no criminal record were killed by "heavily-armed men dressed like ninjas" suspected of being police.

The economy grew by 4.8%, year-on-year, in the second quarter. The growth figures were overshadowed, however, by the anti-inflation policies announced by the economy and finance minister, Danilo Astori. These have already triggered labour unrest.

In the first quarter, year-on-year growth was 6.9%. Quarter-on-quarter, growth in the April to June period was only 0.7% higher than growth in the first quarter. The quarter-on-quarter growth rate in the first quarter had been twice as fast, 1.4%. 

The change in the economy is occurring in agriculture. In the first six months it was flat compared to the same period of 2006. Quarter-by -quarter, there was a 1.9% year-on-year drop in the first quarter followed by a 1.6% year-on-year rise in the second quarter. What has been happening is that there is a structural change going on in the sector: farmers are switching from stock raising into arable farming. They have been lured by the high international prices for grains and oilseeds. Farmers are also cutting back on rice. The biggest increases are in soya, wheat, maize and sorghum. 

Inflation: In August the rate was 1.73%, double the July rate of 0.83%. 

 

The government has been stung by criticism that it has not been working on an anti-crisis plan. It says that it has devised a four-phase plan, the product of six months of planning.  It published the plan, which it said called for extra spending of US$1.48bn, in mid-February. 

According to the finance minister, Dionisio Borda, the first phase, which was implemented in October 2008, was to provide extra monetary resources to the economy.

The second phase formed part of the budget. The government's main priority for 2009 is to promote employment. It will do this by expanding its public works programme. A related anti-poverty programme is focused on supporting 120,000 of the poorest households.

The third element in the plan is to line up financing for an anticipated US$300m fiscal deficit in 2009. The government expects to complete this financing either in March or April. So far, it has secured US$50m. The hope is that the IDB will provide the rest. Borda admits that unless the government secures additional loans it will run out of cash by May 2009. The vice president, Federico Franco, estimates that this year's deficit could end up at US$500m.

The fourth phase is to respond to congressional calls to secure funding for a further US$105m in short term projects. Of this, US$37.5m would go to “family-owned farms", US$10m to boost exports and US$42m on education. 

On 1 November, the president-elect Dilma Rousseff unveiled the main players in her transition team, which will oversee the handover process. The new cabinet won't be announced until mid or late November, after Dilma's trips with President Lula da Silva to the G-20 summit in Seoul and the next Union of South American Nations (Unasur) heads of state meeting in Guyana. Lula appears to be playing a close advisory role, to the extent of 'recommending' certain appointments, immediately prompting opposition sniping that Dilma is nothing but a stopgap until Lula's return in 2014.

Dilma's campaign manager, Antônio Palocci (Lula's first finance minister), who stood at her side during her victory speech on 31 October, was appointed to lead the transition team, along with the PT president, José Eduardo Dutra. Fernando Pimentel, a former mayor of Belo Horizonte and close to Dilma for decades, was asked to coordinate the institutional side of things along with Palocci.   Dutra and the PT secretary general, deputy José Eduardo Cardozo, is the liason officer for the 10 coalition parties. Marco Aurélio Garcia, Lula's foreign affairs advisor, was tasked with overseeing international relations. Others include Clara Ant, Lula's discreet former personal secretary. The team will have a budget of R$2.8m and a staff of 50 to 31 December.

A couple of things were immediately obvious. First, the team, which Dilma described as an “onion", is comprised at the innermost layer of her and President Lula da Silva's closest associates. However, these associates don't necessarily hail from the core of the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT).

Second, neither did it initially include anyone from the main coalition Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB). The PMDB vice president-elect, Michel Temer, initially took this on the chin, saying that he was at Dilma's disposal, but it soon became clear that Temer, a veteran political baron and the PMDB party president, wasn't happy. Temer is an interesting figure   - he promises to be the most powerful VP in some time in Brazil (Lula's VP since 2003, José Alencar, has been plagued with serious ill health). He will certainly be central to keeping the PMDB on side in congress and in the senate.

On 2 November, amid rumblings from the PMDB, José Eduardo Dutra and Temer sat down to iron out these early wrinkles. Hours earlier, Dilma had corrected her first mistake and belatedly invited Temer to play a key role in the transition team.

The two men apparently also agreed a deal whereby the PT and the PMDB will rotate the much coveted presidency of the lower house from 2011- taking two years each. There is method in this manouevre - not only does the PT want to avoid 'friendly fire' from its main coalition partner; both parties are also fearful that other coalition partners, led by the Partido Socialista Brasileiro (PSB), could mount a challenge to their hegemony within the coalition and potentially even challenge them for the lower house leadership.

It's unclear which party will take the first rotation from February 2011, when the newly elected senators and deputies take up their seats. The PT will argue, as per traditition,   that as the largest party it should have first dibs. In February this year, Lula imposed a political deal (over the PT) allowing the PMDB to assume the presidency of both houses, in return for its support of Dilma for the 2010 race. The PMDB, Brazil's largest political party and its traditional kingmaker, then also insisted on fielding Dilma's running mate. Temer was not Lula's preferred choice - he is too powerful, but he had no option but to acquiesce.

The PMDB, which has six ministries currently, including the all important energy ministry, is fully expecting key portfolios in the new government. However it didn't do as well as the PT in the elections - it lost 11 seats in the lower house, where the PT is now the largest party (with 88 seats to the PMDB's 79), and so its bargaining power has been slightly reduced. This has never deterred the mercurial PMDB. Ahead of the meeting between Temer and Dutra, there were rumours that Temer was already courting the opposition Democratas (DEM) from across the floor in a bid to secure sufficient votes to take the house leadership, prompting a countermove by the PT to round up the other coalition partners to stop it.

However, the PMDB is still the biggest party in the senate (taking 20 seats, a gain of three over 2006) and so presumably it will retain its upper house leadership. The current senate president, José Sarney, has said he's not interested in staying on.The PMDB will govern five states from 2011, including Rio de Janeiro (where the popular Sergio Cabral was re-elected) and the two Matto Grossos.

The PSB is one to watch moving forward. It did well this year, electing six governors, 35 federal deputies and four senators, which will give it more leverage within the coalition. Along with its traditional allies the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT, 28 seats) and the Partido Comunista do Brasil (PCdob, 15 seats) it can field 77 votes. Adding in other smaller parties like the Partido Trabalhista do Brasil (PTB) and the Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro (PRTB), it could challenge both the PT and the PMDB. Key PSB figures include: Ciro Gomes, once touted as Lula's heir and now touted for an official position under the new Dilma government; Eduardo Campos, party president and the re-elected governor of Pernambuco; Ricardo Coutinho, newly elected governor of Paraí­ba; and Cid Gomes, Ciro's brother and the popular re-elected governor of Ceará.

The 'shadow' president ?
The conservative press is fuelling rumours that Lula is dictating the pace in the cabinet selection process. Several press reports have suggested that he has variously recommended that Dilma leave in the place the finance minister, Guido Mantega; the central bank president, Henirque Meirelles; the education minister, Fernando Haddad; and the defence minister, Nelson Jobim. Rumour has it that he has also 'suggested' that Dilma place Antônio Palocci away from the immediate centre of power in the health ministry, for fear that he could become a threat to her. Palocci, who has good links with the PT, had been touted as a possible cabinet chief. Lula apparently also reasoned that Palocci, a do-er, might bring some much needed vim to the health portfolio, an area in which the PT administration has achieved less to date. Palocci is also tipped for a position in the part public mining giant Vale. Its current president, Roger Agnelli, long since fell out with the Lula government over official pressure on Vale after it laid off staff in the 2008 global economic crisis.

It's also rumoured that Lula wants to leave the ground nicely prepared for Dilma by using his weight to push through tricky legislation between now and the end of the year, so that she won't inherit it in January. Lula's priorities are the congressional approval of the new regulatory framework for the offshore oil sector and approval of the 2011 budget, potentially taking the decision to make politically unpopular expenditure cuts now.

He is also preparing to take a decision on the purchase of a new fleet of 36 fighter jets for some US$4.0bn-US$6.0bn. Lula has long indicated a preference for French jets, a political decision in line with his stragegic defence deal with France, but the air force is rumoured to prefer a Swedish offer (and the US is also pushing its offer). Lula will also have to take a decision on the extradition of the Italian former militant Cesare Battisti, wanted in Italy on terrorist charges.

Congress	2011	2006
PT	88	79
PMDB	79	90
PP	41	40
PR	41	41
PSB	34	27
PDT	28	23
PTB	21	22
PV	15	14
PSDB	53	59
DEM	43	56
Others	70	62
Total	513	513

Senate                                2011		2006
PMDB	20	17
PT	14	8
PP	5	1
PTB	6	7
PDT	4	6
PR	4	4
PSB	3	2
PSDB	11	16
DEM	6	13
Others	8	7
Total	81	81

   

• 'All the president's men'

Other notables in Dilma's inner circle include: her ex husband, Carlos Araújo, with whom she has a daughter (and now also a grandson); Franklin Martins, Lula's communications minister, tipped for a post at the Planalto; and Rui Falcão, PT vice president. There aren't many women in Dilma's inner circle. One is Sonia Macedo, an old childhood friend. Another is the veteran PT politician and senator elect Marta Suplicy, who may be given a role in the tourism ministry ahead   of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics.

• Media row

Lula is bequeathing Dilma a congressional bill on the proposed regulation of the electronic communications sector. His social communications minister, Franklin Martins, has drafted a reform to the existing regulatory framework which, he argues, is needed to address the advent of new digital and electronic media. Critics fear the bill is a covert effort to exert control over the new media. There are also questions over ownership - Brazilian law forbids any majority foreign participation in local media, however, many internet news sites operating in Brazil are wholly foreign-owned.

Some 150,000 anti-government demonstrators took to the streets of Guayaquil on 26 January. Although the pro-government counter-march attracted fewer than 10,000 supporters, the Gutiérrez administration had much to be grateful for; as the two opposing camps did not meet, the violence many had feared never materialised and the marches passed off peacefully. However, the marchers were keen to give notice that this was just the first of many.

Jaime Nebot, the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) mayor of Guayaquil, summoned the 'white march', so called because its aim was supposedly apolitical, to protest against the government's failure to guarantee security in the coastal city and honour its commitment to spending on health and sanitation. "Today Guayaquil's patience has come to end," said Nebot in a speech in front of the town hall. The mayor said that the demonstration was the first in a wave of protests and that marches were being organised in Quito, Cuenca, Loja and other cities.

The demonstration also allowed the city's citizens to give vent to their longstanding wish for independence; Nebot even called for the establishment of "solidary autonomy" for the provinces of Ecuador, whereby the better-off provinces would help those not so well endowed. The government immediately dismissed Nebot's "selfish" and "separatist" intentions.

The counter-demonstration was a damp squib. Around 8,000 sympathisers of the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) and the president's own Sociedad Patriótica marched a few blocks away from Nebot's protestors. The government's attempt to convene 5,000 indigenous demonstrators failed; a group of some 2,000 marched away from the others, demanding equal rights for indigenous workers in Guayaquil.

The opposition's next target is Quito on 17 February. The march, organised by the Izquierda Demócratica - the party of Quito's mayor, Paco Moncayo, - and Pachakutik, an indigenous peoples' political party, aims to attract around 300,000 protesters. Quiteños, however, have less cause for grievance than Guayaquileños and Moncayo lacks the political clout of Nebot. The demonstration is likely to be weakened further by the widening split between Conaie, the umbrella group for indigenous peoples' social organisations, and Pachakutik, its political offshoot. The new president of Conaie, Luis Macas - himself a former Pachakutik deputy, has said that his organisation will not attend the demonstration. 

"We support the march, but the country's problems are not limited to the composition of the supreme court and rotten institutions_the fundamental issues are the free-trade agreement, Plan Colombia," he said. Macas added that the indigenous organisation was worried about the increasingly violent political atmosphere in the country, saying that he had received a number of anonymous phone calls threatening him over the last few days. Indeed, over the last few months there have been a number of attacks on the property and persons of outspoken critics of the administration, yet some of the stories surrounding the assaults are so far-fetched that they appear to be the work of sloppy agent provocateurs rather than state-sponsored terrorism.

As in Guayaquil, the government intends to hold its own march on the same day as the opposition. "We are not going to wait with our arms folded while these shameless people try to destabilise our country," said Gilmar Gutiérrez, an SP deputy and brother of the president.

One of major policy differences between the two candidates for the presidency is over how the oil industry should develop. Rafael Correa, from the left, has no plans to expand the country's oil production but he does want to increase the state's share of oil output. Alvaro Noboa, from the right, is keen on the neo-liberal recipe of boosting output by attracting foreign investment. He wants to lower taxes and deregulate the industry. 

It is not clear whether Noboa would go as far as attempting to privatise the state oil company Petroecuador: only Argentina, of the region's oil exporters, has privatised the state oil company. Colombia is attempting a partial (20%) privatisation of its state oil company, Ecopetrol, while Bolivia is attempting to reverse, at least partly, the privatisation/capitalisation of its energy industry under previous governments.

The oil industry is vital to Ecuador economically. Oil exports bring in over half the country's total exports revenues and provide the government with 35% of its revenues. The oil industry is currently a mix of public and private sector investment. 

Ecuador produces around 550,000bpd of crude oil. Just over half this amount comes from the state oil company, Petroecuador. The rest comes from a dozen foreign oil companies. Petroecuador's production has been inflated recently by its annexation of the oilfields operated by the US company, Occidental. On 15 May, the government stripped Oxy of its right to the fields after Oxy broke the terms of its concession by selling a stake in the field to a Canadian company, Encana, which then sold the stake on to a Chinese company, Andes Petroleum.

Correa is on record as saying that he will renegotiate all contracts with private oil companies and conduct an audit of all firms. He claimed that the contracts were unfair because the foreign firms took 80% of earnings from the oil they produced. "That is absolutely unacceptable," Correa told foreign correspondents before the first round of the elections. "We're going to revise and renegotiate these contracts." 

Correa also claimed that foreign energy companies misled the government over the profitability of their operations in Ecuador. "The mafias of the right and the abusive multinationals, among them Spanish ones, have consistently violated the Constitution_I'm going to display the tax statements of some Spanish oil companies so they'll be seen like Mother Teresa of Calcutta, working here for free because they always declare losses." The only Spanish oil company that operates in Ecuador is Repsol-YPF.

During his brief stint as economy minister, Correa drew up legislation that forced private oil companies to deliver to the state at least 50% of their windfall oil revenues. These windfalls were produced by the surge in international oil prices. Correa said the contract renegotiations would seek to increase the state's share of the companies' production. 

He accused the oil companies of violating their contracts in Ecuador by failing to meet minimum established investment requirements, use environmentally friendly technology and comply with environmental standards. "It's not just (Occidental) that has broken its contract," Correa said. "There's a pattern of breaking contracts out of disrespect for the state by certain multinational companies."

On 1 March Colombia awoke to the news that its air force had killed Raúl Reyes, the second-in-command of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc). For a few hours the government and its many supporters celebrated the most significant single blow that the Farc has ever suffered, but this jubilation was soon replaced by concern at a rapid deterioration in Colombia's ties with Ecuador, upon whose territory Reyes was killed, and Venezuela, whose President Hugo Chávez was outraged at the incursion and at the "murder" of "a good revolutionary". Colombia responded to accusations that it had violated Ecuador's sovereignty by claiming to have discovered documents on Reyes' computer showing that both Ecuador and Venezuela were cooperating extensively with the Farc.

Surgical strike or a massacre?

Reyes, whose real name was Luis Édgar Devia Silva, was killed alongside another senior Farc leader, Guillermo Enrique Torres (alias Julián Conrado), and 15 other guerrillas at a camp almost two kilometres inside Ecuadorean territory. Two Brazilian-made Super Tucano ground attack aircraft dropped cluster bombs on the camp at 1.30 am in what the Colombian government hailed as a high-tech, high-precision operation.

The Colombian government initially lied about the nature of the raid, claiming that its plan was to bomb a Farc camp within Colombian territory. According to this version of events, the Colombian military only discovered the existence of the camp over the river in Ecuador when guerrillas at this second camp shot at helicopters who were attempting to secure the site of the first bombing, on the Colombian side of the border. The air force was then called back to launch a second bombing raid on the site in which Reyes was killed.

This is what Colombia's President Álvaro Uribe told his Ecuadorean counterpart, Rafael Correa, who took the news without too much drama. However, Correa's outlook changed completely when his own security personnel arrived in the area, replacing the Colombian forces who had stayed behind to secure the site and help remove Reyes' body. Correa was informed that the dead guerrillas were in their underwear and had obviously not been taking pot shots at distant helicopters.

"They were bombed and massacred while they slept," Correa stated, adding that there was "no hot pursuit" - Colombia's customary excuse for launching attacks across the border. "President Uribe was either ill-informed or he shamelessly lied to the Ecuadorean president," Correa averred.

It soon emerged that the latter was the case. Reyes' death was the result of an operation that had been awaiting the green light for a few days and that Uribe knew all about. A combination of radio intercepts and tip-offs had revealed

the location of Reyes' camp inside Ecuadorean territory and the Colombian military had been monitoring the site in preparation for the strike, which was delayed by poor weather in the area. One Colombian soldier was killed in the operation; he died when troops at the bomb site clashed with the surviving rebels who tried in vain to prevent Reyes' body being taken away.

Was it worth it?

Uribe's blatant violation of Ecuador's sovereignty has destabilised the Andean region and left Colombia isolated in Latin America as a whole (see page 3). His attempts to justify the attack after the event by suggesting that Ecuador was giving refuge to Reyes (see page 5) have only made matters worse and might not hold water. The storm raised by the raid begs the question of why Uribe considered Reyes worth the risk.

Reyes was the Farc's spokesperson and its most visible leader. He led the guerrilla group's negotiating team during the three-year peace process with Uribe's predecessor, Andrés Pastrana, which collapsed in 2002. He even travelled to Europe during the peace process. Moreover, he was a member of the Farc's secretariat - the guerrilla group's high command, which before his death comprised its seven most senior leaders.

Before Reyes' death, the military had never killed a member of the secretariat. The raid on 1 March therefore sent the message that no-one in the Farc is safe any more, and that the military's superior intelligence, superior weaponry, and superior technology mean that it can pick off whomsoever it chooses.

This is only part true. There is little doubt that Colombia's security forces are leagues stronger than they were when Uribe took office: billions of dollars of US military aid, arms and assistance have transformed all aspects of the Colombian military, as has a change in the command structure which has resulted in closer cooperation between the armed forces (RA 05-05). Even before Reyes was killed the Farc had learned all about the combined capabilities of the air force and the intelligence service: in recent months several senior guerrillas have been killed by precision air strikes, including Negro Acacio, J.J, and Martí­n Caballero.

But this does not mean the military can kill Farc leaders at will. Reyes was a relatively easy target insofar as sources claim that he had used the same base in Ecuador for more than a year (he rarely ventured into Colombia), and that he had received numerous visitors including foreign volunteers and media. It seems Reyes unwisely assumed that he was safe simply by dint of being on Ecuadorean soil.

More importantly, being able to target previously unreachable Farc leaders does not guarantee victory over the group as a whole. The Farc is a highly organized guerrilla group divided into a number of fronts across the country that are capable of operating without instruction from an overall leadership. Uribe's top advisor, José Obdulio Gaviria, claimed recently that "the secretariat no longer exists" and that the Farc relies on a "virtual cohesion" achieved via the internet.

Killing Reyes was a symbolic victory but it does not win the war against the Farc. There are still 8,000 guerrillas who are prepared to continue the fight against the government; they remain difficult to find and harder to eliminate. After all, if the military did know the Farc's every move there is no way the guerrilla group would still be able to hold Uribe to ransom with 40 hostages, who now look less likely than ever to be freed alive. But by killing Reyes on Ecuadorean soil, Uribe has proved that he will do whatever it takes to defeat the Farc, regardless of what Colombia's neighbours think about it.

Reyes replaced

The Farc announced on 4 March that Joaquí­n Gómez will replace Raúl Reyes in the guerrilla group's seven-man secretariat (its high command). Gómez, whose real name is Milton de Jesús Toncel, will not fulfil as prominent a role as Reyes. His promotion is logical insofar as he is a key military commander of the Farc's forces in the south of Colombia, which were previously under Reyes' control. The so-called Bloque Sur is the Farc's strongest front.

The finance minister, Oscar Zuluaga, has denied that the economy has gone into  recession even though it has registered two consecutive quarters of negative year-on-year growth according the national statistics institute (Dane): -0.6% in the first quarter of 2009 and -1% in the final quarter of 2008. Zuluaga noted that real GDP rose 0.2% quarter-on-quarter, however, between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009. The debate over the niceties of what constitutes a recession is academic. The economy is not in good shape - industrial output fell by a sizeable 7.9% year-on-year in the first quarter - but there are positive signs. Buoyed by an increase in the value of oil and gas exports, the mining and hydrocarbons sector bounced back to expand by 10.6%. Construction, boosted by government spending, was up 4.1%. Any recession would be the first for a decade. Zuluaga is confident that the economy will pick up in the second half of 2009, and said he felt no need to revise the government's growth forecast down from 0.5%-1.5%. One cause for concern, however, is that urban unemployment is on the increase: it rose to 14.9% in January, its highest level in three years.

Inflation: In June the consumer price index fell by 0.86%, having risen 0.01% in May. For the first six months the accumulated rate was -0.78%. The annual rate in June was 2.74%, well down on 7.67% in calendar 2008.

Minimum wage increase: On 2 March Morales decreed a 20% rise in the minimum wage, raising it from a monthly B$679.35(US$97) to B$815.40 (US$118). He also decreed an extra 10% rise in wages for health sector workers, teachers, the armed forces and police officials. In 2006, when Morales first took office, he raised the minimum wage 13.63%, from B$440 to B$500. This was followed by increases of 5% in 2007, 10% in 2008, 12% in 2009 and 5% in 2010.  The latest increase follows 11 days of talks with the main umbrella union, the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) still threatening unrest amid inflationary concerns [RA-11-02]. While it represents a concession of sorts by Morales who previously said that he would raise wages only in line with inflation (7.18% in 2010) the move has failed to placate the COB, which puts the cost of a family basket of basic goods at B$8,300 (US$1,199). The COB objects not only to the increase (though its own demand is completely unreasonable) but the unilateral way in which it was announced. This in turn suggests that Morales has not learnt from his misjudgement over the so-called gasolinazo - his failed attempt to scrap fuel subsidies at the end of last year, which would have seen a 73% and 83% rise in petrol and diesel costs respectively [RA-11-01]. Aside from the overnight price rise, the COB's major gripe with Morales was lack of consultation.

COLOMBIA | Quedó atrás 'el peor año del café'. Aunque en términos de volumen la producción y las exportaciones en el último año, que terminó en setiembre, mostraron resultados más pobres que en 2002/02 (considerado como probablemente el peor en 100 años), la Federación Nacional de Cafeteros dice que gracias a la leve recuperación en el precio mundial, las ganancias por exportaciones subieron modestamente. La producción cayó 1,99% a 11,7m bolsas (de 60 kilos), las exportaciones cayeron 1,43% a 10,5m bolsas.

Las cifras del actual año calendario muestran que la recuperación ya se extendió al volumen. En los primeros nueve meses, la producción subió 1,2% sobre el año pasado, a 7,9m bolsas, y las exportaciones en 4,8% a 7,4m bolsas.

VENEZUELA | Petróleo impulsará la recuperación en 2004. El presupuesto para 2004, sometido la semana pasada a la asamblea nacional, asume un 6,5% de crecimiento del PBI, impulsado por 16,9% de expansión en el sector petrolero y 2,6% en el sector no-petrolero. Este año se espera que la economí­a se contraiga en 11% (la peor declinación), debido principalmente a una caí­da de 11,5% en el sector petrolero, atribuido a dos meses de huelga de la oposición.

El gobierno asume un promedio de US$18,50 el barril de crudo mixto, más alto de los US$16 calculado en el presupuesto de este año, pero menor que US$24,67 realmente percibido hasta ahora este año. La producción petrolera se espera que llegue a 3,02m de barriles por dí­a, contra la actual 2,9m bpd.

Tobí­as Nóbrega, ministro de finanzas, descartó una 'maxi-devaluación': espera que la tasa de cambio llegue gradualmente a Bs/2.016 por dólar (de la actual tasa fija de Bs/1.600). El gasto se calcula en US$26bn; en términos de moneda local, 20% más que en el presupuesto 2003. Se espera que la inflación se reduzca del proyectado 30% de este año, a 26%.

Los vecinos de Colombia se han vuelto particularmente útiles. El 10 de enero, la policí­a panameña anunció que habí­a arrestado a Arcángel de Jesús Henao Montoya, el Mocho, considerado uno de los jefes del cartel de drogas, Valle.

Henao fue apresado en Tortí­, un pequeño pueblo a unos 400 kilómetros de ciudad de Panamá en la jungla de Darién, cercana a la frontera con Colombia. El comunicado oficial dice que el arresto fue hecho 'a requerimiento de Estados Unidos, en una operación conjunta de la policí­a judicial, la oficina del fiscal general y la policí­a nacional.' Otras fuentes han dicho que agentes de la DEA también tomaron parte en la operación.

Orlando, hermano de Arcángel, considerado el más alto jefe del cartel Valle, está en prisión aguardando juicio, acusado de enriquecimiento ilí­cito.

[También en el frente de las drogas, emergió que el programa de interdicción aérea, reiniciada en agosto pasado luego de dos años de suspensión, fue detenido brevemente en setiembre luego que la fuerza aérea colombiana forzó a un avión a aterrizar y luego lo destruyó, sin autorización de los controladores de EU en Key West. El programa se reinició luego de una breve revisión de las normas.]

El recién instalado Presidente Oscar Berger ha dado dio un paso audaz: reducir en 42% la magnitud del ejército y cerrar la mayorí­a de los cuarteles del paí­s, todo de una sola vez. Así­, no sólo cumple con el retrasado compromiso de los guatemaltecos bajo los tratados de paz de 1996, también convertirá a Guatemala en el segundo paí­s centroamericano en tomar un paso concreto hacia el acordado 'equilibrio razonable' de las fuerzas armadas de la subregión.

El Programa de Modernización del Ejército de Guatemala, concebido por el asesor de seguridad de Berger, el retirado General Otto Pérez Molina, entrará en vigor el 30 de junio. Prevé una reducción del ejército de 27.000 hombres (el más grande en Centroamérica) a 15.500 -más en lí­nea con sus vecinos. [El Salvador, el paí­s más pequeño, tiene 16.000; Nicaragua 14.500; Honduras 12.000; y Costa Rica no tiene ejército.] El programa también prevé cerrar todas, excepto cinco bases militares y lo que Pérez Molina describe como 'tres unidades estratégicas.'

Los 11.500 miembros de las fuerzas armadas que serán retirados, recibirán lo que para el standard guatemalteco es un excelente paquete de despido, que promedia US$3.260. Berger dice que el pago debe verse como una inversión, que pronto se traducirá en sustanciales ahorros fiscales. La cuenta total de US$37,5m se pagará en un par de años, pues el presupuesto de defensa se reducirá. El año próximo llegará a sólo US$97,5m, comparado con el planeado originalmente de US$118,7m. Los presupuestos de defensa serán fijados en 0,33% del PBI.

A muchos de los soldados de tropa que dejan la fuerza se les ofrecerá la oportunidad de entrenamiento en la academia nacional de policí­a civil. Esta opción no estará abierta a especialistas u oficiales -lo que calmará algunas de las crí­ticas al plan de Pérez Molina de reforzar la policí­a con reclutas del ejército.

El Presidente Berger, se complació en describir el programa como un 'hecho histórico sin precedentes', fue también franco (o ingenuo) sobre un posible efecto no deseado: que algunos de los que dejan el ejército pueden unirse a las filas del crimen organizado. Dijo que esperaba que los 'principios y valores' de los militares reducirí­an ese riesgo.

Enfrentando lo subyacente
En realidad, muchos guatemaltecos ya ven lazos entre el viejo establecimiento de seguridad y el crimen organizado, a través de las llamadas 'organizaciones clandestinas de seguridad'. Investigar este aspecto será tarea de CICIACS, la comisión especial establecida bajo los auspicios de la ONU.

La comisión tiene el poder de investigar la estructura y actividades de los grupos ilegales y las organizaciones clandestinas de seguridad, sus modalidades de operación, y sus fuentes de finanzas. En particular, CICIACS tratará de identificar: las personas responsables de ataques contra defensores de los derechos humanos, profesionales del sector de la justicia, testigos, periodistas y otras actividades del sector social y el trabajo; los lazos que pueden existir entre esas asociaciones ilegales y los agentes del estado, el crimen organizado y las fuerzas de seguridad privadas respecto a cómo afectan adversamente los derechos humanos; y cualquier otra actividad ilegal que pueda constituir un delito transnacional, como el crimen internacional organizado y delitos relacionados, que directa o indirectamente afecta el sistema de la justicia criminal para proteger los derechos humanos. En cuanto a los pasados crí­menes de los militares, la fórmula de Berger es: 'Si existe algo sobre lo que cualquiera deba responder, para eso estarán las cortes.'

El alcalde de ciudad México, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, cometió el error de enfrentar a lo que se ha vuelto un tema muy susceptible: la amenaza representada por los secuestros, recientemente destacada por la masiva marcha de protesta y abrazada como una causa nacional por la mayorí­a de los polí­ticos. En momentos en que los ataques en su contra y la asamblea de la ciudad se incrementan, él dijo que la marcha de protesta ha sido manipulada por oportunistas.

El alcalde dijo tener el mayor respeto por 'aquellos que demostraron en buena fe y han sido ví­ctimas del crimen', pero fustigó a aquellos, en particular en la 'prensa amarilla', que 'manipularon los legí­timos sentimientos de los ciudadanos, con propósitos polí­ticos.' El hecho, dijo, era que la tasa de delitos en ciudad México habí­a declinado. Esto no es una sorpresa para nuestros lectores [IL-04-24], pero atrajo el oprobio sobre la cabeza de López Obrador. Incluso el presidente de su propio partido, Leonel Godoy, se sintió compelido a unirse al coro, elogiando débilmente al alcalde por su determinación de luchar contra el crimen en la que él describe como una de las ciudades más peligrosas del mundo, pero agregando que 'esos esfuerzos han sido insuficientes'.

Más sobre el punto, Cuauhtémoc Sandoval, miembro del consejo nacional del PRD, dijo del alcalde que habí­a incurrido en un 'error polí­tico y una equivocada percepción' -que de acuerdo con Sandoval 'puede corregirse rápidamente'.

Aumentando la presión
El problema es que la postura de López Obrador ha dado más municiones a los que quieren eliminarlo de la próxima contienda electoral presidencial (sigue encabezando las encuestas). Los partidos de la oposición en la asamblea de la ciudad -el PAN y el PRI- han anunciado que buscarán desalojar a López Obrador de su cargo. Aparte de dudosos procedimientos, eso es muy improbable, pues el PRD tiene una confortable mayorí­a. Sin embargo, llegó a los titulares, y se agregó a la impresión que las cosas se están cerrando sobre el alcalde.

Agregándose a sus penas, la Agencia Federal de Investigaciones (AFI) -versión mexicana del FBI- ha anunciado que llevará a López Obrador a la corte acusado de abuso de autoridad y privación ilegal de libertad, esto último es jerga legal aplicada con frecuencia al secuestro. Lo que ocurrió fue que la policí­a de ciudad de México habí­a arrestado a tres agentes de la AFI por sospechas de pertenecer a una banda dedicada a robar camiones. Fueron liberados por falta de evidencia.

La AFI responde a la oficina del jefe de la procuradurí­a, la PGR, cuyo jefe, Rafael Macedo, ha sido acusado públicamente por López Obrador de hacer una campaña polí­tica en su contra.

Fox contra el delito
Mientras López Obrador cuestionaba los motivos detrás de la gran demostración anticrimen, el Presidente Vicente Fox otorgaba audiencia a sus organizadores y luego anunció un 'plan anticrimen de 10 puntos'. Cuando fue explicado el plan, es una lista de acciones a ser tomadas a fin de preparar un plan anticrimen, que comienza con una reunión del consejo nacional de seguridad, CNS, a mediados de julio 'para acordar sobre nuevas y más efectivas estrategias'.Luego, el CNS se encargará de contactar con los ministros de seguridad y fiscales públicos de los 32 estados, también para identificar medidas anticrimen más efectivas. La única medida anticrimen en la lista es la iniciativa para publicar los crí­menes resueltos por las varias fuerzas policiales, y así­ incrementar su responsabilidad. Fox también prometió un presupuesto anticrimen 'suficiente' para el año próximo.

El perfil demográfico de México -una herramienta vital para planificadores y expertos en marketing- ha pasado por dramáticos cambios. Los titulares se concentran en el hecho que se redujo la tasa de crecimiento de la población de 1,74% a 1,06% en la década pasada, pero esa es sólo una parte de la historia.

Los mejores servicios de salud tuvieron dos efectos importantes. El primero es que más niños sobreviven (la mortalidad infantil cayó de 28,5% a 19,7%). El segundo es que los mexicanos viven más: la expectativa de vida se elevó de 72,6 años a 75,2 -que los ubica más cerca de las tasas de paí­ses más desarrollados.

Esas dos tendencias podrí­an indicar un alza en la tasa de crecimiento de la población. Que eso no haya ocurrido, se debe al hecho que fue contrapesado por la declinación de más de un tercio en la tasa de fertilidad -de 3 hijos a 2,2 por madre. Esto se debe principalmente a que se recurre más al planeamiento familiar y a los anticonceptivos, de 66% a 75% de las mujeres en la década estudiada.

Esa información fue provista por Elena Zúñiga, directora general del Consejo Nacional de la Población (Conapo) en una presentación del informe anual del FPNU sobre la situación de la población mundial. Lo puso en contexto al señalar que, a las tasas actuales, la población global se elevará de los actuales 6,4bn a 9bn a mediados de este siglo, con los 50 paí­ses más pobres duplicando sus poblaciones para 2014.

Tabaré Vázquez decidió abandonar su proclamada intención de confiar en las calificaciones más que en el apoyo polí­tico para nombrar su gabinete. Con las últimas designaciones, todos, excepto dos de los futuros ministros, representan a las facciones internas de la coalición EP-FA. Aunque una de sus últimas designaciones, es el segundo acto de desafí­o al ala izquierda de la coalición.

Tres puestos en el gabinete fueron al Partido Socialista (PS), de Vázquez, dos a los ex Tupamaros (MPP), dos a la facción Vertiente Artiguista (liderada por el alcalde de Montevideo Mariano Arana), y uno cada uno para Alianza Progresista y Asamblea Uruguay. Representa a ésta última (la facción más de derecha de la coalición), Danilo Astori, el ministro de economí­a designado, cuya selección fue anunciada por Vázquez antes que la del resto.

Esa designación, destinada a 'calmar a los mercados', igual a como hizo Lula da Silva al elegir a Henrique Meirelles como jefe del banco central, fue fuertemente criticada por el ala izquierda del EP-FA. Una reacción similar recibió su elección de Jorge Lepra, ex gerente de Texaco para Uruguay y Paraguay, como ministro de industria, energí­a y minerí­a.

Además de Lepra, Vázquez anunció la semana pasada la selección de cuatro ministros más: Reynaldo Gargano (canciller), Marí­a Julia Muñoz (salud), Héctor Lezcano (turismo) y Mariano Arana (vivienda, planeamiento territorial y medio ambiente).

Las repatriaciones en gran escala de supuestos inmigrantes ilegales de Haití­ se reanudaron la semana pasada; las ONG piden a la ONU y la OEA que actúen contra lo que alegan son violaciones de convenciones internacionales. El ejecutivo dominicano acordó actuar en conjunto con sindicatos y grupos vecinales para echar a inmigrantes ilegales y castigar a quienes los emplean.

Desde el 31 de mayo, al menos 262 haitianos han sido repatriados: ellos fueron atrapados en las calles, arrestados en allanamientos o sacados de buses por patrullas del ejército. En ese periodo, el ejército también dijo haber interceptado y devuelto a 102 presuntos inmigrantes haitianos en la frontera. En una conferencia de prensa el 2 de junio, el director de migraciones, Miguel Amarante, flanqueado por lí­deres del sindicato de la construcción. Anunció que un comité especial se habí­a establecido con el Consejo Nacional de la Unidad Sindical, para 'rescatar' empleos para los dominicanos. Entre otras cosas, eso supone la aplicación estricta de la nueva ley de inmigración, que establece multas a empresas que contratan a ilegales. El fundamento es poner en vigencia de manera estricta el código laboral dominicano, que establece que 80% de todos los empleos debe ser reservado para la fuerza de trabajo nacional.

Desde principios de año, la dirección de migraciones ha emitido permisos de trabajo a 14.000 haitianos en las plantaciones de azúcar, y 4.000 en la industria de la construcción. Los funcionarios a menudo estiman que hay 1m de haitianos en el paí­s, la mayorí­a ilegalmente. Amarante dice que unos 100.000 dominicanos que tratan de ingresar al mercado laboral cada año, no encuentran empleos debido a la competencia desleal de inmigrantes haitianos, que 'aceptan menores salarios y no exigen beneficios sociales' El historiador dominicano Pedro Manuel Casals, ha exigido acción también contra los sacerdotes extranjeros involucrados en las ONG que, dice, promueven la 'fusión' de la República Dominicana con Haití­ -de donde se desprendieron en 1884, luego de 22 años de gobierno haitiano.

Se le ha presentado al gobierno del Presidente Alvaro Uribe un caso de prueba bajo su ley de 'justicia y paz': la desmovilización de un lí­der paramilitar que ha sido identificado públicamente en el congreso como un traficante de drogas buscado para ser extraditado a EU -justo cuando el fiscal general de EU, Alberto González, habí­a concluido con el jefe de la procuradurí­a Mario Iguarán, un acuerdo para asegurar la continuidad de la financiación de EU para el proceso de desmovilización.

El 23 de agosto, en la jungla del departamento de Chocó, con frontera sobre Panamá, 150 paramilitares del Bloque Pací­fico, liderado por Francisco Javier Zuluaga Lindo (Gordo Lindo), comenzaron a desmovilizarse. Ese mismo dí­a, en un comité del congreso, el senador Jimmy Chamorro (del Compromiso Cí­vico Cristiano con la Comunidad, C-4, evangélico), desafió al ministro del interior Sabas Pretelt para que 'deje de convertir la extradición en una farsa'. Dijo que Gordo Lindo ha sido un fugitivo evadiendo la extradición por cargos de tráfico de drogas desde 1999, que 'compró la licencia' del Bloque Pací­fico y se volvió uno de los negociadores por las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). 

'El gobierno,' dijo Chamorro, 'tiene la obligación de investigar este caso hasta sus últimas consecuencias y extraditarlo por tráfico de drogas.'

Sabas Pretelt sorpresivamente afirmó que, por un lado, no habí­a traficantes de drogas disfrazados de paramilitares en las negociaciones y, por el otro, que bajo la ley de 'justicia y paz' cualquier paramilitar 'que haya cometido crí­menes atroces o que fue financiado por secuestros o tráfico de drogas serán juzgados y condenados por esos delitos' -aunque se beneficiarí­an de las penas alternativas previstas en la ley si ellos devuelven cualquier activo obtenido de manera ilí­cita y hace reparaciones a sus ví­ctimas.
El desafí­o lanzado por Chamorro es que el gobierno tendrá que probar que el aspecto punitivo de la ley será observado. Chamorro ha fustigado repetidamente al gobierno porque el ejecutivo recurre al privilegio de proteger a los lí­deres paramilitares contra la extradición.

Entrenando al equipo investigador
Un dí­a después del intercambio en el congreso, se anunció que se habí­a llegado a un acuerdo, por el cual EU entrenará a los fiscales públicos y los investigadores de la Policí­a Judicial asignados al equipo de la Unidad de Justicia y Paz a cargo de investigar la elegibilidad de los paramilitares desmovilizados para los beneficios de la ley de 'justicia y paz'. Ese entrenamiento será provisto bajo dos esquemas dirigidos por el Departamento de Justicia de EU: OPDAT (para los fiscales) e ICIPAT (para investigadores penales). Ya 718 fiscales colombianos y 879 investigadores han recibido similar entrenamiento.

Solo recientemente ha surgido que la opinión legal del Departamento de Justicia limpió el camino para que el gobierno de EU financie la desmovilización de las AUC, que parecí­a estar bloqueado por la combinación de dos factores: la clasificación pre-setiembre/11 de las AUC como organización terrorista internacional, y la aprobación pos-setiembre/11 del Acta Patriótica que criminaliza cualquier financiación de organizaciones de ese tipo.

La opinión legal fue que la financiación puede proceder bajo ciertas condiciones -básicamente la certificación que ciertos tecnicismos legales fueron observados. El entrenamiento del equipo de investigación colombiano es un primer paso hacia asegurar que ese obstáculo está eliminado.