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La última encuesta de opinión conducida por CNT/Sensus y publicada el 23 de noviembre, indica una caí­da en el apoyo por el contendiente principal en la carrera presidencial de 2010, José Serra, del principal opositor de centro, el Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB). Sin embargo, el gobernante Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) no tuvo muchos motivos para celebrar, y su probable candidata presidencial, la ministra de la presidencia de Brasil, Dilma Rousseff, tampoco. El rival interno de Serra para la candidatura presidencial, Aécio Neves, podrí­a también obtener poco de la encuesta, pese al creciente respaldo de parte de los miembros del PSDB y algunos de sus aliadlos.

Serra, que aún no es el candidato confirmado del PSDB, insiste que él no iniciará su campaña electoral hasta después de las primarias partidarias en junio del año próximo. Sin embargo, el PSDB se está poniendo nervioso pues Rousseff ya está en la senda de campaña, en su paí­s y en el exterior, con fuerte respaldo del enormemente popular Presidente Lula da Silva. Una victoria para Serra, que hace solamente pocos meses atrás lucí­a como una fuerte apuesta para 2010, ahora luce bastante menos seguro, y el PSDB, que está dividido entre Serra y Neves, ahora repentinamente está en la defensiva.

De acuerdo con la encuesta, Serra tiene el apoyo de 31,8% del electorado, una declinación de 15 puntos desde este mismo momento del año pasado, cuando él era el único competidor “extraoficial". Como tal, alguna caí­da es natural al entrar otros competidores en la carrera, pero una declinación tan marcada fue inesperada y ha vuelto abierta la competencia. Rousseff recibió 21,7% de apoyo, seguida por el socialista Ciro Gómes, con 17,5%, y la ex ministra PT del medioambiente, Marina Silva, que es probable que compita por los Verdes, con 5,9%.

Aunque es innegable que el resultado de la encuesta es preocupante para Serra, el resultado realmente no es motivo de celebración para Rousseff, y como el PT habí­a sugerido a primera vista. Muestra que hay un entrecruzamiento entre los seguidores de Serra y Gomes, pese a la antiguamente establecida animosidad de Gomes hacia Serra. Si es así­, Serra podrí­a atraer la mayor parte de los votos dados a Gomes en la primera ronda y derrotar a Rousseff en una segunda ronda, por 46,8% a 28,2%.

Aunque hubo un leve en el escenario de la segunda ronda, comparado con la encuesta previa de setiembre, cuando Serra aventajaba a Rousseff por 49% a 25%, el cambio estaba dentro de los márgenes de error de tres puntos porcentuales.

El resultado de la última encuesta también confirma que pese a la afirmación del PT, que Rousseff es la candidata mejor posicionada para representar a la administración Lula, Gomes cuenta con más apoyo que Rousseff en una votación en una segunda randa entre los dos, venciéndola por 35,1% a 31,5%.

Sin embargo, muchos analistas creen que bajo presión de Lugo, Gomes no competirá por la presidencia e intentará en cambio ganar la gobernación de São Paulo -no menos porque sin el apoyo del PT, Gomes tendrí­a tiempo insuficiente en los avisos compulsivos de campaña en la TV, que son acordados de acuerdo a la representación del partido en el congreso. Pero sin Gomes disputando la primera ronda, el resultado cambia sustancialmente a favor de Serra, que vencerí­a a Rousseff por 40,1% a 23,5%, mientras el apoyo a Marina Silva crecerí­a a 8,1%.

¿Serra o Neves?
Pero a pesar de los resultados que aún indican que Serra podrí­a ganar la presidencia, su propio partido y su principal aliado, los Demócratas (DEM) permanecen divididos sobre el apoyo a Neves. Sin embargo, en todos los escenarios en los que Neves es el candidato de la oposición, él pierde, tanto contra Gomes como contra Rousseff.

Aún así­, la potencial candidatura de Neves permanece como una posibilidad, con el PSDB teniendo una tradición de desbaratar sus propias chances. En 2006, Serra tení­a una decente chance de derrotar a Lula, cuya campaña de reelección fue socavada por el escándalo del mensalão de compra de votos que involucró a la ex dirección del PT. Aunque Serra aparecí­a delante de Lula en algunas encuestas, el apoyo de algunos miembros del PSDB por el entonces gobernador de São Paulo, Geraldo Alckmin, forzó a Serra a abandonar la carrera.

La corrupción daña a DEM
Otro problema que probablemente afronte Serra, asumiendo que supere el obstáculo Neves, es que él se verá impedido de hacer una campaña sobre una plataforma anti-corrupción el año próximo. La razón de eso es que el gobernador del Distrito Federal de Brasí­lia, José Roberto Arruda, del DEM, ha estado enredado en un esquema de corrupción similar al escándalo del mensalão de dinero a cambio de voto, que dañó al PT.

La policí­a federal afirma que Arruda recibió dinero no declarado de compañí­as que estaban buscando contratos de su administración, y distribuyó el dinero a aliados polí­ticos. Arruda es visto en un video que salió a la luz el 27 de noviembre, aparentemente aceptando grandes cantidades de dinero durante su campaña electoral en 2006. Otros polí­ticos del DEM están en realidad retratados en secuencias del video recibiendo el dinero.

El PSDB está haciendo todo lo posible para distanciarse del escándalo, emitiendo una declaración  diciendo que sus miembros renunciarí­an a sus puestos en la administración Arruda. Aunque Arruda ha perdido nominalmente el apoyo de su partido y el PSB, sin embargo, él permanece en su cargo. El DEM ha abierto una investigación interna el 1 de diciembre para decidir si lo expulsa o no.

• Escándalo del DEM

No hubo crí­ticas desde la mayor parte de la clase polí­tica de Brasil contra el gobernador Demócratas (DEM) del Distrito Federal de Brasí­lia, José Roberto Arruda. Notablemente, el Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) aún no ha usado el escándalo para atacar a la oposición. Eso podrí­a deberse a que la acusación de la policí­a federal, que la compañí­a de construcción Camargo Correa (involucrada en el escándalo de sobornos en el que se ha visto enredado Arruda) ha sobornado al menos a 200 polí­ticos a lo largo de todo el espectro polí­tico.

En una extendida sesión de fin de semana, el congreso aprobó finalmente el presupuesto de L122bn (US$6,42bn) para 2010. El gobernante y dominante Partido Nacional (PN) también utilizó su mayorí­a (71 de las 128 bancas) para aprobar una 'Ley de Emergencia Fiscal' y un polémico paquete de reformas fiscales. Juntas, esas medidas permitirán al FMI y a otras agencias multilaterales de crédito ofrecer préstamos adicionales este año, para el paí­s ya escaso de dinero. La oposición, y algunos dirigentes del sector privado, se han quejado abiertamente acerca de las reformas fiscales,  lo que produjo algunas enmiendas de último momento, pero el gobierno del Presidente Porfirio Lobo no tiene otra opción más que tragar los remedios fiscales exigidos por las agencias multilaterales a cambio de su muy necesitado apoyo para devolver la salud a la frágil economí­a.

La administración Lobo insistió en quejarse acerca del desorden fiscal heredado de sus predecesores -acusando no sólo a la depuesta administración del presidente Manuel Zelaya (2006-2009) sino también a la administración de facto que lo sucedió (liderada por Roberto Micheletti), de despilfarro fiscal.

El nuevo presupuesto se eleva en 8,1% (en términos de lempira) sobre el de 2009. En un esfuerzo por tender una red social de seguridad para el 60% estimado de la población que vive en la pobreza, el plan prioriza la salud (que destina fondos que se elevan 9,2% año en año, a US$1,2bn), y educación (+10,5% a US$530m). Notablemente, sin embargo, el gasto en seguridad (+45,2% a US$160m) y defensa (+22,9% a US$140m), también se elevaron agudamente. Los gastos en obligaciones de la deuda pública llegan a L7,8b n (US$410m), de nuevo subiendo agudamente (40%) sobre 2009. Las cifras de enero 2010 del banco central, ubican el total de la deuda del sector público en US$3,4bn, apenas debajo de 25% del PBI. El grueso de la misma es deuda externa, pero la deuda pública interna se disparó el año pasado bajo la administración Micheletti, pues el paí­s tení­a cortado el acceso a fuentes externas de financiación.

Las multilaterales financiarán alrededor de un tercio del total de US$6,42bn del presupuesto, del cual 56% es asignado al gobierno central y 44% para las instituciones descentralizadas como las municipalidades locales en los 18 departamentos del paí­s. Para asegurar eso y la concesión de financiamiento adicional, el gobierno de Lobo también pidió al congreso que apruebe una 'Ley de Emergencia Fiscal', que permitirá a las multilaterales tratar a Honduras como un caso de emergencia, lo que le da derecho a préstamos otorgados con tratamiento de urgencia. (El paí­s habí­a asignado previamente ese status prioritario luego del devastador Huracán Mitch en 1998, que causó daños por US$5bn-US$6bn). Para reducir el déficit fiscal, estimado en 3,5% del PBI, el gobierno también envió una serie de medidas fiscales. La llamada 'Ley para el Fortalecimiento de los Ingresos, la Igualdad Social y la Racionalización del Gasto Público' -que eleva las tarifas de electricidad y de telefoní­a para los grandes usuarios finales, levanta los impuestos a los cigarrillos y el alcohol y remueve varias exenciones fiscales corporativas, entre otras reformas- apunta a acumular L7,62bn (US$400m) en ingresos fiscales.

El PN y tres de los más pequeños partidos de oposición en el congreso votaron a favor de esa medicina fiscal (bautizada como 'paquetazo'), pero solamente 25 de los 45 diputados del principal opositor, el Partido Liberal (PL), asistieron a los debates de fin de semana, que fue transmitido en vivo por la TV local.

Una misión del FMI dejó Tegucigalpa el 25 de marzo, luego de una visita de 10 dí­as. Retornará en mayo para más conversaciones, probablemente con vista a decidir sobre un préstamo stand-by. No causó sorpresa que el Fondo enfatizara la reforma fiscal, advirtiendo que “se requieren fuertes acciones para contener el actual gasto, especialmente la factura salarial, y fortalecer las finanzas de las empresas públicas, los fondos públicos de pensión y las municipalidades." Honduras tiene una de las más altas facturas del sector público de la región (12% del PBI), desplazando al gasto en programas sociales y de reducción de la pobreza, y limitando el capital disponible para la muy necesitada inversión en infraestructura que podrí­a ayudar a estimular la producción económica. El FMI ha estado presionando por una reforma salarial desde hace años, con escasos resultados. La decisión de Manuel Zelaya de elevar el salario mí­nimo en un robusto 60% en diciembre de 2008, desafiando un consejo del FMI y, lo más importante, sin los fondos para pagar el incremento en momentos en que la crisis económica avanzaba, fue uno de los errores de mal manejo polí­tico que terminó costándole la presidencia.

• Alerta de hambre
  La comisión permanente de contingencias, Copeco, ha declarado una emergencia nacional en respuesta a una severa sequí­a luego que las autoridades de 10 de los 18 departamentos del paí­s (Choluteca, Comayagua, El Paraí­so, Francisco Morazán , Intibucá, La Paz, Lempira, Olancho, Valle, y Yoro) advirtieron sobre el riesgo del hambre. En varias áreas, incluidas Tegucigalpa, Choluteca, Comayagua, La Paz, San Marcos de Colón, y Sabanagrande, también hay severa escasez de agua potable.

El Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) ha lanzado esta semana un cuestionamiento formal de los resultados de las elecciones en el estado de Veracruz celebradas el 4 de julio. El PAN también está meditando sobre cuestionar los resultados en Aguascalientes (donde perdió) e Hidalgo, donde su candidata en la alianza, Xochtil Gálvez, no logró ganar. Gálvez sirvió en la administración del Presidente Vicente Fox (2000-2006) como titular de asuntos indí­genas.

La decisión del PAN de cuestionar el resultado de la elección en Veracruz, el más importante de los estados que fue a las urnas el 4 de julio, es una evidencia más que el PAN confrontará al Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) en todas partes.

El PAN (y su aliado el Partido Nueva Alianza) desea que la elección, que fue ganada por estrecho margen por el titular del PRI, frente al candidato del PAN, Miguel Angel Yunes, sea anulada. El candidato que llegó en tercer lugar, Dante Delgado, de Convergencia, también objeta el resultado. Los dos perdedores arguyen que el gobierno del estado interfirió en la campaña electoral.

La semana pasada, cuando el Presidente Felipe Calderón llamó por teléfono para felicitar a los ganadores, premeditadamente no llamó a Javier Duarte, el nuevo gobernador del PRI de Veracruz. El PRI ha respondido al desafí­o lanzando su propio esfuerzo para que el resultado en Oaxaca sea volcado. Gabino Cué, un candidato de la alianza, ganó convincentemente ahí­ y ya ha dicho que trabajará con Calderón.

• Exportaciones de automotores

En los primeros cinco meses de 2010 las exportaciones de automotores le produjeron a México poco más de US$25bn, mientras las exportaciones de petróleo produjeron US$16,76bn.

Gran Bretaña tiene la intención de “reavivar el dinamismo de su temprana relación con América Latina", afirmó el ministro británico de relaciones exteriores, William Hague, en un importante discurso en Londres el 9 de noviembre. Importante no solamente, como enfatizó Hague, porque al darlo él se convirtió en el primer ministro de relaciones exteriores británico en pronunciar un mensaje en la Canning Lecture “200 años después de los albores de la independencia latinoamericana", sino porque al mismo tiempo el Primer Ministro de Gran Bretaña, David Cameron, su ministro de economí­a y sus ministros de comercio, energí­a y educación estaban todos en China. La decisión de Hague de permanecer en Gran Bretaña para difundir su mensaje sobre América Latina, que tiene un PIB solamente un poco menor de China, en vez de encomendarlo a un ministro menor, presta credibilidad fí­sica a su compromiso retórico en el sentido que “la retirada de Gran Bretaña de la región ha terminado, y ahora ha llegado el tiempo para que comience un avance".

Hague desplegó un gran número de estadí­sticas para demostrar cómo la histórica presencia de Gran Bretaña en América Latina ha sido continuamente erosionada, de proveer 50% de la inversión extranjera en la región y más del 20% de su comercio antes de la primera guerra mundial hasta los dí­as presentes, cuando Gran Bretaña exporta tres veces más a Irlanda de lo que exporta a toda América Latina, y tiene el doble del comercio con Dinamarca que con Brasil. Cualquiera de esas comparaciones es ligeramente envidiosa, dada la caí­da de Gran Bretaña de su preeminencia durante su largo paréntesis histórico, pero sirvió al propósito de respaldar lo señalado por Hague, que “la historia nos enseña que Gran Bretaña tiene un record de subestimación de América Latina y de desdeñar sus oportunidades."

Hague dijo que el gobierno británico está decidido a abordar ese “descuido". “Donde se ha permitido que los músculos de nuestras alguna vez vibrantes relaciones se atrofien o crezcan débiles por carecer de uso, nosotros las construiremos y las pondremos en marcha de nuevo," dijo. El prometió “relaciones intensificadas e iguales con los paí­ses de América Latina (grandes y pequeños) y una “incrementada atención ministerial". Dijo que el adjunto del Primer Ministro, Nick Clegg, encabezarí­a una delegación comercial a la región el año próximo, mientras que Hague visitarí­a por sí­ mismo varios paí­ses en la región.

Hague mencionó alguna cooperación especí­fica con paí­ses latinoamericanos, como en tareas policiales en Bolivia, y la necesidad de forjar una alianza entre la Unión Europea (UE) y América Latina sobre seguridad energética. También emitió la habitual “polí­tica de no intervención" a Argentina sobre las Islas Falkland. Aparte de eso, el discurso de Hague no ofreció nada concreto, excepto con relación a Brasil. El dijo que Cameron conocí­a a la Presidente electa de Brasil, Dilma Rousseff, desde antes de su elección (una reprimenda al Nuevo Laborismo que desairó al Presidente Lula da Silva antes que él sobre la base que él representa a la Izquierda recalcitrante). Inmediatamente se dedicó a cortejar a Rousseff prometiendo el apoyo de Gran Bretaña para que Brasil se convierta en miembro permanente de un Consejo de Seguridad ampliado de la ONU, una de las más apreciadas ambiciones de Lula. Dijo que Brasil lo merece por la fortaleza de su influencia polí­tica y económica pues estaba preparado para convertirse en la quinta mayor economí­a en el mundo en 2025.

Citando libremente a Bolí­var, Hague dedicó gran parte del resto de su discurso a vender a Gran Bretaña como un socio comercial, elogiando a la región por su exitosa polí­tica para superar los efectos de la crisis financiera global y su innovación en polí­tica social, y elogiando prácticamente a cada paí­s, incluida Venezuela, por algo. La única excepción fue Cuba a la que Hague no mencionó en ningún momento. Gran Bretaña permanece replegada sobre ese tema después que Hague fuera criticado por su tentativa de avanzar el enero pasado, cuando él visitó La Habana. Hague habló con el gobierno cubano, pero no con la oposición, en violación de la Posición Común de la Unión Europea.

El Presidente Felipe Calderón sugirió el 5 de marzo que el gobernante Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) deberí­a elegir al mejor candidato para las elecciones presidenciales de 2012, incluso si esa persona no fuese un Panista. La sugerencia provocó inmediatamente una riña en el PAN. El presidente del partido, Gustavo Madero, rechazó de plano la idea. Lo más notable es que el predecesor de Calderón como presidente, Vicente Fox (2000-2006), avaló la idea, incluso aunque Fox y Calderón han tenido desde hace tiempo relaciones difí­ciles, tanto personales como polí­ticas.

La sugerencia de Calderón es una admisión que no hay un obvio candidato del PAN para 2012. Su declaración también muestra que Ernesto Cordero, el ministro de finanzas, ya no es el candidato preferido de Calderón para la nominación del PAN. Algunos dicen que Calderón puede haber avalado a Heriberto Félix Guerra, el ministro de bienestar, que técnicamente no es miembro del PAN, aunque él es miembro de la aristocracia del PAN, a través de su esposa, Lorena Clouthier. Ella es la hija del enormemente popular lí­der del PAN, Manuel Clouthier, que murió en un sospechoso accidente automovilí­stico el 1 de octubre de 1989.

Calderón hizo su incendiario comentario en un discurso ante el comité nacional del PAN. Además de Fox, el lí­der del PAN en el senado, José González Morfí­n, también avaló la noción de un candidato independiente. González Morfí­n señaló que el partido habí­a apoyado frecuentemente a independientes para gobernaciones de estado y alcaldes de ciudades. Fox también apoyo la idea que figuras completamente independientes sean autorizadas a competir por la presidencia. Bajo la actual ley electoral, solamente candidatos nominados por partidos registrados pueden competir por la presidencia.

El Estado
Los dos principales partidos de la oposición en el Estado de México, el Partido Acción nacional (PAN) y el Partido de la revolución Democrática (PRD), han acordado celebrar un referéndum sobre si deben ir en una alianza en las elecciones del estado el 3 de julio. La votación es importante porque eso afectará a Enrique Peña Nieto, el actual gobernador del Estado y favorito para la presidencia en 2012. Si Peña Nieto no logra que su sucesor designado sea electo, probablemente sus aspiraciones presidenciales habrán terminado. En el papel, el candidato de una alianza podrí­a derrotar a la opción de Peña Nieto.

El referéndum, que no será vinculante, se celebrará el 27 de marzo. Nadie sabe cuántas personas participarán debido a que el referéndum no tiene precedentes. Todos los votantes tendrán que probar que viven en el Estado. Los organizadores, Alianza Cí­vica y Propuesta Cí­vica calculan que 350.000 personas podrí­an votar, aunque en el Estado viven 14m personas. La pregunta en el referéndum es: ¿Está usted de acuerdo que el PAN y el PRD deben formar una alianza para apoyar a un candidato único y un programa de gobierno conjunto? Tiene tres respuestas posibles: “Sí­", “No" y “No sé".

• Cassez

La corte suprema ha acordado considerar el caso de Florence Cassez, una mujer francesa que ha sido sentenciada a 60 años en cárceles mexicanas por secuestro y gangsterismo. Su condena, y la negativa de México de permitir que ella cumpla su sentencia en Francia, han conducido a una disputa diplomática entre Francia y México.

El abandono del neoliberalismo en América Latina ha sido particularmente estridente desde fines de los '90, cuando Hugo Chávez fue electo presidente de Venezuela. Sin embargo, no es un nuevo fenómeno: casi al mismo tiempo que las polí­ticas liberales -o "reformas", como fueron llamadas por sus proponentes- fueron introducidas, algunos polí­ticos comenzaron a hacer campaña, si no para su total rechazo, al menos para dar a las polí­ticas "un rostro humano". Mucha de la consiguiente desilusión con las polí­ticas y los polí­ticos se debió a que el neoliberalismo no produjo lo que habí­a prometido inicialmente, y por el fracaso de sus crí­ticos en darle ese "rostro humano".

El neoliberalismo no fue un conjunto homogéneo de prescripciones de polí­ticas económicas -tampoco, en todo caso, fue adoptado en su totalidad, incluso por los que aplicaron sus principios centrales. Ha sido identificado con el Consenso Washington de 1990 que, en realidad, fue un documento tentativo descriptivo, más que prescriptito y terminó siendo una pantalla en la cual cualquiera podrí­a proyectar sus odios particulares.

En su centro estaba la convicción que el estado, grande e intervencionista, debido a la experimentación de larga data con la industrialización basada en sustitución de importaciones, debí­a reducirse para que de esa manera permitir el libre juego de las fuerzas del mercado.

Los medios incluí­an reformas como liberalización comercial y la privatización de las empresas del estado, desregulación, y una ajustada disciplina fiscal para mantener a raya la amenaza de la inflación. Algunos gobiernos prefirieron adoptarlo de manera contundente, no a través de una gradual transición, y se prestó poca atención a la secuencia de las reformas. Los gobiernos (con la notable excepción de la administración Menem en Argentina) fueron comprensiblemente cautelosos en adoptar todo el paquete. La privatización, por ejemplo, no se hizo extensiva a las empresas estatales de petróleo y minerí­a, que proveí­an una parte sustancial de los ingresos fiscales.

En una década quedó claro que las reformas impactaron en los grandes números macroeconómicos, pero no proveyeron los esperados beneficios en términos de empleo, reducción de la pobreza y bienestar social.

Los gobiernos y los acreedores multilaterales insistieron en que las reformas fueron fructí­feras, y que era necesario lo que se llamó "reformas de segunda generación", para corregir los muy visibles defectos; y así­ dar al paquete la "cara humana" de la que aún carecí­a.

Fue en ese momento que un grupo de polí­ticos y académicos de varios paí­ses latinoamericanos, conocido como el Grupo Mangabeira en Brasil, y el Grupo Castañeda en México, produjo la primera alternativa exhaustiva al neoliberalismo, con un admitido tinte de "centro-izquierda".

Reteniendo el compromiso de sostener el equilibrio fiscal y de mantener a raya la inflación, propusieron reconstruir un estado fuerte (capaz de invertir en el pueblo y de actuar como socio en empresas privadas, particularmente firmas pequeñas y medianas) y financiarlo con una sólida base impositiva, pero manteniendo el equilibrio fiscal a un alto nivel de gasto público (no menos de 30% del PBI, que era más del doble del nivel de México en ese entonces); construir ahorros internos y canalizarlos a la producción; y otorgar prioridad a la educación.

Entre los miembros del grupo estaban dos futuros presidentes -Vicente Fox, de México y Ricardo Lagos, de Chile- como también al menos media docena de quienes más tarde ocuparí­an posiciones ministeriales y de asesorí­a en varios gobiernos en la región. No tuvieron éxito en que algún gobierno aplique su menú alternativo, y su Alternativa Latinoamericana de 1997 se desvaneció de la vista y de las mentes.

Las reformas de segunda generación no tuvieron mejor resultado: se desvelaron en ví­speras de la crisis financiera de 1998, que afectó a gran parte de América Latina, incluidas las tres grandes economí­as, una de las cuales (la de Argentina, que habí­a adoptado totalmente las "reformas") pronto se hundirí­a en una de sus peores recesiones. Lo que siguió ha sido descrito como un giro a la izquierda de casi toda la región, donde abjurar o criticar fuertemente al neoliberalismo emergió como la posición principal para atraer votos.

Así­ como la ostensible adopción del paquete neoliberal no significó aplicar el menú completo, tampoco la dura crí­tica al neoliberalismo se tradujo en un rechazo total de las reformas. Después de otra década más, a los remanentes del paquete original (equilibrio fiscal y fuerte posición anti-inflacionaria) se les dio el crédito, de manera algo simple, por la reducción de las tasas de pobreza y la reasunción del alto crecimiento.

Ahora es bien conocido que gobernantes de centro-izquierda "moderados", como Lula da Silva de Brasil y Michelle Bachelet de Chile, están comprometidos con fuerza a mantener la disciplina presupuestaria con estándares europeos y más, y frenar aún la más leve insinuación de presión inflacionaria.

Los lí­deres más "radicales" (Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador), no se han volcado al gasto deficitario prevaleciente en los años previos a los '80. Acabaron con su dependencia del financiamiento del FMI (como lo hicieron Brasil y Argentina), pero han sido prudentes en el ejercicio de la libertad resultante de la polí­tica de tutelaje del FMI.

La iniciativa Alba de Hugo Chávez , que comenzó como una alternativa al ALCA (al que se sigue oponiendo y atacando luego de su desaparición), es presentada ahora como un modelo de integración regional sobre principios opuestos al neoliberalismo. Eso trajo consigo el surgimiento de Venezuela como financista de proyectos económicos y sociales, como también un acreedor alternativo de último recurso para sus socios (en el caso de Argentina, acreedor de primer recurso). También incluyó la adopción de mecanismo de comercio administrado (un antiguo rasgo de las relaciones entre Brasil y Argentina) y la posibilidad de comercio compensado (una especie de trueque).

Este informe examina el cambiante contenido del neoliberalismo desde fines de los '80, los resultados económicos casi dos décadas después, y la conformación emergente de lo que muchos llaman el escenario "post-neoliberal" de América Latina, incluyendo el panorama actual de lí­deres empresariales y la ausencia de signos de alguna alternativa estructurada al menú neoliberal.

Uruguay's biggest exporter of fresh citrus fruits is aiming to have increased its exports by 30% this year. It intends to boost sales in Asia, and to break into the US market where prices are high. Its production target is 80,000t.  

Citrí­cola Salteña was founded in 1945. It is part of the Grupo Caputto. During the orange harvest, which lasts from February to November, the company employs 7% of the province of Salto's working population (or around 2,500 people). The company focuses on producing oranges and tangerines, rather than grapefruit and lemons.  

Last year its exports came to US$16m. The company brands its exports as Naranjales Caputto (Caputto orange groves). The Caputto family owns 67% of the company and an Argentine company, San Miguel de Tucumán, the remaining third. This company is the world's biggest exporter of lemons. It also owns Uruguay's third-biggest citrus company, Milagro.  

Exports are vital for the company. Last year its total sales were US$17m, which means that the domestic market only bought US$1m worth of its fruit. Citrí­cola Salteña accounted for 45% of Uruguay's total citrus exports last year. The next biggest exporter, Urudor, accounted for 35%, and Milagro for about 15%.

The company reckons that of this year's production of 80,000t it will probably export 50,000t. Last year it exported about 39,000t. What is interesting is that the exports go, almost entirely, to remote markets. Less than 1% of the company's fruit is sold in regional markets. The company's traditional market is Europe, to which it has been exporting for more than 30 years.

The company wants to break into the US market because it is comparatively close. The problem is that the market is virtually closed. The only exporters allowed access are from Australia and defined zones in South Africa and Chile. The orange market is also noticeably less accessible than the lemon market. The lure of the US market is that prices there are more than 50% higher than those in the European Union. Navels, which sell for about US$8 per 15-kg box in the EU fetch between US$18 and US$22 a box in the US.  

The reason why the US market is so much more lucrative is that the domestic lobby protecting it is strong. The lobby is keeping a lot of exporters out by raising concerns about fitosanitary standards. Uruguayan exporters have to produce academic research on the incidence of fruit pests in the country before their fruit is even considered eligible.  

Uruguay as a whole is exporting about 100,000t of oranges a year. In the past few years, the export tonnage has fluctuated between 90,000t and 110,000t.  

Now the company claims to be developing the Southeast Asian market. This is quite a challenge logistically since it takes almost two months to ship the fruit, in refrigerated conditions, from the grove to the market. As Jorge Caputto, the managing director, pointed out, maintaining quality control under such conditions can be difficult. He claims that his company has managed to do this, and has thus opened up new markets which have, traditionally, a high consumption of fruit.  

Citrí­cola Salteña has high hopes of the Chinese market. In September, it made its first trial shipment of oranges to China. Last October, the country reached an agreement on fitiosanitary standards and is currently subjecting its products to Chinese inspectors. Caputto pointed out that just getting into the Chinese market will not be enough: he said that the market will only grow when the big supermarket chains establish themselves in the country and set up the logistical network which will enable fresh fruit to be distributed across the country.  

Caputto said that despite this the constraint on increasing exports to Asia was more likely to be his company's ability to grow the oranges rather than China's ability to eat them. He said that he expected exports to Southeast Asia to be around 5,000t this year and double or triple in the next couple of years

Caputto classes South Africa as his company's major competitor. Like Uruguay, South African fruit exporters have also benefited from a major devaluation in the past couple of years, On top of this, labour in South Africa is much cheaper and its climate is ideal for citrus growing. Cheap fruit from South Africa has displaced Uruguayan fruit from price driven markets such as Russia, though Caputto claims that the company is trying to recapture lost ground there.  

The world market for citrus fruit changes throughout the year according to domestic production seasons. For example, the Europe Union market becomes virtually closed from 15 October, when domestic production reaches the market.  

The citrus business is pretty capital intensive. It takes between six and nine years for a new grove to come into production. There is one crop a year. Caputto says that the length of time to bring a new grove into production means that companies have to be very careful about choosing which variety of orange to grow. The most popular variety at the moment is the tough Valencia, which can stand being frozen and shipped. Other varieties have thinner skin, are sweeter or seedless.

Caputto added that national market was very particular about the fruit it bought. He said that the French and the British, for example, had very different tastes and that it was impossible to sell even a kilo of one sort of fruit in the other market.  

Caputto said that the company was just about to start using the El Espinillar grove. This covers 800 hectares and should increase its production capacity by between 15,000t and 20,000t a year over the next two or three years. This year the grove will produce about 2,000t.  

Marketing
When Citrí­cola Salteña first started to export, it used to sell to fruit brokers who would then sell on to the final customer. Now the big supermarket chains want to forge links with producers, so the company sells the bulk of its fruit directly to them. This means that the company packs fruit according to the demands of the customer.  

One of Citrí­cola Salteña's big European customers is Asda, which is now owned by the huge US retailer, Wal-Mart. The company packs the oranges in Asda nets, complete with prices and bar codes, ready for the shelf and the checkout. It does the same for Carrefour in France. By doing this, the retailer cuts costs. The advantage for Citrí­cola Salteña is that the retailer is tied more closely to them.  

Each orange is graded in one of 11 categories and packed with others which fall into the same category. The grading is done by hand and all non-standard oranges are pulped for juice. The company has its own juice plant, which it uses to supply the local market and for export. The juice is exported frozen, while the fresh fruit is exported chilled.  

The company sprays the fruit with gases, mostly ethylene, to standardise the appearance of the fruit, and to stop it appearing green. Caputto said that this was not as gruesome as it sounds. He pointed out that fruit such as satsumas mature from the inside, but their skins do not appear ripe. The ethylene, which is used in a high humidity chamber, triggers a reaction with the chlorophyll which changes to colour the skin of the fruit. The colour is then preserved by waxing the fruit.

The opposition to President Hugo Chávez fears that the government may have got its timing right. The recall referendum on the president, scheduled for 15 August, will come just as the economy feels the effect of higher government spending. The government is able to spend more because the average export price for the country's oil has been 50% higher than it budgeted.

Opposition economists claim that even this year's decent growth will do little to reduce poverty levels and income disparities. The opposition, which is largely rightwing, argues that the government needs to do more to free the economy and allow people to make more economic decisions. The private sector claims that the economy is becoming increasingly state-run and that this will not produce growth and efficiency.

The opposition economists have a point. Although growth in the first quarter was the fastest since quarterly records began in 1993, at 29.8%, the actual level of output is still not up to where it was in 1994, which was the second worst of any year. The worst year was 2003. Despite the recovery in the first quarter, output is still 6% below what it was in the first quarter of 2002 and 13.5% below what it was in 1998. 

Industrialists say that the economy will take between seven and 10 years to recover from the disaster of 2003. The irony is that the industrialists inflicted the crisis on themselves in their misguided effort to bring the government down at the end of 2002 and beginning of 2003, when they all-but crippled the state owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela. The opposition and its supporters, however, blame the government for the mess. The Confederación de Industriales claims that 6,989 companies have closed since 1998. Now there are only 4,500 companies operating in the country: this is 49% of the number in 1998. More tellingly, the Conindustria claims that between 1959 and 1998, capital flight was US$32.2bn. Between 1999 and 2002 capital flight was US$33.18bn.

Conindustria's other indictment is that while the economy grew by 26% every five years since 1959, since 1998 it has contracted by 28%. Equally, between 1969 and 1998, non-traditional exports grew by 81% every five years, but between 1988 and 2003, non-traditional exports fell by 5%.

• The formal campaign for the recall referendum on President Hugo Chávez began on 3 July. The referendum is due to be held on 15 August. The most reliable of the recent opinion polls, from Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, points to a win for Chávez . The poll was commissioned by the opposition, but leaked to the Reuters news agency. The poll showed that support for Chávez had doubled in the past three months and that voters were pretty much split between supporting him and the opposition. A split vote would be enough to secure victory for Chávez , since the opposition has to get a majority of votes in the recall referendum and more votes than Chávez did when he was elected: 3.76m.

The bleak outlook for the opposition means that it is falling prey to wishful thinking. An example of this is the salacious report on what happened at the meeting between Chávez and the opposition-supporting media magnate, Gustavo Cisneros, on 18 June. The report claims that Cisneros delivered a secret report by the US detailing foreign bank accounts held by senior officials in the Chávez administration. Handing over blackmail material is not what Cisneros himself says he did at the meeting. He said that a former US president, Jimmy Carter, set up the meeting with Chávez and that there was no agenda and no negotiating at the meeting, just chat. 

The Carter Center confirmed this version of events: it said that the meeting was designed to promote dialogue and the appropriate mood for the forthcoming referendum. Besides Carter, Chávez , and Cisneros, William Urry, a specialist in negotiation and conflict resolution from Harvard University, was also present at the 18 June meeting in a Caracas military base.

The fevered political situation took another surprising turn on 2 April when a former president, Abadalá Bucaram, returned from exile after all charges and criminal convictions against him were annulled by the supreme court president Guillermo Castro. The return of Bucaram has stirred the opposition to President Lucio Gutiérrez.

The political outlook may be murky, but the economic prospects are clearer. High oil prices have enabled the government to buy off the most vociferous of its critics and it has not made the mistake of previous administrations, which threatened to cut the country's lavish cooking-gas subsidy. The technical changes the Gutiérrez government made, early in its term, to the way it sold oil in the international market have paid off. The state-owned oil company, Petroecuador, reported that in 2004 it sold oil at an average price of US$37.7 a barrel. 

This is impressive. Neither Petróleos Mexicanos nor Petróleos de Venezuela, the region's other major oil exporters of moderate and high sulphur crude oils, managed an average price of more than US$32 a barrel in 2004. Petroecuador said that the average export price for the first quarter of 2005 was US$39.85 a barrel. 

Petroecuador provided the government with US$2.1bn in 2004. Petroecuador and royalties and taxes on private-sector oil companies provide the government with about 35% of its budget. 

The total revenues of Petroecuador, whose output comes to 204,000bpd, came to US$3.9bn in 2004 (US$1.955bn from its exports alone) and US$2.07bn from sales of fuel and other oil products in the domestic market. The country's total oil production was about 500,000bpd in 2004 and exports were worth US$3.9bn.

Unemployment: The rate rose to 12% in February from 11.5% in January, the central bank said.

Debt: The foreign public sector debt fell 0.5% in February to US$10.88bn compared with US$10.93bn in January.

GDP: In the fourth quarter of 2004 this was up by 4.5% year-on-year, the central bank reported.

The soya crop is likely to be about 20% lower this year because of the drought that began in November 2005. GM soya is the worst affected, because it was planted first and has suffered most damage, the Coordinadora Agrí­cola de Paraguay said.

Drought has become a regular problem for the country's farmers in the past three years. Soya yields have fallen substantially: in 2003, they were 2.9t per hectare, but they were down to 2t/h in 2005.

The soya crop is usually harvested between December and April, but this year the crop is likely to be in by the beginning of March because of the drought.

Soya is the country's biggest single export. The 2004/05 crop came to about 4m t. The central bank said that exports were worth US$530m in 2005.

Clothes: The country's textile exports rose by 31% in 2005, according to the Asociación Industrial de Confeccionistas, though the figures are from a comparatively small level. The AIC said that textile exports were US$21m in 2005 compared with US$18m in 2004. The AIC said that 81% of the country's textile exports went to the other members of the Mercosur, with Argentina accounting for 58% of all exports. Outside the Mercosur the biggest two markets are the US and Mexico which accounted for 4% and 3% respectively.

Inflation: Inflation in the first 11 months of 2005 was 10.5%. In the whole of 2004, the rate was 2.8%.

The central bank reported that the economy grew by 11.3% in the first nine months of this year, compared with the same period of 2005. The central bank governor, Héctor Váldez Albizu, forecast that the economy would achieve double digit growth for the full year.

Váldez claimed that the economy was already setting records because never before had it registered five consecutive quarters of double digit year-on-year growth. In the third quarter, the year-on-year growth rate was 10.3%. The most dynamic sectors are communications (26%); agriculture (15%) and construction (30%). Retail is also doing well, up 10.7% in the third quarter, year-on-year.

Opposition politicians say that there is little evidence of this growth delivering higher living standards. They say that ordinary people are seeing prices rise because higher fuel prices are pushing up the retail prices of goods and services.An IMF team travelled to Santo Domingo at the beginning of November to discuss the country's economic outlook and the detail of the fiscal reform.

The IMF's director of its monetary and exchange division, Peter Stella, said that the country was on the way to emerging from its economic crisis but needed further fiscal reform. Stella approved of the central bank's plan to reduce its debt by injecting government resources by issuing domestic bonds. 

Tourism: The key tourist industry is in good shape. In the first nine months of this year, the number of tourists is up by 10% to over 2.6m according to figures from the tourism minister, Félix Jiménez. The big rise has been in the number of Canadian visitors: their numbers are up by 22%. The number of British visitors is up by 17%. The number of Spanish visitors is up by 6%. 

Jiménez is pleased by the surge from new markets in Eastern Europe. The number of Russian tourists is up by 691% and the number of Poles visiting the country jumped by 318%.

The industry should grow further with the inauguration of the new airport at Samana which opened, with a flight to Germany, at the beginning of November. The new airport, the country's seventh capable of handling long haul jets, will start flights to Italy and Spain in November and from December will have flights to Spain and Italy. From 2007, Samana will have flights to Britain.

Jiménez reckons that the total number of tourists this year will hit 4m, up from 3.6m in 2005.Tourism is the country's biggest foreign exchange earner followed by remittances and exports from freezones. 

Inflation: The central bank reckons that the economy will hit the inflation target for 2006 which is for an annual rate of 6%. In 2005 the rate was 7.4%.

The Right is trying to allege that there is something fishy about the country's inflation figures, even though the rate in August was the highest for four months. The central bank president, Martí­n Redrado, was the first to give the issue a stir, by saying that the bank was deeply concerned about inflation. The Right desperately needs some issue which it can inflate into an obstacle to prevent Cristina Fernández, the wife of the current president, Néstor Kirchner, winning the presidency in the first round at the end of October.

Redrado's comment, made at an investor conference in London, drew a sharp comment from President Kirchner. He telephoned Redrado and demanded that he clarify his comments. Feebly, Redrado backed down saying that all he meant was that every central banker was concerned by inflation.

What concerns economists and politicians is not so much the rate of inflation but whether the rate is being calculated honestly. The official rate, for Buenos Aires in August, was 0.6%. This meant that consumer prices had risen by 5% in the first eight months of the year and 8.7% in the past 12 months.

Economists point out that wholesale prices are rising faster than retail prices: this phenomenon shows the effect of subsidies and price controls on inflation. In August the wholesale price index jumped by 1.9%. If these sorts of rises fed through into retail prices, the country would be on course for a consumer price inflation rate of over 20% in 2007.

On 24 September the cabinet chief, Aní­bal Fernández, declared that "there is no inflation in Argentina". This was an about-turn from Fernández's previous comment, on 15 September, on the issue. Back then he said that inflation concerned all Argentines. Bizarrely, Fernández was commenting on the publication of the national inflation figure for August (IPC-Nacional) which showed consumer prices rising at 0.8% in the month.

Beyond Buenos Aires, inflation was particularly high in the provinces of San Luis (3.3%), Mendoza (1.5%) and Catamarca (1.1%). The wide disparity has led opposition commentators to suggest that the official statistics agency, Indec, is manipulating the figures for Buenos Aires. These accusations seem to be on the verge of forcing Beatriz Paglieri, responsible for Indec's inflation department, out of office. She was only appointed in February after Indec officials claimed that the government was rigging the figures.

What does not seem to add up is that government revenues and spending are surging, and domestic consumption is booming, yet none of this demand is feeding through into higher prices, even though most economists agree that there has been little investment in new capacity. The demand side of the economy is clearly running hot: unemployment, for example, is at a 15 year low which suggests that there must be some upward pressure on wages. Imports are also rising faster than exports.

The government has yet to increase utility prices, though it admits that the idea is under study. These have, effectively, been frozen since 2002 discouraging foreign investors from making the new investments, especially in the energy industry, that the economy needs. To be fair, there is still spare capacity in the telecoms industry, because there was so much over-investment before the crash came.

In August tax revenues were 37% higher than in August 2006 at Arg$17.87bn (US$5.6bn). In the first eight months of 2007 tax revenues were up by 32.7% at Arg$127.37bn. President Kirchner noted that in August alone value added tax receipts had gone up by Arg$1bn because of increased consumption. The Vat rate is 21%. In 2006, the government collected Arg$150bn in tax revenues. It had forecasts Arg$170bn in tax receipts for this year.

2008 budget: The government sent a draft budget to congress in mid September. The budget sets an exchange rate of Arg$3.20, pretty close to the current rate, and calls from GDP growth of 4%. This is likely to be another underestimate: the Kirchner government has developed the habit of picking a low growth figure and then using the windfall revenues produced by faster growth as it likes because the revenues are outside the budget and thus beyond congressional scrutiny. At the end of August the government announced supplementary spending of Arg$14.2bn. The government forecast 4% growth in the budget for 2007 but so far the rate has been about 8%. The government is running a fiscal surplus of 3.15% of GDP in 2007 which it will now increase to 4%. In cash terms the surplus is around Arg$20bn.
In 2008 the government forecasts that spending will increase by 15% and revenues by 16%. Tax revenues, it believes, will come close to Arg$200bn in 2007, so hit Arg$230bn in 2008.
Some officials in the economy ministry are concerned that the government is refusing to provide for the US$8.5bn it is scheduled to have to make in principal repayments on its foreign debt in 2008.

Subsidies: In 2008 the government expects to spend Arg$16.4bn in direct subsidies. This is 28% more than the budgeted cost of subsidies this year. On top of this the government will spend a further Arg$19.8bn in indirect subsidies, up 14% on the budget for 2007. There are 29 state companies, some of which are bankrupt, which receive subsidies. The bulk of the money being spent on subsidies is being spent on maintaining energy supplies. The other big items are subsidies on staple foods and hush payments to utility companies particular suburban train operators, which hold their prices at uncompetitive levels.

Industrial activity: Industrial output in the first eight months of 2007 was up by 6.3% on the same period of 2006, according to Indec. The August figure showed a spectacular 9.8% year-on-year rise thanks to a 31% increase in vehicle output; a 20% increase in metal bashers' output; a 17% in the output of industrial gases and a 14% increase in the publishing and printing industry. The industries which contracted in August (year-on-year) were dairying (down 11%); synthetic fibres (down 14%); rubber (down 15%) and basic petrochemicals (down 9%). Capacity utilisation was 75.5%, the highest since November 2006. In July, industrial output fell by 2.1%, month-on-month, following the introduction of energy saving measures by the government.

Poverty: The proportion of the urban population living in poverty stood at 23.4% at the end of June. The government pointed out that it was eight percentage points down on the end-June 2006 level. The rate peaked in October 2002 when 57.5% of the urban population was poverty-struck. This means that 5.6m people, living in cities, are not able to meet their basic needs for food, health, housing, education and transport. Of these people, 1.9m do not get enough to eat every day. The government says that a family of four needs an income of Arg$923 (US$291) a month to meet its basic needs. The most poverty-struck region of the country is the northeast where 41% of the urban population still lives in poverty. The most prosperous parts of the country are Buenos Aires, where poverty stands at under 12% and Patagonia where its is under 13%.

Honda: A Japanese car company, Honda said that it would invest US$100m to build a new car plant at Campana, 80km outside Buenos Aires. The factory will produce a new small car, which has yet to be launched. Production will start in 2009.

 

On 14 July the economy and planning minister, José Luis Rodrí­guez, officially warned Cubans that there would have to be “inevitable adjustments and restrictions" in the government's budget for 2009. He said that these were result of high food and fuel prices.

Food prices have risen sharply even though fuel prices are still cheap by international standards. A litre of petrol sells for 0.95 convertible pesos. The prices of non-subsidised foods in state shops jumped by 18% in May.

Nevertheless Rodrí­guez claimed that the economy would grow by 8% this year. Cuba still does not calculate gross domestic product, preferring a Caribbean variation of the old Eastern Bloc method of Net Material Product. This measures gross output, and takes little account of whether there is a market for the goods produced. In 2007 Rodrí­guez said that the economy grew by 7.5%.

The 8% forecast looks heroic, given that one of the country's most important exports, nickel, has seen its price fall by 38% so far this year. Nickel probably accounts for about half of the country's total exports.

Oil production, however, is up by 6% at 2.1m tonnes for the first half of 2008, the government says. The target for oil production in 2008 is 4m t (around 69,000 barrels per day). Gas would appear to account for much of the extra production. The country is meeting just over 43% of its energy consumption, of about 158,000bpd, from its own resources.

On the other hand, Cuba has to import 85% of the food it needs. It has become reliant on cheap supplies of food from the US. Even so, the rise in international food prices means that the government has had to find an extra US$2.6bn to buy the same volume of food.

This year Cuba is on course for a trade deficit of US$6bn. As it cannot borrow, the only way to fund the deficit is to cut non-essential spending. Companies doing business on the island are finding themselves to be the prime target. 

More tangibly, Rodrí­guez claimed that tourism numbers were up by between 14% and 15% in the first half of 2008, compared with the same period of 2007. He also said that agricultural output was up by 7.5% and industrial output by 6.2%. Rodrí­guez admitted that some sectors were not meeting targets: he singled out construction in particular.

Rodrí­guez gave an indication that economic policymaking is changing in Cuba by noting that wages were rising faster than productivity. He said that average wages were up by 4.6% (it is not clear over  what period) while productivity was up by 3.5%. It is also not clear what criteria Rodrí­guez is using to measure productivity and when the government started such analyses. The average monthly wage in Cuba is US$17.

The difficult economic background explains why President Raúl Castro is advancing so cautiously in implementing recently announced economic reforms, especially the removal of the salary cap. In a speech to the national assembly, meeting for the first of its brief biannual sessions in mid-July, Castro also announced a pension reform, including an increase in the retirement age.

Castro said it would be “unethical to create false expectations" over the removal of salary limits when the global economic situation “could even get worse." Instead he revealed Cubans would soon have to work for longer. In December, the national assembly will rubberstamp a reform to the pension system, lifting the retirement age by five years, to 65 for men and 60 for women. This is a response to demographic change. Official data indicates that by 2025, there will be 770,000 fewer citizens of working age than now.

Castro dressed up the reform as a sign that the quality of the healthcare system meant Cubans were living longer. The cost of pensions, which because they are unfunded are a direct burden on the government, is already high at 13.8% of declared budget spending.

Castro also attempted to answer mounting speculation that there is a rift at the heart of the communist party. He said that he had shown his speech to his brother Fidel who had praised it as “perfect". Earlier this month Fidel, usually reticent on Raúl's performance, eulogised his reforms and vehemently denied that he led a rival faction in the communist party.

Despite this show of unity, differences clearly exist between the two Castro brothers. Raúl's commitment to remove salary caps gradually differs markedly from Fidel. It provided the most widely quoted excerpt from his speech. “Socialism means social justice and equality, but equality of rights, of opportunities, not of income," he said.

Pebercan: In mid July a Canadian oil company, Pebercan claimed that the state oil company, Cupet, had not paid it for most of the oil it had produced since April. Pebercan has not made any payments for April and May and has failed to make the payments it agreed to clear debts run up in 2007. Cupet signed a deal with Pebercan in November 2007 to clear US$39.1m in arrears. Under the terms of the deal, Cupet should pay Pebercan US$118.9m by November 2008. Pebercan has been in operating Cuba since 1993. It is currently producing about 20,000bpd.

Local economists are becoming concerned about the fiscal deficit. In the past couple of years, the public sector's laxity was offset by the surpluses in the private sector. Now the central bank is becoming worried about the damage the growing fiscal deficit will do to the whole economy, which is already looking pretty weak.

In the year to March 2009, the economy contracted 6.2%. It is now in recession, after registering two consecutive quarters of falling output, although the Banco Central (BCCR) has yet to declare this officially. The central bank said that the worst performing sectors were: manufacturing , hotels, construction, agriculture and commerce, all of which were contracting. Only financial and business services, insurance and transport grew, year-on-year, in March but even their rates of growth were below that of March 2008. The scale of the slowdown is clear from the trade figures. In the first quarter of 2009, imports were 30% down on the same period of 2008, while exports were down by only 12%.

The economic slowdown is squeezing the government. On one side, tax revenues are falling, while on the other, its spending is having to rise. In 2008 the government's deficit was around 0.2% of GDP. In 2009 the total public sector deficit may be as high as 4% of GDP. This is pretty close the limit of what is financeable. On the revenue side, income tax receipts have fallen by 11% in real terms in the past six months. Sales tax receipts are down by 8%, while revenues from import tariffs are down by 13% over the same period.

On the spending side, the government's economy-drive, which lasted from February to November 2008, has fallen apart, largely under pressure from the need to do something to blunt the global economic downturn. It increased public sector pensions, wages and salaries and also increased spending on areas such as education. Businessmen are livid that the government has refused to cut taxes.

The problem for policymakers is that once the fiscal deficit starts to loom large, confidence in the currency, the government's inflation-management,  and the sustainablity of the balance of payments starts to waver. The central bank then normally has to respond by jacking up interest rates, which further slows the economy and worsens the fiscal deficit problem. Policymakers' lot is further complicated by the imminence of general elections. The country goes to the polls in 2010.

In the first four months of 2009 the fiscal deficit was US$220m. This is a big turnaround from the first four months of 2008, when the government ran a fiscal surplus of US$156m. The finance minister, Guillermo Zúñiga, blamed the global economic crisis for the change. In the first four months, the government's fiscal income came to US$1.31bn. This was 8.5% down on the same period of 2008. Revenues from import tariffs were down by 21% on the same period of 2008, thanks to falling import volumes. 

On the spending side, the government's expenditure was up by 20% on the first four months of 2008 at US$1.53bn. Zúñiga claims that despite the pressure on the government's finances, the deficit in 2009 will be only about US$800m (or 2.8% of GDP). He said that the government has already lined up a loan of US$500m from the World Bank to cover the bulk of the deficit. 

IBM: On 13 May IBM announced that it intended to hire at least 1,200 people in the country over the next couple of years. Peter Lynt, IBM's vice president for integrated operations, said that the company would hire university graduates  and specialists in administration, finance, human resources, engineering, economic forecasting and accounting. IBM set up in Costa Rica in 2004 and provides outsourced services for companies in 13 countres in the region. It currently operates from Heredia, 12 km north of San José and has 800 staff. In 2008, Foreign Direct Investment  (FDI) in the country came to US$2bn. This year the central bank expects it to be around US$1.33bn.

Jindal Steel & Power announced on 9 March that it intended to continue with the huge Mutún project, which entails total investment of US$21.bn and whereby Jindal will help build Bolivia's first steel mill.

The Mutún project is the most important foreign investment project in the country under President Evo Morales. It is a template for the proposed development of the country's huge lithium deposits at Uyuni.

Before Jindal's announcement, Morales had warned Jindal that it would be stripped of the Mutún concession unless it agreed to continue with the project by 19 March. The project has been bedeviled by delays, the most important of which were caused by the government's inability to provide Jindal with the land it had promised the company.

At a meeting in La Paz on 9 March, the mining minister, José Pimentel, and Jindal's vice president, Vikrant Gujral, agreed that the project was still on course and that the company would invest the required US$2.1bn over the next eight years.

Pimentel subsequently pointed out that in the past three years Jindal has actually invested only US$20m in the project. Under the terms of the contract, signed in 2007, Jindal should have invested a minimum of US$30m a year in the first five years of the project and then US$200m a year in the subsequent three years.

Mutún has 40bn t of various metals, mostly iron ore and manganese. Jindal has access to half the deposit. The government is trying to ginger up Jindal by announcing that it will set up its own iron ore company to develop its half of the Mutún deposit in parallel with Jindal.  This new company, the Empresa Siderúrgica Mutún (ESM), will have a budget of US$1.1bn.

Both imports and exports rose strongly in 2010. According to the central bank, imports rose 21% year-on-year in the first 11 months to reach US$7.57bn. Full year exports rose 25% to US$6.76bn, according to unofficial estimates from a thinktank, Instituto Uruguay XX1.

Even though imports surged in 2010 they did not reach the record level hit in 2008. In the first 11 months of 2010, imports were about US$890m short of their 2008 level. The absolute figures though are misleading, because in 2008 imports were inflated by unusually large volumes of oil imports and electricity. These were needed because of a drought, which idled a large part of the country's hydro-electricity capacity. In the first 11 months of 2008 oil and energy imports came to US$2.56bn: in the comparable period of 2010 these imports came to US$1.38bn.

So, excluding oil and electricity, imports were a record in 2010. Excluding these two categories, exports amounted to US$6.2bn in the first 11 months; this was 30% up on the same period of 2009 and 5% up on 2008.

Imports of consumer goods, thanks to the appreciation of the peso, were strong. In the first 11 months consumer goods imports were up 34% year-on-year, at US$1.8bn. This was also 20% up on the first 11 months of 2008. Sales of new cars, all of which are imported, set a new record of over 40,000 in 2010. The country also imported 755,000 new TVs in 2010, worth US$90m. This may have been fanned by the World Cup, in which Uruguay's team did astonishingly well.

Imports of capital goods were also strong in 2010, up 24% in the first 11 months of the year. Although the overall figure was only just ahead of the comparable figure for 2008, the bald data is again misleading. In 2008 the national airline, Pluna, invested heavily in new planes. It s also worth noting that the private sector accounted for the bulk of the capital goods imports. The public sector has actually trimmed its purchases of capital goods.

Imports of intermediate goods, excluding oil and electricity, were up by 30% in the first 11 months of 2010 compared with the same period of 2009.

Overall, the country probably ran a small trade surplus in 2010, even though official figures have only been published up to September. According to the Instituto Uruguay XXI, the country's exports amounted to US$6.76bn in 2010, a new record. If the Instituto's figure is validated by the official data, the country will have exported 14% more than it managed in its previous record year of 2008.

It is also worth noting that the official export figure does not include exports from free zones. The most important of these is the controversial UPM cellulose plant on the River Uruguay. The UPM plant is the country's biggest ever foreign direct investment and most of its output is exported. Free zones trade does appear in the balance of payments (bop) figures, which shows that in the first nine months of 2010 the country had total foreign sales revenues of US$7.7bn. This is 20% up on 2009 and 8% above the 2008 record. The bop statistics suggest that the economy had total foreign sales revenues of over US$10bn in 2010.

What is important is that export volumes are rising as well as export revenues. This suggests very strongly that the export boom will continue. The country's exporters seem alert to changes in market demand. For example a decade ago the country produced virtually no soya: in 2010 it exported 2m t, worth US$700m. In 2010 the volume of soya exported was up 80%. The country has also increased its wheat exports, which in 2010 were worth US$350m. On the other hand, meat exports fell in volume terms by about 7% though they were up 15% in revenue terms thanks to higher prices. Exports of dairy products jumped 50%, also thanks to higher prices, while volumes sold were virtually unchanged.

It is easy to see why the US is alarmed by President Hugo Chávez . Yesterday the Venezuelan government said that it wanted to demonstrate that it was a reliable source of oil for the US, so it would dispatch up to eight extra tankers to the US. The Venezuelan energy ministry said that this was designed to help deal with the problems caused by the power cuts in the northeast a fortnight ago. The tankers will carry unleaded petrol.

A few hours later, however, President Chávez was spouting off about how the US Free Trade in the Americas (FTAA) initiative was neo-colonialist. He said, at a meeting to announce the new wage deal for public sector workers, that the FTAA represented a return to neo-colonialism. Chávez prefers his Alternativa Bolivariana para América. He claims that multilaterals, such as the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the IMF, are also agents of neo-colonialism.

The government claims that its oil production has now hit 3.11m bpd, up from 3.09m bpd. This is significantly higher than industry experts and other outsiders who say that production is about 2.6m bpd. Until the two month strike-cum-lockout started in December last year, the country was producing 3.2m bpd and exporting 2.5m bpd. At the height of the strike, production may have fallen to as little as 300,000bpd. In the first seven months of the year, the country exported 302.2m barrels of crude. Of this 71% went to the US.

The 2002-2003 coffee harvest was 'the worst for 40 years' according to the Consejo Salvadoreño del Café (CSC). The harvest totalled 1.3m (60-kg) bags. The director of the CSC, Ricardo Espitia, said that the future looked equally bleak, adding that the 2003-2004 harvest is estimated to fall to 1.25m bags. 

Espitia said that El Salvador is looking into the possibility of applying a scheme introduced by Brazil last year under which coffee producers are entitled to sell a percentage of their coffee for a minimum price, taking production costs as a reference. This operates as a kind of insurance policy, guaranteeing the producer a reasonable price even when the price of coffee on world markets falls below this level. Other Central American countries, along with Mexico and Colombia, are also analysing the scheme. 

The principal importers of Salvadorean coffee are the US (42.1%), Germany (23.7) and Japan (7.5%).

The latest economic statistics point to an improving economy. The closely watched industrial output figures from the Confederação Nacional da Indí»stria showed a significant pick up in the amount of hours worked in September and the use of installed capacity. The other piece of good economic news was that inflation for October was just 0.29%, well down on September's 0.78%.

The inflation figure was some way below what independent economists had been forecasting (which ranged between 0.4% and 0.6%). This points to another, probably substantial, cut in interest rates, at the central bank's monetary policy meeting on 18 and 19 November. The initial reaction was to forecast a one percentage point cut: before the inflation figure was announced the market was expecting a smaller cut because of the increasingly strong signs of economic recovery. A one point cut will take rates down to 18%.

The CNI's use of installed capacity in September was up by 0.9% to 79.9%. In September 2002, the index stood at 80.9%. The number of people employed was up by 0.12% and wages were up by 0.05%.

The Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) has said that it is willing to free the five foreign tourists it is holding before the end of the year provided that the Colombian government grants it a demilitarised zone for the handover process. Bogotá wants greater clarification from the rebels, who have been holding the hostages - four Israelis and one Briton - since September.

'As a show of our maturity and willingness to avoid a tragedy, we intend to free the hostages, hopefully before the end of the year. For this to happen, we need the government to withdraw troops from the area where the liberation will take place to guarantee the security both of the hostages and our units,' the rebels said in a statement issued yesterday, 15 December.

The ELN said on 9 December that there was no chance of it freeing the hostages before Christmas as it originally intended. The rebels said that the offensive operations being carried out by the Colombian military in search of the hostages not only made their liberation impossible but also jeopardised their lives. However, the ELN now seems willing to compromise after a humanitarian commission, comprising members of the church and the government as well as UN representatives, last week visited the Sierra Nevada region, which the rebels claim is suffering a humanitarian crisis.