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PARAGUAY | New finance minister appointed. President Horacio Cartes swore-in Lea Giménez as Paraguay’s first-ever female finance minister on 6 June. Giménez replaced Santiago Peña, who resigned in order to pursue the presidential candidacy of the ruling Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC) for the 2018 elections.

Giménez, who had been serving as Peña’s deputy, said she would continue the policies of her predecessor, especially as regards issuing more debt to bankroll public investment. The ANR-PC will hold party primaries this December when internal factions opposed to Cartes retaining his influence over the party will seek to rally behind a candidate to defeat Peña.

Haiti’s President Jovenel Moïse has paid his first official visit to Taiwan since taking office in February 2017. The visit, which took place from 26 May to 2 June, attracted particular attention coming weeks after neighbouring Dominican Republic announced it was cutting ties with Taiwan in favour of mainland China (the latter reportedly offered US$3.1bn in investment and loans) [WR-18-17]. Reports of Chinese interest in rebuilding Haiti’s capital Port-au-Prince are fuelling speculation that the Moïse government could follow suit.

Accompanied by a 30-member delegation which included the presidents of the senate and lower chamber (Joseph Lambert and Gary Bodeau, respectively) as well as Foreign Minister Antonio Rodrigue, President Moïse signed a joint communique with Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen which, according to the Taiwanese government, “will further bilateral cooperation in multiple fields to benefit the people of both countries”. According to the same press release, the two agreed to establish “a high-level taskforce that will draft, within 60 days, new terms of collaboration on economic and infrastructure development in Haiti as well as potential ways to attract more Taiwanese investors to the Caribbean country”.

Yet the statement omits mention of any aid package, saying only that the leaders would “also like to see meaningful contacts between representatives of the business communities of the two countries”. Instead the two leaders announced that Taiwan, which now has just 18 allies in the world after the West African state of Burkina Faso revealed last month that it was breaking ties in favour of mainland China, was granting Haiti a US$150m low-interest loan to upgrade its rural power grids.

Chinese interest

Moïse’s professed commitment to Taiwan comes amid reports that two Chinese companies, Southwest Municipal Engineering Design and Research Institute and the Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC), a state-owned construction firm, have reportedly been negotiating with Port-au-Prince mayor Youri Chevry over a US$4.7bn plan to rebuild Port-au-Prince and transform it into a more modern city. According to the Miami Herald, a letter sent by Chevry in August 2017 to Southwest adviser Xie Yong Jian, confirmed that the municipal government had accepted the proposal.

Among other things, the proposal includes a reconstructed city centre and roads as well as a major 600MW power station; a water distribution network of nearly 900 km; and a sewerage network which includes wastewater treatment plants.

Sica secretary general in Taiwan

Indicative of continued efforts to shore up ties with Central America (which, bar Costa Rica and Panama continues to favour relations with Taipei over Beijing), President Tsai last month received the secretary-general of the Central American Integration System (Sica), Guatemala’s former president Vinicio Cerezo (1986-1991).

In an official press release Tsai said that the two “enjoy long-standing ties, as evidenced by the more than 120 cooperative projects implemented by the two sides since 1992”, while listing ongoing initiatives which span agriculture, medical care and talent cultivation.

Since 2000, Taiwan has offered technical and financial cooperation to the sub-region as an extra-regional observer of Sica.

• Varela names Panama’s FTA negotiator with China

On 24 May, Panama’s President Juan Carlos Varela appointed Alberto Alemán Arias as Panama’s chief negotiator for talks about a free trade agreement (FTA) with China. A presidential press release notes that Alemán, currently the director of the trade & industry ministry’s investment and export promotion agency (Proinvex), will be in charge of coordinating Panama’s actions and strategies in the trade talks with all public entities and the private sector. The announcement comes nearly a year after Panama announced that it was switching diplomatic ties from Taiwan to mainland China.

“We will cover most of Venezuela’s needs…we have that capacity.” With these words Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pledged his country’s economic and political support for the government led by President Nicolás Maduro during an official visit to Venezuela this week. Much like Venezuela, Turkey is also currently wrestling with an economic crisis marked by rampant inflation and a loss of confidence in the domestic currency. But both Maduro and Erdoğan were keen to project that bilateral economic cooperation could help overcome their problems. Whether either will be in a position to bail out the other is a moot point and cooperation could be designed to give each leader a little more breathing space.

Erdoğan became the first Turkish head of state to visit Venezuela when he arrived in Caracas on 2 December for a two-day official visit following his participation in the G-20 summit in Argentina. No official agenda for the visit was published before Erdoğan’s arrival but the speculation was that he and Maduro would seek to seal a series of economic agreements that could help their respective governments overcome the sanctions imposed on them by the US. After holding a private meeting, Maduro and Erdoğan announced the signing of eight economic cooperation agreements covering the areas of oil and mining.

No details of the agreements have been provided but at an ensuing forum attended by businessmen from both countries on 3 December, Maduro and Erdoğan said that they wanted to boost bilateral trade and investments, with €4.5bn (US$5.1bn) in investments in Venezuela. Noting that Turkey is the world’s fifteenth-largest economy, Erdoğan said that his country could satisfy Venezuelan demand for industrial, manufactured, and food products. However, he called for an improvement in the business environment in Venezuela to help attract more Turkish investments. He also blamed US economic sanctions on Venezuela and Turkey for creating instability.

For his part, Maduro offered “full institutional and security guarantees” for Turkish investments in Venezuela, flagging up the attractions of the national mining sector. Last month the US government issued sanctions targeting Venezuela’s gold mining sector, which it claims is being exploited by the Maduro government to make illicit transactions, with Turkey believed to be one of the main buyers of illicit Venezuelan gold. But Maduro said there was scope for Turkey to invest in gold mining in Venezuela, and in the extraction of other minerals including cobalt, diamonds, and iron ore. “We could partner up on mining development, not just gold trading…but direct exploitation,” Maduro said. However, in a sign that the pledges made by Erdoğan are not sufficient to ease the problems faced by the Maduro administration ahead of the start of another presidential term, following the visit, Maduro announced that he was embarking on a trip to Russia to hold a “necessary” meeting with President Vladimir Putin on 5 December.

Another salary increase

President Nicolás Maduro decreed a 150% increase to the national minimum salary on 29 November. This is the sixth salary increase decreed by Maduro this year but the first since he launched a new economic package in August that included the freezing of foodstuff prices, the adoption of a new currency, and other measures aimed at tackling Venezuela’s hyperinflation.

Maduro said that the latest salary increase was another “correction factor” that formed part of the economic package that would help to combat the loss of workers’ purchasing power in Venezuela. The new minimum salary now stands at BS4,500 per month, which is equivalent to just US$52 per month at the official exchange and to around US$10 per month at the black-market exchange rate that is more accessible to ordinary Venezuelans.

Maduro emphasised that the minimum salary increase would ensure that workers have a good end of the year, and was adamant that the economic package implemented by his government was helping to bring hyperinflation under control. He failed to provide any supporting evidence of this, however, while there is ample evidence, in Venezuela and elsewhere, that sharp salary increases stoke inflation rather than taming it.

“It will simply push prices higher, which is what we will now see, and it is going to affect people’s purchasing power directly,” Miguel Valverde, a local economist, said. “Anytime that a salary increase is higher than a country’s increase in productivity it translates into higher inflation, and Venezuela’s productivity levels are very low,” he added.

• Fiscal deficit

Venezuelan economist Miguel Valverde expressed concern that the salary increases, as well as the increase in end of year bonuses for workers and other benefits that the Maduro government has pledged to provide, will only produce a fiscal deficit betraying President Maduro’s pledge that his economic package will be based on a zero deficit. “The bonuses, the toys for children, clothes, ‘perniles’ [a type of ham that is traditionally eaten over the Christmas period in Venezuela]…all represent spending at a time when [government] income is falling due to the decline in oil production,” Valverde said.

• Maduro poised to start another term

President Maduro looks set to serve another six-year presidential term from January after he won re-election in May’s general election called by his government but mostly boycotted by the political opposition. The opposition has not recognised the election result along with the majority of the international community. The opposition maintains that the election was illegitimate, and that Maduro will no longer have a constitutional mandate after 10 January 2019 when the term to which he was originally elected in 2013 ends. It has called for a protest campaign against the Maduro government after 10 January, and also asked the international community to cease to recognise Maduro as Venezuela’s legitimate president at this point.

MEXICO | No to foreign investment. On 28 April Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador said that the Istmo de Tehuantepec infrastructure development project will be carried out without any foreign investment. The project will see the expansion of the Salina Cruz port on Oaxaca state’s Pacific coast, and Coatzacoalcos port in Veracruz state on the Gulf of Mexico, as well as the rehabilitation of a train line connecting the two. According to López Obrador, the train line will open up trade between Asia and the eastern coast of the US, as well as facilitate commercial and people transit between the two states. In addition, the project is set to benefit 76 municipalities, while construction will apparently be carried out without negatively impacting on the environment. The project will be funded by public money and, if private investment is required, it will come from Mexican investors. Finally, López Obrador said that genetically modified (GM) corn will not be introduced in the area.

MEXICO | Slowest growth in a decade. Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) released new preliminary figures on 30 April showing that GDP growth for the first quarter of 2019 was 0.2% compared with the same period in 2018. The figures also show GDP in the second quarter contracted by 0.2% compared with the final quarter of 2018. According to Banco Base this is Mexico’s slowest growth rate since the last quarter of 2009. The figures are far from the 4% annual economic growth that President Andrés Manuel López Obrador promised during his election campaign.

Predicted annual growth figures for Mexico from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are at 2.1% for 2019 and 2.2% for 2020 after being downgraded to reflect lower private investment. Predictions from other institutions are even lower, with BBVA Bancomer bank estimating growth of between 1.5% and 2% for both 2019 and 2020. While analysts view the stagnation as worrying, overall there are no fears of a recession and there are hopes for an improved second quarter. The president of the Mexican stock exchange (BMV), Jaime Ruiz Sacristán, believes that the figures are “reasonable”, and a result of the changeover in presidential administration.

A vigil by supporters of Vice President Cristina Fernández, held outside her Buenos Aires home in the upmarket district of La Recoleta, has become the lightning rod for polarised Argentine politics. It has brought her into a direct clash with city mayor and opposition leader Horacio Rodríguez Larreta.

The current stand-off goes back to 22 August when Diego Luciani, a federal prosecutor, requested that Vice President Fernández be sentenced to 12 years imprisonment and be banned from public office for corruption in the ‘Vialidad’ case, in which she is accused of rigging public works contracts during her two-term presidency in 2007-2015 [WR-22-34].

The case is ongoing and, because of her current role as vice-president, Fernández enjoys immunity from prosecution, at least until December 2023. But she decided to go on the political offensive, presenting herself as the victim of a concerted campaign of ‘lawfare’ – defined as the use of the judiciary for purposes of political persecution. 

This shifted the political focus to the aristocratic and conservative Barrio Norte, and specifically to the intersection of Juncal and Uruguay streets, where the vice-president has her city pied-à-terre, a fifth-floor corner flat with large windows. To the horror of the neighbours, every day since the prosecutor made his call for prison time, supporters of Fernández and the populist Partido Justicialista (PJ, Peronists) have rallied outside the building entrance, chanting their support. She has emerged on occasion to flash the Peronist V-sign for victory and to thank her supporters.

On 27 August Buenos Aires city police, who report to the mayor, Rodríguez Larreta, a prominent member of the centre-right Juntos por el Cambio (JxC) opposition coalition, installed crowd control barriers. Later in the day the vice-president’s supporters breached and knocked over the barriers: there were scuffles and the police used tear gas and water cannons in order to disperse the crowd.

The battle of Juncal and Uruguay has its own version of ‘lawfare’. A federal judge has ruled that the city police must pull back from the vice-president’s home and leave security to be handled by her federal police bodyguard. Rodríguez Larreta angrily retorted that the vice president should stop inciting violence.

Rodríguez Larreta added that city lawyers would challenge the court order. “A judge who is publicly aligned with Kirchnerismo [the vice-president’s brand of populist nationalism], and who has no jurisdiction, is trying in a confused ruling, to order us to leave the streets. We are being ordered to stop providing security in the city,” the indignant mayor said. He added that Fernández should stop “pouring fuel on the fire” with partisan comments, and focus instead on inflation, crime, unemployment, and the crisis in the education system.

The tension around the vice-president’s home is having important political ramifications. The ruling left-of-centre Frente de Todos (FdT) coalition is broadly divided into three groups: the vice-president’s radical Kirchneristas, and two, more moderate groups, the Albertistas who are loyal to President Alberto Fernández, and those who are members of the Frente Renovador (FR) led by the economy minister Sergio Massa. Vice-President Fernández has placed herself in the political centre stage, eclipsing the other two groups. The president, who has disagreed with the Kirchneristas on many issues, has been reduced to meekly supporting his vice president’s claims that she is a victim of rigged courts. Massa, who has been promising an epic battle as ‘super minister’ to bring the economic crisis under control finds himself temporarily at least, out of the limelight.

The Kirchneristas, who have no clear policy of their own on how to deal with the economic crisis, have nevertheless positioned themselves as potential victors in presidential primaries due in less than a year’s time, in August 2023. There are persistent rumours that Fernández may herself seek a third presidential term (which, if she wins, would handily extend her immunity from prosecution) or use her influence to endorse a close associate for the job (possibly even her son, Máximo Kirchner).

There is also a degree of manoeuvring within the JxC coalition. Rodríguez Larreta, a moderate who gets on well with the president, is widely seen as a likely victor in next year’s primaries. But a harder line faction of the coalition led by former security minister Patricia Bullrich (2015-2019) argues for a more confrontational approach. Bullrich is close to former right-wing president Mauricio Macri (2015-2019). Bullrich, a political heavyweight and a former Peronist, has said that the country cannot keep “normalising” poor behaviour by the Kirchneristas and that it is the duty of government to guarantee order and the rule of law.

Bullrich takes firm line

In a television interview Patricia Bullrich said that when she was a minister “no one ever overturned a crowd control barrier” adding that “once you put them up you’ve got to keep them up” (a dig against Mayor Rodríguez Larreta who withdrew the barriers after the court order).

Date: 25 June 2023. If a presidential candidate fails to win 50% +1 of the votes, a second-round run-off will take place on 20 August.

Type: Presidential, legislative (all 160 seats in the unicameral legislature), municipal (340 mayoral seats in 22 departments).

Main presidential contenders: Zury Ríos (Valor-Unionista); Sandra Torres (Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza, UNE); Edmond Mulet (Cabal); Rafael Espada (Partido Republicano); Manuel Conde (Vamos).

Since the 1996 Peace Accords ending Guatemala’s 36-year civil war, no party has won consecutive presidencies in Guatemala. The political class remains badly discredited due to corruption, with parties considered little more than vehicles for clientelism and private business interests. Since the 2019 closure of the United Nations (UN)-backed anti-impunity commission in Guatemala (Cicig), anti-corruption efforts have unravelled, a process which has intensified under the conservative Vamos government led by President Alejandro Giammattei, a former prison chief, acquitted in May 2011 of involvement in a criminal ring inside the interior ministry and police. In July 2021 Giammattei, who is constitutionally barred from seeking another term, was forced to publicly deny having received bribes from Russian nationals. His May 2022 reappointment for a four-year term of discredited attorney general María Consuelo Porras, who was sanctioned in 2021 by the US for obstructing investigations into corruption, raised eyebrows.

With the foreign community having repeatedly expressed alarm about attacks and reprisals targeting anti-corruption officials (a February 2023 report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR] documented a 71.43% rise in such attacks compared to 2021), the July 2022 arrest of José Rubén Zamora, the founder of leading national investigative newspaper elPeriódico, also set off alarm bells. The latest Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by NGO Transparency International released on 31 January singled out Guatemala as one of the worst performers in the Americas while in June 2022 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) added Guatemala to its list of countries committing serious human rights violations, along with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. This has had an impact on development indicators; in its report the OHCHR notes Guatemala’s human development index is 0.627, a decrease of six points from 2015 to 2021.

Against this backdrop there are major concerns regarding the integrity of the electoral authority (TSE) which, like the judiciary, is one of the institutions affected by the democratic backsliding. With 23 presidential candidates registered to compete in the 2023 contest, the electoral process has been overshadowed by controversy over TSE rulings on candidates such as its exclusion of Roberto Arzú (Podemos), the son of former president Álvaro Arzú (1996-2000), a right-wing contender, and Thelma Cabrera of left-wing indigenous Movimiento para la Liberación de los Pueblos (MLP) who stood in the 2019 presidential elections, taking some 10% of the vote. Cabrera’s running mate, former human rights ombudsman Jordán Rodas, was associated with anti-impunity efforts. On 30 March UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk expressed concern regarding the TSE’s rejection of these candidacies on “seemingly arbitrary grounds”.

Candidates in the running.

Recent polls have shown Zury Ríos, the daughter of the late dictator Efraín Ríos Montt (1982-1983), as a frontrunner. A survey published on 14 March by Mexican pollster TResearch showed her on 23.3% of voting intentions, ahead of former First Lady (2008-2012) Sandra Torres of the main opposition Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE), on 17.7%.

A far-right politician, Ríos is a four-term legislator, serving from 1996 to 2012. She was barred in 2019 from seeking the presidency by the constitutional court (CC) which invoked Article 186 of the 1985 constitution, which bars relatives of former coup leaders running for the presidency. This despite Ríos having been permitted to run in the previous (2015) election where she came fifth with some 6% of the vote. She is calling for a hard-line approach to security and has cited the state of emergency invoked by El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele to tackle gangs – which has been strongly condemned by rights groups and the foreign community due to multiple rights violations - as a “model of reference”. This is likely to stoke fears among human rights watchers that a Ríos presidency could further dispense with democratic and constitutional guarantees in Guatemala.

Another major contender is Torres, who lost convincingly to Giammattei in the 2019 presidential run-off (by 57.95% to 42.05%) in a contest marred by nearly 60% abstention – the highest abstention rate in two decades. Torres made her name as first lady during the UNE administration led by her late ex-husband Alvaro Colom (2008-2012), heading up various social welfare programmes. She was also defeated in the 2015 presidential run-off by his predecessor Jimmy Morales (2016-2020) while her previous bid to run in 2011 (after divorcing Colom to sidestep a constitutional prohibition) was thrown out by the courts. In late November 2022, Torres’ path to run in 2023 appeared cleared after a judge threw out a case against her relating to illegal campaign financing allegations dating back to 2015. Her associates have similarly faced corruption allegations. Her late former husband, Colom, featured on the US State Department’s 2021 ‘Engel List’ of ‘corrupt and undemocratic actors, as did Gustavo Alejos, Colom’s chief-of-staff, and another UNE member, Jorge Estuardo Vargas Morales.

While proposing to relaunch social welfare initiatives, Torres’ manifesto also calls for a hard-line approach to security, pledging to strengthen the military, construct four maximum security prisons, and life sentences for “murderers, extortionists and rapists” among other things. In a nod to the apparent conservatism of the electorate, Torres has picked evangelical pastor Romeo Estuardo Guerra Lemus as her running mate. Torres benefits from the party machinery of the UNE which, founded in 2002, is one of Guatemala’s oldest parties – a symptom of the country’s notoriously weak political party system. She also struck an apparent pragmatic alliance last year with Giammattei which could benefit her given the politicisation of the country’s institutions. Yet, like Ríos, she faces doubts over the legality of her candidacy: the choice of Guerra as her running mate would appear to defy a constitutional ban on religious leaders running for the presidency and vice presidency.

TSE

A report by US-based NGO Freedom House released in 2022 notes that in March 2020, after months of delay, congress elected new TSE magistrates (2020−2026) in a session featuring little transparency. Several of those elected are “reportedly associated with officials accused of corruption and drug trafficking and have been accused of falsifying their academic titles”. In its report on the 2019 elections, the Organization of America States electoral observer mission (OAS-EOM) highlights the “judicialisation of elections”, noting that 416 petitions for nullity against decisions on registration of candidates were presented in contrast to 269 presented in 2015.

Dubious candidates

The inclusion of candidates accused of corruption, while hardly new, has similarly raised fears about the integrity of the electoral process and the TSE. Various politicians seeking re-election have been sanctioned in the US over corruption. Examples include former congress president Allan Rodríguez (2020-2022) (Vamos); Felipe Alejos (Todos); and Sofía Hernández, who was elected for Unión del Cambio Nacional (UCN), which was disbanded by the TSE last October, and is seeking re-election with Vamos.

Mulet

The TResearch poll showed septuagenarian former diplomat Edmond Mulet of centre-right Cabal in third place on 16.5% of voting intentions. Widely considered a capable moderate, Mulet ran in the 2019 presidential contest for Partido Humanista, receiving 11% of the vote. A former legislator (1982-1993) for the now-defunct centrist Unión del Centro Nacional, he previously served as ambassador to the US in 1993, a post from which he resigned following the 1993 coup d’état in Guatemala. While in congress, he was involved in the peace talks ending the civil war. He went on to hold senior positions in the UN including as head of the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah) in 2010-2011 and Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (2011-2015). However, Mulet, who has publicly spoken out against the democratic backsliding in the country, is facing uncertainty over his candidacy: the AG’s special anti-impunity unit (Feci) has announced that it requested that Mulet’s immunity from prosecution, which he enjoys as presidential candidate, be lifted for alleged early campaigning and “obstruction of justice” after Mulet questioned the judicial process launched against Zamora.

Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was invited to this year’s G7 leaders’ summit from 19-21 May as an external partner, amid the group’s efforts to gain the favour of developing countries such as Brazil and India who maintain a non-aligned foreign policy, cooperating with the US, China and Russia, and some of whom have expressed similar calls for peace talks to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. This presented Lula with the opportunity to engage not only with the G7’s advanced economies, such as the US or Japan, but also with like-minded countries of the Global South, with the G7 summit proving a useful platform to burnish Brazil’s reputation as a reliable global partner on peace, trade, and environmental protection.

The war in Ukraine dominated the agenda at the summit hosted in Hiroshima, Japan. All G7 member states have supported Ukraine’s defence by sending arms, equipment, or supplies, and at this year’s summit they committed to continue supplying Ukraine’s armed forces and to expand the economic sanctions on Russia. The G7 has also echoed the calls from Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky to discuss a potential peace process only after the complete withdrawal of Russian troops and that the territorial integrity of Ukraine must be a precondition of any future peace agreement – calls which countries like Brazil and India have not endorsed. Nor have they backed the G7’s sanctions on Russia. Zelensky himself made an unannounced visit to Hiroshima. However, the Ukrainian president was too busy to meet Lula, which came as a disappointment to Brazil’s ambitions to position itself as an internationally respected peacemaker.

Despite being snubbed by Zelensky, Lula was able to take away some positive signals from his meetings in Hiroshima. After his meeting with India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the two leaders reaffirmed their neutrality over Ukraine and their pledge to push for peace talks. They also highlighted their shared presence in multilateral forums, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) group of developing countries and the Group of 20 (G20), the rotating presidency of which India currently holds. In 2024 Brazil will hold the G20 presidency and host the group’s summits, providing a significant global platform for Lula to hold talks with more countries from the global South, as the G20 includes not only the members of the G7 and BRICS, but also fellow Latin American countries, such as Argentina, and Asian partners, such as Indonesia.

Using the G7 summit to herald his G20 leadership role next year, Lula met Azali Assoumani, the president of Comores and current holder of the rotating chair of the African Union (AU). Lula called for the AU to be invited to G20 summits, in the same way that the European Union (EU) always has a place at the table among the G7 and G20. Speaking in support of another G20 member, Lula called for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to give Argentina special consideration regarding its debt programme in a meeting with IMF managing director Kristalina Georgieva.

Although not a G20 member, Lula met Vietnam’s Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính, during which they discussed the possibility of a future trade deal between Vietnam and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which would mark a potential avenue for Brazil to strengthen ties with the rapidly developing economies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean). Lula also met the current Asean chairperson, Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo, with whom he discussed setting up an international group for the protection of rainforests in partnership with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the other countries in South America with Amazonian territories. 

Brazil-Africa seminar

From 22-25 May Brazil’s foreign ministry held a series of seminars in Brasília about Brazilian-African relations, which national and international organisations from the government and civil society groups attended. On the first day of the seminars, the deputy foreign minister, Maria Laura da Rocha, highlighted the importance of South-South cooperation, noting that Brazil had a network of 32 technical cooperation agreements with African countries and 70 more initiatives under discussion, covering a range of issues, including healthcare, agriculture, and education. On 24 May Brazil’s government made more gestures towards Brazilian-African cooperation, hosting the ambassadors of Mozambique, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among other countries, at the Planalto presidential palace.

British investment in AmazonFace project

In a boost for Brazil’s climate diplomacy, UK Foreign Secretary James Cleverly travelled to the northern state of Amazonas on 23 May to visit the site of the AmazonFace project, an experiment involving the release of carbon dioxide into the rainforest and monitoring how plants absorb it. Cleverly announced additional investment of £2m (US$2.47m) for the project, bringing the total investment from the UK government since 2021 to £7.3m. The project is a collaboration between scientists from Brazil’s Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia (Inpa), the University of Campinas in São Paulo state, and the British Met Office.

Bird flu state of emergency

As of 22 May eight cases of the H5N1 strain of bird flu (avian influenza) had been detected in wild birds in Brazil, prompting the agriculture ministry to declare an animal health emergency, which will be in effect for 180 days.

The state of emergency will entail the full mobilisation of the ministry’s financial, technological, and logistical capabilities and resources to prevent the spread of the disease to people and to commercial poultry such as chickens and other domesticated birds.

The recorded cases so far have been limited to the Brazil’s southern regions, where there is a larger poultry industry. The first suspected case was reported on 10 May in Espírito Santo state. Of the eight known cases, seven are in Espírito Santo and one in Rio de Janeiro state.

United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres has paid his first official visit in the job to Haiti, which remains in the throes of a multifaceted security and political crisis, two years on from the assassination of president Jovenel Moïse (2017-2021). During his visit, Guterres, who in April compared insecurity in Haiti with that of countries in armed conflict, reiterated the need for a foreign security deployment – a call he first made in October 2022 and has since repeated on various occasions, but which has so far fallen on deaf ears. His visit follows various recent international summits on Haiti, which have failed to produce any breakthrough, either regarding an end to the violence, as gangs continue to exploit the power vacuum left by Moïse’s murder, or the collapse of the state, with no elections held since 2016 and no publicly elected officials serving since January.

During his one-day visit to Port-au-Prince on 1 July, Guterres met Haiti’s caretaker prime minister Ariel Henry, the high transition council (HCT), installed in February, which is tasked with ensuring conditions are in place for elections [WR-23-07], civil society, and political parties. As well as discussing the continued impasse over elections, Guterres’ visit was also reportedly to shore up support for the UN integrated office in Haiti (Binuh), which is tasked with strengthening political stability and promoting good governance in Haiti.

The UN Security Council is due to decide this month on the future of Binuh, which is not itself a peacekeeping mission but replaced previous peacekeeping missions, such as the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (Minujusth, 2017-2019) and the UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (Minustah, 2004-2017). Guterres and Henry also discussed the need for a foreign security force to curb gang activity, a proposal yet to be taken up as the international community opts instead to bolster the police (PNd’H) – a strategy which raises questions given the PNd’H’s continued attrition rate and lack of effectiveness.

Guterres’ visit follows various international summits which have yet to produce a breakthrough. From 11-13 June, the Caribbean Community (Caricom) hosted talks between Henry and some 50 Haitian political and civic leaders in Jamaica’s capital Kingston. According to a Caricom statement released following the summit, Henry agreed to create a unity government and expand the HCT, although its president, former first lady (1988) and 2010 presidential candidate Mirlande Manigat, refused the invitation to attend the Kingston talks, reportedly saying they should take place in Haiti. The Miami Herald reported at the time that one stumbling block is the issue of the structure of the transition government and its power, with members of the Montana Accord, a leading opposition organisation, wanting it to have presidential authority, which Henry is resisting.

Meanwhile, on 15 June Canada’s foreign minister Mélanie Joly held a ministerial meeting on Haiti with partners from Caricom, the US, Brazil, and others. Joly, who recently discussed Haiti with Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva [WR-23-26], announced the launch of a Canada-led joint security coordination cell (JSCC) to enhance coordination and mobilisation of international efforts in security assistance, working with PNd’H, foreign partners, and the UN. In line with a sanctions regime introduced in November 2022, which has targeted 21 members of the Haitian elite for allegedly financing gangs, Joly also announced sanctions on two more individuals: former deputy Prophane Victor, and former senator Gracia Delva, as well as C$10m (US$7.56m) in funding to the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) multi-donor basket fund on security in Haiti and C$3m to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) anti-corruption project.

Foreign security deployment

The Kingston talks followed a visit to The Bahamas on 8 June by US Vice President Kamala Harris where she met Caricom leaders to discuss Haiti, among other topics. While US officials told the Miami Herald that Harris would renew calls for an international security deployment to Haiti, Bahamian Prime Minister Philip Davis was cited by the Caribbean media as saying that there was no “appetite” for this – echoing comments previously made by other Caribbean leaders [WR-23-10].

The economic impact of violence cost the country the equivalent of 18% of GDP in 2024, according to the latest edition of a yearly report from Australian think tank the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), which was released on 16 May.

This represents a 3.4% increase compared to 2023, said the IEP in the 12th edition of the Mexico Peace Index (MPI), and means that the economic cost of violence per person is more than the average monthly salary in Mexico. There were important variations in the economic cost of violence by state, with Morelos, Colima, and Guerrero recording the three highest results with each surpassing more than 35% of state GDP. At the other extreme, the cost of violence was equivalent to just 6% of GDP in Yucatán state, which ranked as the most peaceful state on the MPI.

This is the first recorded increase in the economic cost of violence since 2019, when the cost peaked following a steady increase since 2015, and comes despite the fact that the MPI itself recorded a slight improvement of 0.7% year-on-year.  While the economic impact of violent crime declined by 3%, the cost of homicide increased by 1% and there was a record year-on-year increase in military spending of 39%. As the IEP measures both the direct costs of violence, such as funerals, and indirect ones, such as public and private spending on security, this pushed up the overall cost of violence. 

The IEP also provides a breakdown of the proportion of this cost attributed to different categories used in its model, with homicide representing the largest percentage (38%) of the economic cost of violence. This is followed by violent crime (33%), which encompasses robbery, assault, sexual violence, and firearm crimes; government expenditure on activities aimed at reducing violence (18%); protection costs (10%); and fear of violence (1%), which affects consumer and business behaviour thereby causing economic losses.

Mexico is something of a global outlier in that just 28% of the overall cost comes from violence prevention measures, compared to the global average of 80.3%. “These figures suggest that violence containment expenditure is disproportionately low in Mexico,” said the IEP. With military spending seeing a huge spike, this means that spending has been cut elsewhere: the justice system has seen cuts equivalent to 12% in the past decade, and spending on domestic security and policing is 30% lower than it was 10 years ago.

The knock-on effects of these spending cuts are plain to see. For example, spending cuts in the judicial system have led to a shortage of judges, meaning that delays are common. This impacts public trust in the system and contributes to high levels of impunity. “We can’t deal with violence in the country if we don’t address the three pillars of security and peace: the justice system, the police and the military,” said Carlos Juárez, director of the IEP in Mexico, in an article published by regional security think tank Insight Crime on 28 May. 

Interestingly, 73.6% of the Mexican population believe they live in a state that is unsafe, according to the IEP, a proportion that has fallen from its highest point in 2018 despite consistently high levels of violence and insecurity. “In the Mexican case the perception of fear doesn’t correspond with experiences of insecurity," said Juárez in a press conference on 13 May, saying this could demonstrate “a possible normalisation” of violence. Juárez also said that President Claudia Sheinbaum’s security policy “appears promising”, with more arrests and seizures of drugs and weapons than during her predecessor President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s time in office (2018-2024), although he also acknowledged that Sheinbaum has only been in office for nine months and it is too early to make a firm judgement.

The IEP report follows figures from the national statistics institute (Inegi), published in December, which show that insecurity and crime cost Mexican businesses a total M$124.3bn (US$6.6bn) in 2023, comprising losses and spending on protective measures. While there is no lack of evidence for the economic cost of violence and crime, finding solutions is not as obvious. Even if the government could find the money to address the serious shortfalls in the judicial system, which is unlikely at a time of mounting budgetary pressures and competing policy priorities, Mexico would still be faced with the problem of wealthy and powerful criminal organisations capable of corrupting officials and investing in weapons capable of outgunning even the country’s military in certain situations. Dealing with the root causes of insecurity would instead require a radical change in global drug policy to remove the source of much of these organisations’ revenue, the likes of which is extremely unlikely to be introduced. 

Insecurity and crime

According to Inegi’s national survey of business victimization (Enve), this figure is equivalent to 0.51% of Mexican GDP. It adds that at least 1.3m businesses, or 27.2% of the total number of businesses in the country, were victims of some kind of crime in 2023. This is up from 24.6% in the previous survey from 2021, but lower than the 30.5% recorded in 2019.

Ecuador’s national assembly approved the new budget at the end of November with 78 votes in favour, 66 against, and four abstentions. While President Daniel Noboa won approval relatively comfortably, there was a storm of opposition criticism in the legislature that may set the scene for future battles.

Deputies approved not only the budget for 2026 but also the target spending numbers for a four-year planning period (2026-2029). Total spending next year will be US$46.225bn, leaving a fiscal deficit of US$5.41bn or 3.9% of GDP. 

Nathanly Farinango, head of the parliamentary commission that went over the budget line by line (and a member of the ruling coalition), said that there had been wide consultation on fiscal plans, allowing her to assert that the budget was “aligned with the country’s strategic objectives”. She highlighted that the annual investment plan allocates US$2.18bn next year for 377 projects “to meet the most urgent needs of our citizenry”.

All of which did little to impress the opposition led by the left-wing Revolución Ciudadana (RC) party. RC deputies wanted to send an annotated version of the draft back to President Noboa so that he could turn it into a “real budget that meets peoples’ expectations”. RC Deputy Mónica Alemán said “We are faced with a budget that is fundamentally flawed, lacks transparency in the use of value-added tax, and prioritises debt repayment over investment in public works and the welfare of Ecuadoreans.”

Alemán received cross-party support from the conservative Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) party, whose deputy Alfredo Serrano pronounced the budget “unworkable” and “underfunded,” once more favouring repaying interest at the expense of investment.

The opposition is targeting budget proposals to cut the funding of 19 public universities, but government officials claim the money is being re-allocated to favour a wider mix of higher education entities and that the overall spend is up, not down. During the budget debate in the national assembly, students and university staff demonstrated in protest.

• University budgets cut

Amawtay Wasi, an indigenous university, said its budget had been slashed by US$7m. Another state university, Universidad Central del Ecuador (UCE), meanwhile, said it was US$15m worse off.

Interestingly, while the battle against drug cartels and organised crime remains top of the political agenda, some defence and security spending is set to fall in 2026. The national defence sector will receive US$2.0bn next year, covering the ministry of defence, the armed forces, and the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) among others. This represents a cut of US$131m, or 6.15% compared with the 2025 budget.

The separate internal affairs sector, which includes the interior ministry, the national police, and the SNAI (which runs the prison service), sees its overall budget drop by 0.4% compared with the current budget to reach US$2.23bn. There has been little direct explanation of these cuts, but security budgets have been under-spent in recent years and officials may have wanted to take up the slack.

IMF Review

Almost coincidentally with the budget, the Quito government completed the fourth staff-level review of its 48-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) with the IMF. When approved by the IMF board, the review will unlock up to US$620m in loans.

The IMF said the authorities had met all agreed quantitative targets as well as making “significant progress in implementing their economic reform plan”. According to an IMF press release “policy actions and reforms are helping to enhance macroeconomic and financial stability, safeguard dollarisation, strengthen fiscal sustainability and protect vulnerable groups, and are expected to support a stronger and more inclusive economic growth”.

Bolivia’s former president Evo Morales (2006-2019) once again threw down the gauntlet to the authorities on 11 May when he failed to appear in court to face charges of human trafficking. Morales, who for the past 18 months has been holed up in Chapare, Cochabamba department, under the protection of his coca union, has further raised the stakes by sending his supporters marching on the capital La Paz. The goal of the march, Morales insists, is to highlight the economic problems faced by Bolivians, rather than being a response to the legal threat he faces.

The human trafficking case, which revolves around an alleged relationship between Morales and an underage girl [WR-24-41], has shown the former president to be practically untouchable. Despite being confined to his political stronghold of Chapare since October 2024, Morales has continued to address rallies and give media interviews although he is the subject of an arrest warrant. Under former president Luis Arce (2020-2025), an operation to extract Morales from Chapare was deemed too risky due to the conflagration of national protests that would follow.

By refusing to attend the first day of his trial in Tarija, Morales has gambled that Arce’s successor, President Rodrigo Paz, will reach the same calculation as his predecessor. This is by no means certain. Paz has repeatedly railed against alleged crimes committed by the left-wing governments led by Morales and Arce, and just one month after leaving office Arce was arrested on corruption charges. Morales would be a riskier target for the authorities as his personalist political movement still commands an ardent following.

The strength of that following will be tested in the coming days, after hundreds of Morales’ supporters began a march from Caracollo, in Oruro department, to La Paz. The march is expected to grow in size along its 190km route, having received the backing of various trade unions. Although the march has been billed as a protest against Paz’s economic policies, it will not have been a coincidence that it coincided with the start of Morales’ trial. Dieter Mendoza, a leader in Morales’ coca union Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba, warned on 11 May that “if they touch Evo Morales…the country will erupt like they’ve never imagined – there will be an insurgency in the national territory of Bolivia”.

Judicial proceedings against the former president were suspended following his failure to turn up in court. The prosecutor in the case, Luis Gutiérrez, said that “the trial will be suspended until the accused appears, or is made to appear by the security forces”. He said that enforcing the arrest order for Morales was the responsibility of the police, rather than the attorney general’s office. This effectively passes the buck to the government, given that the police force answers to the interior ministry.

José Ernesto Mogro, a prosecutor in Tarija department, told the RTP television channel on 12 May that prosecutors would seek a 20-year prison sentence for Morales. This would be the maximum applicable sentence for aggravated human trafficking.

Morales, meanwhile, continues to profess his innocence but claims that he will not face a fair trial. “I’m not seeking impunity, just an impartial legal process that follows the constitution,” he wrote on social media on 12 May. “No one should be condemned for political reasons,” he added, accusing prosecutors of having “the sole aim of judicial, moral, and physical annihilation”.

Roadblocks

The march by Morales’ supporters coincides with nationwide protests by transport workers who are demanding compensation for engine damage caused by contaminated fuel distributed by state hydrocarbon company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB). The protests, which have been running intermittently since January, have escalated again over the past week, with roadblocks set up on highways around the country. Efforts at negotiations between the government and transport unions have so far failed to make any progress.

Nicaragua’s authoritarian co-president Daniel Ortega made international headlines in July, declaring elections would no longer take place in the country. There has effectively been no free vote in Nicaragua in years, with the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) government having dismantled all democratic institutions, a process which accelerated following the launch of a brutal crackdown on dissent in April 2018 in response to social unrest. However, Ortega’s announcement was still eye-catching given the iron grip that he and his wife, co-president Rosario Murillo, have on the country’s institutions. Gustavo Porras, the president of the legislature, has since appeared to row back, saying elections would still take place but under further proposed changes to the country’s constitution which would effectively exclude the opposition. However, this has done little to dampen international outrage.

Ortega declared that “there will not be elections here again” on 19 July during an event held to mark the 47^th anniversary of the overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship (1936-1979). The next election was due to take place in November 2027 after presidential terms were extended to six years from five as per a constitutional reform package which took effect last year which further concentrated power in the hands of Ortega and Murillo [SSR-01-25]. In the most recent elections in 2021, from which genuine opposition parties were barred and seven presidential candidates (among nearly 40 opposition figures) were jailed, Ortega claimed around 75% of the vote. However, the contest was blasted as fraudulent by the Organization of American States (OAS) and foreign community, resulting in multiple sanctions from the US and European Union, among others. This condemnation ultimately led the Ortega government to withdraw Nicaragua from the OAS, which took effect in 2023.

With the international community having already applied multiple sanctions to Managua in recent years over democracy and human rights concerns, which ultimately have failed to act as a deterrent, Ortega’s call to scrap elections altogether provoked fresh outrage. On 4 August 10 OAS member states held a meeting of consultation of regional foreign ministers – an extraordinary emergency mechanism reserved for threats to hemispheric peace and security. This was the first time the mechanism had been invoked to discuss a political crisis in Nicaragua since 1978, during the country’s revolution. While the ensuing OAS statement condemned Ortega’s comments regarding the suppression of elections, it ultimately failed to back up its rhetoric with any threat of action, while the fact that Nicaragua no longer recognises the OAS’ authority casts further doubt as to its impact.

Constitutional reform

In an interview broadcast on 6 August with Silvana Jarquín León, a Nicaragua-based correspondent for Russian state-controlled TV network RT, the head of Nicaragua’s national assembly, Gustavo Porras, said that legislators were working on a constitutional reform which would expand the presidential term from six to seven years. He added that under the changes, those whom the regime labels as “coup plotters” and “traitors to the homeland” would not be permitted to participate in elections. Such terms are widely used by Managua to criminalise dissent.

Latest UN condemnation

In one recent sign of foreign alarm regarding the state of human rights in the country, on 13 July, the United Nations Group of Human Rights Experts on Nicaragua (GHREN) denounced the Ortega-Murillo government’s “sudden revocation of credentials for numerous lawyers and notaries”. It warned that the move “effectively erased a vital part of the nation’s legal profession overnight and stripped citizens of their right to legal defence”, while noting it is not a new development, with authorities “arbitrarily and permanently” suspending at least 28 lawyers in 2023, amid “a sweeping purge of the judicial system” underway since October 2023 [SSR-24-02]. According to GHREN, since then, eight magistrates have quit or been forced out, and over 1,000 judicial employees have been dismissed. One of GHREN’s members, Reed Brody, a US human rights lawyer, said that “this silent purge of the legal profession is one more nail in the coffin of the independence of justice in Nicaragua: first they took the judges, now they are taking the lawyers”. 

BRASIL | ¿Política industrial o proteccionismo? La producción industrial cayó 0,2% mes en mes en agosto, de un revisado 0,3% de crecimiento en julio.

Fue el décimo mes consecutivo de actividad declinante. La cifra anual de crecimiento fue de 2,3%, la más débil desde abril. Los fabricantes locales se quejan que ellos no son capaces de competir con la inundación de importaciones baratas y la fortaleza del Real, planteando medidas oficiales de apoyo al sector industrial, incluidos incentivos fiscales y restricciones a las importaciones.

La administración liderada por la Presidenta Dilma Rousseff se ha informado que está preparando medidas adicionales, lo que hizo que algunos críticos critiquen esas medidas como un velado proteccionismo. La semana pasada, en Bruselas, la Presidenta Rousseff sugirió que los países europeos debían adoptar el “modelo brasileño” a fin de salir de su aletargamiento económico.

Rousseff no se privó de hablar del hecho que la nueva política industrial para Brasil es su principal prioridad. “Brasil no puede ser solamente un país de materias primas”, insistió.

El creciente desajuste entre el desempeño del sector industrial interno y el aún próspero sector consumidor –que se ha volcado a un masivo festival de gastos en bienes importados este año– está en el centro de la política de Rousseff.

URUGUAY | Creciente importancia de China. China ha desplazado a Argentina  como el segundo más grande receptor  de exportaciones uruguayas en los primeros nueve meses de 2011:

Las exportaciones uruguayas a China crecieron en 62,5%, a US$505m (8,3% de sus exportaciones totales) comparado con igual periodo en 2010, mientras las exportaciones a Argentina crecieron en 22,4%, a US$444m (7,3% del total).

El principal destino de las exportaciones uruguayas es Brasil, que tomó 19,2% del total de las exportaciones (US$1,17bn) en los primeros nueve meses de 2011. Eso apuntala la importancia de la decisión del gobierno brasileño la semana pasada de exceptuar a Uruguay de una reciente imposición de una tarifa de 30% sobre las importaciones de autos, que había sido ferozmente criticado por el Presidente de Uruguay, José Mujica.

La principal exportación de Uruguay fue la soja, subiendo en 21,9%, equivalente a US$861m, llegando a 14,2% de las exportaciones totales, seguido de carne congelada, que se incrementó en 16,8% a US$737m (12,1% de las exportaciones totales).

Uruguay informó de un déficit comercial de US$198m en los primeros nueve meses de 2011 pues las importaciones superaron a las exportaciones: las exportaciones sumaron US$6,08bn; las importaciones, US$6,28bn.

Casi la mitad de su déficit se produjo en setiembre pues las exportaciones se incrementaron en 19% a US$719m, pero las importaciones subieron en 30%, a US$806m, dejando un déficit de US$87m, de acuerdo con las estadísticas oficiales.

Faced with determined opposition to Russia’s rigged 4 December elections, as we predicted the Kremlin is intensifying its appeal to nationalism.  Perhaps the most dramatic example of this to date came on 12 December from Russia’s permanent representative to Nato, Dmitriy Rogozin, who seemed to warn that Russia faced an attack from the West - and that only Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was capable of protecting Russia.

Speaking to a United Russia rally in Moscow on 12 December, Rogozin warned: “Russia is experiencing difficult times.  The forces that are active in Europe are thinking that Russia may be an easy prey  They have bombed Iraq, they have crushed Libya, they are closing in on Syria, they have trampled the people of Yugoslavia under their feet, but they are thinking about Russia, and they are waiting for every moment when they could use our country’s weakness.  Unfortunately, right now there is not a single leader in Europe who could stand up to the diktat of...Washington...We have such a leader.  It is Vladimir Putin.  He is ready to stand up for Russia.”  On 13 December, Rogozin joined Putin’s HQ for the presidential election in March.

Another noteworthy point is that Russia’s Chief of General Staff General Nikolay Makarov has reiterated his warnings about the danger of full-scale war around Russia’s periphery.  As we reported in a Special Alert, on 17 November, in a speech to the Russian Public Chamber Makarov warned: “The possibility of local armed conflicts along practically the whole of the perimeter of the border has increased dramatically.  Under certain circumstances I do not rule out the possibility that local and regional conflicts may develop into a large-scale war, including with the use of nuclear weapons.”

On 7 December, Makarov embellished this warning when he told a gathering of foreign defence attaches: “[In] North Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Africa...there are a huge number of conflicts with a tendency to intensify...Under certain circumstances a whole number of other states could be drawn into these conflicts.  This will be full-scale war.”

Another example of playing up the external threat came on 8 December when Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that Nato could be pushing Georgia into “a repetition of something like the escapade in August 2008” when the two countries briefly went to war.  On 13 December, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolay Patrushev warned that “individuals are being trained on Georgian territory to carry out terrorist attacks in Russia”.

In the same interview, Patrushev argued that Nato’s anti-missile shield was not aimed at Iran and North Korea but at Russia and China.  No doubt sensing an opportunity from the deepening rift between the US and Russia, on 12 December China’s Vice-Premier Li Keqiang called for a strengthening of the China-Russia “all-round strategic cooperative partnership”.

Argentina | Fernández names general prosecutor’s replacement. On 10 April President Cristina Fernández proposed Daniel Reposo, who currently heads the Sindicatura General de la Nación Argentina (Sigen), a body that carries out internal auditing processes and responds to the executive, as Esteban Righi’s replacement as general prosecutor. Reposo will now have to undergo a selection process put in place by former president Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007): the designation has to be published in the official gazette and two national papers for three days; civil society groups, human rights advocacy groups and academics then have 15 days to submit documents backing or opposing the candidate’s appointment; then the government has 15 days to submit the formal designation documents to the senate; and finally, Reposo will have to submit documentation to the senate and be interviewed in a public hearing, after which the chamber will vote. Reposo needs a two-thirds majority approval to secure the post

On 6 August, Jamaica celebrated 50 years of independence from Britain with renewed pledges to resolve two constitutional challenges: replacing Queen Elizabeth II as head of state with a Jamaican president and replacing the UK’s Privy Council with the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as the final court of appeal.

Both main parties, the ruling People’s National Party (PNP) led by Prime Minister Portia Simpson Miller, and the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) are agreed in principle on the desirability of a Jamaican head of state.  On 26 July, Justice Minister Mark Golding said that he expects a draft bill to establish a republic to be ready by September. 

The political position on the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in favour of the CCJ is more complicated.  The government has tabled bills in parliament to pave the way for this move.  As a constitutional amendment, however, a two-thirds majority is required in both houses of parliament, and while the government has that in the lower house (with 42 out of 63 seats), it does not in the Senate (with 13 out of 20 senators) – and the JLP has said that it will only support the proposed change if it is first approved in a referendum.

The government is holding out against a referendum, with Mark Golding saying: “We disagree with them [the opposition] on that issue.  It’s not legally required or constitutionally required.  We think it is a bad idea to be having issues that do not require referendum to be dealt with in that way.”

The opposition is also using the debate over the twin constitutional issues as a means of highlighting what is sees as the government’s lack of progress on the economy.  During the recent budget debate in parliament, opposition leader Andrew Holness told the government: “You will have my support when you tell me how the CCJ and Queen are going to help end poverty in Jamaica.” 

On this latter point, the opposition claims that the government will not have a new agreement with the IMF in place until 2013.  The government says it will have a new agreement in place with the IMF by the end of the year, with an IMF negotiating team due in Jamaica in September.

COLOMBIA | Ecopetrol firma acuerdo para exploración en el Caribe. El 13 de diciembre, la firma petrolera estatal de Colombia, Ecopetrol, anunció que había firmado un acuerdo de asociación con la firma petrolera de EU, Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, para explotar tres bloques de concesiones para explorar y explotar petróleo en aguas profundas del Mar Caribe.

     En el 2006, la agencia nacional de hidrocarburos (ANH) de Colombia otorgó a Ecopetrol concesiones de exploración y explotación para los bloques de 481.000 hectáreas (ha) en Fuerte Norte y 330.000ha en Fuerte Sur. Sin embargo, Ecopetrol no ha logrado actuar sobre sus concesiones pues estaba concentrado en desarrollar primero sus más accesibles activos en tierra firme.

     Anadarko, el segundo más grande productor independiente de petróleo y gas natural de EU, se acercó a la ANH buscando asegurarse una concesión de exploración para un bloque de 220.000ha conocido como ‘Ángel Púrpura’ en aguas territoriales caribeñas de Colombia. La ANH otorgó a Anadarko la concesión de Ángel Púrpura el 7 de diciembre. Ecopetrol entonces se aproximó a Anadarko, que tiene un bien establecido antecedente en el desarrollo de yacimientos petrolíferos en aguas profundas en el Golfo de México, con el propósito de desarrollar conjuntamente los tres bloques.

     Una declaración de Ecopetrol explica que las dos firmas habían llegado a un acuerdo bajo el cual Anadarko controla la operación de todos los tres bloques en una empresa conjunta de 50-50, aunque no proveyó información sobre los detalles financieros del acuerdo. La declaración agrega que mientras ya existen mapas sísmicos de dos y tres dimensiones para Fuerte Norte y Fuerte Sur, tales trabajos de exploración preliminar se llevarán adelante en el bloque Ángel Púrpura.

     Ecopetrol es actualmente el cuarto más grande productor de petróleo de América Latina detrás de Pdvsa de Venezuela; Pemex de México; y Petrobrás de Brasil; con una producción aproximada de 780.000 barriles por día (bpd). Sin embargo, dado que las reservas de petróleo de Colombia están estimadas en 2,2mm de barriles, el gobierno ha establecido una meta de producción de petróleo de 1m bpd para Ecopetrol, que espera alcanzar en los próximos cinco años.

ECUADOR | Gran déficit para el 2013. El 12 de diciembre, el ministro de finanzas de Ecuador, Patricio Rivera, reveló que la administración  del Presidente Rafael Correa está proyectando un déficit fiscal de US$6mm para el año próximo, para el cual el gobierno ya ha asegurado la financiación. De acuerdo con Rivera la mayor parte de la financiación será por medio de préstamos condicionales que ya han sido otorgados al país, mientras “una suma importante” ya está libremente disponible dado que Ecuador apenas ha utilizado la línea de crédito de US$2mm asegurado con el gobierno de China en junio de este año.

     La negociación del crédito chino, que el gobierno dice que sería usado para financiar proyectos de infraestructuras, fue controversial debido a las preocupaciones que el gobierno de Correa parecía estar convirtiéndose crecientemente dependiente de los préstamos chinos, que a menudo vienen con una alta tasa de interés (de 6,9%) y, alegan algunos, a cambio de la incrementada influencia del gobierno chino en la política ecuatoriana.

     Sin embargo, el Presidente Correa rechaza todo eso: él alega que los préstamos chinos son otorgados sin condiciones especiales y no representan ninguna clase de riesgo para la soberanía de Ecuador. Después de asegurar la última línea de crédito chino, Correa afirmó que eso permitiría a su gobierno llevar adelante un ambicioso plan de inversión para construir plantas hidroeléctricas, carreteras y realizar mejoras en los sectores de la salud y la educación, con el objetivo de concluir muchos de ellas en el 2013, que justamente resulta ser un año electoral. El hecho que Rivera admitió que la línea de crédito fue en gran medida dejada sin ser usada, ha elevado la especulación que ahora será usada para elevar los gastos de campaña.

VENEZUELA | El INE informa incremento en el precio de alimentos. El 18 de diciembre, el instituto nacional de estadísticas (INE) de Venezuela informó que los precios de alimentos se incrementaron en 2,69%, más alto que la tasa de inflación (2,30%. A pesar del hecho que el gobierno del Presidente Hugo Chávez ha introducido controles de precios en una gama de productos básicos, incluyendo comestibles, desde el 2003 y que en abril de este año promulgó una nueva ‘ley sobre costos y precios justos’ que apuntala las medidas de control de precios, los incrementos en los precios de alimentos no están en línea con la inflación oficial como pretendía el gobierno. Esto crea un problema para la población general dado que, como señala el INE, el precio de los 50 ítems incluido en la canasta de alimentos básicos actualmente está en BF1.989,09 (US$463), mientras que el salario mínimo actual en Venezuela es de BF2.047,00 (US$476).

• Otorgan a Perú premio gastronómico

El 12 de diciembre, el ministro de comercio exterior y turismo de Perú, Luis Silva, anunció que el país había sido premiado por primera vez en su historia con el World Travel Awards (WTA), como ‘el mejor destino gastronómico del mundo’, en una ceremonia en Nueva Delhi. Silva celebró el premio señalando que sería “extremadamente positivo” para la economía del país dado que la gastronomía peruana está estrechamente vinculada con el sector del turismo, con ambos emergiendo en años recientes como importantes fuentes de empleo e ingresos. Se estima que el sector gastronómico de Perú es ahora un negocio de US$1,5mm, empleando a unas 300.000 personas en el país, y a muchos más cuando las variadas ferias internacionales de alimentos celebradas en el país son tenidas en cuenta.

Development: On 10 February Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos thanked his Panamanian peer, Ricardo Martinelli, for the capture of ‘Pichi’ (Edinson Rodolfo Rojas), the presumptive leader of the Colombian criminal organisation, ‘Oficina de Envigado’.

Significance: Pichi’s capture in Panama City yesterday is another blow to the Oficina de Envigado, following the arrests of his two predecessors ‘Sebastián’ (Erickson Vargas Cardona)  ‘Valenciano’ (Maximiliano Bonilla) in August 2012 and November 2011.

Key points:

• Colombian police believe that ‘Pichi’ is behind a wave of violence in Medellín. He is wanted in connection with the deaths of two anti-narcotics officers in July 2012 and the deaths of nine suspected members of the Oficina de Envigado on 30 December last. The massacre, which took place in Envigado (on the outskirts of Medellín) was attributed to internal rivalries.

• According to the local press, ‘Pichi’ was picked up by the Panamanian police in a shopping centre in the San Miguel district, on the outskirts of Panama City.

• The Oficina de Envigado first emerged as a group of assassins hired by the notorious drug lord, Pablo Escobar, in the 1980s. Since Escobar’s death in 1993, it has splintered into smaller groups involved in the drug trade in Medellín and drug trafficking routes in the department of Antioquia and other areas on the Caribbean coast.

The commander of the Bolivian navy has revealed that there is growing evidence that cocaine is being shipped into Brazil and Argentina along routes that cross Lake Titicaca and run along the country’s border rivers that flow into Brazil. The government in La Paz and the antidrugs force, Felcn, have been focusing publicly on the routes, by air and overland, that run through the eastern department of Santa Cruz to Brazil and Paraguay. Recent raids by the navy have strengthened the view that, apart from acting as a conduit for Peruvian cocaine base, Bolivia is increasing its own processing of base.

Admiral Gonzalo Alcón, general commander of the navy, told the media in early May that his service had identified routes across Lake Titicaca from Peru with entry points at two municipalities of the department of La Paz, Guaqui and Laja — from where they presumably continue overland into Salta in northern Argentina, where last February a shipment of just under 600 kilos of liquidised cocaine was intercepted by that country’s Gendarmería (paramilitary border police).

He also said that shipments had been intercepted in Cobija (northern La Paz) on the river Acre, which runs into Bolivia, and in Guayaramerín (Beni) on the river Mamoré, which also runs into Brazil. Two inland water routes were detected in the Germán Busch province of Santa Cruz department, one in the Puerto Quijarro area on the Canal Tamengo which connects with the Paraguay-Paraná system, the other in the Arroyo Concepción area of Bolivia’s portion of the huge Pantanal wetlands shared with Brazil.

In May, said Alcón, the navy’s élite Diablos Azules unit, acting jointly with the Felcn, had located 15 cocaine processing labs along the Isiboro river, an affluent of the Sécure in the Mamoré basin. Though he did not spell it out, it is widely assumed that, as was the case on the large lab found in 2011, their product was cocaine base. The surrounding Isiboro-Sécure national park is a coca-growing area, and the presence of processing labs suggests a measure of local cocaine production, which if confirmed would dent the government’s insistence that Bolivia is basically just a transit country for Peruvian cocaine.

Apart from the eastern route via Santa Cruz, supplied by the airbridge from the Apurímac-Ene-Mantaro valley (Vraem) and Pichis-Palcazú [SSR-14-04] in Peru, evidence from that country has been mounting of a growing movement both overland and airborne, through northwestern Bolivia, with hubs in the department of La Paz, and then on to Argentina or, as was the case with the February seizure in Salta, to Chile, where other shipments of liquidised cocaine have been intercepted. [For related developments in Argentina, see page 16.]

The eastbound airbridge is still busy. In the first half of May the Felcn reported several important interdictions. In the capital city of Santa Cruz de la Sierra the force intercepted an overland shipment of 764 kilos of cocaine, half of which was HCl ready to go on to Brazil, the other half presumably destined to be refined locally before heading east — a further indication of a growing dedication to production in Bolivia. In the Mamoré province of northeastern Beni police located a clandestine airstrip next to which 1.6 tonnes of cocaine were found buried, and in Charagua, some 260 kilometres south of Santa Cruz city, authorities managed to seize 80 kilos from a Brazilian-registered aircraft that had been forced to make an emergency landing. The aircraft’s destination was thought to have been Paraguay; the cargo was only a fraction of the 300kg loads usually flown in from Peru.