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The Venezuelan opposition presidential pre-candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski denounced an attack on a political rally in the western state of Apure on 15 August, which he said had left 39 of his supporters injured. The attack, which he said was carried out by the colectivos who act as social enforcers for President Nicolás Maduro’s government, comes amid a deteriorating political climate that has seen at least two opposition candidates receive death threats.

“Violent groups in Apure state attacked our campaigners and the people waiting where we had a rally planned,” Capriles tweeted. “We tried to reschedule and groups of bikers once again arrived to continue meting out violence”. The planned event, in the city of San Fernando de Apure, had to be abandoned after campaigners for Capriles’ Primero Justicia (PJ) were attacked by a group of people who hurled objects and paint at them, while others shouted pro-government slogans and set fire to a PJ flag. Capriles later said that 39 of his supporters were injured in the confrontation.

This incident comes against a worsening backdrop of electoral intimidation. Another opposition pre-candidate, Delsa Solórzano, said on 12 August that she had received death threats, including one claiming to be from Colombia’s Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN). Death threats and the ELN’s initials were also daubed on a campaign office of another pre-candidate, María Corina Machado, in late July.

Venezuela’s attorney general, Tarek William Saab, has said that the authorities are investigating the threats made against Solórzano. President Maduro was more dismissive, saying that “in my view it’s simply a set-up by malicious people, because they made the threat in the name of Maduro, of Diosdado [Cabello, the government’s hard-man], of the Bolivarian revolution”. Maduro insisted that “we’ve never used the methods of violence or attacks to resolve our political differences”.

The opposition coalition Plataforma Unitaria Democrática (PUD) is increasingly warning of attempts by the Maduro administration to disrupt its primary election, which is scheduled for 22 October and will see a single candidate selected to represent the opposition in next year’s election, the date of which has not been set. On 14 August the PUD issued a statement accusing the government of “developing a communications strategy that links the primary with violence”. Maduro has grown increasingly strident in his attacks on the opposition in recent weeks, accusing unspecified individuals of “sowing fascism” through “lies, hatred and violence”.  

Venezuela appeals reopening of ICC probe

The Venezuelan government issued a statement on 14 August saying that it will appeal the decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague to reopen its investigation into alleged crimes against humanity in Venezuela. The ICC had announced on 27 June that it would resume its investigation, which was paused while the court considered a request by the Venezuelan authorities to take over the case. That request was rejected on the grounds that Venezuela’s own investigations have been insufficient. The government statement said that the ICC investigation has “a clear political motivation and is part of the ‘regime change’ strategy being pushed by foreign powers, based on false accusations of crimes against humanity”.

Paraguay’s new President Santiago Peña held a meeting on 20 August with the heads of other branches of government as well as judicial authorities overseeing anti-corruption measures. While Peña called for a “coordinated fight against corruption”, the new administration’s roadmap to combating corruption has met with scepticism from opposition parties and civil society groups – in particular, his controversial calls to dissolve the national anti-corruption secretariat (Senac).

“The functions of the government must be deployed around a consensus that harmonises a system of cooperation,” said the attorney general, Emiliano Rolón, after the meeting in the presidential palace also attended by Peña and Senator Silvio Ovelar, the congress president, both affiliated with the ruling Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC). However, a senator from the centre-left opposition Partido Encuentro Nacional (PEN), Kattya González, was cited by national daily ABC Color on 21 August as saying that Peña’s behind-closed-doors “summit” of the ‘Three Powers’ on tackling corruption was an attempt to snub the legislature, which she said was the proper forum to discuss anti-corruption initiatives so that the opposition can hold the ANR-PC’s proposals to account in congressional debates.

González went on to criticise the anti-corruption record of ANR-PC governments, highlighting that under former president Horacio Cartes (2013-2018), the head of the national anti-corruption secretariat (Senac) was Soledad Quiñónez, the sister of Sandra Quiñónez, Rolón’s predecessor as attorney general who has been accused by opposition lawmakers of shielding Cartes from domestic corruption investigations. The US government has previously sanctioned Cartes for allegedly committing a variety of corrupt activities including money laundering, misappropriation of public funds and assets, and involvement in cigarette smuggling. Rolón took over from Quiñónez on 9 March and two weeks after assuming his post he said that his office would investigate the US government’s allegations against Cartes.

• Cartes sanctions

A few weeks after former president Horacio Cartes (2013-2018) was appointed president of the ruling ANR-PC, the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (Ofac) sanctioned him and former vice president Hugo Velázquez (2018-2023) on 26 January for “involvement in rampant corruption”. Ofac also sanctioned four companies owned or controlled by Cartes. This followed the decision by the US State Department in July 2022 to blacklist Cartes and Velázquez for “involvement in significant corruption” [SSR-22-09].

Peña’s political mentor, Cartes became the party president of the ANR-PC on 10 January. The new administration has plenty of old faces allied with Cartes, such as Interior Minister Enrique Riera, who served as Cartes’ education minister from 2016-2018. Ángel Barchini, Peña’s current justice minister, served as ambassador to Qatar under Cartes. Barchini has been implicated in cocaine trafficking allegations in 2004 and 2009. Peña himself had served as finance minister under Cartes, a post now filled by Carlos Fernández Valdovinos, who was president of Paraguay’s central bank during the Cartes presidency.

Despite the corruption allegations surrounding Cartes and figures like Barchini, Peña has called for the dissolution of Senac, having claimed during a press conference on 31 July that the anti-corruption institution has “not discovered anything” since its creation in 2012. On 22 August the national daily Última Hora reported that the government was preparing legislation which would transfer Senac’s functions to the comptroller general’s office (CGR). Senator González has chaired discussions in congress, holding sessions on 21 and 25 August, to debate the future of Senac. González stated that civil society organisations invited to the congressional meetings have “expressed their concern” with the government’s plans. The NGO Coalición por la Legalidad, one of the groups invited to the discussions, released a statement on 31 August calling for the government to strengthen the allegedly ineffective Senac, rather than eliminate the state’s anti-corruption institutions.

In July, the state of São Paulo completed the sale of its water utility company, Companhia de Saneamento Básico do Estado de São Paulo (Sabesp) – a controversial sell-off, raising questions about whether it will bring net benefits to society.

Water and sewage coverage is a problem in Brazil, where about 15% of the population does not have access to running water and 44% have no sewage treatment. But while many of the country’s water and sewage companies lack money and perhaps the experience to address this, that is not the case of Sabesp. It was a well-run company that generated profit and provided relatively good and expanding services to more than 28m customers across 375 municipalities in Brazil’s most populous state.

Raising a total R$14.77bn (US$2.66bn) in revenue, the sale of a 32% stake in the company was the country’s second-largest share transaction – after the 2022 privatisation of electricity company Eletrobras – and the third-largest public share offering worldwide for the year-to-date.

Still, the sell-off ended up being something of a disappointment for existing shareholders and for the governor of São Paulo state, Tarcísio de Freitas. Sabesp was sold nearly 20% below market price in a tender that drew only one bidder, Equatorial Energy SA. Equatorial bought a 15% stake for R$6.9bn in a first stage in June, with the remaining 17% of the shares going for the same price in a dispersed offer to private investors in a second stage.

Equatorial has little experience in water management. Its biggest stakeholder is Daniel Dantas, a controversial entrepreneur and founder of Opportunity Asset Management, which played a key role in the privatisation of Brazil’s telecoms industry in the 1990s. Dantas was sentenced to prison then acquitted in an alleged bribery case and battled former partners in court over years.  

Adding to concerns is the potential rise in the price of water, which could make a resource of basic human needs unaffordable in a country where eight out of 10 consumers are already in debt, according to the trade group CNC. Previous privatisations, especially of water utilities, from Rio de Janeiro to Ouro Preto and Manaus, have drawn heavy criticism over price increases and poor water quality.

Critics accused Freitas of pushing through with the privatisation for ideological reasons and to build up a war chest that could fund public works and boost his popularity ahead of a possible campaign. Seen as a possible heir to the right-wing vote in the 2026 presidential elections, Freitas was infrastructure minister under former president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023), during whose term he oversaw the transfer of dozens of ports, roads, and airports to private management.

In response to criticism, Freitas said that the qualified personnel of Sabesp would continue to ensure the company’s good performance. “We have the best people and the best operation and that’s being preserved,” he said during a press conference.

Although it will be the de-facto operator, Equatorial won’t be the majority shareholder. The state of São Paulo will maintain an 18.3% stake against its 15% share. In addition, a lock-in clause prevents Equatorial from selling its stake until it has met so-called universalisation targets, meaning everyone within its remit must have running water and sewage treatment.

In mid-October Gonzalo Carrió, a member of Nicaraguan human rights NGO Colectivo de Derechos Humanos Nicaragua Nunca Más (CDHNN+), warned of a new phase of illegal property seizures by the government led by authoritarian President Daniel Ortega. The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) administration had already begun seizing property in line with its crackdown on dissent which started in 2018.

Carrió made his remarks in a broadcast posted on social media on 16 October, the same day that the country’s attorney general, Wendy Morales, revealed that the FSLN government had declared 35 properties for public use. Morales, who in March this year was sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (Ofac) for being “complicit” in the government’s “oppression”, justified the confiscation of properties (whose previous owners were not identified), claiming that they were in a “state of abandonment and could be used to disturb the peace, social wellbeing, and citizen security.”

According to a report published in May this year by Observatorio Pro Transparencia y Anticorrupción (Opta), which is run by local rights NGO Hagamos Democracia, at least 135 properties have been seized by the FSLN administration since it launched its crackdown on dissent in 2018. Describing the report as the first attempt to begin documenting illegal seizures by the Ortega government since 2018, Opta puts the value of these properties at more than US$250m in total. However, it said that this is just the “tip of the iceberg” given the paucity of information available and the reluctance of victims to come forward, faced with the threat of repression.

Underlining that property seizures have intensified since February 2023, when over 220 political prisoners were released, sent to the US, and subsequently stripped of their citizenship and assets [SSR-23-04], Opta draws parallels between the current wave of confiscations and “La Piñata”, a massive transfer of titling of confiscated and expropriated property to the FSLN leadership which occurred at the end of Ortega’s first mandate (1979-1990). The US State Department has estimated that some 28,000 foreign-owned and Nicaraguan-owned properties were expropriated under La Piñata.

Targeting the church

According to the CDHNN+ statement released on 14 November, over 1,262 religious organisations have been closed down since 2018. It adds that between 2018 and 2024, over 870 attacks have been carried out by the authorities against the Catholic Church while at least 22 religious media have been shuttered.

President of episcopal conference expelled

With the Catholic Church and other religious organisations among those targeted with property seizures, the recent expulsion to Guatemala of the Bishop of Jinotega, Carlos Enrique Herrera Gutiérrez, who is the president of Nicaragua’s episcopal conference (CEN), is a further sign of the government’s continued crackdown on the Church which has escalated this year [SSR-24-09].

Herrera’s expulsion on 13 November follows those of Bishops Rolando Álvarez and Isidoro Mora, who were exiled this year to Rome, having been detained (and in Álvarez’s case, sentenced to prison) on charges widely considered trumped up. Another bishop, the auxiliary bishop of Managua, Silvio José Báez, was forced into exile in 2019 after receiving death threats.

According to a statement released on 14 November by rights NGO, Colectivo de Derechos Humanos Nicaragua Nunca Más (CDHNN+), Herrera was expelled after reportedly criticising noisy events on 10 November organised by Leónidas Centeno Rivera, the FSLN mayor of Jinotega, which disrupted religious services.

Meanwhile, the latest tally posted on social media on 14 November by Martha Patricia Molina, a Nicaraguan researcher in exile who documents church repression by the authorities, estimates that 261 religious figures have been exiled since April 2018, of whom 55 were exiled this year. These include 141 priests and 99 nuns.

Trinidad & Tobago’s Prime Minister Stuart Young announced this month that the US had revoked special licences for the development of two offshore natural gas projects between Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela: Dragon, which was being developed by British multinational oil firm Shell and Trinidad’s state-owned Natural Gas Company (NGC), and Cocuina-Manakin, which was being developed by NGC and British multinational BP.

The projects are in Venezuelan waters, very close to the maritime border with Trinidad & Tobago. Developing the Dragon field in particular, (which has an estimated 4tn cubic feet [tcf] of gas reserves, compared with an estimated 1tcf for Cocuina-Manakin), would have solved a big problem for the Trinidad government: the existing Atlantic liquified natural gas (LNG) project is running out of gas to liquefy. Last year Atlantic, a partnership between Shell, BP, and NGC, produced 8.5m tonnes of gas, 4m less than its installed capacity according to figures from UK-headquartered London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), a global financial data provider, cited in a 20 March Reuters report.

Earlier in March, BP had said it was planning to decommission the first production train at Atlantic, which has been idle since 2020, because of a lack of sufficient feedstock. On paper at least the Dragon field could have solved that problem many times over, providing the natural gas needed to boost Atlantic LNG output.

Both Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela had been eager for the projects to go ahead. In December 2023 NGC announced the signing of the licence relating to the Dragon field between NGC, Shell, and Venezuela’s oil ministry while in July 2024 it announced the signing of a similar licence with BP relating to the Cocuina-Manakin gas fields. Under the previous US government led by former president Joe Biden (2021-2025), the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (Ofac) had granted special licences to the companies, allowing them to operate despite US sanctions against Venezuela.

However, on 9 April Young confirmed Ofac’s decision to revoke the licences, which comes as a major blow to the government. It was hardly a surprise given similar measures taken by the current US administration led by President Donald Trump against other oil companies operating in Venezuela such as US oil firm Chevron [WR-25-10]. In a 9 April statement the Energy Chamber of Trinidad & Tobago (ECTT), the lobby group for the energy and related sectors, described the news as “disappointing…but not unexpected”, underlining the importance of the government “continu[ing] to engage actively” with the US and Venezuela. Young has also revealed plans to seek meetings with US officials ahead of the 27 May deadline for the companies to wind down activities.

• Other opportunities?

In its 8 April statement on the revoked Ofac licenses, the Energy Chamber of Trinidad & Tobago nonetheless highlights “significant opportunities to develop natural gas fields within Trinidad & Tobago’s exclusive economic zone”. It cites the Mento and Coconut offshore gas fields being developed by US-headquartered EOG Resources and BP, Ginger which is being developed by BP, and Manatee (Shell). It also notes that there are others, including Calypso, Blackjack, and Onyx, “where companies are working towards taking a final investment decision”.

A team from the US Department of Energy surveyed the Simón Bolívar hydroelectric plant in Venezuela’s Bolívar state on 2 August, signifying progress on US-supported plans to overhaul the country’s electricity sector.

Venezuela’s creaking electrical infrastructure has for years been a central economic weakness, resulting in regular power outages and hindering the expansion of the electricity-hungry oil sector. The situation has worsened following the 24 June twin earthquakes, which caused structural damage at the Termocarabobo thermoelectricity plant in Carabobo state. President Delcy Rodríguez visited Termocarabobo on 3 August and said that repair works had enabled the recovery of “300 of the 600 megawatts that Termocarabobo provided”.

Upgrades to the electricity grid are widely viewed as essential to enabling an oil-led economic recovery, and in early June the government-controlled national assembly unanimously approved a reform aimed at boosting private investment in the power sector. As was the case following the January reform to hydrocarbon legislation, a significant chunk of that investment is expected to come from the US. A 7 January statement that was issued four days after the US capture of Rodríguez’s predecessor, Nicolás Maduro (2013-2026), said that “Venezuela’s electricity grid is dilapidated and fragile after years of socialist mismanagement, corruption, and poor maintenance”. It added that “we will work to improve the electricity grid, which is essential to increasing oil production, economic opportunity, and the daily quality of life for the Venezuelan people”.

The US chargé d’affaires in Caracas, John Barrett, announced on social media this week that he had attended a survey of Simón Bolívar hydroelectric plant that was carried out by “technical experts” from the US Department of Energy, in collaboration with Venezuela’s electricity ministry and state power firm Corpoelec. Barrett said that “the team conducted a technical diagnosis that will help define a roadmap for the modernization of the national electricity system”. This, he added, fits within the framework of Washington’s “three-phase plan” for Venezuela, consisting of recovery, stabilisation, and democratic transition.

Highlighting the ongoing strain posed by the power issues, on 4 August Rodríguez announced “a plan for reducing consumption of electricity and water”, calling on citizens to limit their electricity use amid fears that the El Niño climate phenomenon could pile more pressure on the grid in the coming months. Her plea was criticised for its lack of detail by Henrique Capriles Radonski, the leading opposition figure in the national assembly, who asked “how many more times are we going to listen to empty plans?” In the meantime, Capriles said, the strain would be felt by “families who go hours without electricity, businesses that are losing their income, hospitals at risk, affected students, and producers who see how it’s getting more and more difficult to move the country forwards”.

Slow progress on oil deals

The US news website Axios reported on 3 August that there is mounting frustration in the US government and oil sector that no new oil concessions have been granted since the passage of Venezuela’s hydrocarbon reform in January. Frustration has reportedly intensified amid the oil market disruption caused by the war in the Middle East. The US Department of Energy, which is bearing the brunt of the criticism, reportedly rejected these claims, with sources telling Axios that new oil deals will be signed in the coming weeks.

New government-opposition talks set to begin

The president of Venezuela’s national assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, spoke on the phone on 1 August with Dinorah Figuera, the president of the opposition’s parallel legislative assembly, to discuss the agenda for negotiations which will begin in Caracas in the coming days. The talks, which will not involve opposition leader María Corina Machado, will centre around three key topics: responding to the 24 June earthquakes; strengthening democracy; and rights and political guarantees. The sidelining of Machado has raised questions over Figuera’s mandate to reach an agreement.

The three months of protests about the government’s education reform plans have prompted copycat protests in Brazil and Colombia. The Chilean protests show little sign of subsiding. On 3 September, President Sebastián Piñera met student leaders for four hours, but failed to reach an agreement.

Indeed, in some respects, the government is going back to the drawing board yet again, promising to draft another new reform proposal (its third so far this year) for the students to examine. The latest proposal was sent to the students by the education minister, Felipe Bulnes, on 5 September, but the students have yet to respond.

The government has also been distracted by an accident in which 21 people were killed when a military aircraft crashed near the San Juan Fernández archipelago on 4 September. As a mark of respect for the victims of the crash, the government asked the students to cancel a one-day strike scheduled for 6 September: the students refused and the strike went ahead.

The students, drawn from both schools and universities, and backed by their teachers, want the government to take over the provision of primary and secondary education from local municipalities and to put an end to for-profit organizations offering education services.  Chile has 1m people in higher education (of a population of 17m). Students complain that higher education at both university and vocational colleges is expensive and leaves them saddled with large debts.

In the latest proposal, the government had wanted to set out a new timetable for talks about education reform. Camila Vallejo, the president of the Chilean Students Federation (Confech) and the most prominent of the student leaders, insisted that the latest round of talks “does not mean we are abandoning the movement [demonstrations]... [President Piñera] never asked us to abandon it”.

Rodrigo Rivera, president of the national coordinator of secondary students (Cones), concurred with Vallejo and said that high school students would continue their protests “until we receive concrete answers and solutions to our demands”.

Carabineros:  On 2 September the national director of Chile’s national police force (carabineros), General Eduardo Gordon, submitted his resignation to President Piñera. The carabineros have come under increasing criticism of late, triggered by their response to the continuing student protests, which climaxed with the killing of 16-year old Manuel Gutiérrez on 26 August. The release of an article accusing General Gordon of fiddling with police documentation to protect his son during an investigation into a traffic accident proved the final straw. Upon his resignation, General Gordon said he hoped his removal would “serve as a catalyst” to restore peace to Chilean society.

Growth:  On 7 September the central bank cut its GDP growth forecast for 2011 by a quarter of a percentage point. The bank is now forecasting annual growth of between 6.25% and 6.75%, down from a previous range of between 6% and 7%, set in June. The president of the central bank, José de Gregorio, said that the bank was reacting to the unsettled international economic outlook. In the first half of 2011 the economy grew 8.4% year-on-year. July’s year-on-year growth of 4% was well below independent forecasts.

• Inflation
  

In August monthly inflation was 0.2%, bringing the rate for the past 12 months to 3.2%. The monthly rate was double that expected by independent economists and may prompt the central bank to resume interest rate increases. The central bank, however, has cut its forecast for annual inflation in 2011 to 3.3%, from 4% previously.

El gobierno del Presidente Daniel Ortega está acusando a la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA) de participar en una conspiración de EU para desestabilizar a Nicaragua. La acusación está calculada para desviar la atención de los crecientes reclamos sobre las irregularidades que rodearon las elecciones del 6 de noviembre, que vieron a Ortega ganar de manera aplastante y a su Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) asegurar una mayoría de dos tercios en el congreso, que las encuestas, y la historia reciente sugerían que era inalcanzable.

Denis Moncada, el embajador de Nicaragua ante la OEA, afirmó el 21 de noviembre durante una sesión extraordinaria del consejo permanente de la OEA, que la misión de observadores de la OEA era parte de un gran plan orquestado por EU de “inaceptable interferencia”. William McGlynn, el vice-representante de EU ante la OEA, respondió que el único elemento desestabilizar en Nicaragua era el mismo gobierno.

La misión de observadores de la OEA había sido en realidad bastante circunspecta acerca de la transparencia de las elecciones –solamente afirmó que había sido impedida de ingresar en 20% de los sitios que trataron de visitar para monitorear la elección– pero Moncada acusó a la OEA de proveer “información falsa, y de carecer de objetividad, imparcialidad y transparencia”. Esos mismos cargos podrían fácilmente ser aplicados al Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) de Nicaragua, especialmente porque se había abstenido de difundir los resultados de cada sitio de votación de la Junta Receptora de Votos (JRV) que haría mucho más fácil la verificación independiente de observaciones limitadas. La agresión de la administración Ortega ante incluso esta tibia crítica podría hacer que la OEA adopte una posición más dura. La misión de observadores de la Unión Europea (UE) afirmó el 17 de noviembre que el CSE había actuado de una manera opaca y arbitraria y que las irregularidades que la misión había detectado constituyente un serio revés para la democracia.

Moncada citó los comentarios de un Coronel retirado, Víctor Boitano Coleman, quien (en resumen) afirmó que se le habían acercado funcionarios de la embajada de EU para ir a Washington y denunciar el fraude electoral. Boitano, en ex guerrillero Sandinista que estaba buscando ser electo como diputado por la Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense (ALN), dijo que el “rostro visible” de esta campaña de desestabilización era el opositor Partido Liberal Independiente-Movimiento Renovador Sandinista (PLI-MRS). El secretario general de la OEA, José Miguel Insulza, implicó que Boitano estaba trastornado. “Este es un candidato a diputado que en los 24 meses pasados ha acusado a tres candidatos presidenciales de tratar de asesinarlo a él; de desear conspirar con él; o de asesinar a alguien”. Insulza podía haber agregado que a mediados de octubre, el presidente del propio partido de Boitano, Enrique Quiñónez, denunció que él había abogado para secuestrar a la hija de Ortega, Camila Ortega Murillo.

• Reacción empresarial

El presidente de la federación de empresas privadas (Cosep), José Adán Aguerri, dijo que él pediría al Presidente Ortega que destituya a todos los jueces instalados en el consejo supremo electoral (CSE), incluido su presidente, Roberto Rivas, debido al desorden electoral. El mismo hecho que él cree que Ortega tiene el poder de hacer tal movida flagrantemente inconstitucional, solamente muestra cuán poca integridad institucional permanece en Nicaragua. Ciertamente, Ortega usó su control del CSE para desobedecer la constitución con el objetivo de buscar la reelección.

PANAMA | Security tensions at the top. President Ricardo Martinelli faced a looming crisis after tensions between Security Minister José Raúl Mulino and Police Chief Gustavo Pérez de la Ossa prompted the former to present his ‘irrevocable’ resignation on 9 March, only to retract it subsequently. The row was prompted by Pérez’s rejection of a bill backed by Mulino to create an internal affairs tribunal for cases against police officers. In what Mulino described as an “unacceptable act of insubordination”, Pérez came out against it, arguing that “only the police can judge the police”. Having served in the notorious ‘anti-terrorism’ unit of former military ruler Manuel Noriega (1983-1989), Pérez remains a controversial figure [WR-11-50] and his stand did little to assuage ongoing doubts regarding his influence in the government. Martinelli who appointed Pérez in 2009, sought to defuse the looming crisis by switching him with Julio Moltó, the head of the executive’s national state security council. Martinelli has, however, withdrawn the contentious bill.

Venezuela | Costa Rican diplomat released. On 10 April the Costa Rican commercial attaché at the embassy in Caracas, Guillermo Cholele, was released by his kidnappers. According to Venezuela’s minister of interior & justice, Tareck El Aissami, all members of the criminal group that abducted Cholele have been identified by authorities and the police are working towards securing their arrest

Another nationalisation: Less than a month after Morales nationalised Colquiri, a small tin/silver mine controlled by Sinchi Wayra, a subsidiary of Switzerland’s Glencore [RA-12-06], on 10 July he announced that he would decree the nationalisation of the Mallku Khota mine, owned by Compañía Minera Mallku Khota (CMMK), a subsidiary of the Canadian company South American Silver (SASC). With indicated resources of 230.3m ounces of silver and 1,481 tonnes of indium, plus inferred resources of 140m ounces of silver and 935 tonnes of indium, Mallku Khota has the potential to be Bolivia’s biggest mine. Along with the Colquiri mine, it had been at the centre of recent social unrest. Over the past month, seven people, including mine employees, were taken hostage by mining opponents and one person died in as yet unclarified circumstances. Four of the hostages were rescued on 6 July, with the other three being released by their captors two days later. The latter group included engineers employed by SASC and accused by the local community protestors of spying on them. While the nationalisation of Colquiri was accepted by Glencore – although this could change depending on the terms of the compensation, which the government is still in the process of determining, the announcement regarding the Mallku Khota mine met with an outspoken response from the Canadian company. On 10 July, SASC issued a statement expressing “extreme disappointment”, adding that “South American Silver has not received any formal notice from the Bolivian Government about the cancellation of its concession and is actively seeking clarification about the government's intentions”. Greg Johnson, the president and CEO of South American Silver, was clear that "we strongly object to the government's stated course of actions [sic] and we will pursue all legal, constitutional and diplomatic options”.

Inflation: According to Bolivia’s national statistics institute (INE), the monthly inflation rate for June was 0.21%, less than the 0.49% registered in May. The INE reported that accumulated inflation to June this year reached 1.96%, less than half of the 5% forecast by the government for 2012.

SECURITY | Trilateral working group on narco-trafficking.   Following a 14 November meeting in Lima with his regional counterparts from Bolivia and Brazil, Peru’s interior minister, Wilfredo Pedraza, announced that a new trilateral working group would come up with proposals to jointly tackle drug trafficking. Pedraza said the technical group, which must report back in 60 days, would examine measures like improved joint border security efforts (land, air and fluvial), improved police coordination and intelligence sharing. Pedraza stressed the importance of “concrete actions” to tackle drug trafficking, with a focus on three shared border zones: Madre de Dios, Puno and Ucayali in Peru; the Bolivian departments of Pando, La Paz and Bení; and the north eastern border states of Acre and Rondônia in Brazil. Along with the Bolivian and Brazilian justice ministers, Carlos Romero and José Eduardo Cardozo respectively, also present at the meeting were: Peru’s justice minister, Eda Rivas, the deputy foreign minister, José Beraún Araníbar; the head of Peru’s national commission against drugs (Devida), Carmen Masías, and the national police chief, Raúl Salazar. Flavio Mirella, a representative from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as the two ambassadors and other high level representatives from Bolivia and Brazil also attended.

SECURITY | Alternative crops gain ground. On 14-15 November Peru’s national commission for development and life without drugs (Devida) hosts over a committee of 100 anti-drug experts from 23 countries, including senior representatives from the US and the European Union, which will examine Peru’s progress in promoting alternative crops to the coca leaf in the country’s main drug producing regions. In Tarapoto, in the Amazon region of San Martín, Mario Ríos told the committee that some 80,000 hectares of land in the area had been planted with coffee, cocoa and other alternative crops in the past 15 years, replacing coca leaf plantations. Introducing some of the local farmers and cooperative leaders, Ríos said that 130,000 families had benefited directly or indirectly from this “alternative development”. He pointed out that the benefits extend to the health of local people no longer exposed to the harmful pre-cursor chemicals used to make cocaine, which previously contaminated both the land and local water supplies. Devida is trying to emphasise the positive socio-economic outcomes in Peru’s fight against drugs. According to its latest figures, Peru remains the world’s second main coca leaf producer with an estimated 62,5000 hectares planted to September 2012, up 5% on the year and approaching Colombia’s estimated planted area of 64,400 hectares.

ECUADOR | Otro préstamo de China. El ministerio de finanzas de Ecuador, emitió un comunicado el 26 de febrero en el que informaba que el Banco de Desarrollo de China le había transferido US$1,4mm, parte del préstamo de US$2mm que el banco acordó con Ecuador el pasado diciembre. La declaración explica que el gobierno del Presidente Rafael Correa había asegurado el préstamo a ocho años, con una tasa de interés del 7% (con dos años de gracia), para financiar su presupuesto del 2013, que ahora está “completamente financiado”. La declaración sigue para agregar que esta es la primera parte del préstamo, que puede ser libremente usado por el gobierno. Por otro lado, la segunda entrega, de US$600mm, estará dividida en dos partes, con US$300m destinados a proyectos de energía, y US$300m para desarrollar proyectos en el sector de la salud. Con este préstamo, China se ha consolidado como el principal acreedor de Ecuador, pues el país andino ha recurrido en repetidas ocasiones a su socio asiático para obtener préstamos desde que decidió hacer un default parcial sobre su deuda externa en el 2008, y ha buscado evitar acudir a los mercados internacionales para obtener fondos.

COLOMBIA | TLC con Corea del Sur. Los gobiernos de Colombia y de Corea del Sur firmaron un nuevo tratado de libre comercio (TLC) el 21 de febrero. Pese al hecho de que el comercio bilateral entre los dos países se cuadruplicó entre el 2002 y el 2011, llegando a US$1,9mm el año pasado, la mayor parte (US$1,5mm) fue en la forma de exportaciones coreanas a Colombia. Estas son predominantemente productos manufacturados tales como autos, auto-partes y maquinarias. Por su lado las principales exportaciones de Colombia a Corea del Sur son productos con menor valor agregado, como carbón vegetal, minerales y, significativamente, café.

El fuerte contraste entre lo que exporta cada país ha llevado a que el acuerdo, que eliminará el 96,1% de las tarifas a todas las exportaciones colombianas, y el 96,7% en todas las tarifas a las exportación coreanas en los próximos 10 años, sea recibido con reacciones diversas en Colombia. Por un lado, el problemático sector del café le ha dado la bienvenida al acuerdo, mostrándose optimista acerca de la posibilidad de incrementar sus exportaciones a tan importante mercado de rápido crecimiento. Genaro Muñoz, el presidente de la federación nacional de productores de café (FNC), ha dicho que el acuerdo representa una “gran oportunidad” para el sector, señalando que Corea del Sur compra 1,6m de bolsas de café al año, con el 20% actualmente proviniendo de Colombia. Según Muñoz, con la eliminación de las tarifas, que puede llegar a ser tan altas como del 8%, las exportaciones de café a Corea del Sur podrían incrementarse por alrededor del 5% al año, para el beneficio de las 500.000 familias que dependen de este sector para su sustento.

En contraste, el sector automotriz de Colombia está preocupado de que el acuerdo podría  completamente arrasar” con el sector si el gobierno colombiano no provee más incentivos a los fabricantes del país. El presidente de la asociación automotriz y de partes automotrices (Asopartes), Tulio Zuloaga, dijo que la industria automotor de Corea del Sur es “extremadamente competitiva”, pues es capaz de producir automóviles y partes mucho más baratamente que los fabricantes de Colombia. Zuloaga explicó que el gobierno coreano “generosamente protege” a su industria nacional proveyendo exenciones fiscales de cerca del 50%, así como también descuentos de hasta el 50% en los costos de la energía. Según Zuloaga, el TLC con Corea del Sur, junto con TLC firmado con EU el año pasado y otro actualmente en la etapa de negociación con Japón, casi “podrían borrar a esta industria”, que emplea a 4,3m de personas, o el 23% del total de  la fuerza de trabajo.

PERÚ | Pagando deuda con anticipación. El 26 de febrero, el ministerio de economía y finanzas de Perú (MEF) anunció que estaba pagando por adelantado US$1,7mm de un préstamo obtenido del Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) y del Banco Internacional para la Reconstrucción y el Desarrollo (BIRD).

La semana pasada el ministro de economía y finanzas, Luis Miguel Castilla, había dicho que el gobierno estaba contemplando hacer un pago adelantado de su deuda externa, como parte de sus esfuerzos para abordar la apreciación del Sol contra el dólar de EU, que llegó recientemente a PEN2,55/US$1. Castilla había explicado que a fin de hacer el pago el gobierno estaba considerando emitir bonos en el mercado local por hasta US$4mm, de los cuales US$1,8mm serían usados para hacer el pago por adelantado, US$1,2mm se depositarían en el fondo de estabilización fiscal y US$1mm se utilizarían para el servicio de otras deudas.

Una declaración oficial del MEF expresó que estaba planeando llevar adelante una emisión inicial de bonos; con una segunda emisión a tener lugar solamente si la primera resulta sobrepasada por la demanda por al menos el 25% del monto ofrecido.

• Venezuela cierra las tiendas Zara por tres días

El 25 de febrero, las autoridades venezolanas ordenaron una suspensión de actividades por tres días de Phoenix World Trade, la distribuidora local de la firma de prendas de vestir española Zara, en medio de sospechas de posibles infracciones relacionadas a la fijación de precios. Trino Martínez, el presidente de la agencia nacional venezolana de defensa del consumidor (Indepabis), dijo que la agencia había hallado “irregularidades, incluyendo un arbitrario incremento en los precios” y que había aplicado una multa de US$85.000 a Phoenix World Trade y suspendido sus actividades por 72 horas. Trino agregó que después de la suspensión, Indepabis realizará otra investigación, y si persisten las irregularidades “someteremos el caso al ministerio público para que puedan iniciarse los procedimientos penales”. La decisión se produjo después de que el Vicepresidente Nicolás Maduro advirtiera que el gobierno “lucharía contra la especulación capitalista”, después de tomar la decisión a principios de mes de devaluar el Bolívar.

Egypt’s 50-member constitutional panel approved a new draft constitution on 1 December.  Not surprisingly there are significant differences with the 2012 constitution because the group devising it is so different.

The 2012 document was drafted by a Constituent Assembly (CA) of 100 members who had been elected by the two houses of parliament.  As about 75% of parliament comprised Islamists, it is not surprising that Islamists formed a high proportion of the CA, about 48% according to the Muslim Brotherhood.  The present panel has just two Islamists amongst its 50 members.

Nevertheless, the new draft constitution does keep the 2012 provision that says that “Islam is the religion of the state. Principles of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation.”  However, left out is Article 219 which defined the principles of Sharia as “general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community”.  The problem with this article, complained liberals, is that it seemed to allow for the annulling of any existing laws that might contradict Sharia.  The 2013 draft holds that “verdicts of the Supreme Constitutional Court represent the reference when interpreting the principles of Sharia”.

Not surprisingly, the Salafists are unhappy about the change of emphasis.  The deputy chief of the country’s largest Salafist group, Yasir Burhami of Salafist Call, described the new constitution as the “worst in Egypt’s history”.  He also confirmed that Salafists would not vote for it.

Another cause of concern for the Islamists is the article which “bans the formation of political parties along religious lines”, which is a considerable strengthening of the rather weak provision in the 2012 constitution which said that “political parties that discriminate on the basis of gender, origin, or religion are not allowed to be formed”.

Another area of controversy is a provision that seems to tie the president’s hands on the appointment of the defence minister.  The new document says: “Defence Minister is appointed after the approval of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the provisions of this article are valid through two consecutive presidential terms after the constitution is put into effect.”

There has also been a widening of the conditions under which a civilian might be tried by a military court.  The new constitution says: “Civilians must not stand trial before military courts except for crimes that constitute direct assault on military facilities, camps of the armed forces military equipment, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, documents, secrets, money, military factories, or crimes that involve direct assaults on men of the armed forces while performing their tasks.”

Quotas for the representation of farmers and workers in the House of Representatives (HR) have been removed, and unlike in the 2012 version there seems to be better provision for women who will be “properly represented in legislative bodies, in a way defined by law”.  The new constitution also says that the state will work “to make youth, Christians, handicapped, and Egyptian expatriates properly represented in the HR in the first election that follows the passage of this constitution”.

This latter provision apparently had difficulty achieving the required 75% majority in constitutional panel, but was eventually passed under pressure from panel chairman Amr Musa.  However, Musa was unable to achieve the same result with the provisions for the electoral system, which envisaged that two-thirds of the HR’s seats would be elected on the basis of individual candidates and one-third via electoral lists.  The issue is now to be resolved by the interim president in his current role as the legislative authority.

The next step is for the constitution to be approved by a referendum 30 days after being presented to the president, which it was on 3 December.

COLOMBIA | La Santé en pos de ser global. El 6 de Febrero la firma farmacéutica de Colombia, La Santé, anunció que había completado con éxito la adquisición de Pharmetique S.A., la subsidiaria local del gigante farmacéutico alemán Boehringer Ingelheim, por una suma no revelada. El acuerdo le permite a La Santé consolidarse como el primer actor en la industria farmacéutica de Colombia y le provee una sólida plataforma desde la cual podrá continuar su rápida internacionalización. En años recientes, La Santé ha emergido como una de las ‘multilatinas’ de la región, con operaciones en 12 diferentes países de América Latina, todo lo cual le permitió obtener US$360m de ventas el año pasado.

El gerente ejecutivo (CEO) de La Santé, Charles Bevan, dijo que la adquisición de Pharmetique, que produce medicamentos de venta bajo receta y sin receta en Colombia, permitirá a la firma incrementar su valor neto por alrededor del 30% y elevar su capacidad de producción un 50%. Actualmente La Santé tiene tres plantas de producción en Colombia y una en Venezuela. Bevan señaló que la operación de compra también ubicará a la firma “en la vanguardia del proceso reproducción” pues Pharmetique es una de las firmas tecnológicamente más avanzadas en el mundo con sus técnicas de producción “viniendo directamente de Alemania”.

Bevan dijo que después de la adquisición, la firma espera expandir sus negocios entre un 19% y un 30% durante el próximo par de años, con planes para comenzar a exportar medicinas a México y África para el 2016; y a EU y Rusia y Asia Central en un futuro cercano. De hecho, Bevan dijo que La Santé ya está conduciendo estudios preliminares en el mercado de productos dermatológicos –uno de los puntos fuertes de la firma– en los mercados mexicanos y africanos.

Explicando la estrategia de expansión de la firma, Bevan dijo que hace 15 años su fundador, Carlos Vallecilla, comprendió que era fundamental “leer el futuro y anticiparse a los eventos” y que, como resultado, en años recientes La Santé ha adoptado la estrategia de adquirir firmas que le permitirían experimentar un rápido proceso de internalización en “anticipación de las firmas de TLCs [Tratados de Libre Comercio]”. Desde el 2011, Colombia ha firmado TLCs con todos sus socios de la Alianza del Pacífico (Chile, Perú, y México) así como también con la Unión Europea y EU, todos los cuales La Santé está ahora en buena posición para explotar.

ECUADOR | Multan a América Móvil. La Superintendencia de Control del Poder de Mercado (SCPM) de Ecuador, el órgano antimonopolio del país, anunció el 9 de febrero que había decidido multar, al Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones (Conecel), la subsidiaria local de la mexicana América Móvil, unos US$138,5m por prácticas de abuso de mercado. De acuerdo con la SCPM, la decisión de multar a la firma el 10% de sus ventas reportadas en el 2012, fue tomada como resultado de una queja presentada por la firma propiedad del Estado, Corporación Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (CNT), en octubre del 2012.

CNT acusó a Conecel, que tiene una dominante participación del 67% del mercado ecuatoriano de las telecomunicaciones, de hacer que los dueños de propiedades en las que ha erigido sus infraestructuras de telecomunicaciones firmen contratos de exclusividad en violación de las leyes antimonopolio. Según CNT, el 83% de los contratos de Conecel incluyen una cláusula que prohíbe a los dueños de la propiedad permitir que otras empresas de telecomunicaciones instalen equipos similares en sus propiedades y les obliga a pagar una multa si esta cláusula es violada. CNT alega que esta práctica en gran medida le ha impedido expandir su cobertura y mejorar su provisión de servicio.

Conecel niega estos alegatos, cuales dice que son “maliciosos y temerarios”. Dice que CNT no ha proveído evidencia sustancial de que la firma en algún momento haya impedido que CNT, que actualmente controla solamente el 2,5% del mercado, desarrolle y expanda su red. Conecel dice que ha presentado a la SCPM “evidencia sólida” que desacredita las acusaciones hechas por CNT y ha “mostrado que esta firma podría sin costos transaccionales o económicos adicionales establecer infraestructuras de telecomunicaciones lo suficientemente cerca de nuestra propia infraestructura”. Como tal, Conecel ha rechazado la “injusta” multa aplicada contra la firma por SCPM, alegando que además de haber “serias inconsistencias” en el proceso de toma de decisiones de la SCPM, “la magnitud de la sanción viola el principio constitucional de proporcionalidad de las penas”. Concel dio que cuestionaría la decisión en las cortes locales.

Esta no es la primera vez que Conetel ha encontrado problemas en Ecuador. En el 2012, la firma fue forzada a pagar US$193m en impuestos atrasados del periodo 2003-2006 después de perder un caso en las cortes.

• Remesas venezolanas

El 10 de febrero el  gobierno venezolano anunció la suspensión temporaria del envío de todas las remesas de dinero que ciudadanos venezolanos a miembros de sus familias en Colombia hasta nuevo aviso. Una declaración oficial dice que la medida surge del reciente acuerdo firmado por los gobiernos de Venezuela y Colombia, bajo el cual los dos acordaron trabajar juntos para combatir el contrabando de bienes a través de sus fronteras. Como parte del acuerdo, los dos países decidieron que en el futuro las remesas venezolanas serían hechas en pesos colombianos y no en dólares de EU, en un esfuerzo por evitar que individuos en Venezuela aprovechen la tasa de cambio preferencial del dólar ofrecida por el gobierno a los importadores para comprar divisas y transferirlas a Colombia. La declaración explica que la suspensión permanecerá vigente “hasta que este mecanismo comience a funcionar”.

Eduardo Cunha, the speaker of the federal lower chamber of congress from the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), finds himself increasingly isolated in his struggle to avoid losing his political rights. Politicians from a wide range of parties have taken to the floor of congress to demand his removal. At present, Cunha has enough allies and resourcefulness to delay the work of the ethics committee that is investigating his case. However, the use of these stalling tactics is raising the ire of many colleagues and perhaps making his ouster more likely.

On 19 November, the reporter on the Cunha case, Fausto Pinato, from the Partido Republicano Brasileiro (PRB), was due to present his findings to the ethics committee. However, Cunha managed to block this initiative by convening a plenary session of the lower chamber at 9am that day. According to house rules, no committees are allowed to meet in conflict with this session. This provoked an open rebellion against Cunha on the floor of the chamber, with cries of “shame” and “Out, Cunha” resounding through congress.

Then, on 24 November, Pinato managed to present his report, calling for further investigation into Cunha. However, allies of Cunha on the ethics committee called for more time to analyse the decision. The committee will now meet again on 1 December. Given that the committee has 90 days to deliberate, no final decision on Cunha is likely until well into 2016.

Whereas the main opposition, the Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (PSDB), has become increasingly outspoken in its desire to see Cunha removed from office, along with other, smaller left-wing parties, the ruling Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) is caught in a bind. On the one hand, in the midst of the scandal at the state oil company Petrobras it wishes to show it is tough on corruption; on the other hand, it does not want to do anything that might provoke Cunha into instigating impeachment proceedings against President Dilma Rousseff.

It appears the committee is evenly divided, between 10 pro-Cunha deputies and 10 anti-Cunha deputies. If that is the case, the tie would be broken by the president of the committee, José Carlos Araújo. In the meantime, Cunha’s allies are now trying to remove Pinato as committee reporter because he himself has a case against him at the supreme court.

Mining waste reaches the Atlantic

Over the weekend of 21-22 November, the tide of mud and mining waste from the collapse of the Fundão dam, near Mariana, Minas Gerais, reached the Atlantic Ocean, after flowing down 600km of the Rio Doce. All along the river, fish, plant and animal life has been devastated: the high turbidity of the waters has drastically reduced the level of oxygen present in the river. A mud plume has drifted around 9km along the coast of Espírito Santo, endangering the Comboios nature reserve.

Samarco, the joint venture between the Anglo-Australian mining giant BHP Billiton and Vale, the Brazilian mining firm, so far insists that the levels of heavy metal particles present in the sediment are not dangerous. However, tests are still ongoing, with many biologists arguing that the level of toxicity in the water will not be apparent for some time.

The national water agency (ANA) initially prohibited the cities along the river from using the water for human consumption. That ban has now been lifted for the biggest city, Governador Valadares, but around 150,000 residents elsewhere along the river are still without a regular water supply.

• Trade surplus

In October, Brazil posted a trade surplus of US$1.99bn and an accumulated surplus of US$12.24bn in 2015. Exports amounted to US$16.05bn (down 4.1% year-on-year) and imports US$14.05bn (down 21.1% year-on-year). For the first time in two years, Brazil’s exports to Argentina increased, mainly due to increased auto exports.

Since the start of the year, there has been a revival of violence in the southern Bío Bío, Araucanía, and Los Ríos Regions – where the indigenous Mapuche lay claim to ancestral lands. The Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM), one of the most radical Mapuche organisations, has already claimed responsibility for some of the incidents which come despite renewed efforts by the Nueva Mayoría national government led by President Michelle Bachelet to address the problem.

On 28 January a group of some 20 masked individuals ambushed a Carabineros police patrol on land belonging to the forestry authorities in Lanco commune, in Los Ríos Region, setting alight machinery, two trucks, and a van and leaving two Carabineros officials injured. While the authorities have yet to confirm officially who was behind the attack, the local press reported that pamphlets were left alluding to Matías Catrileo, an indigenous Mapuche activist who was killed by a police officer in 2008.

Two days earlier the CAM issued a communiqué claiming responsibility for arson attacks – one which took place on 24 January at the site of a kitchen used for employees at a hydroelectric plant, Central Hidroeléctrica Angostura in Bío Bío region and another which took place damaging forestry equipment in the Capitán Pastene area, Lumaco commune, in the Araucanía. The CAM communiqué said that the actions were part of a “permanent commitment to reconstruct ourselves as a nation”, in a “frontal battle against the expressions of capitalism, through military actions assumed by the ORT-CAM [resistance groups of the CAM – Órganos de Resistencia Territorial], seeking to deepen territorial and productive control of the territory demanded”.

The reports of violence in the area come despite recent efforts by the Nueva Mayoría to address violence there such as the creation of a new security zone [SSR-15-10]. On 7 January deputy interior minister Mahmud Aleuy travelled to the Araucanía where he met the head of the appeals court for the regional capital city of Temuco, Aner Padilla; the regional prosecutor for Araucanía, Cristian Paredes; the general director of police, Bruno Villalobos; the deputy director of the local investigative police (PDI), Dario Ortega; and the director of the national intelligence agency (ANI), Gustavo Villalobos. Agreements to come out of that meeting included plans to train police officials on collecting evidence at crime scenes, to reduce errors caused by inconsistent procedures; to create a working table on measures of protection in the region; better coordination between authorities on arms control; and plans to improve coordination between institutions.

At the end of last year President Bachelet herself visited the Araucanía – her first visit there since taking office again for a second term in March 2014 – although her visit focussed not on security but on regional development. A presidential press release notes that “the Ministry of Health and the National Fund for Regional Development provided 28.7 billion pesos in 2015 alone. The investment scheduled for next year doubles that amount and we will be investing a total of 56.5 billion pesos in healthcare.”

That rural violence is on the rise in Araucanía was suggested in a report presented by Paredes on 12 January 2016. He said that 302 incidents related to rural violence took place in Araucanía in 2015, 6% more than in 2014 – the most common crime being arson attacks, and forest fires. However, Paredes sought to downplay the links between this and the Mapuche issue, telling reporters that “we are not talking about the Mapuche conflict because we understand that it is a generalised expression [of violence]”. Paredes also said that there had been an increase in the number of convictions handed down for these crimes, with 40 sentences handed down in 2015, up from 14 in 2014.

CHILE | Poverty reduction. Chile’s poverty rate, as measured by household income level, fell from 14.4% to 11.7% between 2013 and 2015, while the incidence of extreme poverty fell from 4.5% to 3.5%, according to the latest instalment of the Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional (Casen) released on 22 September.

The new positive poverty reduction data was presented by the social development minister, Marcos Barraza, who said that multidimensional poverty – which considers access to things such as education, public health, labour, education, and housing – also fell from 20.4% to 19.1% during the period. Barraza argued that this showed that Chile’s economic and social policies were succeeding in reducing poverty and inequality despite the current domestic economic slowdown.

Barraza’s comments were echoed by President Michelle Bachelet, who is in need of a political boost having recently seen her approval rating sink to the lowest level of any head of state in Chile since the return to democracy in 1990 [WR-16-33]. Bachelet said that she was satisfied with the Casen results and stressed that “400,000 people have been lifted out of poverty”, even as Chile faces a challenging international economic scenario marked by low copper prices.

However, this positive poverty reduction trend could be threatened. Due to the collapse in the price fetched by copper, of which Chile is the world’s largest producer, the Bachelet administration has announced that it will present one of the country’s most austere draft national budgets since 1990 to congress this year. It is expected that this tight budget will affect the government’s policy of investing in education, health, and social security.

URUGUAY-PARAGUAY | Economic optimism. The finance ministers of Uruguay and Paraguay, Danilo Astori and Santiago Peña respectively, stated during a meeting in Montevideo on 27 September that they are optimistic about the current economic outlook for their respective countries. Both Astori and Peña expressed confidence that the signs of economic recovery observed in the larger economies in the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) – Argentina and Brazil – would be sustained and lead to increased growth for the whole regional trade bloc.

However, Astori said that the signs of economic recovery must be “treated with caution”. Likewise, Astori insisted that both Paraguay and Uruguay maintain their “firm and convinced support for the strengthening of Mercosur”. This remark could have been motivated by comments by former Uruguayan president Jorge Batlle (2000-2005) in an interview with the national daily El Observador on 22 September, in which he called for Uruguay to leave Mercosur so that it could negotiate bilateral trade accords to help diversify its economy to boost growth (see sidebar).

Astori’s optimism echoes the comments of President Tabaré Vázquez, who maintained during an interview conducted with Uruguay’s weekly Búsqueda on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September that Uruguay would not sink into recession in 2016 and that were “real signs of an economic improvement”. The Vázquez administration is forecasting GDP growth of 1.4% in 2016, following growth of just 1% in 2015, but Vázquez expressed confidence that it would growth would pick-up in 2017.

This optimism contrasts with the poor economic performance that the US bank JP Morgan forecasts for Uruguay, as well as for Brazil and Argentina. In a 13 September report, JP Morgan said that it now considers that Uruguay is experiencing stagflation (stagnation plus inflation) and would not register positive economic growth this year, while in 2017 it would grow by a mere 0.6%.

In addition, JP Morgan predicted that Brazil’s GDP would fall by 3% this year, while Argentina would contract by 1.4%, and that both countries would grow by 1.4% and 3.4%, respectively, in 2017. Paraguay, on the other hand, is expected to post one of the highest growth rates in the region, according to JP Morgan, of between 3.5% and 4% in both years.

• Members of Mercosur willing to relax rules

On 22 September Uruguay’s President Tabaré Vázquez maintained that there is consensus among the four founding Southern Common Market (Mercosur) countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay) to relax some of the bloc’s internal rules in order to make it more dynamic. Specifically, Astori said that the founding members aim to change a rule requiring members to negotiate free trade agreements (FTAs) with third parties jointly. Vázquez’s remarks came during his attendance of the United Nations General Assembly, where he also revealed that Uruguay would start negotiating an individual FTA with China, a process he said has been supported by the Presidents of Brazil and Paraguay.

Peru’s President Pablo Kuczynski’s approval rating plummeted by 11 percentage points over the course of the last month. On the plus side, Kuczynski is not alone. The entire political class has suffered a decline in popularity by association with the bribery scheme conducted by the Brazilian construction firm Odebrecht [WR-17-03], including Keiko Fujimori, the leader of the main opposition Fuerza Popular (FP) Kuczynski narrowly defeated in last year’s presidential elections. On the negative side, the last 15 years have demonstrated that once Peruvian heads of state start to slide in opinion polls, they tend to keep going with a concomitant erosion of their credibility when they flirt with single figure approval ratings.

President Kuczynski now enjoys an approval rating of 36%, according to a nationwide opinion survey published by the national daily La República, with his disapproval rating edging up to 52%. This despite the majority of the 1,216 respondents expressing support for his government’s decrees in the economic sphere and to combat organised crime. Failure to fight corruption was one of Kuczynski’s principal perceived failings. Fujimori’s approval rating fell from 43% to 37%, while that of the presidential candidate for the left-wing coalition Frente Amplio (FA), Verónika Mendoza, fell from 29% to 26% (see box below).

Kuczynski’s cause was certainly not helped by one of the legislators from his own party, Peruanos por el Kambio (PPK), calling for his resignation on 31 January. The ruling party opened disciplinary proceedings into Deputy Moisés Guía after he called for the presidential office to be “declared vacant and a popular insurgency [to take place] on 4 March” unless the government confirmed that it has no intention of “introducing gender ideology [and] promoting homosexuality” in this year’s school curriculum. Religious organisations are leading a high-profile campaign entitled ‘Don’t mess with our kids’ denouncing such an intention, which the education ministry expressly denies.

PPK emphatically rejected Guía’s comments and reaffirmed its “loyalty” to Kuczynski. Guía later issued a statement saying he had been “carried away by the moment” and expressing his “loyalty, support and respect for the presidential office, as well as the fight against corruption which at this time requires the unity of all democratic forces”.

Power struggle on the Left

Peru’s Left faces the risk of rupture. Verónika Mendoza, who finished third in last year’s presidential elections, recently launched her own party, Nuevo Perú, in the southern city of Cusco. The event was attended by some deputies from Frente Amplio (FA), the coalition which she represented in the elections, and some dissidents from Tierra y Libertad, the rival party within FA led by Marco Arana, with which Mendoza has competed for influence on the Left. Mendoza says Nuevo Perú will seek registration (a fraught process in Peru if the last elections are anything to go on) to compete in the municipal and regional elections in 2018 and afterwards the presidential elections in 2021.

Mendoza needs to collect some 740,000 signatures to register her party (4% of those who voted in the last general elections). She aims to get over 500,000 in the regions of Cusco and Puno alone (where she enjoys strong support) and to collect 2m in total by October this year at the latest as an emphatic statement of intent.

Mendoza pointedly did not seek to distance herself from FA, insisting that Nuevo Perú would form part of the coalition. But there is considerable internal tension with Tierra y Libertad, the only party in FA that enjoys official registration (which allowed Mendoza and FA to compete in the last elections). Registering her own party would allow Mendoza to go her own way.

• Santos meeting

President Kuczynski made a point of emphasising his government’s commitment to root out corruption during the third binational cabinet meeting with his Colombian peer Juan Manuel Santos on 27 January in Peru’s southern city of Arequipa. Kuczynski condemned corruption and its “serious impact” on political institutions and national economic development. Kuczynski and Santos, whose government has led the way in the region in moving to arraign former public officials accused of corrupt links to Odebrecht, signed a joint statement promising to “coordinate binational actions to combat corruption and impunity swiftly and resolutely”.