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  • VENEZUELA: “Strange events” in Caracas

    LatinNews 09 October 2014 Hits: 2588

    While the government led by President Nicolás Maduro has sought to accuse Colombian paramilitary elements (and even the former president of Colombia Alvaro Uribe [2002-2010]) of involvement in the murder of Robert Serra, a young deputy from the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), in his Caracas home last week, some local political analysts suspect that incident may in fact relate to - the increasingly public - internal tensions within the Bolivarian Revolution. Such suspicions were further fuelled by a violent clash just days later between police and armed members of a pro-government collective, in which another five people died. Whatever the truth (and it is unlikely to come out any time soon), political violence in Venezuela looks to be a growing risk, adding to the perception that Maduro is not in ‘full operational command’, to borrow a military term.

    A communiqué dated 8 October said that President Maduro had ordered a “thorough and exhaustive investigation” into what the statement termed “the strange events” in central Caracas a day earlier. The actual details are hazy, but the basic facts are that early on 7 October officers from Venezuela’s Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalísticas (CICPC) raided the headquarters of the ‘Escudo de la Patria’ collective, in the Quinto Crespo neighbourhood of Caracas. Several officers were taken hostage and an eight-hour stand-off ensued before a second CICPC operation rescued the hostages. Two members of the collective were killed in the first raid, and a further three in the hostage rescue operation.

    The five victims included José Odreman, the ‘Frente 5 de Marzo’ collective leader and also spokesperson for the Escudo de la Patria group, who, if a string of photos published by local media is anything to go by, appeared to be well connected to senior officials in the government, all the way up to the executive. Coincidentally, Odreman also appeared in some photos with Robert Serra. Hours before his death and during the stand-off with the CICPC, Odreman posted a video online declaring the interior and justice minister, Army General Miguel Rodríguez Torres, “responsible” for anything that might happen to him and accusing the CICPC of killing someone that had worked with him. Local media immediately took this to mean Serra. “Math never fails”, Odreman declared in the video, leaving no-one the wiser as to what he meant.

    José Sierralta, the director of the CICPC, has flatly denied that the CICPC operation had anything to do with the Serra case, reiterating that the force was targeting a “dangerous” criminal gang. He claims that Odreman, an ex-Caracas metropolitan police officer, led a gang known as ‘El Odreman’ suspected of several murders. There has been some speculation that the incident is part of efforts by the now heavily military-controlled Venezuelan government to control renegade elements.

    • Cabello

    The national assembly president, Diosdado Cabello, on 7 October said that the material authors of the Serra murder had been identified and that the authorities were now after the intellectual authors. He added that the murders had been planned over two months. The daily El Universal reported that six people connected to Serra were in custody at the Caracas HQ of the Bolivarian intelligence service (Sebin). It suggested that two Policaracas police officers and four other people that had worked directly with Serra could be linked to the murder. Meanwhile, Maduro said that with the help of third countries the authorities had deterred “terrorist attacks” in Venezuela designed to destabilise the country, with the government and PSUV leadership targeted.

  • PARAGUAY: Recordings revive ‘narcopolitics’ issue

    LatinNews 11 June 2015 Hits: 735

    The emergence of a recorded conversation between a convicted drug trafficker and three government representatives has revived concerns that local drug-trafficking groups have infiltrated the domestic political system. With President Horacio Cartes away from the country on official business in Europe (see sidebar), it has been left to Vice-President Juan Afara to deal with the emerging crisis. Afara has held meetings with some of the government officials implicated in the incident to try to get to the bottom of it. But it appears that the renewed focus on ‘narcopolitics’ may now start claiming the heads of some officials.

    The recording began circulating on Paraguayan media on 5 June. It is said to be of a conversation that two senators (Arnaldo Giuzzio of the opposition Partido Democrático Progresista [PDP] and Arnoldo Wiens of the ruling Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado [ANR-PC]) and the head of Paraguay’s anti-drugs agency (Senad), Luis Rojas, held with an imprisoned Brazilian drug trafficker, Ezequiel de Souza, back in November 2014. In the recording (only part of which has been made public) De Souza tells the three men about the links that his and other local drug-trafficking organisations (DTOs) have succeeded in forging with the local authorities.

    De Souza tells his interlocutors that the DTOs have permeated all levels of government from municipal to national; from law enforcement and the judiciary to the legislative and the even the executive. He provides the names of dozens of prosecutors, politicians and judges (including many of those already implicated in narcopolitics following the murder of Pablo Medina [WR-15-05]), all of which he accuses of forming part of an extensive corruption network. But the most significant revelation made by De Souza was that he himself had paid between US$30,000 and US$40,000 a month to members of Senad and the interior ministry in exchange for information. De Souza mentions the deputy interior minister, Javier Ibarra, a former anti-drugs prosecutor, as being his main contact (he also suggests that the interior minister may have also been on the take, although he does not mention Minister Francisco de Vargas by name).

    The revelations caused an immediate furore. Rojas, who in the past has warned about the spread of the influence of DTOs on local politicians and back in April said that his agency’s investigations into this would provide some “surprises”, admitted to being present at the conversation with De Souza. But Rojas said he was not aware that it had been recorded (it is believed the recording was made by Giuzzio, a former anti-corruption prosecutor, who is heard speaking into the device describing the meeting); and that the material should not have been made public. Rojas explained that the meeting took place in his office soon after De Souza’s arrest and at the latter’s request after he said that he wanted to give evidence to two “respected” legislators. But Rojas warned that not everything that De Souza said may be true given that “at that time De Souza was scared of being transferred [from a Senad jail] to Tacumbú [prison]”.

    But Rojas’s remarks only led to more questions. Why were the allegations kept secret? Had the information been passed to the public ministry? And if so, has there been an investigation? On 7 June the attorney general’s office responded to some of these by launching a formal investigation into the allegations. In an 8 June press conference, Giuzzio and Wiens said they had now delivered the full recording to the public ministry. From Europe President Cartes ordered Rojas, Ibarra and all officials implicated to cooperate fully with the probe. Afara summoned Ibarra and Rojas to a private meeting to discuss the issue. Ibarra rejected the accusations, denied knowing De Souza and was adamant that he would not heed the calls for him to resign and face investigation.

    • Cartes jets off to Europe

    As the recording scandal emerged on 5 June, President Cartes left the country on a flight bound for Europe. Cartes was scheduled to make a two-day official visit to Spain on 8 and 9 June ahead of his attendance at the European Union (EU)-Community of Latin American and Caribbean states (Celac) summit due to be held between 10 and 12 June in Brussels. However, Cartes said that he had decided to leave for Europe a few days earlier so as to be able to attend the Union of European Football Associations (Uefa)’s Champions League Final played by Italy’s Juventus and Spain’s Barcelona in Berlin on 6 June.

  • ECUADOR: Correa takes El Niño action ahead of protests

    LatinNews 26 November 2015 Hits: 309

    President Rafael Correa has decreed a state of exception in 17 of Ecuador’s 24 provinces for two months as a preventative measure ahead of the eventual arrival of the El Niño weather phenomenon. This confers on Correa the right to suspend or limit freedom of movement, association and information and will include the whole of the period during which the national assembly will debate 15 constitutional amendments, including indefinite re-election. Protest movements have planned a march on 26 November in Quito (part of Pichincha, one of the provinces included in the state of exception) and a general strike to coincide with the assembly’s debate in December.

    The opposition is suspicious of the timing of President Correa’s decision to decree a two-month state of exception. It is equally suspicious of Correa’s announcement that the reform introducing indefinite re-election will only take effect from 24 May 2017 thus excluding him and deputies who have served two straight terms from standing again in February of that year. “[Correa] moves his chess pieces in accordance with a political strategy, not by chance,” one opposition deputy, Cynthia Viteri, said. Indigenous protest groups also suspect a trick.

    Despite this suspicion, Gabriela Rivadeneira, the president of the national assembly, agreed last week to accept Correa’s proposed provision “with respect and solidarity” even though a number of deputies from the ruling Alianza País (AP), including her, were reluctant to do so. Correa tweeted Rivadeneira’s name along with that of former vice-president Lenín Moreno, and the interior minister, José Serrano, as possible successors. The incumbent vice-president Jorge Glas has already ruled himself out of the running.

    Meanwhile, Correa has engaged in a piecemeal cabinet reshuffle over the last month. The latest changes saw Margarita Guevara, a doctor by profession who had been a territorial coordinator for the health ministry, replace Carina Vance who had served as health minister for more than three years and on whose watch the budget assigned to health almost doubled from US$1.31bn in 2011 to US$2.41bn in 2014; and Carlos Pareja Yanuzelli, the current director of the state oil company Petroecuador replace Pedro Merizalde as hydrocarbons minister. Days later Xavier Enderica, a former South American swimming champion, became the new sports minister; and Daniel Ortega, the environment minister.

    The biggest changes saw Leonardo Berrezueta, who was serving as governor of Azuay, take over as labour minister from Carlos Marx Carrasco, and Patricio Barriga, who represents Correa on the council of regulation of information (Cordicom), replace Fernando Alvarado as communications minister.

    Marx had only held the post for 18 months and could have paid the price for the involvement of part of the trade union movement in the string of protests against the Correa administration this year denouncing the new labour code. Marx, however, had spent the seven years prior to his appointment as labour minister as head of the tax agency and presided over the largest increase in the tax take in Ecuador’s history. For his part, Alvarado had held the post since 2009, the longest continuous stretch at the head of one ministry under Correa, masterminding strategic communications and the dark art of spin. Marx will remain as president of the AP’s ethical commission; Alvarado takes over as tourism minister replacing Sandra Naranjo, the rising star who became head of the planning and development ministry (Senplades) several weeks ago.

    • Successors

    The foreign minister, Ricardo Patiño, showed a letter from former vice-president Lenín Moreno expressing his complete loyalty to the ‘Citizens’ Revolution’ and his pride at being mentioned as a possible successor to President Correa. Patiño said Moreno had made it clear that he would never consider running for another movement. Patiño himself might feel aggrieved at having been overlooked by Correa as a potential successor given that he has served in every cabinet since Correa took office in 2007 holding all of the most important positions. Bolivia’s President Evo Morales said this week that Correa had confided in him that he was stepping aside to spend more time with his family.

  • HAITI: Moïse clings on

    LatinNews 21 February 2019 Hits: 9251

    A week after the mass protests began calling for his resignation [WR-19-06], President Jovenel Moïse finally ended his silence, insisting he would not resign. His government has since unveiled nine measures aimed at addressing the key demands of protesters - the economic crisis and alleged embezzlement of some US$2bn of funds from Petrocaribe, Venezuela’s discounted oil initiative - although these have yet to quell the unrest.

    In his address to the nation on 14 February, President Moïse said that he would not step down and “hand the country over to drug traffickers”, alluding to government officials who he said had taken to the streets along with “heads of gangs wanted by the law”. These remarks were likely to exacerbate existing security concerns, already heightened after all 78 prisoners escaped from a prison in Aquin town, Sud department on 12 February while the police were dealing with nearby protests.

    While in his speech Moïse failed to provide any proposals to address the economic crisis, two days later, on 16 February, Prime Minister Jean Henry Céant revealed the nine measures. Among other things, these include a 30% reduction in the price of rice, one of the main staples of the Haitian diet; a 30% reduction in the office of the prime minister’s budget; abolition of “unnecessary privileges” of senior state officials; the pledge to crack down on illegal smuggling, amid estimates that Haiti loses about G$60bn (US$724m) a year as a result of this activity (with the money to be invested in domestic production); and abolition of all monopolies to protect workers in the production sector.

    The new measures also addressed the public anger over the continued failure to prosecute the alleged corruption involving Petrocaribe (in which Moïse himself has been implicated [WR-19-06]). They included promises to appoint a new director of the central financial intelligence unit (UCREF) and a new director of the anti-corruption unit (ULCC) to speed up efforts to recover the money lost.

    The government’s response is yet to satisfy protesters or the opposition Secteur Démocratique et Populaire (which brings together some 20 political parties and has called for the unrest to continue until Moïse steps down). The blockades and protests have also sparked humanitarian concerns.

    Humanitarian concerns

    On 12 February the Haitian association of private hospitals (AHPH) warned that its 28 member hospitals “are starting to face major challenges: lack of electricity, lack of fuel, lack of oxygen, impoverishment of medication inventories and stoppage of means of transportation and communication”.

    This comes on top of more general humanitarian concerns. A report dated 28 November 2018 from the United Nations Secretary-General cites the partial results of an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (a standardised scale that integrates food security, nutrition and livelihood information) conducted in October 2018 in drought-affected areas which found 5% of the population analysed (145,078 people) are in an emergency phase, and 25% (629,082 people) are in a crisis phase, representing approximately 30% of the population analysed.

    Projections of the situation indicate that from October 2018 to February 2019, 774,159 people will be “food insecure” and in need of assistance. The 2018 humanitarian response plan, which is aimed at reaching 2.2m Haitians with humanitarian and protection assistance and requires US$252.2m, was only 11.2% funded as at 23 November 2018.

    • Céant under pressure

    With President Moïse adamant that he will not quit, it appears that Prime Minister Jean Henry Céant is facing growing pressure from the top to step down. On 14 February Miami Herald journalist Jacqueline Charles tweeted that she had just spoken to Céant who “confirmed that he is under pressure to resign by the palace” although he told her “I will not resign”. Céant, who was a 2016 presidential candidate for the opposition Renmen Ayiti party, has only been in the post since September 2018. His predecessor Jack Guy Lafontant was forced to quit in July last over the government’s mishandling of a rise in petrol prices.

  • REGION: US under pressure to stop deportations

    LatinNews 30 July 2020 Hits: 3011

    The US government led by President Donald Trump has already drawn criticism from local and international human rights groups over its increasingly hard-line on migration - evident in moves such as the inking last year of three bilateral migration accords known as Asylum Cooperative Agreements (ACAs) with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras [SSR-20-01]. These concerns have intensified over its determination to press ahead with the deportation of illegal migrants to Central America during the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic amid fears that this risks further spreading the virus.

    International institutions such as the United Nations (UN) Network on Migration, which includes the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the UN Refugee Agency, have more generally called on governments around the world to “suspend forced returns during the pandemic, to protect the health of migrants and communities”. However, human rights organisations like Human Rights Watch (HRW), Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF), and Refugees International (RI) have all highlighted the particular vulnerability facing Central American countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, urging the US to halt deportations which have already been on the rise.

    • Deportations

    In FY 2019 the US deported 54,919 Guatemalans compared with 50,390 in FY2018 according to US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) figures. The figures show a significant increase in the number of Hondurans deported (from 28,894 in FY2018 to 41,800 in FY2019) while 18,981 Salvadorans were deported in FY2019 compared with 15,445 in FY 2018.

    In a statement dated 4 May, MSF warns that this process is moving people from the epicentre of the pandemic in the US to lower transmission countries and will exacerbate the public health emergency in the region, particularly given people awaiting deportation from the US “are often held in detention centres for weeks or even months…[which] have become ideal breeding grounds for the massive spread” of the virus. In a press release dated 4 June, HRW said that as of 1 June, over 1,406 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainees in the US had tested positive for Covid-19, adding that the number of detainees who have fallen ill is likely to be much higher given ICE has tested fewer than 12% of detainees. Meanwhile an RI report released on 23 June noted that a 34-year-old Guatemalan man was the second detainee to die from Covid-19 in ICE custody.

    According to figures cited by MSF in total, the US and Mexico returned at least 6,500 Guatemalans, 5,000 Hondurans, and 1,600 Salvadorans between March and mid-April while the RI report highlights that at the end of April, deportees from the US made up nearly 20% of the 500 Covid-19 cases in Guatemala. This led Guatemala’s President Alejandro Giammattei to suspend deportations on 15 May while in a video conference organised by US think-tank, the Atlantic Council, on 21 May, he complained that “Guatemala is an ally of the US, but I don’t believe that the US is an ally of Guatemala, they don’t treat us like an ally”. Giammattei said the US has left Guatemala with imported Covid-19 cases, serving as a strain on the country’s health system. However, flights resumed on 9 June and according to RI, deportees continued to test positive for Covid-19 upon arrival in Guatemala despite having clean bill of health documents from the US.

    Ruling against ACAs

    The Trump administration received a setback over the ACAs after a panel at the US appeals court for the Ninth Circuit ruled on 6 July that the controversial Interim Final Rule (IFR), established by the US government last year which set out the framework for the implementation and background for the ACAs, was unlawful. The appeal was lodged by a group of non-profit organisations representing asylum seekers. While the US government argued that IFR was consistent with an existent rule that bars a migrant who can be removed to a ‘safe third country’ from applying for asylum, the panel concluded that the IFR “does virtually nothing to ensure that a third country is a safe option”.

  • THE BAHAMAS: Mixed feelings over oil search failure

    LatinNews 19 February 2021 Hits: 2359

    The Bahamas Petroleum Company (BPC) began drilling an exploratory well on 20 December 2020 amid a swirl of conflicting emotions. There were some who saw the hope of a major oil discovery as a potential boon for an economy that has been amongst the world’s hardest-hit by the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, and there were some who saw the prospect as a threat to The Bahamas very special environment and thus to tourism, its most important (and currently struggling) industry. For now, at least, the controversy has been resolved: on 8 February, BPC announced that the exploratory well had not found commercial quantities of oil and would be abandoned.

    The Bahamas economy has taken a terrible battering in recent times. In its Article IV report of 22 January, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted: “The archipelago was just starting to recover from the severe damage caused by Hurricane Dorian in fall 2019, when the global outbreak of Covid-19 led to a sudden stop in tourism, the main source of its income and employment”.

    According to the IMF, GDP will have contracted by 16.2% in 2020. It is hoping for a modest rebound of 2% growth in 2021, but the economy will not “converge back to its pre-pandemic level” until 2024.

    Furthermore, on debt, the IMF says: “Public debt is expected to jump to almost 90% of GDP by 2021 and to remain more than 22 percentage points above its pre-pandemic level over the medium-term”.

    One of the principal legacies of Hurricane Dorian is that it left the authorities with limited fiscal space to deal with the effects of the pandemic. And the pandemic itself has narrowed that space even further. In the second quarter of 2020, year-on-year revenues halved. Yet the collapse of tourism, accounting for 50% of GDP and 70% of employment, is having large-scale socioeconomic effects that must be addressed.

    Faced with this impossible situation, the government turned to the IMF in June 2020, which duly made available around 40% of the additional financing needed for FY2019-2020, with the balance made up by other international financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank.

    As to the economic recovery, there is an interesting divergence between the IMF and the Bahamian authorities. The IMF sees risks as being “large and skewed to the downside”. It is concerned about the resurgence of the pandemic “necessitating further lockdowns” and possible delays in reaching widespread immunisation. As the IMF says, “In such a scenario, growth, the current account, and fiscal position would all deteriorate, with implications for debt sustainability”.

    The Bahamian authorities, on the other hand, although they have a deeper contraction estimate for 2020 than the IMF (-19%), are expecting growth of 3% in 2021 and “they see risks as tilted to the upside”. They point to the tourism sector’s attractiveness given its close proximity to the US and the fact that the pick-up could be rapid with reopening.

    IMF policy advice

    Following its Article VI Consultation, the IMF has summarised its policy advice as follows:

    “The Bahamas would benefit from a comprehensive package of policies to limit the damage from the pandemic, set the stage for a resilient recovery, and achieve durable and inclusive medium-term growth:

    • Fiscal Policy. In the near-term, focus on protecting lives and livelihoods, ensure rigorous appraisal and selection processes of the announced capital projects and enhance the efficiency of social spending; develop detailed contingency plans. Announce credible medium-term tax policy, revenue administration and spending measures to finance investment in infrastructure and education, strengthen resilience to climate change, and lower public debt.
    • Monetary and Financial Sector Policies. Focus on reserve adequacy; gradually remove capital flow management measures once the economy is on a stronger footing. Closely monitor financial stability risks. Ensure effective implementation of crisis management reforms and strengthen central bank data collection and capacity. Continue enhancing the country’s regime to counter money laundering and terrorist financing and cybersecurity preparedness.
    • Structural Reforms. Steadfastly implement reforms to enhance diversification and productivity, including streamlining administrative processes, modernising the insolvency regime, and reducing frictions in the job-matching process. 

    The oil disappointment

    In what was a piece of potentially good news from an economic perspective (although seriously controversial from an environmental perspective), on 20 December 2020 BPC announced the start of drilling for an exploratory well 90 miles west of Andros. The company said that it was targeting oil resources of up to 1.44bn barrels. In optimistic mode, BPC Chief Executive Simon Potter raised hopes of a significant find by saying: “Our third seismic survey revealed structures that have the potential to contain a world-class barrel oil resource that, if present in the way we hope, could prove to be transformative, not just for our company, but for the nation and people of The Bahamas as a whole”.

    It was not to be. On 8 February, the company admitted that “whilst the well encountered oil…commercial volumes of oil have not been proven at this well location”. The company added: “Drilling has now ceased, the well having reached a depth of approximately 3,900 metres without incident, and the well will now be permanently plugged and abandoned”.

    The company added that over the coming weeks, BPC will undertake a detailed evaluation of all technical information gathered during drilling and “will review the appropriate way forward for future monetisation of its business in The Bahamas, in particular with a view to the renewal of a farm-in process”. In truth, however, it seems likely that the company will now focus on its efforts to find oil in Trinidad & Tobago and Suriname.

    This news might not do much for economic optimism, but it will please the environmentalists, who have been scathing about the oil exploration. As ocean-protection activist, Alexandra Cousteau, put it: “It sounds so absurd because it is. The government of a country whose name is practically synonymous for paradise is giving the green light to an oil company to drill in its blue, pristine waters”. Simon Carey, executive director of the Bahamas National Trust (BNT) has added his voice to the opposition by pointing out that it is “duplicitous” for the country to – on the one hand – go to the United Nations with complaints about global warming and rising sea levels while – on the other – entering the fossil fuel market “as a contributor”.

    Legal fight

    The chairman of the Save the Bays organisation, Joseph Darville, expressed his relief at the news of the failed exploration, but he added that the environmental organisation would continue with its legal fight to stop oil drilling. He said: “This gives us an incredible, I think, way in order to continue our judicial review and to have discovery to find out exactly how these permits came about, why there wasn’t broad national consultation and information with respect to any aspect of these licenses being given”.

  • EL SALVADOR: Strengthening the military

    Patrick de Courcy 27 August 2021 Hits: 4450

    On 19 July President Nayib Bukele announced that 1,046 soldiers would be incorporated into his Plan Control Territorial (PCT) security initiative and revealed plans to double the military (FAES) from 20,000 troops to 40,000, a process which he said would take “five years to implement totally”. This process of militarising citizen security began under previous Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena) and Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Arena) governments. At the time it was received with alarm by human rights groups as it violates the constitution and 1992 Peace Accords ending the 1980-1992 civil war. Bukele’s announcement however drew particular concerns given what local civil society groups and the international community have flagged up as his authoritarian tendencies – not least the deployment of security forces to congress back in February 2020 [SSR-20-04].

    Bukele said that the changes were in line with the fourth phase of the PCT, which he began rolling out soon after taking office in July 2019 and includes repressive and preventative measures. He said the military would not just move into gang-controlled areas but also help support the national police (PNC) improving security at bus stops and on buses, the frequent target of gang extortion.

    Bukele also claimed progress with regard to the PCT, which has been a major factor in his sky-high popularity. On 14 July he said that in the first two years of his Nuevas Ideas government, El Salvador registered a total of 2,985 homicides, down 75% on the 11,825 homicides registered in the first two years in office of his predecessor Salvador Sánchez Cerén (FMLN, 2014-2019). At the start of the year PNC statistics cited by the government tallied 1,322 homicides in 2020, or 3.67 per day on average, down from 2,398 in 2019 which averaged 6.6 a day.

    The announcement regarding the additional use of troops to support the PNC in citizen security efforts, however, drew concerns from organisations like Plataforma de Seguridad Ciudadana (PSC), a group of some 15 local civil society groups. A 26 July statement by PSC reiterated that the militarisation of citizen security contradicts El Salvador’s constitution, which states that it is the sole responsibility of the PNC and that the president is only authorised to call out the military in “exceptional circumstances”. The PSC also slammed the policy as misguided and one which fails to address key problems such as forced disappearances, gender violence, and corruption, among other things.

    Meanwhile a US-based NGO, Due Process of Law Foundation (DPLF), notes in a 21 July statement that some 9,825 soldiers are currently involved in citizen security as part of the TCP – the highest number of military personnel involved in the fight against crime since the end of the civil war. The DPLF complains that these actions demonstrate that the current administration continues to support repressive security policies that privilege militarisation over prevention and technical investigation of crimes.

    The DPLF also cites the Inter American Commission on Human Rights as warning that “the progressive militarisation of the police has not significantly contributed to reduce the climate of insecurity; on the contrary, many countries have experienced an upsurge in violence in addition to reports of abuses, arbitrariness and human rights violations by state security forces”.

    Bukele’s claims of progress vis-à-vis security are also subject to question. According to PNC figures cited by investigative media El Faro, in the first six months of 2021, 675 homicides were registered in El Salvador, up 13% on the 596 registered in the first half of 2020. Meanwhile reports of disappearances are also on the rise. According to figures provided to Spanish news agency EFE by El Salvador’s attorney general’s office (FGR) via the law of access to public information, the number of disappearances reported in the first four months of 2021 more than doubled compared with the same period in 2020, from 196 to 415.

    Disappearances

    According to the 2021 annual report on El Salvador by US-based NGO Human Rights Watch (HRW), published in January 2021, from January 2014 to October 2019, the PNC registered over 11,900 disappearance victims (including more than 400 children) – which exceeds the estimated 8,000 to 10,000 disappeared during the civil war. It notes that “the disappearances are committed by a range of actors, including gangs and the police. Few cases are investigated”.

    Transparency concerns

    Further compounding fears about Bukele’s perceived authoritarianism, human rights groups and press freedom NGOs have raised concerns about proposed reforms to the access to information law (LAIP) which were presented to congress by Interior Minister Juan Carlos Bidegaín Hananía on 12 July but have since been reportedly removed from the national assembly website.

    Local civil society groups like Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho (FESPAD), the journalists’ association Asociación de Periodistas de El Salvador (APES) as well as the Alianza Regional por la Libre Expresión e Información, a network of 18 NGOs from 16 countries in Latin America, expressed concern about the changes. Among other things these provide for the possibility of all public information becoming classified; information regarding the patrimonial assets of public servants to remain confidential and make it more difficult to access information, doubling the amount of time that institutions have to hand over public information from 10 to 20 days.

    A statement dated 13 July by APES warns that the changes will hinder journalists’ ability to expose corruption. APES says that “all these reforms undermine the human right of access to information” and make the right of requesting information a more exhaustive process for citizens and journalists.

  • PERU: Vásquez reaches out to opposition

    Patrick de Courcy 14 October 2021 Hits: 4160

    Peru’s new prime minister, Mirtha Vásquez, announced on 13 October that she would shortly begin a round of talks with representatives of different political parties in congress, which is dominated by the opposition. Vásquez, a moderate leftist, has a vocation for dialogue and consensus, which stands in marked contrast to her predecessor, Guido Bellido, of the Marxist-Leninist Perú Libre (PL). But while her overtures were well-received by congress, it has not stopped opposition parties from advancing an initiative to limit the executive’s use of the contentious ‘vote of confidence’ mechanism.

    In a press conference after her first cabinet meeting, Vásquez said that the impending talks would be “very healthy for the country’s governability”. She said her first meeting would be with the president of congress, María del Carmen Alva, on 15 October and that she was in the process of setting up other meetings to lay out the government’s agenda for health, social inclusion, and poverty reduction. These meetings are also essential for Vásquez to win a vote of confidence from congress in her cabinet.

    This is likely to be granted by congress but Vásquez expressed concern at a legislative initiative to restrict the executive’s use of a vote of confidence, a mechanism enshrined in the constitution as a way of resolving disputes between the two branches of government. At present the president can disband congress if it twice denies a vote of confidence in a matter of his or her choosing. Under the proposed reform making its way through congress, the executive would not be able to subject constitutional reforms or issues in the remit of congress to a vote of confidence. Vásquez urged congress not to approve an initiative that would “alter the balance of powers and seriously affect the rule of law”. It also looks like an explicit attempt to stop any attempt by the government to promote a constituent assembly to modify the constitution by this means.

  • PARAGUAY: Abdo Benítez strikes blow against Cartes

    Patrick de Courcy 21 July 2022 Hits: 3730

    Paraguay’s President Mario Abdo Benítez promulgated the World Health Organization (WHO) Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco on 18 July in a setback for his chief rival within the ruling Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC), former president Horacio Cartes (2013-2018). The Honor Colorado (HC) faction of the ANR-PC loyal to Cartes narrowly failed to hold up the protocol in congress, where the bulk of the opposition and the Colorado Añetete faction of the ANR-PC loyal to Abdo Benítez voted to approve it.

    The WHO protocol was established in South Korea in 2012 when it was signed by President Federico Franco (2012-2013) of the now-opposition Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA) before being shelved during the ANR-PC administration of Horacio Cartes (2013-2018), the tobacco tycoon who owns the Tabacalera del Este SA (Tabesa).

    The protocol seeks to eliminate all forms of illicit trade in tobacco products through a package of measures implemented by countries in cooperation with each other, including compulsory licensing and record-keeping for importers, exporters, and manufacturers to protect the supply chain of tobacco products and prevent diversion of licit products into the illicit market and vice versa; a global tracking and tracing regime; and sanctions for the manufacture, sale, transportation, and distribution of tobacco products in violation of the provisions of the protocol.

    The protocol was sent to congress by the Abdo Benítez administration in 2018. It was narrowly approved by the senate on 19 May and the lower chamber of congress on 6 July as opposition deputies and Colorado Añetete voted together. Deputy Kattya González of the opposition Partido Encuentro Nacional (PEN) argued in the lower chamber debate that 90% of all tobacco manufacture in Paraguay was “sold illegally around the world” and that approval of the protocol was “a national cause”.

    The managing director of Tabesa, José Ortiz, appealed to congress to reject the protocol on the grounds that it was prejudicial for “legal companies”. The presidential hopeful of Honor Colorado, Santiago Peña, competing in December’s primary elections for the right to contest next April’s presidential elections on the ANR-PC ticket, vigorously opposed the adoption of the protocol.

    Honor Colorado Deputy Justo Zacarías Irún said the protocol was “anti-Cartista”, insisting it was sponsored by tobacco giants British American Tobacco and Philip Morris International to the detriment of smaller tobacco companies. When it became clear the Cartistas were not going to be able to block it, Zacarías pushed unsuccessfully for the protocol’s adoption to be delayed for a year while a budget was approved, possibly in the hope that a new congress would be in place under a Peña presidency and it could be archived once more.  

    After promulgating the protocol, Abdo Benítez said it reaffirmed Paraguay’s struggle against “this global public health problem”. Abdo Benítez also ratified another piece of legislation approved last week in congress extending the control of the secretariat for the prevention of money or asset laundering (Secretaría de Prevención de Lavado del Dinero o Bienes – Seprelad) over tobacco companies and sports clubs. Seprelad will create administrative regulations for them to observe with the aim of preventing and detecting money-laundering operations.

    Money laundering

    In January this year the then-interior minister Arnaldo Giuzzio presented a 30-page deposition to Seprelad alleging that former president Cartes was involved in organised criminal activity in the form of “money laundering, illegal enrichment, and false financial declarations”. It has long been alleged in Brazil that, besides its legitimate business, Cartes’ Tabesa is also involved in the mass smuggling of cigarettes to the country.

  • MEXICO: Marriage equality receives boost

    Patrick de Courcy 25 November 2022 Hits: 2151

    Same sex-marriage is now legal across all of Mexico’s 32 states. On 26 October, Tamaulipas state congress approved a reform to its civil code to permit marriage for all people over 18 years of age and not just between a man and a woman, becoming the final Mexican state to legally recognise same-sex marriage. The amendment follows similar rulings in October in the states of Guerrero, Tabasco, and Estado de México (Edomex).

    Legislators in Tamaulipas passed the reform with 23 votes in favour, 12 against, and one abstention. The debate was interrupted by religious protesters, prompting the legislators to move to a different room to finalise the voting, according to the local press. The reform in Tamaulipas came just one day after a similar ruling was approved in Guerrero state.

    The Tamaulipas initiative was spearheaded by a legislator from the opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), Nancy Ruíz Martínez. The state’s congressional human rights commission welcomed the ruling, releasing a statement in which it declared that “we applaud the intense fight undertaken by civil society organisations to push through the legislative reform which today is a reality.” At the national level, the president of Mexico’s supreme court (SCJN), Arturo Zaldívar, also praised the measure, tweeting that: “The entire country is shining with a huge rainbow. Long live the dignity and rights of all people. Love is love.”

    According to Mexico’s constitution, each state has the right to determine its own laws on civil, family, and registration affairs. The legal recognition of same-sex marriage has therefore progressed through Mexico’s states in a prolonged and piecemeal fashion, beginning with the state of Mexico City (CDMX) in 2009. The measure was later passed through the states of Quintana Roo (2012) and Coahuila (2014). The movement gained more traction in 2018 when the left-wing Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena) party assumed power and legislators subsequently ruled to legalise same-sex marriage in six states in 2019, two in 2020, seven in 2021, and seven in 2022.

    The SCJN has played a key role in triggering the stream of rulings legalising same-sex marriage across Mexico’s states. When CDMX became the first state to decriminalise same-sex marriage in 2009, former president Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), of the right-wing Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), attempted to file a constitutional complaint to appeal the measure. However, the SCJN rejected the president’s proposal in 2010. Then, in 2015, the SCJN issued a ruling stating that restricting legally binding marriages to heterosexual couples was unconstitutional.

    Although lesbian, gay, bisexual, transexual, transgender, and intersexual (LGBTI) activists have welcomed the rulings, they have also insisted that much work lies ahead to guarantee equal rights and combat violence and discrimination against their community. Former CDMX legislator, David Razú Aznar, who spearheaded the campaign for same-sex marriage in 2009, celebrated the news from Tamaulipas on Twitter. However, he also asserted that “we must not forget that there is still a lot of work to do to combat all types of discrimination.”

    President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has avoided addressing the recent progress for same-sex marriage and has not alluded to possibilities for the continued expansion of rights. López Obrador is known to hold socially conservative views and maintains a somewhat uneasy relationship with the LGBTI community.

    Therefore, Mexico’s LGBTI movement will continue to campaign and pressure legislators into addressing other issues, such as the disproportionately high levels of violence affecting LGBTI people [SSR-22-03] and the banning of conversion therapy - treatment or psychotherapy which aims to change a person’s sexual orientation or to suppress a person’s gender identity. Mexico’s senate voted to ban conversion therapy in October. The bill will now pass to the lower chamber of deputies for a vote.

    LGBTI migrants

    International NGO Human Rights Watch released a communiqué in May warning that LGBTI migrants may face “increased risk of harm in Mexico due to their sexual orientation or gender identity”. Migration policies such as the Migrant Protection Protocol (MPP), also known as the Remain in Mexico programme, and Title 42, have led to a build up of migrants in dangerous Mexican border towns. HRW reported that LGBTI asylum seekers said they had been expelled “even after expressing their fear of returning and telling border agents they identified as LGBT, had HIV, or had experienced abuse related to their gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.” HRW also said migrants had described serious abuse during their journeys to the border, including by Mexican officials.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    Abbi Dicker 29 February 2024 Hits: 1644

    ARGENTINA | IMF backs Milei. The first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Gita Gopinath, paid a two-day visit to Argentina last week to hold talks with President Javier Milei and his economic team, the umbrella trade union movement Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT), private sector firms, academics, and civil society organisations.

    Gopinath said the Milei administration had made “important initial gains in restoring macroeconomic stability and establishing a strong fiscal anchor”. But she stressed that the government needed to ensure that “the burden of the adjustment does not fall disproportionately on working families” as well as emphasising the importance of dialogue “to build social and political support…to ensure the durability and effectiveness of reforms”.

    Notably, directly after meeting Milei, Gopinath held a meeting with the head of the Unión Obrera de la Construcción de la República Argentina (UOCRA), Gerardo Martínez, the representative of the CGT, who claimed that Argentina was “on the verge of extreme social conflict” and accused the president of having no vocation for dialogue. Martínez told the national daily Clarín that he had expressed his concern to Gopinath that Milei was intent on “a mega adjustment with no type of restraint at all”.

     

    BRAZIL | G20 ministers discuss climate finance. Currently holding the G20’s annual rotating presidency, Brazil hosted finance ministers and central bank chiefs from the group’s member states in São Paulo this week. With climate finance high on the G20’s agenda, the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero (GFANZ), a co-chairman of which, former Bank of England governor Mark Carney (2013-2020), signed an agreement on 27 February pledging to support decarbonisation projects funded by Brazil’s state development bank (BNDES).         

    On 26 February the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) signed an agreement with Brazil’s ministries for finance and environment and with the Brazilian central bank (BCB) to boost green investments. During the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Rio de Janeiro on 21-22 February, the foreign ministry of G20 member Japan also expressed interest in donating to the Amazon Fund, Brazil’s funding mechanism for Amazon rainforest protection, which would make it the first Asian country to make a contribution.

  • TRACKING TRENDS

    Abbi Dicker 10 July 2025 Hits: 1585

    MEXICO | Vehicle exports, production up while sales decline in June. On 7 July Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) reported that production and exports of light vehicles had increased year-on-year in June 2025, while sales were down. Exports were up 14% at 331,517 units, following yearly declines in April and May, while production increased by 4.9% compared to June 2024, with a total of 361,047 units manufactured. However, domestic sales declined 5.9% to 116,062 units in June. Cumulative production from January to June rose slightly by 0.5% year-on-year to 2.0m units. Exports over the same period fell 2.83% to 1.7m units, while sales were also down 0.25% to 709,344. The US remained the primary destination for exports, accounting for 79.7%% (1.3m) of exports in the first half of the year.

    MEXICO | GFCF continues to fall. Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) released its latest figures on gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) on 3 July, announcing that investment in April 2025 was down by 7.7% in annual terms, with a monthly drop of 1.7%, on seasonally adjusted figures. This followed an annual decrease of 5.7% and monthly rise of 0.2% in March, as well as an annual decrease of 5.0% and monthly rise of 0.2% in February, according to the latest figures. The results represent the eighth consecutive month of annual decreases. The annual decline in April was the result of a 5.5% decrease in investments in construction, and a 9.1% drop in investments in machinery and equipment. The monthly result was a result of a decrease in investment in construction of 1.1% and of 2.2% in machinery and equipment.

  • CHILE: Security minister replaced after two months in office

    Abbi Dicker 04 June 2026 Hits: 511

    President José Antonio Kast has carried out a mini cabinet reshuffle just over two months into his term, replacing the security minister Trinidad Steinert with the public works minister Martín Arrau. This comes amid declining approval ratings and criticism over the government’s apparent lack of a concrete strategy to address crime, which had been a key pillar of Kast’s election campaign rhetoric last year [SSR-26-01].

    Kast has not had an easy start to his term, with his popularity sinking in the two months since his inauguration on 11 March. National pollster Cadem released figures on 17 May showing that his approval had dropped from 57% in mid-March down to 36% in mid-May. When asked what Kast’s main campaign promise had been, 44% of respondents said it was tackling insecurity while 30% said it was irregular migration. When asked if they believed the government had a concrete security plan, only 36% said they agreed while 64% disagreed.

    In the mid-May poll, more than half of survey respondents (57%) expressed approval for Kast’s main migration initiative, the ‘Plan Escudo Fronterizo’ (Border Shield Plan) to bolster border security infrastructure, launched shortly after his inauguration in mid-March. But despite Kast’s rhetoric on the campaign trail seeking to associate immigration with criminality, it appears that digging ditches and setting up fences along the northern borders is not enough to convince the public that he has a plan to reduce crime rates.

    The initial appointment of an experienced prosecutor such as Steinert, who has spent years handling cases involving violent crimes and criminal gangs such as Tren de Aragua, was supposed to send a signal that Kast’s government would respect technocratic credentials and come up with security strategies backed by experts. However, Steinert’s lack of political experience seems to have worked against her.

    On 15 May, after speaking in a session in congress about the government’s security policies, Steinert gave an interview to local broadcaster Radio Agricultura in which she said she was not expecting this level of scrutiny. In particular she said: “There are many aspects [to the job] that have been… more complex [than expected]… for example, this demand that I did not expect, the demand to have a concrete, structured security plan”.

    In the following days, members of left-wing opposition parties such as Frente Amplio (FA) and the Partido Socialista (PS) seized on the opportunity to criticise Steinert, with the FA’s president Constanza Martínez highlighting that the Kast government won the election declaring security as a priority area and yet it had still failed to produce a security plan. Meanwhile, speaking on broadcast network Radio Cooperativa on 19 May, the president of the Partido Comunista de Chile (PCCh), Lautaro Carmona, accused Steinert of “arrogance”, given the complacency of not having come up with a security plan or delivering on the job expected of her.

    These comments from opposition figures came before Kast announced on 19 May that he would replace Steinert, a move which the public appears to agree with, according to Cadem figures. The pollster carried out a survey on 20 May which showed that 87% respondents approved of Kast’s decision to enact a reshuffle. Aside from Steinert, Kast also replaced his spokesperson, Mara Sedini. Kast is likely hoping that new ministers with better public communications skills might help stem the decline of his approval ratings.

    Cabinet changes

    On 19 May Steinert was replaced by Arrau, while Arrau’s role of public works minister was filled by Louis de Grange, who will carry out this role alongside his current responsibilities as the minister for transport and communications. Kast’s spokesperson, Sedini, was replaced by Claudio Alvarado, who currently serves as interior minister and will serve as government spokesperson alongside this role.

  • BOLIVIA: Paz sends in the army to clear roadblocks

    Abbi Dicker 25 June 2026 Hits: 1050

    Bolivia’s President Rodrigo Paz caved in to weeks of pressure on 20 June when he declared a state of exception which allowed him to deploy the army to clear the roadblocks which have ground the country to a halt since mid-May. Paz had been reluctant to take this step for fear of aggravating protesters loyal to former president Evo Morales (2006-2019), who warned that resorting to military force would send the death toll spiralling. So far, however, the state of exception has been a success, with a drastic reduction in the number of roadblocks and Morales’ coca union, Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba (SFTC), announcing a pause in the protests.

    Surrounded by his cabinet ministers, President Paz announced that he had “instructed the Bolivian police and the armed forces to carry out the necessary actions to restore freedom of movement” and issued a warning to those still manning the barricades that “there’s still time to voluntarily desist”. He said that resistance will be met with “the full rigour of the law and all the legitimate force that the constitution and democracy grant the State to protect its citizens”. The state of exception, which swiftly attained the necessary two-thirds support in the legislative assembly, will last for a maximum of 90 days.

    Paz took this step three days after he launched talks on 17 June with the main workers’ union, Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) – one of the main instigators of the unrest alongside Morales’ SFTC [WR-26-24]. Notably, the talks were launched after the COB dropped its insistence that Paz must resign before the roadblocks can be lifted, with the union instead demanding action on issues such as fuel prices.

    This breakthrough was likely to have been a factor in Paz deciding that it would be safe to launch a military operation to clear more intransigent protesters, while seeking to sustain talks with the COB. When he announced the state of exception, he reiterated that “if you have legitimate demands, the doors of dialogue will remain open, as they have been since day one”.

    Under the state of exception, freedom of movement has been rapidly restored on most of Bolivia’s highway network. Within two days, the number of roadblocks had fallen from over 50 to just six, according to the highways administrator (ABC). These were concentrated in Cochabamba department, Morales’ main bastion.

    Despite Morales’ warnings that sending in the army would result in a bloodbath, Paz has at least temporarily succeeded in subduing the unrest without causing any further deaths. Indeed, speaking alongside Morales at an SFTC press conference on 22 June, a leading figure in the union, Isidro Auca, announced that there would be a “temporary pause” in the roadblock campaign, which he said would give the protest movement time to regroup.

    Morales may have opted for a cautious response to the state of exception as a result of a 20 June warning from the minister for government, Marco Antonio Oviedo, that the military would not hesitate to intervene in Morales’ stronghold of Chapare, Cochabamba, if the unrest persists. This might have paved the way for Morales’ arrest on human trafficking charges, which he has avoided since late 2024 by living under the protection of the SFTC in Chapare.

    Extracting Morales from Chapare has been deemed too dangerous under both Paz and his predecessor Luis Arce (2020-2025), given the risk of sparking an uprising by his followers. However, Morales may have decided that the government’s calculus would change if it was already facing a violent nationwide conflagration of the sort that Morales warned would follow the deployment of troops.

    Economic impact

    On 19 June the national chamber of industry (CNI) put the economic impact of the roadblocks at over US$3bn, representing around 6% of GDP. The CNI said that the industrial sector had suffered losses of US$600m, equating to around US$12m per day, and putting at risk 150,000 jobs in the sector.

  • SURINAME: Preparing for wealth

    Abbi Dicker 16 July 2026 Hits: 580

    Comparisons between Suriname and oil-booming Guyana are irresistible, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its latest report on Suriname – Post-Financing Assessment Discussions – adds some important notes of caution.

    The example of what is happening in neighbouring Guyana is hugely encouraging for Suriname. Since US oil company ExxonMobil discovered a vast offshore reservoir in the Stabroek block in 2015, with production starting in 2019, Guyana’s GDP per capita (at current prices, IMF) has increased from US$5,790 to US$33,170 in 2025. Quarterly production in the first quarter of 2026 was 900,000 barrels per day (bpd), bringing in record revenues of US$761m. By 2030, Guyana could be producing 1.7m bpd of crude oil. Cost recovery on the Stabroek Block should be achieved this year after which Guyana’s share of oil profits will rise from 12.5% to 50%.

    Suriname’s position, however, is significantly different. It is not just running a few years behind Guyana in oil exploration, with its first significant discoveries in Block 58 not coming until 2020, it also faces greater challenges. Oil industry experts caution that Suriname’s reservoirs are more complex than those of Guyana and require more careful development planning. Nor have the discoveries to-date been as large as those in Guyana. Development timelines are longer and costs higher.

    Nevertheless, more than 750m barrels in recoverable oil have been identified in Block 58, and a final investment decision (FID) of US$10.5bn for the GranMorgu project was confirmed in October 2024. Production, with a maximum capacity of 220,000 bpd is expected to begin in 2028. The project is a joint venture between French oil giant TotalEnergies (40%), the US’s APA Corporation (40%), and Suriname’s state-owned Staatsolie (20%). Furthermore, TotalEnergies is expected to start a new round of exploration in 2027. The plan is to drill four new exploration wells in Block 58.

    At the same time, in June Malaysian-owned Petronas Suriname reported two new discoveries in Block 52, bringing its discoveries to eight successful wells with total reserves of more than 1bn barrels of oil equivalent.

    Back in 2015, when Guyana made its first big discovery, the two countries had almost exactly the same GDP per capita (Suriname, US$5,760; Guyana, US$5,790). Now, while Guyana’s GDP per capita has surged to US$33,170, Suriname’s is languishing at US$8,860. This must be frustrating for Suriname, but the IMF at least sees this as an important time for preparation. In its latest report on Suriname, released on 10 June, the IMF warns that reform momentum has been slowing and that it needs to be regained. One specific problem is that inflation is again in double digits, with inflationary pressures increasing, “due to the lagged effects of pre-election fiscal slippages and overly loose monetary policy”.

    The IMF warns: “It is critical to put in place a new monetary policy framework prior to the oil boom that is centred on short-term interest rates as the primary policy instrument…Agreeing on a five-year fiscal plan and associated spending limits (as part of the 2027 budget) and operationalizing the sovereign wealth fund are essential to safeguard policy credibility. There is also a need to quickly implement the procurement law and revise anti-corruption legislation.”

    The IMF wants the government to broaden the tax base, improve revenue administration, and phase out fuel and electricity subsidies. With regard to the latter, the IMF notes that following the recent rise in oil prices, the government announced a cap on prices of fuel, “effectively reversing the withdrawal of fuel subsidies under the program”. It adds: “Electricity subsidies also remain in place and are set to become more costly with rising oil prices.”

    For the IMF, price subsidies “blur the market signal of a scarce commodity” and can become very costly. They are also untargeted. “The government should phase out these subsidies (especially for businesses and at higher consumption levels) and focus on targeted social support to those in need while strengthening the social safety net.”

    The IMF says that gradually increasing the electricity price to reach “cost recovery” could generate 2% of GDP in fiscal saving as well as incentivising investment in generation capacity and grid modernisation.

    With regard to tax, the IMF says there are opportunities to broaden the tax base and improve revenue administration. For instance, “the scope of excise taxes could be increased” and better use of information technology could improve tax compliance. In its last Article IV Consultation report, issued in February, the IMF said that excise revenues are low by international standards. It recommends increasing rates on alcohol and sugary drinks and introducing excises on gambling and single-use plastics.

    However, in the June report the IMF acknowledges, “such tasks are complicated by capacity constraints, a political landscape that requires careful consensus building, and social pressures to increase spending”.

    Governance is another IMF concern. It urges full compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), including “timely disclosure” of payments and revenues, the publication of oil and gas contracts, greater transparency of state-owned enterprises’ “quasi-fiscal activities”, and more transparent disclosure of gold mining royalties.

    A key IMF concern is corruption. It sees “a short window of opportunity” to improve transparency and strengthen anti-corruption mechanisms ahead of large-scale oil inflows. The IMF urges the “swift passage of amendments to the anti-corruption law to strengthen the income and asset declaration regime and its effective implementation”. In its Article IV report in February, the IMF calls for mandatory declaration of income and assets of politically exposed persons.

    The IMF also emphasises the importance of a new procurement law that requires the publication of all tenders, procurement contracts, names of awarded entities and their beneficial owners, and the names of the public officials who awarded the contracts. There should also be “ex-post validation of delivery of the contracted service”.

    Another challenge for Suriname is to build local capacity that can benefit from the booming oil industry, and it is making progress. Staatsolie is running training programmes in partnership with universities, and TotalEnergies is committed to using local suppliers where possible, but there is a long way to go before the oil industry’s demand for skilled labour, such as welders, engineers, and logistics specialists, can be met from the domestic labour pool.

    On the plus side, the economy is experiencing reasonable growth as the country prepares itself for the oil bonanza. In 2025, the non-natural resource economy is estimated to have grown by more than 4% and is expected to reach 4.7% in 2026. In its Article IV assessment, the IMF adds that “oil field development and relatively stable gold production are expected to support growth of around 4% until 2028, when offshore oil production is expected to push growth to around 30%”.

  • CHILE: The municipals get off to an early start

    LatinNews 15 February 2012 Hits: 806

    October’s municipal elections in Chile are still some way away, but this year’s race has taken on added relevance, not only in light of last year’s lengthy student protests, which delivered a sharp shock to the local political scenario, but also because these elections will be the first since the introduction of new electoral reforms. The main political parties are preparing for the municipals well in advance, in recognition of the fact that the vote will set the tone for the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2013. As a result, there is already intense jockeying going in, as members of the ruling and the opposition coalitions seek to position themselves before the electorate.

    In 2011 voting in Chile was made voluntary, while automatic voter registration was also introduced for the first time. Together, these reforms have the potential to dramatically transform Chile’s electorate and consequently the country’s political scene. For instance, an estimated 4.7m eligible voters will be added to the existing electoral roll of 8.12m. The national youth institute (Injuv) estimates that 60% of these new additions are aged between 18 and 29, the majority of which would have been involved in last year’s student protests. In one fell swoop, this age group will now represent over a quarter of the total electorate (27%), and so cannot be ignored. (Whether they all turn out to vote is another question).

    Chile’s political parties know that the game is about to change and the upcoming municipals represent a useful testing ground. First of all, candidates will have to engage with the electorate more than ever, simply in order to get people out to vote. Moreover the municipals present an opportunity for the individual parties in the two dominant coalitions to differentiate themselves from each other and establish their own electoral bases, ahead of a potential reform of the binomial system, which favours a dual system and has ensured the endurance of the two big coalitions in Chile.

    In the ruling right-of-centre Coalición para el Cambio, tensions between the main conservative Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI) and the more moderate Renovación Nacional (RN) have reached boiling point. Since coming to power in 2010, the RN has increasingly looked to distance itself from the UDI. Last month, on the second anniversary of President Sebastián Pinera’s second round election victory,  Senator Hernán Larraín of the UDI summed up the coalition’s time in government, admitting that “In truth it has been very hard for us to govern. Political coordination between the government, its parties and its parliamentarians has cost us more than anticipated”. The UDI and the RN have not been on the same page on most important political issues, but in particular electoral reform [RBS 12-1].

    In mid January the RN, in conjunction with the opposition Democracia Cristiana (DC),  a moderate member of the left-of-centre Concertación opposition coalition, presented a proposal to reform the binomial electoral system.The UDI was incensed by its partner’s decision to go behind its back to talk to the opposition about a reform it staunchly opposes.

    This unexpected move not only illustrated the level of discontent inside the ruling coalition; but also, it gave rise to the idea that Chile’s long static political dynamics are starting to change.

    The upshot is that the mood in the ruling coalition is not the best, complicating discussions as to potential municipal candidates. In the last (2008) municipal elections, the distribution of candidates between the UDI and RN was almost equal, with the UDI taking 58 mayoralties and the RN 55. Another complicating factor is that the Coalición para el Cambio is waiting to see if some of its prominent mayors might opt to run for the senate (in 2013) instead, meaning that the coalition would have to come up with alternative nominees for these seats.

    Meanwhile, over in the four-party Concertación, which currently runs 134 municipalities, the situation is not much better. The DC’s approximation with the RN has also created tensions in the Concertación, meaning that it has not been able to take advantage of the obvious weaknesses in the ruling coalition.

    Indeed, the Concertación itself looks increasingly unstable. Moderate members like the DC and  Partido por la Democracia (PPD) are starting to feel uncomfortable about their alliance with the more radical Partido Socialista (PS) and the Partido Radical Social Demócrata (PRSD). In addition, unlike the Coalición para el Cambio, the Concertación decided last year that it would, for the first time, hold primaries in 2012 to select candidates for the majority (60%) of the races it intends to take part in. The decision was an attempt to show that the Concertación is more engaged with its electoral base and more open to renewal than its main rival.

    However, there is a risk that the primary process, scheduled to take place on 1 April, will negatively affect those Concertación mayors seeking re-election, as they face into the prospect of protracted campaigns and the political wear-and-tear that this represents.  Inevitably, the primaries have fuelled the latent tensions between the four members, as they try to push their own candidates in the important races. The DC in particular has used the opportunity to challenge the Concertación’s main political leadership, and thereby set itself apart within the coalition.

    The Concertación has identified 34 municipalities as “special cases” in which it will not hold primaries for various reasons. At least 12 of these are municipalities in which it is waiting to reach some sort of agreement with the Partido Comunista (PCCh). In the 2008 municipal elections, the Concertación and the PCCh agreed to a so-called “omission pact”, under which the Concertación tacitly backed PCCh candidates in municipalities in which it did not field a candidate, in order to avoid splitting the leftist vote. This time round, the PCCh has already identified the municipalities in which it intends to compete and has asked Concertación to “reserve” them. But the PCCh itself has since stalled the negotiations, as it examines whether the current political landscape provides it with an opportunity  to capitalise on the social discontent and the new electoral reforms to court young voters and increase its political clout independently.

    Sensing an opportunity, the DC expressed its desire to field candidates in at least four of the 12 “reserved” municipalities. This prompted a strong reaction from the PCCh, whose secretary general, Lautaro Carmona, warned the Concertación on 7 February that the PCCh would be ready to field candidates “across the country” if it was not guaranteed the first option in its preferred municipalities. The Concertación countered that the fact that the DC had pencilled in names for these races did not make them definitive or mean that the ‘omission pact’ had been abandoned. However, the DC revealed that it was carrying out polls in the areas in question, in order to determine the viability of its candidates. It expects to have the results by the end of February, ahead of the resumption of the negotiations with the PCCh in March. While it may be a bit precipitate for the centrist RN and DC to consider their own separate electoral alliance ahead of this year’s municipals, the possibility of such an alliance in the not-so-distant future is now greater.

    Emblematic races

    A couple of high profile mayoral races are been identified by  political parties (and the media) as the ones that will determine the future state of Chile’s political landscape. First and foremost is the race for the capital, Santiago. The country’s most important municipality is currently run by the UDI's Pablo Zalaquett, who will almost certainly seek re-election. However, the PPD president, Carolina Tohá, and the DC’s vice-president, Laura Albornoz, have already registered as pre-candidates for the Concertación primaries. In Valparaíso, the internal struggle within the Concertación will pit Paula Quintana of the PS, a former planning minister (2008-2010) under Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), against the DC’s Hernán Pinto, a former city mayor (1990-2000). This scenario will be played out again in La Florida, where the DC is fielding former mayor Gonzalo Duarte (1990-2000); and the PS is backing Vivienne Bachelet, Michelle Bachelet’s cousin, who is running as an independent but is backed by the PS.

    For the Coalición para el Cambio, the municipality of Concepción presents a particularly difficult problem, given that former mayor Jacqueline van Rysselberghe (2000-2010) of the UDI, who resigned her post to become governor of Bibío following the 2010 earthquake, has declined to run for mayor again. Despite the fact that this represents a good opportunity to capture this important municipality, whose greater metropolitan area is second only to Santiago, no high profile Concertación candidate has stepped forth.

    Meanwhile in Maipú, a decision by Mayor Alberto Undurraga (DC) not to seek re-election in order, to run for the senate in 2013, means that the Concertación does not have a strong candidate to represent it in one of the largest comunas in the metropolitan Santiago area. In another Santiago Metropolitan area municipality, Puente Alto, Mayor Manuel José Ossandón of the RN, who has been in office for the past 12 years, has also decided to compete for a seat in the senate next year, exposing an RN bastion. So far, the Concertación has failed to identify any candidates for that municipality.

    • Confident Zalaquett

    On 12 February Santiago’s Mayor Pablo Zalaquett stated that the prospect of facing a high profile Concertación candidate such as Carolina Tohá or Laura Albornoz didn’t faze him. “I have full faith in that whoever my rival is, I will continue being mayor. I came here for eight years and will stay eight years in Santiago” he quipped. Interestingly, Zalaquett also referred to the new “young” electorate and its potential to alter the elections. According to him, young people do not represent a “strong vote in Santiago... and if they did, it can be won it through work and dialogue”.

  • In Brief – Nicaragua

    LatinNews 22 March 2012 Hits: 1638

    Nicaragua | Ortega says no to drugs. On 21 March President Daniel Ortega came out against the proposal put forward by his Guatemalan peer, Otto Pérez Molina of legalizing drugs as an alternative strategy to the war on drugs. Porfirio Lobo of Honduras, Laura Chinchilla of Costa Rica and El Salvador’s Mauricio Funes have come out in favour of the debate, though have clearly stated they do not agree with the de-regulation proposal. The government of Panama has been less clear: Foreign Minister Roberto Henríquez said “we don’t agree in the least bit with legalisation”, but failed to clarify if they would welcome or participate in the discussion. Central American leaders are due to debate the initiative at the next Central America Integration System (Sica) summit, scheduled to take place in Guatemala on 24 March.

  • RASTREANDO TENDENCIAS

    LatinNews 21 May 2012 Hits: 655

    VENEZUELA-ECUADOR | Promoviendo proyectos de integración. El canciller de Ecuador, Ricardo Patiño, se reunió con su par venezolano, Nicolás Maduro, en Caracas el 14 de mayo para firmar varios acuerdos de cooperación dirigidos a incrementar el comercio bilateral en 20%. Maduro explicó que los acuerdos, en su mayoría, cubren las áreas de energía, aduanas y cooperación fiscal que reforzarán aquellos previamente firmados por los dos países en el 2007. En particular, Maduro expresó que ambos países habían llegado a un acuerdo aduanero de asistencia y cooperación que se espera que facilite el comercio entre los dos países a fin de alcanzar las ambiciosas metas comerciales.

    Por su lado, Patiño destacó un acuerdo para establecer una “gran compañía nacional de cacao” que permitirá a ambos países realizar una producción común. De acuerdo con Patiño, los dos países decidieron  sobre esta “asociación internacional” tomando en consideración que juntos Ecuador y Venezuela exportan más del 60% del cacao Fino de Aroma saborizado del mundo.

    Sin embargo, el acuerdo más importante parece ser una alianza estratégica entre la petrolera estatal de Venezuela, Pdvsa, y su contraparte ecuatoriana, Petroecuador. Bajo el acuerdo, Pdvsa, asegurará la provisión de petróleo crudo a una nueva refinería que será construida sobre la costa del Pacífico de Ecuador. Según Maduro, esto es “fundamental” para consolidar el desarrollo del proyecto, al permitir el establecimiento de acuerdos financieros globales para su construcción y para “asegurar la participación de otros importantes socios internacionales”.

    Más ambiciosamente, ambos ministros también expresaron sus deseos de discutir, una vez más, la construcción del “gasoducto del sur” un proyecto de integración energética entre Venezuela, Colombia, y Ecuador. “Con la hermana República de Colombia estamos trabajando en este proyecto de gasoducto del sur [...]” dijo Maduro. Él señaló que la cuestión sería discutida en la próxima reunión del consejo sudamericano de energía que se celebrará en Caracas el 18 de mayo.

    COLOMBIA | Efectos negativos del TLC. Justo un día antes de que el Tratado de Libre Comercio (TLC) entre Colombia y EU entre en vigencia, un grupo de ONGs internacionales publicaron un informe, el 14 de mayo, exponiendo algunos de los efectos negativos que podrían impactar a los productores agrícolas de Colombia. El informe “Impacto del TLC EU-Colombia sobre la economía de pequeñas granjas en Colombia”, desarrollado  por varias ONGs lideradas por Oxfam, halló que el 70% de los 1,36m de pequeños granjeros de Colombia serán negativamente afectados por el tratado pues sus ingresos podrían decrecer hasta un 16%.

    El informe afirma que “el acuerdo fue negociado de manera desigual y asimétrica”, permitiendo a EU mantener sus “políticas proteccionistas”. De acuerdo con el informe, Colombia ha ofrecido remover las tarifas inmediatamente sobre importaciones valuadas en US$830m, mientras que EU solamente ha ofrecido remover tarifas sobre importaciones que actualmente están valuadas en US$776m.

    Por otro lado, en Ecuador, grupos empresariales han expresado preocupación en el sentido de que el último TLC de Colombia podría dañar la economía domestica ecuatoriana al “aislarla” aún más de sus mercados primarios. El presidente de la cámara de comercio de Quito, Blasco Peñaherrera, lamentó el hecho de que Ecuador parece estar crecientemente aislado dentro de la región andina dado que ahora Colombia y Perú tienen TLCs en vigencia con EU, el principal socio económico de los tres países. Como resultado, Peñaherrera dijo que las exportaciones ecuatorianas como flores, pescados, vegetales y maderas perderían competitividad pues estas deberán pagar tarifas para ingresar a EU, mientras que los productos colombianos y peruanos no.

    COLOMBIA | Importante adquisición en el sector bancario. El 14 de mayo, el banco de propiedad colombiana, GNB Sudameris, anunció que había concluido la adquisición de las operaciones del gigante bancario británico HSBC, en Colombia, Perú, Uruguay, y Paraguay, por US$400m. El acuerdo significa que GNB Sudameris ahora estará a cargo de 62 sucursales a lo largo de los cuatro países, con activos de un valor de US$4,4mm, agregado a los actuales US$6mm del banco. El presidente del GNB Sudameris, Jaime Gilinski, dijo que “esta transacción es la más importante en la historia del banco, pues expande significativamente la presencia del grupo en América del Sur, lo que nos permitirá promover nuestro crecimiento regional”.

    • Newmont decidirá sobre Conga

    El 15 de mayo, el presidente de Minas Buenaventura, Roque Benavides, reveló que la firma de EU, Newmont, el socio mayoritario en el proyecto minero de US$4,8mm de oro y cobre de Conga, en Perú, es la que tomará la decisión de seguir o no con el proyecto en menos de un mes. Benavides explicó que Conga es un “proyecto difícil” y que un equipo de ingenieros y empleados de Newmont y  Buenaventura estaban evaluando las recomendaciones hechas después del peritaje de la Evaluación del Impacto Medioambiental de Conga, ordenado por el gobierno peruano. Benavides dijo que ellos estaban evaluando los pros y contras y los costos del proyecto antes de llegar a una decisión.

  • In Brief - Peru/Colombia

    LatinNews 23 January 2013 Hits: 1523

    SECURITY | Peru to cooperate in rescue of hostages. On 22 January Peru’s defence minister, Pedro Cateriano, said that the Peruvian armed forces will help in the operation to rescue hostages kidnapped by the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia. A group of five miners, including two Peruvians and one Canadian were kidnapped in the province of Bolívar by Colombia’s second-largest guerrilla group on 18 January. The ELN said the kidnapping was a response to the Colombian government’s granting of “99% of the mineral rights of the Serranía de San Lucas to foreign companies, leaving only 1% for the communities that live in this area”. Colombia's defence minister, Juan Carlos Pinzón, said the group’s actions were unjustifiable. “We will continue looking for them,” he wrote on Twitter.  The last foreigners to be in kidnapped in Colombia were a group of Chinese workers taken hostage by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombi (Farc) guerrilla in 2011; they were released just before the start of peace talks between the government and the Farc last year.

  • RASTREANDO TENDENCIAS

    LatinNews 24 January 2014 Hits: 1061

    NICARAGUA | Nuevo presidente del banco central. El Presidente Daniel Ortega ha revivido las preocupaciones de su interferencia en las instituciones del Estado, con su decisión, esta semana, de destituir al titular del Banco Central de Nicaragua (BCN), el ex ministro de finanzas, Alberto Guevara, reemplazándolo con el número dos del banco, el gerente general, Ovidio Reyes. Ortega no ha dado razones para su decisión de reemplazar a Guevara, pero el opositor diario local, La Prensa, la vinculó con los “supuestos excesos” de Guevara, tales como su insistencia de hospedarse en suntuosos hoteles.

    Guevara fue designado en febrero del 2012 [IL-12-09], en reemplazo de Antenor Rosales, quien dejó su cargo después de cinco años en el mismo –decisión atribuida a su resistencia al pedido del Presidente Ortega de mover algunas de las reservas internacionales de Nicaragua a un banco regional propuesto por una iniciativa regional liderada por Venezuela.

    Los temores de que la decisión de reemplazar a Rosales, quien era considerado clave para mantener la estabilidad económica de Nicaragua, tendrían un impacto negativo no se han materializado. En su visita más reciente (diciembre del 2013), el Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI) señaló que “durante los últimos dos años, los desarrollos macroeconómicos en Nicaragua han sido generalmente favorables. El crecimiento del producto interno bruto (PIB) fue de un promedio del 5,25% durante 2011-2012, y la inflación anual promedio fue del 7,25% durante el mismo periodo. Mirando hacia delante, el panorama macroeconómico también permanece generalmente positivo. Se esperar que el PIB real crezca un 4,25% en el 2013, y después se estabilizara en su nivel potencial del 4% durante el mediano plazo. La inflación está proyectada en alrededor del 7%, apoyada por el sistema de régimen de paridad móvil, que había ayudado a anclar las expectativas inflacionarias”. Mientras señala que persisten riesgos (ver abajo) el FMI también elogió los esfuerzos de “las autoridades para mantener la disciplina fiscal y la estabilidad monetaria que, combinada con el progreso en la reforma estructural, han ayudado a fortalecer la confianza y estimular el crecimiento económico”.

    GUATEMALA | Gasoducto. El ministro de economía de Guatemala, Sergio de la Torre, anunció esta semana planes para que Guatemala y la compañía petrolera estatal de México, Pemex, construyan un gasoducto de 500kms vinculando a los dos países. De la Torre dijo que el gasoducto, que unirá la ciudad de Salina Cruz en el estado mexicano de Oaxaca, con el departamento guatemalteco de Escuintla, podría reducir los costos de la energía hasta en un 75% y proveería a los fabricantes locales con acceso a una energía más barata.

    Sin que Pemex haya hecho comentarios sobre el proyecto, los medios internacionales han citado a funcionarios guatemaltecos ubicando el costo del proyecto entre US$1,2mm o US$700, mientras que también se ha informado que el Presidente Otto Pérez Molina ha dicho que el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) ha expresado interés en proveer un préstamo de US$300m. El plan, que aún debe ser firmado por el Presidente Pérez Molina y su contraparte de México, Enrique Peña Nieto, viene después de la visita a México del 13 de enero, del canciller de Guatemala, Fernando Carrera, quien se entrevistó con su par mexicano, José Antonio Meade Kuribreña, durante la cual ambos acordaron promover el comercio y la inversión bilateral

    • Riesgos

    En su informe de diciembre del 2013 sobre Nicaragua, el FMI destacó que “los riesgos a la baja permanecen, derivados del elevado déficit y la incertidumbre externa de Nicaragua con relación al panorama global y el esquema de financiación de las importaciones de petróleo de Venezuela”.