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POLITICS | Opposition student groups clash in Caracas. On 21 March Venezuelan police fired tear gas to break up clashes between pro- and anti-government student groups near the national electoral court (CNE) in central Caracas.  Several hundred students who attempted to gather at the CNE to demand “clean elections” for the presidency on 14 April got involved in violent scuffles with an estimated 150 pro-government supporters with bottles, stones and eggs hurled between the groups, according to local press estimate. The police formed a cordon between the two and fired tear gas to disperse the groups.

On state TV last night acting President Nicolás Maduro condemned the violence and warned government supporters ‘not to fall for it’. He repeated his accusations that US right-wingers are trying to destabilize Venezuela, noting the two US attaches expelled from the country on 5 March last were not only trying to make contacts with the Venezuelan military but were also giving advice to opposition student groups, including students that staged a hunger strike last year. He also repeated that the late president Hugo Chávez’s cancer was “provoked”. “On the internet there are lots of articles about how the Empire has been trying out these kinds of biological, bacteriological weapons since the 40s and 50s”, he insisted. Yesterday the US state department again dismissed as “outlandish” Maduro’s various conspiracy claims. In an e-mailed statement State Department spokesman Patrick Ventrell said: “We categorically reject allegations of U.S. government involvement in any plots to destabilize the Venezuelan government or to harm anyone in Venezuela. The repetition of unsubstantiated and outlandish allegations by Venezuelan officials about U.S.-based plots is disappointing.

El congreso aprobó el 7 de noviembre una importante pieza de legislación dirigida a reprimir la corrupción oficial y erradicar la impunidad. Mientras que el proyecto de ley fue saludado por el nuevo primer ministro, César Villanueva, como un avance hacia la política del gobierno de tolerancia cero hacia la corrupción, el mismo fue ensombrecido por las repercusiones de otra votación en el congreso una semana antes para designar a la diputada Martha Chávez como coordinadora del subgrupo de derechos humanos de la comisión de justicia del congreso. La incongruente designación de Chávez, quien había defendido algunas de las más notorias violaciones de los derechos humanos del autoritario gobierno de Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), confirmó cuán desubicado está el congreso, aunque finalmente la comisión actuó para removerla de esta posición.

La sensibilidad pública hacia (y la sospecha sobre) la corrupción oficial es particularmente aguda en Perú, después de una década de la cleptocracia de Fujimori. La nueva legislación significa que los funcionarios públicos ahora podrán ser acusados por actos de corrupción incluso aunque estos fueron perpetrados antes de ser electos (o designados en el caso de empleados de agencias del Estado o empleados públicos).

Susana Silva Hasembank, la coordinadora de la Comisión Anti-corrupción de alto nivel (CAN), dijo que la legislación “fortalecería el marco legal [de Perú] para prevenir la impunidad”. Ella agregó que la ley “pone a nuestra legislación en línea con los estándares internacionales en la lucha contra la corrupción”. La CAN, que fue consagrada en ley en enero del 2013, ejerce la coordinación entre cuerpos de gobierno a niveles regionales y nacionales así como también en la comunidad empresarial para proponer políticas de largo plazo para prevenir y combatir la corrupción (ver más abajo).

Martha Chávez

Restaurar la confianza pública en el congreso requerirá más que esta nueva ley enfocada en la corrupción oficial. El congreso es la rama del gobierno en la que menos confía el público, con un rating de aprobación de un solo un dígito en las encuestas de opinión, y su credibilidad recibió un verdadero golpe una semana antes cuando Martha Chávez fue electa por el subgrupo de derechos humanos de seis miembros como su coordinadora, el 31 de octubre. Dado que el subgrupo se ha adjudicado a sí mismo la tarea de evaluar las conclusiones de la Comisión de Verdad y Reconciliación (CVR), formada en el 2003 para revisar el conflicto armado de 1980-2000, su elección ha provocado una fuerte reacción. Chávez calificó el informe de la CVR como parcial y sesgado, una reivindicación de las guerrillas de Sendero Luminoso (SL) y totalmente desacreditado. Ella dijo que conduciría una investigación sobre corrupción entre los autores del informe para “hallar quién les pagó” para llegar a sus conclusiones “encubriendo a Sendero”.

Grupos de derechos humanos locales como la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDDHH, y Aprodeh, criticaron al congreso por designar en este rol a Chávez, afirmando que ella no tiene ningún respeto por los derechos humanos (no que el respeto a los derechos humanos haya sido siempre un prerrequisito para liderar cuerpos de derechos humanos –China, Cuba, Rusia, y Arabia Saudita, ganaron asientos por tres años en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de la ONU, esta misma semana). Estos grupos de derechos humanos pidieron a la comisión de justicia del congreso que la removieran y llevaron a cabo protestas públicas contra su designación; el 5 de noviembre, unas 1.000 personas salieron a las calles de Lima para expresar su protesta.

Chávez se mantuvo firme, incluso provocando al Presidente Ollanta Humala diciendo que era “un rehén de los grupos de derechos humanos”. Sin embargo, pese a que inicialmente votaron para sostener su designación, una semana más tarde, el 12 de noviembre, la comisión de justicia respondió a las protestas, votando por nueve votos a seis para desbandar el subgrupo de derechos humanos. Chávez calificó la decisión como un formal golpe de gracia, igual al que Sendero administraba a sus enemigos. Sin embargo, ella sostuvo que ya había logrado lo que se había propuesto hacer, “despojar a la CVR de su sacrosanta reputación”.

• Comisión anticorrupción

La Comisión Anti-corrupción (CAN) está compuesta por el primer ministro, y el ministro de justicia, los presidentes de las ramas judicial y legislativa, así como también los titulares de la corte constitucional, el consejo judicial nacional, la asamblea nacional de gobiernos regionales, y la asociación de municipalidades de Perú.

Las ventas minoristas cayeron en diciembre por primera vez en nueve meses, resultando en una caída general para todo el año del 4,3%, el resultado más débil en una década (en el 2003, el sector creció un 3,67%) de acuerdo con los últimos datos del instituto nacional de estadísticas (Ibge). Inesperadamente, las ventas cayeron un 0,2% mes en mes (en términos de volumen) antes de la temporada de Navidad, aunque aún se elevaron un 4,0% en términos de volumen sobre el diciembre anterior.

Los brasileros parecen haber perdido sus ansias de comprar en medio de un lento crecimiento del empleo, crecientes tasas de interés y el impacto de una inflación más alta sobre el dinero que llevan a casa. La confianza de los consumidores en enero cayó a su nivel más bajo desde mediados del 2009, de acuerdo con el Índice de Confianza del Consumidor (ICC) compilado por la Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV). La FGV encuestó a 2.000 familias en las siete ciudades más importantes de Brasil para el ICC, que mide la disposición de las familias de hacer compras de una canasta de bienes de consumo y evalúa las expectativas acerca del empleo, ingreso, y oportunidades económicas. El índice tiene un rango de 1 a 200, con 100 considerado como un indicador de sentimiento neutral. El ICC terminó enero del 2014 en 108,9 puntos, cayendo de 112,5 en diciembre. Este fue el punto más banjo desde junio del 2009, cuando descendió a 108,7 puntos en medio de la crisis económica global.

Un índice más amplio del Ibge de las ventas que incluye a los sectores automotriz y de la construcción cayó un 1,5% mes en mes en diciembre después de que las ventas de automóviles cayeron agudamente (3,4%). Este índice se elevó un 3,6% en general en el 2013.

Los críticos del gobierno de la Presidenta Dilma Rousseff dicen que su enfoque de la política de exenciones fiscales destinadas a estimular el consumo se ha quedado sin kilometraje. El gobierno alega que estas políticas siempre han tenido la intención de ser medidas temporales para estimular el crecimiento durante la crisis y que su nuevo enfoque es sobre las políticas de promoción de las inversiones para así facilitar la producción económica nacional impulsada por el sector privado en el mediano plazo.

CUBA | Frenesí diplomático. Laurent Fabius se convirtió en el ministro francés de más alto rango en visitar Cuba por más de 30 años, el 12 de abril. Fabius, el canciller francés, visitó La Habana después de acompañar al Presidente Hollande a una visita de estado a México. Él mantuvo conversaciones con su par, Bruno Rodríguez, y con el Presidente Raúl Castro. La visita tuvo lugar después de que Frans Timmermans se convirtió en el primer canciller de Holanda en visitar Cuba desde la Revolución Cubana, en enero, y poco antes de que la Unión Europea (UE) recomience las conversaciones con Cuba en La Habana, programadas para el 29 de abril, sobre comercio, inversión, y derechos humanos. Fabius dijo que la aprobación por parte de Cuba el pasado marzo de una nueva ley diseñada para atraer a nuevos inversionistas extranjeros [IL-14-13] era alentadora.

El mismo día en que Fabius visitaba La Habana, el Presidente Castro mantenía conversaciones en La Habana con Salvador Sánchez Cerén, el Presidente electo de El Salvador. El Salvador estableció lazos diplomáticos bilaterales con Cuba en el 2009, por primera vez desde su rompimiento después de la Revolución Cubana. Sánchez Cerén insistió en visitar a sus vecinos centroamericanos y de la República Dominicana antes de hacer un peregrinaje especial a Cuba, la cual el izquierdista Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) anunció que él estaba visitando por razones médicas. Sánchez Cerén se dirigirá al Vaticano el 25 de abril para mantener una audiencia con el Papa. El FMLN, aunque profundamente influenciado por la Revolución Cubana nunca compartió su doctrina anti-religiosa.

EL SALVADOR | Reforma militar y política. Los medios extranjeros se concentraron esta semana en una resolución de la Cámara Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de E Salvador del el 11 de abril, que afirma que el uso de los militares para patrullar los puntos calientes del delito no contraviene una provisión constitucional que restringe su rol en la seguridad interna, y estaba justificada por los “excepcionales” niveles del delito y la inseguridad en El Salvador. Aunque significativa, los desarrollos a largo plazo gel 12 de abril, que no fueron informados por la prensa extranjera, podrían ser aún más significativos. La derechista opositora, Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Arena), realizó un análisis ‘post-mortem’ después de su derrota electoral del mes pasado, durante el cual 700 miembros del partido exigieron amplias reformas internas para hacer que el partido sea más elegible. El principal empuje de las recomendaciones que emergieron del congreso, que serán enmendadas y aprobadas por la asamblea nacional de Arena el 3 de mayo, apuntan a la democratización de Arena, especialmente a el uso del voto secreto y a las elecciones primarias para poner fin a la imposición de candidatos para las alcaldías y la legislatura por parte de los pesos pesados del partido.

Diosdado Cabello, president of Venezuela’s national assembly and number two in the ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), on 29 June declared the winners of the PSUV’s day-earlier internal primaries for the 6 December legislative elections. Cabello, who as the PSUV’s first vice-president effectively runs the party (President Nicolás Maduro is the party president), said the PSUV primaries were “a lesson in dignity” in the face of “the contempt and sustained attacks from the Right” and heralded a great victory in December. Cabello contrasted the democratic nature of the PSUV’s contest with the internally-contentious process run by the main opposition coalition, Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD).

The PSUV primaries followed a month of campaigning by some 1,162 pre-candidates chosen in April by 13,600 grassroots assemblies across the country. These assemblies, known as Comités de Lucha Popular y las Unidades de Batalla Bolívar-Chávez (Ubch), are closely overseen by Cabello. He put the turnout at 3.16m, of an estimated 7m registered PSUV members, and boasted that it was over five times that for the open national primaries held by the MUD on 17 May, when turnout was just over 0.6m (of the 19m-strong national electorate). Some opposition figures questioned Cabello’s reported turnout, with the former deputy, Maria Corina Machado, tweeting photos of sparse-looking voting centres.

In contrast with the MUD, however, which held its open process in just 33 of the country’s 87 districts (choosing the rest by internal consensus), the PSUV held primaries in all 87 districts to choose 100% of its legislative candidates; albeit the leadership typically ‘finalises’, in not altogether transparent fashion, the pre-candidates chosen by the Ubchs (which has led to dissent from the base in the past). The PSUV will now negotiate with its 13 or so allied parties in the Gran Polo Patriótico Simón Bolívar (GPPSB), the official ruling left-wing electoral coalition put together in 2011 by the late president Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) in support of his re-election bid in 2012, to complete lists. This year 168 seats will be elected for the national assembly, up from the current 165.

• CNE riles the MUD with gender quotas

The MUD has run afoul of new electoral regulations on gender parity published by the national electoral council (CNE) on 25 June stipulating that women must make up 50% of candidates’ lists. The MUD suggests that the CNE, having already gerrymandered electoral districts, is again moving the goalposts in favour of the PSUV, at a time when the polls suggest a strong voter preference for the opposition. The timing of the ruling is undoubtedly awkward for the MUD, which has only just managed to complete the complicated internal process among its 29 parties to finalise its December line-up. The fractious coalition still has to decide on whether to field candidates on individual party tickets or whether to have a single ‘unity’ ticket, as proposed by the moderate leadership.

However, the fact is that the CNE had warned about this on several occasions (in April and again in May), and it is the case that it has moved to implement obligatory gender quotas in previous elections when it became apparent that parties were failing to adhere to its recommended guideline that at least 40% of electoral candidates be female. Of the PSUV’s primary candidates, 50% were under 30 years of age, while 60% were women, in line with CNE recommendations. On the day, just 30% of the chosen PSUV candidates were women, nevertheless this was still far ahead of the MUD’s tally. In the MUD’s final lists, only 11% of the final candidates are female. There are now some suggestions that the MUD will have to tear them up its lists and start again. End box

• González pledges to return

The former prime minister of Spain, Felipe González (1982-1996), says he aims to return to Venezuela before the 6 December elections. “Unless the Vienna Convention declares me persona non grata, I have the right to circulate freely”, he asserted. González, who cut short a planned week-long visit to Venezuela in early June after authorities refused him permission to visit imprisoned opposition politicians or attend their trial sessions in his capacity as their legal counsellor, called on the Maduro government to allow “freedom of representation” in the elections (so that jailed politicians and exiles could run) and the presence of international observers. To date, the CNE has only accredited an electoral ‘accompanying mission’ from the Union of South American Nations, which the Venezuelan opposition suggests is not a neutral observer.

MEXICO | Cisco announces major investment. On 27 September Charles Robbins, the CEO of US networking hardware manufacturing firm Cisco Systems, the world’s largest producer of internet connectivity equipment, announced plans to invest US$4bn to expand the firm’s operations in Mexico in the next two years. The planned investment is among the largest announced since President Enrique Peña Nieto first assumed office in 2012 and should help to stimulate domestic economic growth. The announcement was made after Robbins held a private meeting with Peña Nieto at the Los Pinos presidential residence in Mexico City.

A statement issued by Peña Nieto’s office said that the decision to expand Cisco’s operations in Mexico answered to the fact that the firm considers that the structural economic reforms promoted by the Mexican government have created an environment conducive to investing and conducting business in the country. Robbins said that the likes of the financial, labour, and education reforms have made Mexico more competitive and would help to develop a better-trained labour force, adding that “Mexico is rapidly becoming one of Latin America’s economic success stories”.

According to the statement, the expansion of Cisco’s operations in Mexico will allow for the production of routers, servers, screens, and wireless access points, among other networking hardware products, in Mexico. The statement adds that this will result in the creation of 270 direct jobs and 77 indirect jobs on top of the 4,830 direct and 1,015 indirect jobs that Cisco’s existing operations in Mexico’s Jalisco state have already generated.

• Rising up the rankings

The vote of confidence in Mexico’s economy and its competitiveness by Cisco comes as the latest World Economic Forum (WEF)’s Global Competitiveness Report, released on 28 September, ranked Mexico 51^st out of 138 observed countries, with an overall rating of 4.41 out of seven. Mexico’s latest ranking is six places higher than in the previous WEF report and its best ranking and (rating) since the current methodology was employed in 2006. The WEF report notes that this improvement was achieved thanks to increased labour market flexibility, access to financing, and market competition deriving from the structural economic reforms.

Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro has defied US sanctions slapped on the petro, the much-trumpeted cryptocurrency launched by his government to try and escape the country’s financial and economic crisis. Refusing to accept that the US action meant the petro was stillborn, Maduro ordered the state oil company Pdvsa to start using the cryptocurrency, and announced the creation of four special economic zones to trade goods and services in it. Maduro also slashed three zeroes off the paper currency, holding aloft a new 100 bolívar note. There were no accompanying monetary reforms to try and arrest the runaway inflation which will soon put the zeroes back on.

Speaking on state television on 22 March, President Maduro said that Pdvsa and other basic industries and state enterprises that generate income from exports would start using the petro immediately. Maduro ordered the Corporación Venezolana de Comercio Exterior (Corpovex) to start using petros for essential imports of food, medicine, and industrial inputs, and to pay taxes to the central bank (BCV). He maintained that the country’s state companies could “exchange products for petros with every country in the world”, wishful thinking given the US imposed sanctions on the cryptocurrency.

Maduro announced the creation of four exclusive and special economic zones (essentially corresponding to current duty-free areas) to trade goods and services in the petro: Margarita Island and the Los Roques archipelago for “premium tourism” in the north, the Paraguaná peninsula in the north-western state of Falcón, and the Ureña-San Antonio economic zone on the Colombian border. Maduro added that national tourism operators would start using the petro directly.

Costly cosmetic reform?

Maduro said that his preference would be for Venezuela to migrate to a 100% digital system, but he announced a “necessary monetary reconversion”, while presenting new 20, 50, 100 and 200 denomination notes, to take effect from 4 June. The bolívar fuerte (BF) will henceforth be known as the bolívar soberano (BS). Maduro did not provide any details regarding the duration of the changeover period. When the government announced the withdrawal of the BF100 note in December 2016, with only 72 hours of notice, it caused widespread chaos, and large queues outside banks.

Ramón Lobo, the president of the BCV, confidently asserted that the redenomination would “attack inflation and reduce the shortage of cash”. Another redenomination will be required before the end of 2019, however, at the present rate of inflation of well in excess of 50% per month and in the absence of concrete monetary reform, for which the government has shown neither appetite nor aptitude.

Lobo said the “old bills” would be taken out of circulation. Some of these bills are actually very new, however, with Lobo announcing the launch just a few weeks ago of a new BF100,000 note, the equivalent of US$0.50 on the black market, enough to purchase a small coffee, and other denominations at the end of last year.

Maduro said the new currency would help fight “the economic war of financial persecution…personally directed by [Colombia’s President] Juan Manuel Santos, advised by Julio Borges [a prominent leader of the opposition coalition Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD)]”.

• Power outage

Severe power shortages in western Venezuela have caused blackouts of 18 hours. The electricity minister, Luis Motta Domínguez, appealed for “patience” from inhabitants of the states of Táchira, Mérida, Barinas, Trujillo, Portuguesa, and Apure. He said the shortages were due to “low levels of water” in state reservoirs. On 22 March protesters damaged the country’s most sacred bust of former president Hugo Chávez (1999-2013) in the main square in Sabaneta, the birthplace of the founder of the Bolivarian Revolution in the state of Barinas, by burning tyres around it.

Last week’s speech to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by Carlos Ruiz Massieu, the UN special representative in Colombia, struck something of a familiar note. Not for the first time, his quarterly report emphasised the threat of escalating violence in Colombia, and the importance of the proper implementation of the country’s momentous 2016 peace agreement. And yet, these words appeared to take on new significance in light of the events of the previous day: the inauguration of US President Joe Biden, who looks set to take a diametrically opposite stance to his predecessor on the subject of Colombia’s peace deal.

In the course of the US election campaign in 2020, former president Donald Trump (2017-2021) slammed the peace agreement as “a terrible treaty with the Colombian drug cartels”, and as “a surrender to narco-terrorists”. On 21 January, however, the US ambassador to the UN, Richard Mills, marked a significant shift in US policy by warning the UNSC that the growing violence in Colombia “has a direct and damaging effect on the implementation of the peace agreement”, urging the government led by President Iván Duque – himself a noted sceptic of the 2016 deal – to do more to rectify this situation.

Talk of a potential rift between Biden and Duque – whose ambassador to the US, Francisco Santos, has been accused of campaigning for Trump during the election – has been somewhat overblown. While relations may cool slightly under Biden, the new president is not about to turn away from one of the US’s closest allies in Latin America, nor is he likely to advocate a major overhaul of Colombia’s security policy. As well as expressing confidence that Biden will build “a very close relationship” with Duque, US ambassador Philip Goldberg noted last week that Biden was “one of the architects of Plan Colombia”, the cornerstone document of US-Colombia military co-operation.

Domestic critics of Duque’s government have long identified the proper implementation of the peace agreement as a key demand, but on 22 January Colombia’s transitional justice mechanism (JEP) took this a step further, ordering that a series of measures be taken to improve protections for demobilised combatants, at least 256 of whom have been murdered since signing the peace agreement in 2016. Emilio Archila, Duque’s presidential adviser for stabilisation and consolidation, was dismissive of the JEP’s criticisms, insisting that implementing the peace agreement has always been a key government priority.

Farc conference

The Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común (Farc), the political successor to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia guerrilla group that demobilised in 2016, held its annual conference from 23-24 January. As well as rearticulating criticisms of the government for failing to protect former combatants (of which a further six have been killed already in 2021), the party agreed to change its name to Comunes, in an attempt to disassociate itself from the growing number of guerrillas who have returned to combat in recent years, often spurred on by the threat to their lives.

Covid-19 claims life of defence minister

In the early hours of 26 January, President Duque confirmed that his defence minister, Carlos Holmes Trujillo, had died of coronavirus (Covid-19). Trujillo, 69, had been hospitalised in Bogotá since 12 January, with military commander-in-chief General Luis Fernando Navarro deputising for him as defence minister (a role he will retain until a replacement is appointed). Trujillo’s death prompted Duque to declare three days of national mourning for the 52,000 Colombians killed by the virus.

Trujillo had been a controversial figure, and many of those expressing sadness at his passing had been demanding his resignation just months ago, after at least 13 protesters were killed while demonstrating against police violence in September 2020 [WR-20-37]. Trujillo had been a close ally of Duque and a prominent critic of the 2016 peace agreement, and he was thought to be among the frontrunners to claim the candidacy of the ruling right-wing Centro Democrático (CD) party in Colombia’s 2022 presidential elections.

Medicine shortages remain a thorn in the side of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s government. Many attribute the crisis to the centralisation of the medicine procurement and distribution system in 2019. The overhaul supposedly aimed to reduce costs, root out corruption and de-monopolise the market. However, the reality has seen a sustained lack of critical medicines, prompting repeated protests, criminal investigations and profound frustration over a system that does not seem fit for purpose. López Obrador started the year faced with mounting pressure to fix the problem, with direct appeals from the medical community, the political opposition and from within his own party.

When the Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (Morena) government overhauled the medicine procurement and distribution system, López Obrador claimed the former process had been plagued by corruption and price gouging. Under the revamped system, the federal finance ministry (SHCP) purchases medicines with the instruction of the wellbeing institute (Insabi) and the assistance of the United Nations Office for Project Services (Unops). State-owned medicine distribution company (Birmex) then distributes the medicines to public health provision organisations.

However, the new system has not functioned as planned. Under López Obrador, Mexico’s social security institute (IMSS), which provides healthcare to 51% of Mexicans, has received a twelve-fold increase in complaints from those unable to find the medicines they require. The IMSS received 5,850 complaints between January and October 2021. This compares to 443 in the last year of former president Enrique Peña Nieto’s term (2012-2018), according to figures obtained by Mexican newspaper Animal Politico via a freedom of information request. Despite repeated assertions from López Obrador that the issues would be ironed out, the shortages have intensified over time. In its most recent report, Cero Desabasto (‘zero shortage’), a collective for groups of patients, their relatives, and organisations supporting them, recorded 1,823 complaints of shortages between May and August 2021 – the highest number it has reported in a four-month period since launching in February 2019.

Critics attribute the shortages to a lack of planning and an underappreciation of the complexities of medical procurement and distribution. Structural issues hamper each stage of the process, from procurement to distribution [SSR-21-07]. Coordination between the various bodies involved has been inefficient, leading to protracted procurement processes. Unops lacks experience with projects of this scale or nature prompting many, including the technical council of the IMSS and the Mexican association of pharmaceutical laboratories (Amelaf), to question its suitability for the task. Birmex, a pharmaceutical laboratory which was initially created to produce, import and sell vaccines and active pharmaceutical ingredients, has noted itself that it does not have the capacity or specific infrastructure needed to undertake the large-scale storage and distribution of medicines.

Off the back of building pressure – including several criminal complaints - at the end of last year, López Obrador ordered health minister Jorge Alcocer and Juan Antonio Ferrer, the head of Insabi, to resolve the medicine shortages problem “without excuses”. The answer, as has oft been the way with the Morena government, was to turn to the armed forces. On 30 November, López Obrador announced that Jens Pedro Lohmann, a former general major, would take over operations at Birmex. Under Lohmann, members of the army, navy, air force and national guard have been assisting the distribution of medicines across the country. The appointment is yet another example of López Obrador’s reliance on the armed forces to carry out civilian activities [SSR-21-11].

• Criminal complaints

On 1 July a lawyer representing 220 parents of child cancer patients filed a complaint before the attorney general’s office (FGR) against deputy health minister, Hugo López-Gatell, for genocide, discrimination and negligence in relation to shortages. A complaint has also been filed against health minister Jorge Alcocer over the failure to guarantee the supply of medicines. On 26 July, the supreme court (SCJN) added to the legal pressure, ruling that the government had a duty to guarantee patients’ access to medicines and treatments.

The armed forces, who have also assisted in the distribution of coronavirus (Covid-19) vaccines in the country, committed to transporting 54.2m units of medical supplies to warehouses and medical centres in all 32 Mexican states in December. The military’s role in medicine distribution was then extended, as the armed forces continued to distribute medicines in January. According to Alcocer, as of 4 January, 59.6m units of medical supplies had been transported with the help of the defence ministry (Sedena), the navy and the national guard, surpassing the original target.

However, those in the pharmaceutical industry are dubious of this quick fix. “The army may have the capacity, but it is a very delicate issue,” Arturo Morales Portas, president of Amelaf, told Mexican newspaper La Razón. “It's not easy to distribute medicines: it's a logistical issue because they have to be consolidated in one place, in a warehouse, and they have to be distributed to different places.” It is also true that the logistics of transporting and distributing thousands of different types of medicine is a very different and more complex task than delivering just seven kinds of Covid-19 vaccine.

The main cause of complaint, however, is that the solution does little to address the root causes of the delays and will not prevent future shortages from occurring. Insabi and Unops presented the 2022 tender for the purchase of medicines at the end of November, which many in the pharmaceutical industry flagged as being too late, given that the companies that win contracts will need several months to manufacture the medicines. Juan de Villafranca, executive director of Amelaf, says he can foresee a “barrage of shortages” this year.

Indeed, pressure has mounted from various sides for López Obrador’s government to put an end to the problem this year. Members of the opposition centrist Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) issued a statement on 3 January saying that 2022 must be the year that the medicine shortage ends. The party’s national executive committee (CEN) also launched a social media campaign, #RetoPorMéxico, to highlight issues including the shortages. “Let this year bring truly good things for our country, like the supply of oncology medicines that our children so need,” read a CEN Twitter post. On 10 January, the party launched another campaign, ¿#YLasMedicinas?, stating that Morena’s “misplaced priorities” had cost the lives of millions of Mexicans. The campaign referenced two of López Obrador’s flagship infrastructure projects, the Tren Maya railway and Dos Bocas oil refinery, saying the Morena government was injecting “unlimited resources” into “whimsical” projects, while ignoring the health crisis.

• Human impact

Cancer patients have been particularly affected by the shortages. One in four reports of shortages recorded by Cero Desabasto between May and August 2021 was related to this disease. Parents of child cancer patients have been at the forefront of the campaign to end the shortages, staging weekly protests outside Mexico City (CDMX) airport.

A press conference given by Alcocer on 4 January has done little to alleviate the pressure. A journalist asked him about issues in the final stage of the process, which have seen patients going to collect prescribed medicines from the pharmacy only to be told the medicines are not in stock. In Alcocer’s answer, he appeared to insinuate that healthcare workers were to blame, stating that “doctors are the ones who manage this link”. In response, directors of Mexican medical federations, associations and colleges wrote to López Obrador, Alcocer and his deputy Hugo López-Gatell to object to the “inappropriate declarations” made by the health secretary. The medical representatives said the comments would lead the public to blame healthcare workers for shortages, “when we all know exactly what the real cause is”.

The medical community were not the only ones to take issue with Alcocer’s performance at the conference, in which he stated that 21.3m units of medical supplies had been distributed in the past six days. Morena minister Patricia Armendáriz, a member of the lower chamber of congress and usually a staunch supporter of López Obrador and his government, took to Twitter to ask why, if so many medicines were being distributed, did the public remain without them. “Why not give the percentage that is missing and tell us why children are going without chemo[therapy]?” asked Armendáriz. “More needs to be done.”

Alcocer appeared confident in the January press conference, declaring that Insabi had procured 201m units of medical supplies for the first quarter of 2022, whereas Unops had purchased 87m units to meet the demand of federal entities until June 2022. However, all eyes will remain on the health minister and the president to ascertain whether promises have substance and whether, finally, the shortages are over. In the likely event that problems persist, the legal, political and medical pressures will only mount further. 

Amid an exodus of Russians fleeing their country since it invaded Ukraine last year, Argentina has emerged as a popular destination for pregnant mothers close to term. Permissive immigration laws and good healthcare are part of the appeal, but the trend has started to cause some concern among Argentine authorities.

Birth tourism is not a new phenomenon – there has long been a trend for wealthy Russians to give birth in Florida, for example – but the context of the war has increased the appeal and put Argentina firmly on the map of Russian mothers-to-be. Some 22,000 Russians entered Argentina last year, according to Florencia Carignano, the head of Argentina’s immigration office. Nearly half of these were pregnant women, of which over 6,000 had given birth by the start of 2023. There were reportedly 30 pregnant Russians entering Argentina every day in February this year.

There are obvious draws. Russian citizens can enter Argentina as tourists without a visa. Babies born on Argentine soil automatically receive citizenship, which can then help speed up the process for the parents to claim an Argentine passport. The South American country’s passport gives visa-free access to 171 nations, compared to 118 with the Russian passport – and will allow for easier entry to the US, for example. It could also help navigate sanctions.

On a more personal level, new Russian mothers in Argentina speak of the quality of the healthcare (some cite the possibility of having an elective caesarean, not an option in Russia) and how welcome they feel in the South American nation, where the anti-Russia sentiment that pervades Europe is absent. An investigation by tech-focused news outlet Rest of World found a burgeoning ecosystem of Russian ‘momfluencers’ in Argentina, providing advice and a support network to their growing number of compatriots who have come to give birth in the Spanish-speaking country.

But the phenomenon has started to worry authorities. In early February, six Russian women were initially prevented from entering at Ezeiza international airport in Buenos Aires as they could not satisfactorily prove that they were travelling for tourism reasons. They were in the last trimester of pregnancy, travelling alone with little money and without a return flight. The arrest in Slovenia in January of two alleged Russian spies using Argentine passports will have deepened concerns that the country’s passport will start being viewed with suspicion. The US is reportedly paying attention. 

• US concern?

After Argentine authorities announced that they were investigating the phenomenon of Russian birth tourism in Argentina and cracking down on potentially illegal companies facilitating this, the US is said to have expressed interest in the investigation. Argentina is reportedly looking into links with terrorism, espionage, and drug-trafficking, and the local press reported that US authorities informally contacted courts in Argentina about the results of the investigation. 

The main problem, according to Carignano, is that many Russians simply come to give birth, claim citizenship for their child, and then leave the country, leaving a lawyer in charge of the process for acquiring citizenship. She also said that criminal organisations were involved in the process, charging Russian nationals large sums for travel packages bringing them to Argentina for childbirth and often exaggerating the ease with which parents could obtain a passport.

“Argentina has a history and legislation that welcomes migrants who choose to live in our country in search of a better future. That does not give permission for mafia-like organisations to profit from the sale of artifices to obtain our passport for people who don’t want to reside in our country,” Carignano said back in February, highlighting the country’s concern that the reputation of its passport may be suffering.

In a press conference on 21 August, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador labelled the news agency Reuters as “liars”. López Obrador was responding to a report published by the news agency on 18 August that stated that Mexican drug trafficking organisations (DTOs) were using remittance payments to send illicit earnings from the US to Mexico. The report has hit a nerve given that remittances to Mexico have soared since López Obrador took power in 2018, something which the president often celebrates due to the positive impact on Mexico’s economy - despite the drawbacks of an overdependency on money sent from those overseas.

López Obrador attributed the surge in remittances to hardworking immigrants in the US supporting their families in Mexico, questioning whether Reuters was misled or had financial motivations for the claims. López Obrador claimed that Signos Vitales, a Mexican civil society organisation which he said was owned by Claudio X. González, a businessman associated with the political opposition, played a pivotal role in the report’s sourcing. According to President López Obrador, Signos Vitales is comprised of individuals who are driven by economic gains or hold animosity towards the current government due to personal motives.

Reuters has pointed out that its report draws from various sources, including interviews with Mexican citizens, US federal court cases, and inputs from civil society organisations such as Signos Vitales. The report states that criminal groups, particularly the Sinaloa DTO, are exploiting legitimate remittance networks to launder their drug earnings. According to Reuters, this process involves disguising ill-gotten gains in small transfers to “average people across Mexico who have no obvious links to organised crime”. These individuals receive drug money masquerading as remittances, break it down into smaller transactions, and funnel it back to the DTOs, retaining 1% as compensation.

As the number of legitimate remittances being sent back to Mexico has increased, Reuters states it has become ever easier for DTOs to disguise their earnings this way. Remittances to Mexico hit a record high of US$58.5bn last year, of which Reuters estimates that around US$4.4bn (7.5%) could have been derived from criminal activity. Remittances this year are set to be even higher.

Remittances

From January to July 2023, total remittance income reached US$35.8bn, representing a 9.4% increase compared to the same period of the previous year, according to Mexico’s central bank (Banxico).

Isabel Allende Bussi, a member of the left-of-centre Partido Socialista (PS) and daughter of Chile’s former president Salvador Allende (1970-1973), has lost her seat in the senate over a controversial initiative by the government of President Gabriel Boric to buy her father’s house in Santiago and convert it into a museum. Even though the purchase was never completed, the constitutional court (TC) ruled on 3 April to unseat Allende Bussi, since members of congress are not allowed to enter into contracts with the State.

In late December 2024 the government announced a plan to purchase the Allende residence and turn it into a museum but decided to abandon the plan on 3 January amid a wave of criticism. The move to turn the home of Allende, an iconic historical figure of the left, into a national heritage site could have further inflamed the highly polarised political climate in the country. Many left-wing Chileans hail Allende as Latin America’s first democratically elected socialist leader who died as a martyr toppled by a military coup in 1973, whereas many conservatives blame Allende for economic mismanagement that worsened hyperinflation in the early 1970s. However, a bigger problem was that, under Chile’s constitution, it would have been a conflict of interest for a member of congress such as Allende Bussi, a co-owner of her father’s house, to make a sale to the government.

A column published on 11 April on investigative journalism site Ciper Chile described the Allende house case as a “scandal without villains”. Rather than a corrupt politician seeking personal profit through an illegal sale of assets, the column portrays the now-former senator as a daughter who was just trying to celebrate her father’s memory, but failed to consider the seemingly unambiguous wording of Article 60 of Chile’s constitution, which reads: “A deputy or senator who during their term enters or guarantees contracts with the State, acts as a solicitor or agent in private administrative matters, in the provision of public posts, advisory roles, functions, or commissions of a similar nature, shall cease to hold office.”

Allende Bussi was not the only public official to lose their job due to the house sale scandal. On 6 January Boric requested the resignation of his minister of national assets, Marcela Sandoval, who was involved in the plan to acquire the house, and on 10 March Boric’s defence minister, Maya Fernández, also resigned. Fernández is Allende Bussi’s niece and a granddaughter of Salvador Allende. She is also another co-owner of the residence in question. Right-wing opposition parties had been seeking to impeach Fernández over the aborted house sale, since cabinet ministers are also not allowed to enter into contracts with the State, but she resigned before the vote was held. The lower chamber of congress voted on the motion to initiate impeachment proceedings against her on 26 March, but the opposition failed to rally enough support, as 70 deputies voted against and 64 voted in favour.

Constitutional court ruling

According to reports in the national press, eight of the TC’s ten judges voted on 3 April to eject Allende Bussi from her seat in the senate. The judges rejected the arguments from Allende Bussi’s defence lawyer, Gabriel Osorio, that even though the senator violated the letter of the law, she was not violating the spirit of Article 60. The article’s underlying purpose is to prevent corruption, whereas Allende Bussi’s intentions were never about personal gain or profit, according to the defence lawyer. Osorio also highlighted that the sale of the house was never completed.

However, just for agreeing to the sale, the TC ruled against her, ending her 31-year spell as a member of congress. After the court’s decision, Allende Bussi stated that “we [as a family] acted in good faith and never received a single peso for a project that did not prosper”. The highly politicised case also drew responses from presidential hopefuls expected to run in the election this November. On 3 April Carolina Tohá, the presidential candidate of the centre-left Partido por la Democracia (PPD), wrote on social media that Allende Bussi “has had an impeccable political career” and describing the ruling as “sad news”, although she did stress that the TC’s decision must be respected. The reaction by the Boric government was even more negative, as the presidential spokesperson Aisén Etcheverry said that, while the ruling must be respected, “we cannot help but lament a decision that… would set a serious precedent”. Meanwhile, Evelyn Matthei, the presidential candidate for the right-wing opposition coalition Chile Vamos, welcomed the ruling, saying that “our constitution must always be obeyed and respected” and “there is no room for exceptions or privileges for anyone”.

Tensions with allies

The ejection from the senate of Isabel Allende Bussi (Partido Socialista, PS) had reportedly soured the relationship between the government led by President Boric’s Frente Amplio (FA) and the PS, which forms part of the ruling alliance but blames the downfall of one of its key senators on the government’s botched initiative to turn Salvador Allende’s house into a museum. On 4 April national daily La Tercera cited the PS party president Paulina Vodanovic as saying that there are tensions between the PS and allies such as the FA, but she affirmed that her party is not planning to leave government. Currently there are three PS-affiliated cabinet ministers in the Boric administration: Álvaro Elizalde (interior minister), Jessica López (public works), and Carlos Montes (housing and urbanism).

MEXICO | Industrial production continues to fall in yearly terms. On 11 November Mexico’s national statistics institute (Inegi) reported that industrial activity had decreased by 3.3% year-on-year in September. In monthly terms, Inegi’s index of industrial activity (Imai) decreased by 0.4%. February is the only month this year to have registered an annual increase in the Imai (+0.1%), with September’s drop the largest since January (-3.6%). September also marks the fourth consecutive month of monthly decreases, following falls of 0.3% in August, 1.1% in July, and 0.4% in June, according to the latest figures.

The annual result in September was driven by a 7.2% year-on-year decrease in construction and a 3.2% drop in mining, while manufacturing was down by 2.3% and utilities (electricity generation and transmission, provision of water and gas) decreased by 0.2%.

In monthly terms, construction was the only sector to register a decrease (-2.5%). Mining was up 0.7% compared with August, utilities increased by 0.4%, and manufacturing was up by 0.2%.

MEXICO | Casinos blacklisted over money laundering concerns. Mexico’s finance ministry (SHCP) announced that it had listed 13 casinos as blocked entities following an investigation into potential money laundering.

The SHCP said behaviour that appeared to be consistent with money laundering, including large cash transactions, transfers to countries including the US, Romania, Albania, Malta, and Panama, and transfers of money on digital platforms by people with economic profiles not in keeping with the quantity of money received, had been detected in relation to these casinos.

Mexico has come under pressure to crack down on the money laundering networks of cartels and other criminal groups from the US administration of President Donald Trump. The SHCP reaffirmed its commitment to collaborate with the US Department of the Treasury in tackling the issue.

Following months of turbulence in US-Brazil diplomatic ties, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva met President Donald Trump in the White House on 7 May. Although no concrete agreement emerged from the meeting, the fact that they had decided to meet in person sends a positive signal for bilateral relations, although lingering points of tensions between the left-wing Lula government and the right-wing Trump administration are expected to remain, as officials from both countries will continue negotiations on issues such as tariffs, security, and mining.

After a meeting that reportedly lasted over three hours, Lula spoke to journalists in Washington and expressed optimism over the direction of US-Brazil relations. Last year, tensions escalated in July-August, with Trump ordering the imposition of steep tariffs on Brazilian products and the US government imposed sanctions on Brazilian officials such as supreme court (STF) justice Alexandre de Moraes, the presiding judge of the trial which resulted in the conviction in September of Lula’s far-right predecessor and Trump ally, Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023), who was found guilty of plotting a coup after losing the 2022 election to Lula.

However, from September 2025-February 2026, the signals from the Lula and Trump governments indicated efforts to ease tensions and negotiate new tariff rates. But diplomatic tensions rose again in March-April this year, due to issues such as the Brazilian government’s decision in March to revoke the visa of a US government adviser who had planned to visit Brazil [WR-26-11], as well as the continued presence in the US of Bolsonaro ally Alexandre Ramagem, another convicted coup plotter, who fled to the US in September last year to seek asylum [WR-26-16]. Ramagem is subject to an extradition request, but it remains uncertain if the Trump administration will send him back to Brazil to serve his prison sentence or grant him asylum in the US.

According to a Brazilian government statement, the agenda of the Lula-Trump meeting focused not on points of disagreement but shared interests such as tariff rates, cooperation on initiatives to address transnational organised crime, and access to Brazil’s vast reserves of critical minerals. Lula said representatives from the US and Brazilian governments should meet again in 30 days to discuss trade and tariffs.

Funding for security

In an apparent effort to signal his commitment to combatting criminal gangs, President Lula signed a decree on 12 May to launch a new security programme that will allocate R$11bn (US$2.2bn) in funding for law enforcement institutions. The programme will focus on boosting financing towards four main priorities: operations against money laundering to target the cash flows of organised crime; improving the country’s prisons, where many gang leaders are known to continue running their businesses from behind bars; operations to investigate homicides; and operations to intercept the trafficking of firearms.

Panama, El Salvador, and Honduras have all been compelled to declare states of emergency due to conditions associated with the El Niño weather phenomenon. This comes as Central America is already bracing for what is expected to be severe effects of El Niño, which began in June, is forecast to last into 2027, and is expected to disproportionately hit the so-called ‘Dry Corridor’ (a swathe of tropical dry forest spanning parts of Central America, including Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala).

On 25 August Panama’s government led by President José Raúl Mulino announced a national state of emergency due to El Niño, and its associated effects such as drought and floods. The move allows the government to accelerate responses to address these impacts. Five days earlier the Panama Canal Authority (ACP) announced that “due to current watershed conditions, including below-expected precipitation in the Canal watershed”, and despite water-saving measures implemented by the Panama Canal to counter El Niño effects, it would be limiting daily transits via the Panama Canal starting 3 September to 34 (nine via the Neopanamax locks and 25 through the Panamax locks). This limit will further drop to 32 in total from 15 September (nine at the Neopanamax locks and 23 at the Panamax locks). As of 30 June FY2026, the Panama Canal averaged 35 daily transits, according to a July ACP report.

Elsewhere, on 25 August, El Salvador’s government led by President Nayib Bukele announced a ‘red alert’ across national territory in response to drought, while on 19 August the Honduran government led by President Nasry Asfura declared a state of emergency in 75 municipalities and said that a further 71 municipalities (out of the country’s total 298) would be placed on alert. On 26 August this was amended to 103 under the state of emergency and 82 under alert. Also on 19 August, the president of Honduras’ legislative assembly, Tomás Zambrano, announced a strategy to address the drought crisis, involving mayors, international donors, the private sector, ministers, and legislators. He also revealed an action plan which boosts budgetary support for mayors, delivers machinery to the most affected municipalities, introduces a national water plan, and provides for a decree which makes it easier to adjust municipal budgets.

These announcements come as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Noaa), a US federal government agency, reported on 13 August that El Niño “is strengthening, with a greater than 90% chance of a very strong event during the Northern Hemisphere fall and winter 2026-27”. Eight days earlier the United Nations (UN) World Food Programme (WFP) warned that El Niño is “set to significantly worsen food insecurity in some of the world's most vulnerable countries into 2027”, adding “the largest impacts are expected in parts of Central America and southern Africa”. The WFP 5 August update warns that Latin America and the Caribbean could see one of the sharpest rises in food insecurity due to El Niño, threatening over 13m people. Central America is projected to have the largest proportional increase (83.1%) of all analysed areas.

Food insecurity

According to the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras (Unah)’s observatory for food and nutritional security (Obsan), over 1.8m Hondurans are set to face food insecurity between April and October 2026 (out of a population of 11m). Meanwhile in neighbouring Guatemala, the presidency’s secretariat of food and nutritional security (Sesan) has warned that up to 3.2m people (17% of the population) are likely to face IPC (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification) Phase 3 or above between July and September – at which point food insecurity is judged to have reached crisis levels. Sesan attributed the emerging risk “primarily” to the probable effects of El Niño.

Following mounting speculation last month [RC-11-12], Panama’s former military ruler Manuel Noriega (1983-1989) is once again back on native soil after more than two decades abroad. Despite the media hype, his return, which followed an extradition request pushed by President Ricardo Martinelli, no doubt aware of an opportunity to cause further discomfort to Noriega’s former party, the opposition Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), has been met with relative indifference (a reflection no doubt of Panama’s young population). As well as prompting speculation regarding the information he might have at his disposal and, more critically, whether he will share it, Noriega’s reappearance in the country has provided fresh impetus to demands of justice for human rights abuses committed during the military dictatorships led by him and his predecessor, General Omar Torríjos (1968-1981).

Having served jail time in the US for drug-trafficking, racketeering and money laundering and then in France for money laundering, Noriega was promptly sent to prison upon his return on 11 December to serve three concurrent 20-year sentences for the murder of political opponents, for which he had been convicted in absentia. The expected petition from his lawyers that he serves out his prison sentence under house arrest has yet to materialise. Such a move would be in line with a 2008 amendment to the law passed under the previous PRD administration, granting this benefit to convicts aged over 70. The change was widely considered to be in anticipation of the return of Noriega, who is now 77. A recent survey by pollsters Dichter & Neira, revealed that only 42% of respondents were in favour of granting him this benefit while 51.3% opposed it.

Noriega’s return has, however, prompted demands from local and international human rights organisations for new investigations into military dictatorships. Martinelli has already announced plans to bring Noriega to trial for the disappearance and presumed killing of Everett Clayton Kimble Guerra, a 21-year old US-Panamanian citizen and a US marine, in 1968. (At the time, Noriega was in charge of the headquarters of the western province of Chiriquí, where the incident took place). Other signs that the government plans to revisit the past include a presidential decree, issued on 5 January, reactivating a truth commission to identify victims and those ‘disappeared’ during the dictatorship. The commission had operated between January 2001 and April 2002 under the Partido Panameñista (PP) administration of Mireya Moscoso (1999-2004), and it documented 110 (out of 148) cases of reported human rights abuses. According to the US Institute of Peace (Usip), an independent federal institution set up and funded by the US Congress, an unofficial follow-up committee continued to work and in October 2003 the Truth Commission was extended to 31 December 2004. The Usip highlights as “serious setbacks” to these efforts, “a lack of funds” and “opposition” from the PRD.

• Martinelli tightens grip over the judiciary

At the start of this year, two new justices were sworn onto the nine-member supreme court (CSJ) for a 10-year term. Hernán Antonio De León Batista and Luis Ramón Fábrega Sánchez, who were proposed by Martinelli and ratified by congress, replace two judges aligned with Moscoso, whose terms had expired. Four of the nine CSJ justices are now Martinelli appointees, after two others were selected in 2010 in a highly questioned process [RC-10-01].  Among the doubts over the latest appointments, local commentators point out that Fábrega is a brother of the deputy minister of the presidency, María Fábrega. Their father, Jorge, himself a former CSJ alternate, is reportedly the most influential of Martinelli’s advisors. The fact that De León was serving as magistrate on the general revenue office (DGI)’s tax tribunal at the time of his appointment also raised objections from legal experts, who cite a 2004 constitutional amendment banning those who served in the executive (in this case the economy and finance ministry) from sitting in the CSJ.

• New CSJ president

The recent inauguration of Alejandro Moncada Luna, another ally of President Ricardo Martinelli, as president of the supreme justice court (CSJ) for a two-year term has also triggered concern among the opposition regarding the President’s control over the top court. Moncada was one of the two controversial appointments made to the CSJ by Martinelli in 2010.  A former member of the opposition Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD), Moncada threw his weight behind Martinelli's Cambio Democrático ahead of the 2009 election. Previously, Moncada had also served as a legal adviser to the ministry of government and justice under the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega (1983-1989). These former associations have gained attention given pressure on the Martinelli government to file new charges against Noriega.

• PNC chief

It is not just the opposition Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD) which could encounter some discomfort as a result of Manuel Noriega’s return to Panama; some top officials serving in the Martinelli administration could also face some difficult questions. One example is the national police (PNC) chief, Gustavo Pérez de la Ossa, who was appointed by Martinelli and had served in Noriega’s notorious ‘anti-terrorism’ unit. In April 2010, the attorney general’s office opened an investigation into Pérez, amid media leaks of a classified police document which revealed that he had been discharged in 1990 for “affecting the prestige of the police” over the kidnapping of US citizens during the US invasion of Panama in 1989.

REGION | Wen looking to cement long-term economic relationship. On 26 June China’s prime minister, Wen Jiabao, proposed before the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) the creation of a China-Latin America & Caribbean cooperation forum in order to strengthen economic and political ties and a cooperation fund to be used to promote this.

    Prime minister Wen’s visit to the Eclac headquarters in Santiago, Chile marked the end of a week-long visit to South America in which he visited virtually all the countries that make up the Southern Cone (except for Paraguay) and made some very interesting proposals aimed at deepening the relationship between the Asian giant and its South American partners, which in recent years have provided China with the fundamental food and raw materials that it needs to continue its economic expansion.

    Speaking at Eclac, Wen said that China and Latin America must continue to work together to “combat protectionism” and to open new markets in order to achieve the objective of bilateral trade of “over US$400bn” in the next five years. In order to achieve this, Wen proposed the creation of a “mechanism of periodic dialogue” between the various Latin American foreign ministers, China and Eclac, which in his view could hold its first meeting before the end of the year.

    Focusing on food supply, one of the pillars of China-Latin America bilateral trade and an important issue for the Chinese government, Wen proposed the creation of similar forum where agricultural ministers from China and Latin America could meet in order to promote cooperation in this area in order to achieve annual trade in this sector of US$40bn in the next five years. Wen said the first meeting of this forum could take place in China in 2013.

    The Chinese leader also floated the idea of establishing a “food reserve mechanism” consisting of 500,000 tonnes of food to be used in cases of natural disasters or humanitarian crisis. Wen also made more concrete proposals which included the promise of Chinese financial assistance to the region in order to aid with its development. “The Chinese government will continue to offer economic assistance to the countries of the region that are interested,” Wen said. He then proposed the creation of a new cooperation fund accessible to Latin American & Caribbean companies, which would help them finance projects in the areas of manufacturing and technology development, pointing out that China was ready to pledge some US$5bn to get it rolling. In addition, Wen also announced that China’s development bank (CDB) could open a new US$10bn “special line of credit” for joint infrastructure projects in the region.

    Before delivering all these proposals to Eclac, Wen met the presidents of each of the countries that he visited and signed a number of cooperation agreements all aimed at increasing trade. More ambitiously, after completing his whirlwind tour of three of the four Southern Common Market (Mercosur) members, Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina, Wen also proposed the idea of establishing a strategic alliance between China and Mercosur, which contemplates the creation of a free trade zone between China and Mercosur. Indeed, while visiting President Cristina Fernández on 25 June, they held a teleconference with President Dilma Rousseff of Brazil and José Mujica of Uruguay in which Wen said that China’s goal was to “deepen cooperation” at all levels with Mercosur, but particularly in trade in order to double China-Mercosur trade by 2016. Last year bilateral trade was US$99.48bn as China has consolidated itself as Mercosur’s main trade partner.

    Wen’s proposal was well received by the three South American leaders with President Mujica pointing out that it was an attractive proposal given that China “is the great buyer and seller of our time”. Similarly President Rousseff said that at a time of global economic crisis it was important to “join forces”, while President Fernández said that the proposal represented a “historic opportunity”.

    However, the problem for Mercosur is that the negotiations of trade agreements must be done as a bloc and all four members, including the temporarily suspended Paraguay, must agree to them. Paraguay is the only Mercosur country that much to China’s displeasure recognises Taiwan and it is expected that it will need a little more persuasion than its Mercosur counterparts to fully embrace the idea.

• Paraguay ponders life outside Mercosur

On 27 June the president of Paraguay’s industrial union (UIP), Eduardo Felippo, said that the UIP was analysing the scenario of Paraguay being expelled from the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) after its initial suspension. Interestingly Felippo claims that in fact leaving the bloc would “benefit” Paraguay more and “hurt” the other members. According to Felippo, in leaving the bloc, Paraguay will have access to more opportunities to export to other markets and so in the future “our trade partners will be others and not these countries which, like it or not, were all part of the Triple Alliance, a reference to the political alliance formed by Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay to fight Paraguay in the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-1870).

El fiscal general Roberto Gurgel ha hecho lo impensable –él ha abierto una investigación relacionada con los alegatos de impropriedad financiera aplicada al ex presidente, Lula da Silva (2003-2010) por uno de los cabecillas del mensalão, Marcos Valerio. El gobierno encabezado por la sucesora de Lula, Dilma Rousseff, ha montado una campaña para el control del daño.

El mismo Lula se muestra despectivo con relación a las afirmaciones de Valerio: que Lula no solamente conocía acerca del esquema de soborno de dinero por votos en el congreso, por el cual su ex número dos, José Dirceu, está enfrentando una sentencia de prisión de 10 años, sino que él mismo se benefició del esquema, utilizando parte del dinero público canalizado para el esquema, para sus propios gastos personales. Valerio, un ex publicista encargado de supervisar el lado del dinero en el mensalão, fue sentenciado a más de 40 años en prisión y multado en US$1,3m. Condenado tempranamente en el juicio, Valerio juró no caer solo y ha buscado reducir su sentencia cooperando con las autoridades.

El 19 de diciembre, Gurgel dijo que él prestaría “atención” al testimonio de Valerio, aunque recalcó que Valerio había hecho declaraciones engañosas en el pasado. “Marcos Valerio ha hecho frecuentemente declaraciones que él considera explosivas y que cuando las analizamos en profundidad, no contienen nada. Pero vamos a ver que hay detrás de su declaración y si eso podría ser la base para otras investigaciones. Como siempre, nada dejará de ser investigado.”

Aparentemente, Valerio hizo originalmente sus alegatos contra Lula en el testimonio a los fiscales federales en setiembre, y el archivo más tarde llegó a manos del importante diario opositor, O Estado, que publicó la historia en noviembre. Los críticos señalan que Valerio dio su testimonio después de ser condenado por la corte suprema, pero antes de ser sentenciado.

Lula, quien siempre ha negado la propia existencia del mensalão, sostiene que el mismo es una conspiración urdida por la oposición contra su gobierno laborista, previamente había calificado a Valerio de mentiroso. Anunciando planes para recorrer el país en el 2013 en un intento por reforzar el apoyo a la Presidenta Rousseff ante las elecciones generales del 2014, Lula dijo que los ataques contra él estaban motivados políticamente (ver abajo).

• Lula

“Hay una sola chance para que ellos me golpeen; trabajando más duro que yo. Un vagabundo hablando mal de mí desde una habitación con aire acondicionado, va a perder,” bromeó el ex presidente Lula da Silva en respuesta a las acusaciones hechas contra él por uno de los cabecillas condenados del mensalão, Marcos Valerio.

In the last two issues of Caribbean & Central America Report we have addressed concerns that Jamaica could be heading towards “failed-state status”. The issue had been raised by Professor Brian Meeks at the ruling People’s National Party (PNP) 75^th anniversary symposium in July. Meeks did not actually say that Jamaica was a failed state but that it could be “gradually heading” towards that status without knowing it, like “a frog in hot water”. Our own view, expressed in the July and August issues, was that the fears were exaggerated. Further relatively positive news during the past month suggests that is the correct assessment.

The most obvious piece of good news for Jamaica in the past month has been the successful completion of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s first quarterly review of Jamaica’s performance under its 4-year US$944m Extended Fund Facility (EFF) arrangement. The successful completion of the review not only allowed for the IMF to disburse a further US$30.6m (taking total disbursements to US$240.4m), it also opened the way for a further US$330m in multilateral support. The World Bank is due to provide US$200m with the rest coming from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

In its commentary on its review, the IMF said: “Overall programme implementation under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) has been strong, despite the weak economic environment. The authorities’ continued commitment to the program objectives of strengthening Jamaica’s fiscal position and creating the conditions for sustained economic growth will be critical to a revival of investor confidence and domestic demand in the period ahead.”

For the remainder of fiscal year 2013/14, the IMF listed the priorities as including “the enactment of an effective fiscal rule to lock in the gains from the fiscal adjustment thus far, and a comprehensive tax reform to broaden the tax base and reduce distortions”.

The good news from the IMF, announced on 30 September, was anticipated by a few days by Standard & Poor’s, which on 26 September raised its long-term foreign and local currency credit ratings on Jamaica to ‘B-‘ from ‘CCC+’. The outlook is marked as stable. Jamaica’s short-term foreign and local currency ratings were lifted to ‘B’ from ‘C’.

Despite the relatively good news, however, Finance Minister Dr Peter Phillips has continued to hammer home the message that tough times lie ahead. Speaking on 30 September to The Gleaner newspaper, Phillips said that there was no place for complacency. He said: “It is still early days and we have to maintain the same level of vigilance if we are to reduce the debt and to establish the conditions for growth.”

The long term aim is to reduce Jamaica’s debt-to-GDP ratio to no more than 60% by 2025/26. It is currently running at about 150% of GDP. Phillips said: “For us the end objective is the reduction of debt, the return of growth.” However, he added: “But it is no doubt we have a very difficult period before us; it has been difficult, still difficult, I think what we have to understand is that any course of treatment for any individual who had to undergo a medical procedure, or any change in direction, involves hardships, but we need to be clear that there is an end objective.”

Luckily for Phillips and the PNP government, the politics remains favourable for the time being. First of all, the Portia Simpson-Miller government enjoys a clear majority in parliament and does not have to face the electorate again until late 2016.

Secondly, the opposition Jamaica Labour party (JLP) is riven by internal strife as it deals with a challenge to its leader Andrew Holness. The challenge, to be decided on 10 November, is coming from deputy leader Audley Shaw.

Holness has been in a weak position from the moment he took over the premiership from Bruce Golding and then called a snap election two months later in December 2011, which he lost. The PNP took 41 of the 63 seats on offer, an increase of 13 over its 2007 result. The loss meant that the Golding/Holness administration was the first one-term government in Jamaica’s history – and, despite the austerity, on current form it does not look as if the current Simpson-Miller administration is going to match that unique achievement.

Shaw is basing his run for the JLP leadership on the basis of a “lack of assertiveness” on the part of the JLP. Shaw says that the JLP under Holness is failing both to keep the government accountable and to present itself as a viable government in waiting. In a statement announcing his challenge, Shaw also claimed to see “a serious lack of motivation and low morale among our party members and functionaries”.

What made matters worse for Shaw was the fact that the JLP’s lack of progress comes at a time when youth unemployment is “close to 40%”, the Jamaican dollar “is at its lowest in the country’s history…sending prices through the roof” and “crime is on the rise with an average of four persons being murdered each day”. What the JLP needs now, argues Shaw, is “strong, visionary, and decisive leadership”.

But if Shaw is finding Holness a relatively easy target to hit, he appears not to be making much of an impact beyond. He also has a dubious track record of his own, having been the finance minister who negotiated an agreement with the IMF that the government, in the end, proved unable to adhere to. As The Gleaner put it in an editorial: “That credibility factor has to be addressed.” In the meantime the prime minister seems secure in her control of the PNP with no one at the moment looking likely to challenge her leadership ahead of the next election.

Peru’s congress was scheduled to try again this week to decide on forming an investigating committee to look into the scandal of official national police (PNP) protection for a man convicted of illegal phone tapping and acts of corruption who had been a participant in the network of former president Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000)’s notorious former intelligence adviser, Vladimiro Montesinos. Meanwhile, three other investigations have been set in motion which may lead to a conflict between jurisdictions — and, some suggest, to a cover-up.

The scandal followed the revelation that the homes of Oscar López Meneses and his father had been enjoying full police protection for some time, without any officially acknowledged authorisation. Already three PNP generals, two colonels and a major have been relieved of their duties, and President Ollanta Humala’s security adviser has resigned — though Humala has denied any knowledge of the situation [WR-13-47].

A congressional debate on the establishment of an investigating committee had to be suspended on 29 November when heated exchanges made it unmanageable. The main differences were over how far back the investigation should delve (since the origins of the situation appear to be prior to the current administration) and whether the ruling Gana Perú coalition should be on the committee).

Chief national prosecutor José Peláez has initiated an investigation by the public prosecution service, focusing on the possible commission of three offences by police officers: misuse of public resources, ‘generic falsity’ and abuse of authority.

A separate investigation has been launched by PNP General Julio Bueno Tirado, the supreme prosecutor of the Fuero Militar Policial (FMP, the formally autonomous Military-Police Jurisdiction, which deals with offences committed by members of the military or police force in the course of their official duties). Bueno has already started questioning the police officers who have been relieved of their duties. He has said he is seeking evidence of three offences: disobedience, excesses in the exercise of command, and undue use of service resources. A third, administrative investigation has been launched by the inspector-general of the PNP, Héctor Dulanto Arias.

General Bueno has said that he may request the lifting of communications secrecy (jargon for permission to examine telephone communications by suspects), and that he would not hesitate to summon President Humala to testify.

Multi-award-winning journalist Ricardo Uceda wrote in La República on 3 December that Bueno “has an excessive idea of his power: a military prosecutor does not have the power to obtain telephone information from those he is investigating.” Uceda adds, however, that this is the first public hint that the affair may go beyond police officers acting beyond their remit by providing unwarranted protection — for example, if the two homes involved had been used as bases for illegal electronic surveillance.

Uceda also calls to mind the FMP has in the past been used by every elected government since 1980 as “a mechanism to protect those in uniform in cases of common crimes, particularly violations of human rights.” In his view, “the real investigation is not about the misuse of some police vehicles but about determining if two heads of the armed forces’ joint command (the incumbent, José Cueto, and his predecessor Luis Howell) were involved in authorising the protection [as] former police chiefs maintain.”