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ARGENTINA | Elecciones provinciales. Fabiana Ríos, la gobernadora de la provincia más meridional de Argentina, Tierra del Fuego, ganó la reelección por otros cuatro años el 3 de julio. Ríos, del local Partido Social Patagónico (PSP), derrotó a Rosana Bertone, del Kirchnerista Frente para la Victoria (FPV) por sólo un punto porcentual en una segunda vuelta, superando un déficit de ocho puntos en la primera ronda. Ambas candidatas son aliadas de la Presidenta Cristina Fernández.

ARGENTINA | Se eleva la toma fiscal. En la primera mitad de 2011, la toma fiscal se ha incrementado en 32,5%, a Arg$254,04bn (US$61,36bn), comparado con igual periodo del año pasado. La toma fiscal en julio solamente fue de Arg$48,68bn (US$11,76bn) subiendo 30,5% sobre junio de 2010.

ARGENTINA | 2012 Budget. The ruling Frente para la Victoria (FPV) and its allies in the senate approved the 2012 budget by 44:26 on 21 December, turning it into law as it had already been approved by the lower chamber. The budget allows for total spending worth Arg$505.13bn (US$117.22bn), forecasts inflation of 9.2%, economic growth of 5.1%, allows for the use of US$5.67bn to service the foreign debt and estimates an average peso/dollar exchange rate of Arg$4.40/US$.

ARGENTINA | Anti-terrorism law. President Cristina Fernández promulgated Law 26,734, the so-called anti-terrorism law, on 28 December. The passage of the law had been requested by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money-laundering and terrorist-financing. However, the extremely vague wording of the article reforming the penal code triggered criticisms from both pro- and anti-government corners, who say the law could be used to criminalise social protests and persecute political opponents.

URUGUAY | Export record. Uruguay smashed its export record in 2011. Exports totalled US$8.02bn, up 18.5% on 2010, according to official figures. It is the second year in a row that Uruguay has broken its previous export record. Once again, however, exports were outstripped by imports, which increased by 23.5% on 2010 to US$8.57bn last year. Brazil is Uruguay’s main trading partner, taking 20.3%, or US$1.63bn, of total exports. China is the second largest recipient of Uruguayan exports, accounting for US$665m, up 78.3% on 2010, ahead of Argentina, with 7.3%, or US$588m. Frozen meat was the biggest single export, amounting to US$979m, 12.2% of the total, followed by soya (10.7%, US$858m) and rice (5.9%, US$475m).
The government of President José Mujica also received a boost last month when the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) removed Uruguay from its “grey list” of nations deemed to be taking insufficient action to combat tax evasion. The OECD released a statement saying Uruguay had shown its commitment to meet the international standard by signing seven new bilateral tax accords, most recently with Ecuador, Liechtenstein and Switzerland, although it is yet to sign accords with Brazil or Argentina. The OECD announcement came just weeks after French President Nicolas Sarkozy irked the Mujica administration by including Uruguay in a list of nations he said should be shunned by the international community for being tax havens.

El Presidente Hugo Chávez apenas ha podido hacer una pausa para respirar después de su triunfo electoral el 7 de octubre, antes de prepararse para el próximo obstáculo electoral –las elecciones regionales del 16 de diciembre. Chávez reorganizó su gabinete para llenar las posiciones dejadas vacantes por los ministros que tienen la misión de ganar las gobernaciones estatales para el gobernante Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV).

Hay siete gobernadores que buscarán la reelección por la opositora coalición Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD). El más destacado de ellos es, por supuesto, Henrique Capriles Radonski, quién se ha sacudido el polvo después de su derrota frente el Presidente Chávez y ya se prepara para un enfrentamiento con el Vicepresidente saliente, Elías Jaua, en el estado de Miranda. Los otros son Pablo Pérez (Zulia); César Pérez (Táchira); Liborio Guarulla (Amazonas); Enrique Salas Feo (Carabobo); Henry Falcón (Lara); y Morel Rodríguez (Nueva Esparta). José Gregorio Briceño, el gobernador de Monagas, también se presenta para la reelección, pero como independiente, habiendo abandonado las filas Chavistas.

La campaña no comienza oficialmente hasta el 1 de noviembre, pero la fecha límite para el registro formal de candidaturas finalizó el 12 de octubre, y para todos los efectos y propósitos la campaña ahora ya está en marcha. “Capriles no tendrá la gobernación de Miranda como un premio consuelo”, dijo Jaua a sus partidarios mientras registraba su candidatura en Los Teques, la capital del estado. Una derrota ya sea de Capriles o Pérez en los dos estados venezolanos más populosos, sería devastador para la MUD; una derrota de ambos sonaría como la sentencia de muerte para la coalición.

Cuatro de los seis cambios en el gabinete hechos por Chávez esta semana fueron para reemplazar a ministros que fueron enviados a la lucha electoral. Juan Carlos Loyo, quien fue reemplazado por Jaua en el ministerio de agricultura el pasado enero por no producir suficiente progreso en incrementar la producción domestica, está de regreso en el rol. El ministro del interior, Tarek El Aissami, quien competirá por la gobernación de Aragua, fue reemplazado por el General de la Guardia Nacional (GN), Néstor Reverol. Reverol ha servido como el zar de la droga de Venezuela. Su designación en cualquier otro  país de la región hubiera provocado serias controversias ya que el más alto puesto de aplicación de la ley en manos de un militar (la GN es una de las cinco ramas de las fuerzas armadas Bolivarianas –y es percibida como la más corrupta).

En otra parte, Nicia Maldonado (Amazonas) fue reemplazada por su viceministra en el ministerio para los pueblos indígenas, Aloha Núñez; y Erika Farías (Cojedes) desocupó el ministerio de la presidencia, la reemplaza la Almirante Carmen Meléndez, la primera mujer en alcanzar ese rango en Venezuela (y de hecho en América Latina) el pasado julio y ahora será la nueva ministra del reciente reforzado ministerio de la Presidencia y de Auditoría de la Gestión de Gobierno. Meléndez dijo que su ministerio funcionaría “24 horas por día”. Lo necesitará. La nueva palabra clave de Chávez es “eficiencia”. Esta palabra  ha surgido una y otra vez en todo lo que él ha dicho y escrito desde su triunfo electoral el 7 de octubre. Meléndez estará a la vanguardia de este impulso por la eficacia a medida que Chávez continué clamando por una “revisión y autocrítica” –términos crecientemente comunes en Cuba desde que Raúl Castro ha tomado el control de las riendas del poder.

Meléndez tendrá que persuadir a muchos del mismo equipo sobre esta incrementada eficiencia. Chávez mantuvo el mismo personal en todos los ministerios de peso pesado. Los únicos cambios que no fueron forzados por las elecciones fueron los de los ministerios de comunicaciones y de medioambiente. Ernesto Villegas, un periodista reemplaza a Andrés Izarra en el ministerio de comunicaciones y Cristóbal Francisco reemplaza a Alejandro Hitcher como ministro del medioambiente.

• Capriles

“Ellos tienen una estructura brutal, honestamente. El domingo hemos visto todo, en términos de estructura y poder del gobierno,” dijo el derrotado candidato, Henrique Capriles, en una entrevista con el diario nacional, El Universal, el 14 de octubre. Ellos tiraron la casa por la ventana (no ahorraron ningún gasto) y obtuvieron el 55% de los votos”. Capriles alegó, por ejemplo, que la recientemente lanzada Misión Vivienda era menos acerca de construir viviendas que compilar una base de datos para obtener votos. Este supuesto abuso de poder se extendió hasta espiar a Capriles por medio de la agencia de inteligencia de Venezuela, Sebin, según el periodista argentino, Jorge Lanata. Lanata dijo que fue interrogado por dos horas en el aeropuerto de Caracas por agentes que eliminaron documentos comprometedores de las computadoras de su equipo, y borraron datos de las cámaras y teléfonos móviles.

El Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional (TCP) de Bolivia últimamente ha atraído el interés del público por varias razones. Los siete miembros de la corte recientemente emitieron una resolución contra cuatro artículos de la ley de autonomía del 2010, que han permitido a ciertos opositores del gobierno suspendidos de sus puestos por supuesta corrupción, a que reasuman sus responsabilidades. Saludado como un signo más de la independencia del TCP, la movida se produce en momentos en que la corte debe considerar la legalidad de la candidatura del Presidente Evo Morales, antes de las elecciones generales del 2014.

El 6 de febrero la corte, que fue electa en una votación pública sin precedentes en octubre del 2011, falló en contra de cuatro artículos de la ley del 2010, que estipula que las autoridades electas que enfrentan investigaciones por corrupción sean suspendidas de sus puestos. Esto también le siguió a otros signos de independencia –no menos la decisión de noviembre del 2012 contra el delito de desacato, que incluye la difamación y calumnia contra altos funcionarios públicos, así como también la aplicación retroactiva de la controversial ley anticorrupción del 2010, la ‘Ley Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz’ [IL-12-44].

Los críticos de la ley del 2010, que ha sido invocada para remover a oponentes tales como los gobernadores de Tarija y Beni, Mario Cossío y Ernesto Suárez, así como también al popular ex alcalde de Potosí, René Joaquino, de la izquierdista Alianza Social (AS) local, quien acusó a Morales de judicializar la política teniendo como blanco a sus oponentes. Silvia Salame, una ex magistrada de la corte constitucional y actual presidenta del consejo de abogados fue citada en la prensa local diciendo que como resultado de la aplicación de la ley, fueron removidos de sus puestos más de 100 funcionarios.

Joaquino fue uno de los primeros funcionarios suspendidos en ser reinstalado, y mientras que Suárez renunció, provocando nuevas elecciones en Beni el mes pasado (ganadas por la oposición) [IL-13-03], Cossío, quien ahora está en el exilio en Paraguay, se rehusó a renunciar. Ahora se especula que él podría regresar. El retorno de estos funcionarios  hizo que representantes del gobierno como el Vicepresidente Álvaro García Linera, pidan al TCP que clarifique si la aplicación de la ley puede ser retroactiva.

Como un signo más de independencia, el presidente del TCP, Ruddy Flores, otra vez esta rehusando acatar la línea del gobierno. El 15 de febrero, él respondió que mientras la nueva constitución del 2009 establece que ninguna ley puede aplicarse retroactivamente, el Artículo 132 estipula que ciertos casos relacionados con los esfuerzos anticorrupción están entre las excepciones. Él dijo que la última decisión en estos casos descansa sobre las autoridades locales.

Prueba de reelección de Morales

Es probable que el tribunal constitucional este de nuevo bajo escrutinio en relación a otra cuestión. El 15 de febrero el senado de Bolivia envió un proyecto de ley para que dictamine si el Presidente Evo Morales y el Vicepresidente Álvaro García Linera pueden competir por sus cargos en el 2014. Sometido por Eugenio Rojas, el líder del bloque en el senado del gobernante Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), el proyecto de ley está diseñado para disipar la incertidumbre acerca de la legalidad de la declarada candidatura de Morales, dado que la constitución sólo permite dos periodos presidenciales consecutivos.

Morales, quien asumió el poder en el 2006 y en el 2010 alega que como él esta sirviendo por primera vez bajo la nueva constitución, él es elegible para presentarse de nuevo. En marzo del año pasado, el partido gobernante celebró una cumbre nacional, en la cual Morales fue declarado como su candidato.

Legisladores de la oposición tales como el diputado Fabián Yaksic, del disidente Movimiento Sin Miedo (MSM) de izquierda, continúan insistiendo en que la única manera en la cual el Presidente Morales pueda participar en las elecciones del 2014 es enmendando la constitución.

• Primera embajadora indígena

A comienzos de este mes, el Presidente Evo Morales nombró a Rusena Maribel Santamaría Mamani, como enviada de Bolivia a Ecuador, la primera mujer Aymara que recibe el cargo de embajadora. Una agrónoma y ex líder de la Federación Departamental Única de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas Originarias Bartolina Sisa de La Paz, Mamani juró ante el canciller de Bolivia, David Choquehuanca, otro Aymara, el 8 de febrero.

*** Kurdish troubles.  According to a Turkish police report, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), with which the government is in peace talks, has kidnapped 331 children over the past six months, including 15 children from a local festival on 23 April.  According to one of the kidnapped children’s family, the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) has asked the PKK to return the children but it has refused.

There is a feeling in security circles that renewed activity by the PKK could be leading towards a breakdown in the ceasefire agreed last year.  The Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) and the PKK are said to have established 48 training centres across 10 provinces.  It is said that as many as 8,500 youths are being trained in these centres, which are euphemistically called Education Support Houses (EDEV).

Security sources say that the purpose of  the centres is to recruit more PKK members and to strengthen its support base.  Participants are being encouraged to join PKK militants based in the mountains.

*** Hopes for Colombian peace deal by year-end.  Colombia’s President Juan Manuel Santos, who is facing re-election on 25 May, says that he is convinced that he can achieve peace with the FARC rebel group by the end of this year if he is re-elected.  In an interview on Monday, he said: “I do not like imposing absolute deadlines, but the dynamics suggest that before the end of the year we could end the five-point agenda”.

Santos said that “almost three” of the agenda items had been agreed, and that the other two, transitional justice and what to do with the demobilization and surrendering of weapons, “could be completed in the remaining months of this year”.  He added: “We will close the point of drug trafficking in the coming weeks”.

Santos also said that he hopes any peace deal can embrace the ELN guerrillas as well.  He said: “It is a challenge that I hope we can address and hopefully we can converge the two processes and end all guerrilla forces in Colombia once and for all.”

In answer to his critics for talking to guerrillas, Santos said: “Of course we are talking with enemies.  Sometimes people forget that peace is negotiated with enemies.  They accuse me of legitimizing enemies, but of course if you don’t sit down with them you wouldn’t be able to reach any kind of agreement.”

BRAZIL | Unemployment up. On 19 February Brazil’s national statistics institute (Ibge) produced its latest unemployment statistics, showing that the jobless rate rose to 9% in November 2015. Almost all sectors of Brazil’s economy saw job losses. The industrial sector cut 2.9% of its posts; agriculture 2.5%; information technology, communications and financial services saw a fall of 6.7%. Only construction, up 6.1%, and domestic services (maids, cleaners etc.), up 4.7%, saw positive growth. A total of 9.1m Brazilians are now unemployed, for those in work, the average salary fell in 2015 compared with 2014. Added to this is the impact of inflation, currently running at 10.7%.

Ibge’s latest data set comprises the months of September to November 2015. Compared with the previous three months, unemployment was up by 0.3%; compared with the same period of the previous year, unemployment rose from 6.5% to 9%. The fact that domestic services is one of the brightest spots in the Brazilian economy is indicative of the depth of the recession. During the recent boom years of the Brazilian economy, the shrinking pool, and increasing cost, of housemaids became a common grumble of the upper middle classes.

Uruguay’s ruling Frente Amplio (FA) coalition used its senate majority to save the interior minister, Eduardo Bonomi, once again on 31 October. Bonomi was hauled before the senate four days earlier by the political opposition to respond to some fierce questioning in relation to the public security situation in the country. Bonomi stood his ground during the interrogation but the opposition was unconvinced by his responses and Senator Jorge Larrañaga, of the centre-right opposition Partido Nacional (PN, Blancos), presented a motion of censure.

Bonomi came to the senate armed with figures. He claimed that homicides and violent theft were both in decline. He argued that the police patrols which the government introduced in April had played a part in bringing down violent theft by 3.1% so far this year and even more (4.5%) in Montevideo. Senator Pedro Bordaberry, the leader of the right-of-centre Partido Colorado (PC, Colorados) who led the questioning of Bonomi, accused the interior minister of “bad management, bad results and manipulated figures”, claiming that “there are more homicides, violent thefts and burglaries” in Uruguay.

This was the third time Bonomi has faced a motion of censure, but just as before it was never likely to prosper because the FA has closed ranks around cabinet ministers time and again when they have been arraigned by the opposition in congress. It was duly rejected by 17 votes to 14 (Senator Pablo Mieres of the Partido Independiente joined the FA’s 16 senators). Bonomi was subsequently ratified in his post by President Tabaré Vázquez.

The city of Rio de Janeiro has been particularly hard hit over the past few days. At a time of year when attention usually turns to Brazil’s most emblematic city for pre-Carnival festivities, Rio de Janeiro state authorities declared three days of official mourning last week for the victims of a rainstorm and of a fire in the dormitory of a football training centre.

Rio is accustomed to being hit with torrential rains in the summer, but last week’s storm caused serious damage and claimed seven lives in the process. The heavy rain caused landslides in hillside favelas, felled trees, destroyed part of an elevated cycle path, and flooded streets, homes and hotels. Rio state governor Wilson Witzel blamed the destruction on the neglect of previous municipal governments – the cycle path, which was built ahead of the 2016 Olympic Games, has already collapsed twice before. This week, classes were suspended following warnings of more heavy rains.

The 8 February fire at the Ninho do Urubu training centre of Flamengo football club, Brazil’s most famous club, was possibly related to the extreme weather. It is believed that a short-circuit in an air conditioning unit, possibly caused by a power surge as a result of the rain, started the fire that killed ten underage football players and injured three more.

The immediate reaction to the death of the teenagers was one of extreme sadness from supporters, rival Brazilian footballs clubs, and football teams from around the world. It is not just Rio and Flamengo fans who are in mourning. In the football-mad country, the death of ten young players at the start of potentially scintillating careers in Brazil’s most popular club is a blow to the national psyche. What is more, it comes as the country is still reeling from the disastrous dam break in Brumadinho, Minas Gerais, last month [WR-19-04].

High-profile tragedy upon high-profile tragedy is not only eroding morale at home but also damaging the country’s image abroad, just as President Jair Bolsonaro is trying to project promises of a new, better Brazil. The destructive rains in Rio and deadly fire at the Flamengo training centre have once again drawn attention to the country’s poor infrastructure, inadequate safety regulations and prevention measures, and lack of enforcement. The fire especially has led to a bout of national introspection over Brazil’s inability to prevent the repetition of past tragedies (a fire in a nightclub in 2013 killed almost 250 people, while it was only last September that Rio’s National Museum burnt down). It is the new governments, at both federal and state level, which must now take on the consequences of past mismanagement and neglect.

Authorities are inspecting Flamengo’s Ninho do Urubu training centre, which reportedly did not have a fire safety certificate and had already been fined multiple times for irregularities. Lack of compliance and rebukes from the municipality had not prevented the centre from continuing its activities.

The sense of frustration at the lack of prevention and accountability was encapsulated by national daily O Globo on its 11 February front page: “Negligence and impunity mark tragedies in the country,” the headline read. Respected journalist Ricardo Boechat echoed this feeling on Radio BandNews’ daily news commentary, mere hours before he died in a helicopter crash. Boechat’s untimely death has given more visibility to his calls for the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government to recognise their responsibility in the recent tragedies, whether through omission or complicity, and to implement the necessary changes to remedy this.

• Iconic journalist dies

Ricardo Boechat, a well-respected columnist and radio and TV presenter who began his career in the 1970s, died in a helicopter crash in São Paulo on 11 February. His death was mourned across the country, with politicians and journalists of all colours lamenting his loss and praising his work. Boechat has been labelled a reference for good independent journalism at a time when the media is under constant attack. Authorities are investigating the accident. Local media report that the helicopter’s licence was in order, but that it was operated by a company that was not authorised to transport passengers.

Honduras and Nicaragua have been named in the top ten countries most vulnerable to climate change by NGO Germanwatch.

The organisation presented its Global Climate Risk Index 2019 during the COP24 Climate Summit in Katowice, Poland in December 2018. The index looks at how badly different countries have been impacted by weather-related loss events including heat waves, storms and floods, assigning each one a Climate Risk Index (CRI) score using data from insurer Munich Re and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

For the period 1998-2017, Honduras was the world’s second-worst affected nation. In that time there were 302.45 deaths per year due to climate change, or 4.215 per 100,000 inhabitants, with a total of 66 climate events causing total losses of US$556.56m. This is equivalent to 1.846% of GDP, according to the report. Honduras had been ranked first for the period 1997-2016, but Puerto Rico took on the mantle after suffering widespread devastation due to Hurricane Maria in 2017.

While neighbouring Nicaragua has made headlines due to the political crisis which has been ongoing since April 2018, stemming from the crackdown by the Daniel Ortega government against its opponents, the population is also facing serious challenges due to climate change. The country ranks sixth on the Climate Risk Index, with 162.60 deaths per year due to climate change, or 2.945 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, for the same period. A total of 45 climate events caused US$223.25m total losses in that time, equivalent to 1.009% of GDP. Although the situation is still worrying, Nicaragua has fallen two places since ranking fourth for the period 1997-2016.

Haiti is another nation in the region that features in the top ten, taking over fourth spot. Of these ten, eight are developing nations. While monetary losses are lower in these countries, the report says that climatic risks are higher. There is more loss of life and existential threats are more extreme due to a lack of preparation and weaker disaster response.

While both Nicaragua and Honduras have suffered a string of climatic events, Honduras has such a high ranking due to the exceptional destruction meted out by Hurricane Mitch in 1998, according to the report. Germanwatch claims that these kinds of tropical storms are set to become more intense as a result of global warming, and an increasing probability of a rapid succession of storms could have terrible consequences in developing nations that struggle with disaster relief.

Other issues affecting the region also exacerbate the effects of extreme weather events. As a transit point for drug shipments from South America to Mexico and the US, Central America and the Caribbean has suffered increasing amounts of deforestation as traffickers launder their money by buying land for cattle ranching. The Costa Rican NGO Fundación Neotrópica revealed the latest results of research which show that drug trafficking is a major driving factor in the deforestation of protected areas, and deforestation is one of a number of factors affecting the availability and quality of water. Experts also worry that extreme weather could cause a water crisis.

However, a number of initiatives are working on a response to these risks. One such scheme is the “Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility” (CCRIF SPC), which allows members rapid access to funds in case of disasters, according to Germanwatch.

• SICA

Climate change is also a hot button issue for the Central American Integration System (Sica), a collection of eight states from the region, which is currently working on a new regional strategy on climate change (ERCC). All of the Sica countries are now signatories of the 2015 Paris Agreement after Nicaragua belatedly signed up in October 2017.

COSTA RICA | Decreasing fiscal deficit. Costa Rica’s central bank (BCCR) released new figures on 11 July which showed the country’s fiscal deficit reached 2.99% of GDP in June, up from 2.68% registered in the first half of 2018. The country’s fiscal deficit closed at 6% in 2018 and the government led by President Carlos Alvarado is hoping to reduce it further through the new tax reform which took effect on 1 July, which includes replacing the old sales tax with a value added tax (VAT). The Alvarado administration is in the process of holding a dialogue table with a multi-sectoral group that staged protests against the new VAT at the turn of the month [WR-19-26].

However, in a report released on 22 July, the BCCR revised down its biannual economic growth projections after a disappointing first half of 2019. In January it forecast 3.2% GDP growth for 2019 and 3% in 2020 but the BCCR has now reduced 2019 growth projections to only 2.2% and 2020 projections to 2.6%.

The BCCR cited as grounds for its decision, international factors such as China-US trade tensions, Brexit, and the severe recession in Nicaragua. Climate change is also to blame, negatively affecting agriculture production while national unemployment rates of 11.3% in the first quarter of 2019 also mean less consumer spending and economic risk taking.

International scrutiny of the government led by President Sebastián Piñera has intensified this week following the arrival of an observer mission from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The mission is tasked with evaluating the situation in Chile amid accusations of systematic human rights violations by the security forces during the policing of the ongoing social protests that erupted in October last year. The Piñera government has been accused of being directly responsible for allowing and/or instigating these rights violations. Should the IACHR mission find credible evidence of this, the government’s standing both at home and abroad could be seriously damaged.

Human rights organisations including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have denounced the heavy repression of the protests by Chile’s security forces and accused the Piñera government of being responsible either by omission or by issuing express orders to repress the protests which have left a toll of 27 dead. Chile’s national human rights institute (INDH), a government body, has itself reported 1,445 cases of suspected abuse by the authorities, including sexual violence, torture or cruel treatment, and excessive use of force since the start of the protests in mid-October 2019. Moreover, the INDH has noted that 2,063 of the 3,649 people injured during the protests have sustained wounds from projectiles (bullets, rubber bullets, or tear gas canisters) fired by the security forces. Meanwhile, Chile’s attorney general’s office has opened 2,670 investigations into complaints of human rights abuses.

The various reports of rights violations and accusations of systematic abuse led the IACHR to ask the Piñera administration for permission to send a mission to observe the situation on the ground to follow up the one it had sent in November. This request was approved, and the mission, led by IACHR president Esmeralda Arosemena de Troitiño, arrived in Chile on 25 January. The following day, the Chilean government issued a statement in which it said that officials from the foreign ministry had received the mission, which will remain in the country until 30 January. During this time the mission will meet government officials and representatives from human rights organisations and wider civil society around the country, including victims of the violent protests, indigenous groups, and immigrants to analyse the situation in the country and gather evidence.

The mission said that it would deploy three different groups of specialists that will travel to different parts of the country. They will be focused on analysing the causes and consequences of the protests and their impact; issues relating to rights of indigenous groups and migrants; and issues relating to gender violence and the quality of life of the LGBTI community. The mission will then draft a report. The presence of the mission is uncomfortable for the government given that various officials, including Piñera, have been accused of being responsible for some of the alleged violations, with Piñera already facing (and avoiding) impeachment proceedings over these [WR-19-50].

• Homophobic abuse

The IACHR’s mission focus on analysing the situation of the LGBTI community in Chile stems from the fact that the security forces have been accused of targeting members of this community during the protests. Representatives from the Movimiento de Integración y Liberación Homosexual (Movilh) local civil society organisation presented the IACHR mission with 23 separate complaints of “homophobic” abuse by the police targeting members of the LGBTI community recorded since the protests began. Movilh says that this abuse includes “torture, arbitrary detention, and insults based on individuals’ sexual orientation, or gender”, affecting 10 lesbian women, nine homosexual men, three transsexuals, and a member of an LGBTI collective.   

Chile’s congress is still investigating whether officials have any case to answer in relation to the recorded abuses, and the political opposition has threatened to take a case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Should the IACHR mission find damaging evidence against the Piñera administration, this could be used by congress or the opposition to strengthen their cases against the government and even lead to it facing a case at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In a clear sign that the government is wary of the IACHR’s presence, Foreign Minister Teodoro Ribera reportedly reminded the mission that it must not meddle in Chile’s internal affairs and to refrain from making any political comments.  

CUBA | Battling Covid-19 economic fallout. Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel demanded “more intensity and greater innovation” to revive the economy, while addressing the council of ministers on 28 June. Díaz-Canel said that a national economic and social development plan to 2030, and a strategy for strengthening the economy in a prolonged period of crisis would be unveiled in early July.

Cuba is in the first phase of a three-stage plan for a return to a new normality after three months of severe restrictions to contain the spread of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic on the island. Domestic tourism is back up and running, as well as restaurants and cafes, with reduced capacity, and charter flights to Cuba’s northern and southern cays will be permitted in the second phase of the plan, when schools will also reopen. All-important international tourism, however, will not resume in full until the third phase of the government’s plan by which point the peak of the hurricane season could have arrived.

The government has also announced that the Havana International Fair, by far the country’s most important multi-sectoral trade fair, which was due to be held from 1-5 October, has fallen victim to the public health crisis. Ana Teresita González, the foreign trade and foreign investment minister, said that “if the situation allows, other events will be organised to promote trade and investment”.

Cuba needs more than US$2bn of foreign investment per year to sustain its economy. Compounding the country’s problems, remittances from Cubans living abroad, especially the US, which are estimated to amount to around US$3.7bn annually, have also dried up due to the economic impact of the pandemic.

‘Fake news’ and the deliberate spreading of misinformation are not the preserve of the far-right – however, there is no doubt that they are an important tool for the radical ‘bolsonarista’ movement that supports President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil. A swathe of inquiries are underway in the country, investigating not only the suspected weaponisation of fake news by Bolsonaro supporters, but also the possible existence of an organised criminal structure underlying these efforts.

The 2018 presidential election, which Bolsonaro won, was marked by frequent fake news stories, and by concerns that these contributed to manipulating voter intentions [SSR-18-10]. These concerns are at the heart of a number of legal actions under consideration in Brazil’s electoral court (TSE), which question the legitimacy of the election of Bolsonaro and his vice president Hamilton Mourão. Other probes, ordered by the federal congress and the supreme court (STF), are investigating if and how fake news has been used by supporters and political allies of Bolsonaro to discredit his critics, rile up his base, and influence public debate. 

Some of the cases in the TSE date from late 2018. The investigation ordered by the STF into the use of fake news to threaten the court’s magistrates was launched in March 2019. Congress set up a mixed parliamentary committee (the ‘CPMI das fake news’) to investigate the alleged existence of an organised structure dedicated to spreading misinformation in favour of the government – a structure dubbed the ‘office of hate’ (‘o gabinete do ódio’) – in September 2019.

This three-pronged offensive on ‘bolsonarista’ fake news has come into the public eye as investigations have picked up pace in recent weeks, overlapping with each other as well as with other operations targeting allies of the president, and contributing to the escalation of tensions between the federal executive and the country’s democratic institutions. Bolsonaro, his government, and his allies, including his sons (two of whom are suspected of being involved in the ‘office of hate’), have condemned what they see as judicial persecution and ideological censorship.

• Anti-democratic rallies

Bolsonaro supporters who have promoted or attended rallies advocating the closure of congress and the supreme court (STF) are now the target of an investigation ordered by the attorney general’s office (PGR), which considers that these demonstrations, and some of the bolsonaristas’ brazen attacks on Brazil’s democratic institutions, breach the national security law, which defines crimes against the social and political order. There appears to be crossover with the fake news investigations, notably on the sources of funding and involvement of certain individuals. For example, online right-wing activist Sara Fernanda Giromini (‘Sara Winter’) was arrested in June for her role in a bolsonarista group spearheading anti-democratic acts, but has also been investigated (and charged) for threatening STF justices.

“Freedom of expression is not freedom of aggression. It is not the freedom to destroy democracy, institutions, and the dignity of others,” STF justice Alexandre de Moraes said on 17 June, during a vote concluded the following day, which maintained the court’s investigation. Earlier in May Moraes, who is the rapporteur on the case, had authorised police raids on addresses linked to supporters of Bolsonaro believed to be financing or organising misinformation aggression campaigns. The evidence collected so far “points to the real possibility of the existence of a criminal association [...] dedicated to the dissemination of fake news, offensive attacks on various people, authorities, and institutions,” Moraes had said, a view which coincides with the congressional inquiry’s investigations into the issue.

In a bid to verify the existence of such an organisation, Moraes has since ordered that the banking secrecy of several bolsonarista lawmakers be lifted, so that investigators can scrutinise their accounts. Wealthy pro-Bolsonaro businessmen have also come under scrutiny for their suspected financial contributions to such a structure.

Financing and fighting fake news

One way in which organised fake news campaigns are financed is through advertising. Investigations by the congressional committee, accessed by national media in early June, found that official government propaganda, paid for by the (now defunct) presidential communications secretariat (Secom), appeared on hundreds of “inappropriate” channels, including websites offering illegal investment opportunities and pornographic content, as well as dozens of websites known to circulate fake news. At the time, the Secom had said it was not directly responsible for where its advertisements appeared, as this was managed through Google Adsense’s algorithms. 

An independent online initiative dubbed Sleeping Giants Brasil has been targeting this source of income for websites known to manufacture fake news, such as Jornal da Cidade Online, a right-wing conservative site that was called out for publishing pro-Bolsonaro misinformation during the 2018 elections. Inspired by the identically-named movement in the US, Sleeping Giants Brasil contacts companies which advertise on such portals, often unknowingly. Since launching in May, Sleeping Giants Brasil has successfully convinced several firms, amongst them state-owned bank Banco do Brasil and US computer company Dell, to pull their ads from such websites. 

Meanwhile, separately to the CPMI das fake news, congress has been pursuing avenues to regulate misinformation through legislation. In late June, the senate was discussing a bill which would create the ‘Brazilian law on freedom, responsibility and transparency online’. Commonly referred to as the ‘fake news law’, this bill proposes combating fake news by regulating online and messaging content more stringently, notably by collecting data on social media users. This would doubtless impact the modus operandi of bolsonarista networks, and even the way President Bolsonaro communicates with his base. But the controversial bill has met with wider criticism from across civil society and the big tech sector, prompting concerns about the impact that it would have on Brazilians’ privacy, freedom of expression, and security.

Multiple concerns with fake news law

A statement signed by tech giants Google and Facebook, as well as Twitter and Facebook-owned messaging service WhatsApp, released on 25 June, criticised multiple aspects of the fake news bill. As well as raising concerns with the privacy and data collection aspects of requesting identification documents from social media users (a sticking point with civil society organisations), the tech companies pointed out that the bill threatens the country’s economy and innovation, describing the requirement for Brazil-based data as a “modern commercial barrier”. Congress has been asked to reconsider voting on this bill, which was on the senate’s voting agenda for 30 June at time of writing.

The government led by President Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou accused Uruguay’s main trade union movement of trying to piggyback on International Women’s Day on 8 March by electing to stage a general strike for the same day ahead of a crucial national referendum at the end of the month. The Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores-Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (PIT-CNT) umbrella trade union denied deliberately politicising an event designed to improve gender equality. The PIT-CNT said it had opted to organise a strike for the same day because working women were victims of the labour reforms contained within the Lacalle Pou administration’s 476-article Ley de Urgente Consideración (LUC), nearly a third of which it is hoping to overturn in the referendum on 27 March.

The PIT-CNT announced on 10 February that it would organise the 24-hour strike for 8 March “for the rights of female workers”, but the government argued that it was co-opting the day for political reasons ahead of the referendum. Vice President Beatriz Argimón, of the centre-right Partido Nacional (PN, Blancos), the senior partner in the ruling coalition, said she had reluctantly decided not to take part in the International Women’s Day “historic march” as she customarily would because the PIT-CNT had “politicised” it. “I am against those who seek to divide us,” Argimón said.

Mónica Botero of Inmujeres, the women’s institute affiliated to the centre-left Partido Independiente (PI), part of the ruling coalition, accused the PIT-CNT of having stolen a “political space”. “The PIT-CNT made it impossible to take part. It did so in a shameless way, knowing that the march would be one of the most attended for the last five years,” Botero said. The turnout was indeed large, more than twice the size of last year’s march, albeit that was affected by the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic.

The PIT-CNT insisted that it was not seeking to hijack the day, but it explicitly linked the strike to the referendum, tweeting “Vote ‘yes’ [to repealing the 135 LUC articles that are the subject of the referendum] for your rights”. Flor de Liz Feijoo, the secretary general of one of the participating trade unions, Sindicato Unico de la Aguja y Ramas Afines (SUA), which organises workers in the clothing sector, meanwhile said that women were being hit by salary cuts and price increases and were therefore involved in a necessarily political struggle to reverse them.

Government ahead

The government appears to have a slight edge as the referendum on the LUC approaches, according to two separate surveys by national pollsters Opción Consultores and Factum. The Opción Consultores survey, conducted between 17 and 26 February, put the ‘no’ vote backed by the government to maintain the LUC ahead by 38% to 36%, with 22 % undecided. The Factum survey, conducted between 12 and 22 February, gave the ‘no’ vote a more comfortable lead of 41% to 32%, again with 22% of respondents undecided.

MEXICO | Positive noises around EU trade deal. Mexico’s Foreign Minister Alicia Bárcena announced on 18 July that she had held a “productive meeting” with Valdis Dombrovskis, the executive vice president for economy of the European Commission (EC) about the process to conclude the modernised free trade agreement (FTA) between Mexico and the European Union (EU).

The meeting took place in Belgian capital Brussels on the sidelines of the summit between the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (Celac) and the EU, where Bárcena also met Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the EC. Bárcena stated that Mexico was “excited about the possibility of a second visit [from von der Leyen] to our country in the near future”.

Von der Leyen visited Mexico on 15 June, meeting President Andrés Manuel López Obrador who stated they had agreed to finalise an update of the Mexico-EU FTA before the end of the year. Although updates to the Mexico-EU FTA were agreed in principle in 2018, the modernised deal has not yet been ratified. The updates are designed to remove high Mexican tariffs on European food and drinks, allow the EU to export more services to Mexico, and increase labour and environmental protections.

Cuba and Venezuela

Mexico’s Foreign Minister Alicia Bárcena also used the EU-Celac summit to defend ending the US blockade on Venezuela and Cuba. Bárcena met Cuba’s President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez to reiterate Mexico’s support against the blockade and agree to continued cooperation on energy, agriculture, and health. This is consistent with the foreign policy of President López Obrador who last year refused to attend the US-hosted Summit of the Americas due to the exclusion of the heads of state of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

On 12 January the Nicaraguan government led by President Daniel Ortega seized the assets of CISA Exportadora, the largest buyer of the country’s coffee, after its parent company, Netherlands-headquartered Mercon Coffee Group, declared bankruptcy the previous month and plunged the vital sector into crisis.

Coffee is Nicaragua’s fifth-largest export, bringing in US$607m in 2023, according to figures from the ministry of development, industry & trade (Mific). There are some 44,000 coffee growers, around 500 of which are large producers and the rest are small farmers, and the sector employs around 330,000 people, equivalent to 15% of the labour market, according to research compiled by Spain’s agriculture ministry (MAPA) in July 2022. CISA Exportadora was the largest marketer of Nicaraguan coffee, buying grains directly from farmers and selling it on the international market. The company’s extensive involvement in the sector included 130 coffee collection centres serving a network of more than 6,000 coffee producers built up over more than 70 years of operations in Nicaragua.

As a result of its economic importance, the government has stepped in to try and make CISA Exportadora fulfil its financial and commercial commitments, according to a statement posted on state mouthpiece el19digital, with the local media reporting that it is taking action against the company for US$30m in alleged debts. However lawyers acting on behalf of CISA Exportadora and Mercon Coffee Group have questioned the validity of its claim, according to reports by Bloomberg Tax, and said that they are in “sensitive dialogue” with Nicaraguan officials over the seizure of assets.

The issues began in December, when CISA Exportadora abruptly announced that it was suspending operations in Nicaragua. Parent company Mercon then declared bankruptcy in the US in order to protect its assets, with a letter from CEO Oscar Sevilla claiming that “the business no longer has the necessary financing to continue its operations”. This caused concern among many coffee farmers who had contracts with CISA, which also provided technical and financial support to growers through its Mercapital arm. The closure of Mercapital left farmers without cash to cover the costs of this harvest season, including wages for workers, as bankruptcy was declared with the harvest in full swing, the worst time for growers to face any sort of disruption.

Coffee growers also face further issues because other buyers are refusing to purchase from former CISA clients, arguing that their coffee belongs to the company because it had already paid them for it. This may force growers to sell at local markets for lower prices to raise the cash to pay workers and keep harvesting, leading to lower incomes for this coffee year. Dozens of growers are aiming to organise a committee to defend their interests, according to a report in local media outlet Confidencial published on 9 December. The aim is to attempt to influence the bankruptcy process and make sure “that they do nothing behind our backs,” said one grower.

In a follow up article published 18 January, growers told Confidencial that their biggest issue was finding buyers for their coffee. In addition, as things stand many have still not been able to secure new sources of funding due to issues surrounding the aforementioned agreements with CISA. Many will go bankrupt themselves if a solution is not found, one told Confidencial. Some also criticise the Ortega government for making the situation worse, detailing how proposed solutions, such as exporting coffee to China thanks to a recently signed trade deal [EB-23-10], are not realistic. The Chinese market would only absorb a tiny proportion of Nicaragua’s coffee production, according to the report. 

The Mercon bankruptcy is the latest blow to a sector that has had to deal with many headwinds in recent years, some of which are structural, and others caused by global events. For example, the price of coffee is known for its volatility, which makes it hard for growers to budget and plan ahead, while in recent years the prices of agricultural inputs such as fertiliser has increased, due in part to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Then there is the growing impact of climate change, which has caused erratic weather patterns that have impacted yields and made pests and disease more prevalent.

Many of these factors are also affecting coffee growers in other parts of Central America, raising concerns about the future viability of the vital cash crop. However Nicaragua’s coffee sector is now facing an existential threat due to the Mercon bankruptcy. There is little to suggest that a speedy solution will be found, and a continued legal stalemate could force many of the producers affected to leave the business. This would badly affect the economy due to the importance of coffee exports, and increase poverty in affected communities.

FTA with China takes effect

Nicaragua’s minister of development, industry & trade (MIFIC), Jesús Bermúdez, has said that under a new free trade agreement (FTA) with China, which took effect on 1 January, Nicaragua has the capacity to quintuple exports to China within five years, from US$200m currently to US$1bn within that period. Speaking to state-owned TV channel TN8, Bermúdez said that China’s exports to Nicaragua are worth some US$1.3bn currently, an amount which he said could rise to US$2bn within ten years. The two countries established relations in late 2021 following Nicaragua’s severing of ties with Taiwan and signed the FTA in August 2023.

IMF praises Nicaragua’s economic resilience 

On 19 January the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a statement on its latest consultation with Nicaragua, highlighting the country’s economic resilience despite multiple shocks.

The IMF sets out how economic growth was steady in 2022 and is forecast to hit 4% in 2023, while inflation is declining and the central government has a small surplus. The current account balance will record a surplus of around 4% of GDP in 2023 due to support from remittances, which it said would contribute around 28% of GDP, double the contribution that they made in 2021. Officials also praised “prudent macroeconomic policies” which have allowed for the accumulation of significant international reserves of US$5bn by the end of October last year.

Looking ahead, the IMF forecasts that economic growth will slow slightly to 3.5% in 2024, with a similar forecast for the medium term. This is slightly below the 2000-2017 average of 3.9% per year, but overall the IMF says the outlook is positive with balanced risks. While a stronger recovery in domestic demand could boost GDP growth and remittances could grow still further, IMF officials also cite the country’s vulnerability to natural disasters and the possibility of more international sanctions as potential risks to the economy.

The IMF said that it supports continued efforts to maintain a prudent fiscal policy as part of fiscal consolidation plans. “Staff recommended more ambitious fiscal efforts, to entrench fiscal sustainability, build fiscal buffers and create space for higher social and capital spending in the medium term, to reduce poverty, and support growth, through tax administration measures, better targeting subsidies and reallocating current expenditures,” it added.

If all goes as expected, Brazil may only have two major airlines by early next year. Gol and Azul, the country’s second and third-largest airlines, respectively, have begun merger talks. And the government broadly supports the idea – not because it wants fewer airlines, but because the alternative is worse.

In the wake of the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, which grounded planes and plunged the economy into a tailspin, airlines were hit hard. LATAM, the largest carrier in Brazil, filed for Chapter 11 back in 2020 and Gol did so early in 2024. Last year was also a challenging year. Floods shut down the airport in Porto Alegre, one of the country’s top 10 by volume. A currency depreciation sent the cost of fuel, plane leases, and parts higher. Concern over Azul’s debt load forced it into a debt for equity swap last year, which gave lessors a stake in the company in exchange for writing off US$550m they were owed. 

Brazil, as much of Latin America, is already a challenging market for an airline to operate in, with a highly volatile political and economic environment. The cost of capital and taxes are higher than in mature markets. Despite the country’s continental size, it doesn’t support more than two large airlines, industry experts say. Over the past 10 years the market grew only 0.7% per year on average in terms of passenger miles flown, according to the aviation regulator Agência Nacional de Aviação (Anac).

While Azul president John Rodgerson said the airline had other options and didn’t depend on a merger with Gol, he argued that a larger company would fare better in the face of growing international competition. “A merger allows us to compete with anybody. A larger company has advantages that a smaller one doesn’t have,” Rodgerson, told CNN Brasil. “It’s a great opportunity for Brazil to compete on a global level.”

The government expects the regulatory approval by the antitrust agency Cade and by Anac to be complete by early 2026. “The merger will improve the companies’ governance, that is, they’ll have more capacity to buy more aircraft engines, to buy the foodstuffs that are served on aircraft. That is, greater purchase volumes to bring down the price,” Silvio Costa Filho, minister for ports and airports, told state media outlet EBC.

More importantly both companies would be better capitalised and in a better position to invest and expand, and to weather market downturns. One condition for the merger to go ahead is that Gol successfully concludes its Chapter 11 proceedings, which is expected in April of this year. The company hopes to emerge with more capital and with less than the R$20.18bn (US$4.2 bn) in debt it had before it began the process. To lend credibility to that objective, Gol has obtained a US$950m cash injection from members of the Ad Hoc Group of Bondholders of Abra and other Abra bondholders. Abra is the holding company that controls both Gol and Colombia’s Avianca.

According to an MoU signed between the two companies, Abra would appoint the chairman of the board of directors and Azul would appoint the CEO of the new company. Each would have three of the nine directors on the board, with the remaining directors being unaffiliated with either. Each of the carriers would continue to fly under their respective brands.

But neither company will emerge entirely unscathed from the merger. With the new entity controlling more than 60% of market share, antitrust authorities are likely to require it to give up certain airport slots or routes. 

The economic impact of Peru’s rising crime rate was underlined in late June in two surveys by local business lobbies and think tanks. Extortion, which has grown explosively in recent years, continues to be the main crime weighing on the business sector.

The surveys contained no end of bad news for President Dina Boluarte’s government as it attempts to present itself as a steady hand against organised crime. A report published by the Peruvian industrial association Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (SNI) on 23 June found that 45% of industrial businesses had been victims of crime between June 2024 and May 2025, with 16% of those surveyed stating that they had reduced or cancelled investments due to concerns over insecurity. The survey found that 58% of respondents had increased their security spending compared with the previous year, putting more money into private security guards and CCTV cameras and diverting funds from other more profitable investments.

Crime’s impact on business is particularly acute in the capital Lima, where the Observatorio del Crimen y la Violencia (OCV), a research initiative by a group of Peruvian banks, announced on 25 June that 50% of residents know businesses that were forced to close or reduce their services due to crime over the past 12 months. This compared with 32% at the national level. “The closure of neighbourhood businesses is a concrete sign of how insecurity damages daily life,” said Ricardo Valdés, a co-author of the report. “This is not only a problem for the police, but a phenomenon that deteriorates the economic, social, and emotional environment of millions of people”.

Unfortunately for the Boluarte administration, the same report found that her preferred method of cracking down on crime is failing to resonate with the public. Whilst 36% of respondents said that they live in areas where states of emergency have been declared, enabling the government to deploy the military to assist with policing duties, only 9% said that these have been effective in reducing crime. Meanwhile, 52% said that the states of emergency have not had a positive impact, while 39% said that they had been neither positive nor negative.

Meanwhile, the report found that the authorities are making little progress against extortion, the crime which most impacts businesses and which sparked nationwide protests late last year in response to the murders of transport workers by extortionists [SSR-24-11]. Comparing the months of March 2018 and March 2025, the OCV stated that the number of extortion complaints had more than doubled from 1,471 to 3,757, while the percentage of complaints that ended in a “positive result” fell from 89.87% to 33.40%. Over the same period, the OCV stated that Peru’s prison population increased from 86,800 to 101,302, while the number of extortionists behind bars fell from 1,330 to 1,290.

The government is now pushing ahead with plans for the construction of new prisons, which it says will help bring down crime rates. On 21 May Peru’s investment promotion agency (Proinversión) announced plans for six new penitentiaries in the regions of Ica, Huánuco, Amazonas, La Libertad, Piura, and Lima. Contracts for the projects will be tendered through the ‘works for taxes’ (OxI) incentives programme, which grants companies tax breaks for developing critical infrastructure, but which critics have argued encourages corruption. Separately, the prisons authority (Inpe) is developing plans for a maximum-security mega prison in Ica that it says will hold over 3,100 inmates.

Leaving the American Convention on Human Rights?

Justice Minister Juan Alcántara announced on 25 June that the foreign ministry will form a commission to deliberate leaving the American Convention on Human Rights. This was proposed by new Prime Minister Eduardo Arana ahead of his confidence vote in congress on 12 June and the idea has previously been floated by right-wing parties which argue that the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Corte-IDH) amounts to an infringement on Peru’s sovereignty. Peruvian authorities have in recent years defied injunctions from the Corte-IDH on issues such as amnesties for crimes committed during the internal conflict against guerrilla group Sendero Luminoso (SL), and the release from prison in December 2023 of late authoritarian president Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000).

President Rafael Correa made an appeal to the armed forces at the weekend not to be deluded by “a revenge plan” drawn up by “traitors” with the aim of instigating a coup. The “traitors” in question, Correa said, were “the same politicians as always… retired officials in the army, totally in the service of the CIA… and a few active officials.” Correa said they were trying to sow discord in the military just as they had before “the 30S coup”, the police mutiny on 30 September 2010 which saw Correa sequestered in a hospital before being rescued by special forces.

Speaking during his weekly broadcast, Correa said that the “revenge plan” was much the same as 30S, and consisted of spreading false rumours about salaries with the goal of stirring up unrest. He specifically accused the opposition Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP), of former president Lucio Gutiérrez, of being behind the latest “desperate” plot (Correa insists Gutiérrez was behind the 30S police mutiny) designed “to create uncertainty in the armed forces”.

It is far from the first time Correa has alluded to a plot against him without providing much in the way of concrete details. At the root of the 30S police mutiny was disillusionment with a new public service law, and its effect on salaries and bonuses. The government has agreed to make back payments of salaries to 2010 to mitigate these concerns, but Correa said the PSP was behind the introduction of a debate in congress calling for these payments to go back to 2008 at a cost of US$70m to the State. Correa appealed to the security forces not to be deceived and maintained that the salary arrangements his government had reached with them were far better than his predecessors had managed.

The political opposition accuses Correa of paranoia. He made no mention of it, and it might have no bearing, but it is certainly noteworthy that the commander of Ecuador’s army, General Patricio Cárdenas, resigned for “personal reasons” days before Correa made this latest conspiracy claim. Any shake up in the military hierarchy warrants attention: the institution played an instrumental role in quashing the police mutiny - but it took its time before acting. Cárdenas left two months before the culmination of his two years in the post. He was replaced by General Marco Vera, former head of the general staff.

Correa insists that because his opponents are unable to beat him at the polls, some of them are intent on pursuing other methods of coming to power. The timing of the latest allegations is intriguing because by portraying himself as the victim of internal subversion, Correa can make a stronger case for justifying some of his government’s more authoritarian actions. This week he pushed through congress an electoral reform law which will seriously restrict media coverage in the run-up to elections by prohibiting all print or broadcast coverage that could be construed as favouring or denigrating individual candidates, or their policies, during election campaigns [WR-12-03].

The opposition is up in arms about the law which it argues is tantamount to censorship of the media and persecution of journalists (see sidebar). It also argues that candidates will be totally unaccountable to the public, which as a result will be inadequately informed to make a judgement when election day comes. Correa is adamant that the reform is necessary to prevent the media from being a “political actor” and influencing the elections with its own agenda. He maintains that the law will also apply to his weekly Saturday broadcasts during the electoral campaign.

The opposition also criticised a tweak to the PR system in the electoral reform law for nationally and regionally elected deputies to congress. The ruling Alianza PAIS (AP)’s narrow failure to secure a congressional majority in the last elections has held up a number of Correa’s policy initiatives. The opposition insists that the reform will favour Correa’s AP, which, it maintains, would have won a comfortable majority of 75 seats in the 124-seat congress in the 2009 elections under this system rather than the 59 it did win.

• Ecuador in Africa

Ecuador is looking to open new markets and sign cooperation accords with African countries, the foreign minister, Ricardo Patiño, said during a workshop in Quito entitled “Ecuador in Africa” this week. Patiño said the conference might very well be entitled “Ecuador is not in Africa” because of the country’s lack of diplomatic ties with the region. He said Ecuador was keen to learn lessons from Cuba, Brazil and Argentina about how to expand ties with Africa, and would add six embassies over the next two years to the two it currently has in Gabon and South Africa.

• Media crackdown

An Ecuadorean court ordered two journalists, Juan Carlos Calderón and Christian Zurita, to pay US$1m each in damages to President Rafael Correa this week, and an additional US$100,000 for legal costs. The two men claimed in their book “El Gran Hermano” (“The Big Brother”) that Correa was aware of all of the contracts which his government had sealed with businesses linked to his older brother Fabricio Correa, to the tune of US$170m. Correa vehemently denied this was the case. Separately, another journalist, Emilio Palacio, formally sought asylum in the US this week after being sentenced to three years in prison for an opinion piece he wrote in the national daily El Universo about the 30S police mutiny.

BELIZE-GUATEMALA | Referendum on territorial dispute suspended. The government of President Otto Pérez Molina has suspended the referendum which was due to take place on 6 October 2013 to decide whether the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague should resolve Guatemala’s longstanding territorial dispute with Belize. 

    While both countries agreed on 27 April 2012 to stage simultaneous national referenda, Pérez Molina now claims that the “conditions” are not right for the vote to take place in Guatemala, citing three “fundamental” problems. These are the lack of “sufficient information offered to the public”; the fact that Belizean legislation requires a 60% level of participation for the referendum to be considered legitimate; and the high cost (Q$270m/US$35m) of holding the election in Guatemala.

    Guatemala has maintained a claim over 12,772km² of adjacent land and sea, more than half of Belize’s territory, stretching from south of Sibun up to the Sarstoon River and including many of its coastal cayes. While the two countries embarked upon a dialogue process in 1995, brokered by the Organization of American States (OAS), the negotiations have so far failed to yield much progress.