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Esta semana, el gobierno del Presidente de Uruguay, José Mujica, fue puesto a la defensiva por los sindicatos que representan a los profesores de colegios secundarios y a los magistrados. El 17 de noviembre los profesores de colegios secundarios públicos iniciaron una huelga de 24 horas para protestar contra los agresivos ataques verbales y físicos sufridos por dos profesores; la Asociación de Magistrados del Uruguay (AMU), por su parte, decidió en una asamblea que organizaría una masiva marcha en Montevideo el 26 de noviembre, a menos que el gobierno cumpla con sus demandas salariales.

El momento elegido por los profesores para realizar la huelga está lejos de ser ideal para el gobierno, pero el mismo Mujica ha reconocido que su gobierno no ha logrado llevar adelante la necesaria reforma del sector de la educación durante los últimos cinco años, y la oposición ha buscado explotar la desilusión del público con el pobre estado de la educación en el país.

Pero la huelga judicial sería algo mucho más serio. Esto no tiene precedentes en Uruguay y, si sigue adelante, será justamente cuatro días antes de la segunda ronda de las elecciones presidenciales donde se enfrentarán el ex presidente, Tabaré Vázquez (2005-2010), de la gobernante coalición izquierdista del Frente Amplio (FA), contra Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou, del principal partido opositor de centro-derecha, el Partido Nacional (PN, Blancos). Tal como están las cosas, todo luce como una calculada amenaza para extraer concesiones del gobierno. Vázquez tiene una confortable ventaja sobre Lacalle Pou en las encuestas de opinión, pero nada puede darse por sentado, y el gobierno del FA intentará desesperadamente evitar la huelga de los magistrados.

Los profesores van a la huelga

El incidente que involucró a dos profesores de un colegio secundario ocurrió el 14 de noviembre afuera de las puertas de entrada de un colegio en Barros Blancos, en el departamento de Canelones al este de Montevideo. Hubo una pelea en el cual dos profesores intentaron separar a dos alumnas cuando fueron atacados  por otros adultos, al parecer padres de alumnos.

El sindicato de profesores emitió una declaración diciendo que organizaría una huelga en protesta contra ese tipo incidentes, los cuales alegó que se han vuelto más y más comunes y que no pueden ser disociados del fracaso del gobierno en contrarrestar los crecientes niveles de violencia en la sociedad. Además, acusó al gobierno de manchar la reputación de su profesión.

Queja judicial

La AMU, por otro lado, está exigiendo incrementos retroactivos de salarios para sus miembros que vienen exigiendo desde el 2011, cuando el gobierno aumentó los salarios de los ministros del gabinete en línea con los de los senadores nacionales, ignorando una ley que requiere un incremento proporcional para los jueces de la corte suprema (CSJ) e incrementos concomitantes para todo el sector judicial, incluyendo funcionarios administrativos y judiciales. El gobierno se rehusó aplicar estos incrementos, y aprobó una ley diseñada para evitarlos, pero la CSJ dictaminó que la misma era inconstitucional.

Con la amenaza de una perjudicial huelga en un momento tan sensible, a solamente cuatro días antes de la segunda ronda de las elecciones, el gobierno del FA estará dispuesto a asumir un compromiso antes de la fecha límite del 24 de noviembre establecida por la AMU, pero tratará de evitar tener que desembolsar un monto adicional de US$60m por año para cumplir con los incrementos salariales exigidos por los magistrados.

Si los magistrados deciden seguir adelante con la amenaza de huelga el 26 de noviembre, el ministro del trabajo, Julio Bayardi, dice que él buscaría prohibir la huelga del sector judicial debido a que es un servicio esencial. Pero esta prohibición necesitaría ser aprobada –precisamente, por la CSJ.

• Encuestas electorales

Tabaré Vázquez tiene una ventaja de 13 puntos porcentuales sobre su rival Luis Alberto Lacalle Pou de cara a la segunda ronda presidencial del 30 de noviembre, de acuerdo con el último sondeo de opinión difundido por la firma encuestadora local, Equipos. Vázquez tiene el 51% del apoyo, comparado con el 38% para Lacalle Pou, con un 4% de los entrevistados aún indecisos y un 7% preparado para votar en blanco o anular su voto.

HONDURAS | Rebote del comercio. En la primera mitad del año, el déficit comercial de Honduras fue de US$2,5mm, un incremento del 5,7% sobre los US$2,4mm informados por el banco central en el periodo comparable de hace un año. Las exportaciones fueron de US$2,3mm, subiendo un 4,4% anualmente, gracias en particular a las ventas más fuertes del café, pues Honduras y otros pequeños productores se beneficiaron de una pobre cosecha en Brasil.

Como tal, las exportaciones de café se elevaron por más de un tercio para llegar a US$829m en la primera mitad del año, con un muy considerable incremento del 25% en los volúmenes embarcados y un 9% de incremento en los precios. Las exportaciones de café estaban destinadas en su mayor parte a Europa y EU. Por otro lado, las exportaciones agro-industriales totales, que también incluyen cosas como el aceite de palma, camarones, azúcar, y tilapia, alcanzaron un valor de US$1,3mm en la primera mitad, elevándose un 2,4%, gracias en gran medida a un incremento del 7,8% en las ventas de bananas (US$242m). Las ventas de otros productos (melones, sandías y vegetales) cayeron, en medio de la severa sequía en Centroamérica, que ha afectado las cosechas este año.

En otras partes, las exportaciones de productos manufacturados, valuadas en US$530m, llegaron al 23,1% del total, con ventas incrementadas de productos manufacturados de hierro, papel y cartón, y textiles; la mayor parte de las exportaciones textiles de Honduras se producen en fábricas de ensamblaje offshore locales (maquiladoras) para ser reexportadas a EU.

Las importaciones de la primera mitad del año llegaron a US$4,8mm, subiendo un 5,1% anualmente. Mientras un dólar de EU más fuerte probablemente elevó la factura de importaciones, el incremento de amplia base en las importaciones también refleja la recuperación de la economía interna. Como tal, la importación de productos primarios e intermedios (algunos de estos son aportes para la maquila) se elevaron en casi un 25% a US$1,6mm, mientras que la importación de los bienes de capital se elevó un 14% a US$763m y los bienes de consumo un 7,6% a US$1,4mm. También hubo un gran incremento en las importaciones de bienes para la construcción, que se elevaron un 51,2% año en año (a US$223,5m). Esto fue debido a las compras para los nuevos parques de energía solar que están siendo construidos en el país.

Finalmente, gracias a la caída en los precios globales del petróleo, las importaciones de energía (combustibles, lubricantes, y electricidad) cayeron un 32,4%, lo que ayudará a reducir el gran déficit en las cuentas externas (el déficit de cuenta corriente, típicamente promedia un 7% al 8% del PIB), dando también a los productores hondureños un importante respiro mientras ellos continúan recuperándose.

*** UN HELPS GUYANA-VENEZUELA TO MEND SOME FENCES. In May, the US oil company Exxon Mobil announced that it had made “a significant discovery” of oil in waters off Guyana. The only trouble was that the waters were adjacent to the region west of the Esseuibo River that Venezuela claims as its own despite an 1899 ruling to the contrary. Accordingly, Venezuela demanded that Exxon cease its activities, and when this didn’t happen it withdrew its ambassador to Guyana in July. It also blocked the appointment of Guyana’s new ambassador to Venezuela in early September. Tensions were then further raised when Guyana’s President David Granger accused Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro of ordering an “extraordinary escalation of Venezuelan military activity”. It is thought that the oil find could amount to more than 700m barrels.

A slight de-escalation has now been negotiated by United Nations (UN) General Secretary Ban Ki Moon, who brought Granger and Maduro together at the UN on 27 September. Maduro agreed to allow a UN delegation to visit Caracas to gather the facts on behalf of the Secretary-General, and he agreed that Venezuela would restore its ambassador to Georgetown immediately and accept Guyana’s nominated ambassador.

But the tone of Granger’s comments after the UN meeting indicates the continuing underlying tensions. Pointing out that all the problems were created by Venezuela he said: “It was the Venezuelans who withdrew the ambassador from Georgetown. It was Venezuela that refused to give our nominee for ambassador, Ms Cheryl Miles, agreement. It was Venezuela which held a military manoeuvre on the border. It was Venezuela which promulgated the decree on May 26 [purportedly annexing Guyanese territorial waters]. It was Venezuela which sent a naval corvette into our waters on October 10, 2013. All the provocation came from Venezuela. There has not been any lack of conversation on our part.”

For his part, Maduro described the meeting with Granger as “complex, tense, difficult”, but he added that Venezuela was “not an imperialist country” and was looking to restore “brotherly relations” with Guyana.

*** BAHAMAS ASSURED OF “EARLY COMPLETION” OF MEGA RESORT. Prime Minister Perry Christie of The Bahamas said on 28 September that he had been assured by the chairman of China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) that the troubled Baha Mar mega resort would be completed. He said that he had held “very positive discussions” with the chairman of CSCEC who had assured him of “his full cooperation to ensure its early completion and opening”.

Construction at the US$3.5bn Baha Mar project stopped in February due to liquidity problems, and provisional liquidators have now been appointed to oversee the affairs of Baha Mar Ltd.

CSCEC subsidiary China Construction America (CCA) is the main contractor for Baha Mar, and Christie will be hoping that the assurances from the chairman of CSCEC will see work on the project restored in good time. CSCEC and CCA are major investors in The Bahamas, with the former acquiring the British Colonial Hotel last October. CCA is also involved in the construction of the US$250m The Pointe resort which will comprise 200 rooms and an 80-berth marina. Christie said: “There are a myriad of other opportunities that may stimulate China Construction’s interest…so we look forward to a long and mutually rewarding relationship…”

• Belize's Barrow calls elections

The United Democratic Party (UDP) government led by Prime Minister Dean Barrow was returned to a second term in power in March 2012 (winning 17 seats to the opposition’s 14) and theoretically had until March 2017 before needing to meet the electorate again. However, on 28 September Barrow announced that an early election would be held on 4 November. The prime minister appears confident that the UDP will secure a third consecutive term, and judging by the UDP’s performance in the March municipal elections his confidence is well placed. The UDP inflicted a humiliating defeat on the People’s United Party (PUP), with the UDP winning 62 out of 67 seats contested nationwide, and it captured control of all municipalities except one.

The Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) government led by President Evo Morales and the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) umbrella trade union last week agreed on a 6% general salary increase and a 9% increase in the national minimum wage for this year. While rejected by the private sector, the deal, over what has been a thorny issue in recent years, was a bonus for Morales. However it comes as his government has faced heavy criticism over its handling of a dispute stemming from demands put forward by the disability sector.

COB executive secretary Guido Mitma told reporters that with the increases agreed on 26 April (which are well above the 2.95% inflation rate registered in 2015), the monthly minimum salary will rise to B$1,805 (US$261) from B$1,656 (US$239). This was less than the COB’s initial demands of 8.5% and 15% increases as agreed in 2015, although above the initial government offer of 4% for both.

The COB’s acceptance of a final deal, less generous than the increases agreed the previous year, no doubt reflects continued concerns regarding slowing growth and a related fall in government revenue. This stems from the fall in international commodity prices – in particular hydrocarbons – the country’s main export. While Bolivia is forecast to register one of the highest GDP growth rates in 2016 (4.5% – in line with 2015 – according to the latest figures from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America & the Caribbean, Eclac), a February report by a local private sector lobby, Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior (Ibce), notes that Bolivia’s exports were 32% down in value terms in 2015 compared with 2014, amounting to US$8.7bn (see sidebar).

The wage deal has been strongly rejected, however, by private sector lobbies such as the Confederación de Empresarios Privados de Bolivia (CEPB) and the national chamber of commerce (CNC). CEPB president Ronald Nostas grumbled that the private sector had been excluded from the talks and the final deal had been unilaterally imposed. Meanwhile CNC president Fernando Cáceres told reporters that companies would likely have to lay off staff, serving only to increase the size of the informal economy.

Protests

While the threat of unrest from the COB was averted, the MAS government has faced protests from organisations representing disabled people which are calling for a B$500 (US$72) monthly bonus, up from the current annual B$1,000 (US$146) they receive in benefits.

On 25 April protesters in wheelchairs and on crutches arrived in the capital, La Paz, after a trek of several weeks from different parts of the country to present their demands. The issue made headlines following video footage of riot police using tear gas to disperse protesters. While government officials, such as the deputy interior minister Rodolfo Illanes, told reporters on 27 April that the police were targeting “infiltrators” who were using the protest for their political ends, rather than demonstrators, this failed to convince institutions like the Bolivian Episcopal Conference (CEB) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) which issued statements condemning the use of violence.

On 29 April the government inked a 42-point agreement with organisations representing disabled people, which includes promises of benefits relating to areas such as education, housing, health and employment. However it failed to cover the demand for the B$500 suggesting that the unrest is likely to continue. Arguing that since 2012, the government had paid out B$71.8m (US$10.3m) in benefits to some 122,112 people, Economy & Finance Minister Luis Arce said that increased benefit would cost the state B$369m (US$53m) a year which the government cannot afford.

• Drop in exports

According to the February 2016 report by the Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior (Ibce), Bolivia’s hydrocarbon exports dropped 39% in value terms to US$4.0bn in 2015 and down by 1% in volume terms, while mining exports registered a 27% decrease in value terms to US$2.8bn, but increased by 1% in volume terms.

ARGENTINA | Major investment announced. Argentina has received confirmation of a total of US$48bn of investment until 2019, President Mauricio Macri confirmed during his participation in the 52nd Annual Colloquium organised by the Instituto para el Desarrollo Empresarial de la Argentina in Mar del Plata in Buenos Aires province on 12 October.

Macri highlighted that the investment commitments came from local and foreign firms and responded to “the new phase that Argentina is going through [since his government reorientated economic policymaking]. He also stressed that there were many opportunities to develop sustainable mining, energy sources, and tourism, among other sectors.

A few days after this announcement, the Chinese electronics company TCL Corporation expressed its intention to invest US$100m in Argentina. On 18 October, President Macri received the owner of the company, Dong Sheng Li, when the latter announced that this investment would be made over the next 12 months. TCL Corporation, dedicated to the production of cell phones, televisions and other appliances, mainly under the Alcatel brand, is looking to set up a joint venture with an Argentine company.

CHILE | Nectarine exports to China. On 25 October Chile’s agriculture minister, Carlos Furche, announced that Chile will start exporting nectarines to China following the signing of a new bilateral export protocol agreement. Speaking at the ‘Chile Week’ cultural event held in Miami, US, Furche said that the signing of the agreement with China, on 20 October, after three years of negotiations had been “greatly sought after by both the public and private sector”. Furche underlined that Chile exports approximately US$55m worth of nectarines worldwide, but that China is Chile’s main trading partner and that it is also the fastest growing market for the country’s food exports.

The agreement was signed after Chile’s fruit exporters’ association (Asoex) reached a memorandum of understanding with China’s Eastern Airlines in order to facilitate the direct air transport of fruit produce from Chile to China, including nectarines, blueberries, and cherries. This agreement will last for a year, after which both parties will evaluate its development and possible renewal.

PARAGUAY | GDP growth higher than anticipated. On 24 October Paraguay’s central bank (BCP) revised up its growth projection forecast for the year from 3.5% to 4% in the wake of the latest economic output figures, which showed an accumulated GDP increase of 4.3% from January to September. However, speaking at an event organised by Spain’s chamber of commerce in Asunción the following day, the president of the BCP, Carlos Fernández Valdovinos, did not rule out adjusting it upwards again as the expectation is that economic activity will remain “resilient” from now until the end of the year.

Fernández highlighted the dynamic activity in the domestic construction sector thanks to the development of new infrastructure projects. In a bid to attract more investment to this sector, Fernández noted that although Paraguay is ranked 122^nd out of 138 countries by the World Bank in terms of infrastructure investment, the country offers high returns on such investments. He added that Paraguay also has a sustainable level of national debt and that, along with Peru and Chile, it is one of the few Latin American countries with a stable credit outlook, while other countries in the region are experiencing downward revisions amid falling growth rates. “Paraguay is on the right track,” Fernández concluded.

As Paraguay suffers from a record drought, this year’s harvest is likely to be “the worst since the beginning of large-scale agricultural production”, the country’s agriculture & livestock minister, Santiago Moisés Bertoni, recently warned. The Paraguayan government is offering a support package for farmers suffering from the drought’s impact.

Bertoni said on 8 March that the government was offering loans, debt refinancing, repayment postponements, and subsidised seeds to help farmers hit by the country’s extended drought. The central bank and state-owned development banks were mobilising resources to offer low-interest loans and to support re-planting. He said farmers in difficulty could apply to delay tax payments.

Over the last two years, a drought has cut back yields from the country’s main export crops such as soya, reduced navigation levels in the Paraná-Paraguay waterway, and caused capacity limitations and costly delays in shipping (Paraguay is a landlocked country largely dependent on the Paraná River for its agricultural exports). Bertoni said the country’s total cultivated area of 3.2m hectares was critically affected by the drought with production volumes dropping by as much as 50-60%.

Paraguay is the world’s fourth largest soya exporter and is bracing for a steep fall in output. Since last December the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has cut back its estimate for Paraguay’s 2021/2022 harvest by 37% to 165m bushels (compared with more moderate downward adjustments of 7% for Brazil and 9% for Argentina). Together, the three countries account for more than 50% of world soya supply. Compared with last season’s 378m bushels Paraguay’s output could be down by as much as 56%. The association of Paraguayan oilseed producers (Cappro) has called on the government to waive soya import duties, which would allow locally based crushers to buy soybeans from its neighbours for crushing and re-export.

The loss of revenue may be partially offset by re-exports and by rising soya prices, which are responding to tight global supply and disruption caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the associated and emerging spike in global energy prices will also create something of a perfect storm for Paraguay by pushing up transport costs.

The net outlook is that economic growth will be significantly lower this year. According to provisional data from the central bank, Paraguay’s GDP grew by 5% last year. However, growth appears to have decelerated in the third and fourth quarters of last year. A panel of economists surveyed by consultancy FocusEconomics is predicting a dip to 3.2% GDP growth this year, rising to 3.9% in 2023. Inflation is expected to exceed 5%.

Brazil’s federal police (PF) launched an operation on 11 August, dubbed Operation ‘Lucas 12:2’, part of an investigation into alleged attempts by allies of former president Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2023) to sell high-value jewellery items gifted to him by foreign governments including that of Saudi Arabia, which potentially constituted acts of money laundering. Although the operation has not directly targeted Bolsonaro, Lucas 12:2 marks the latest addition to the legal woes piling up on the former president. 

Named after a verse in the Gospel of Luke, ‘for there is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed’, the PF operation has targeted Bolsonaro allies who are suspected of “using the structure of the Brazilian state to move high-value items…without using the formal banking system”, according to a PF statement. The individuals in question include a lawyer who worked for Bolsonaro, Frederick Wassef; Mauro Lourena Cid, the father of Bolsonaro’s former aide, Mauro Cid; and Osmar Crivelatti, another former Bolsonaro aide. PF officers served search and seizure warrants at the properties of these men on 11 August.

Mauro Cid, who has been under arrest since May as part of a different PF investigation, allegedly sold two expensive watches in the US in June 2022 and then worked with Wassef and Crivelatti to retrieve the watches in March this year, after the national media had extensively reported on the jewellery scandal. Speaking to the press on 15 August, Wassef confirmed that he had flown to the US and bought back one of the watches on 14 March, which was returned to the authorities in April, but he denied any involvement in the initial sale.

PF investigators suspect that Cid sold the jewellery in the US and then planned to send the money from the sales to Bolsonaro himself. Cid allegedly used his father as an intermediary, as US$68,000 was deposited in his father’s bank account in June 2022, a sum equivalent to the estimated total value of the two watches sold. The PF has also accessed Mauro Cid’s phone and found messages exchanged in January this year in which he mentioned US$25,000 sitting in his father’s bank account and appeared to have discussed ways to deliver that money to Bolsonaro.

The PF has not found evidence that might incriminate Bolsonaro himself in the alleged scheme to sell the watches, and no warrant for preventative detention or search and seizure has been issued for the former president. But the seized phones, computers, and other communication devices of Lourena Cid, Wassef, and Crivelatti could provide more clarification on the nature of the scheme.

Bolsonaro ally to lose governorship

On 14 August the regional electoral court of Roraima (TRE-RR) ruled to remove the state’s right-wing governor, Antonio Denarium (Progressistas [PP], but formerly of Bolsonaro’s Partido Liberal [PL]), from his post. Denarium allegedly breached electoral rules by using a food baskets distribution programme during the 2022 campaign period to promote his re-election bid. The case has gone on to the top electoral court (TSE), and Denarium will stay on as governor until the TSE pronounces its ruling.

Amid uncertainty as to whether Bernardo Arévalo, who convincingly won the 20 August presidential run-off election on an anti-corruption pledge, would assume office on 14 January (for more discussion of this see our sister Weekly Report), late last year Guatemala’s legislature acted on a constitutional court (CC) order to pick the new supreme court (CSJ) by mid-December. The appointments had been pending since 2019, held up initially by appeals filed against the process, and then by revelations of interference in the justice system by illicit groups. The CSJ and legislature are both aligned with the so-called ‘pacto de corruptos’, an allusion to corruption in Guatemala’s institutions, which Arévalo has pledged to take on. The latest CSJ appointments are unlikely to assuage impunity concerns.

As per Guatemala’s constitution, 13 CSJ and 135 appeals’ court magistrates are replaced every five years. However, the judges who served from 2014-2019 remained in their posts after the process of picking their successors hit various obstacles. Initially appeals were filed against the process of selecting the new justices while in 2020 a case known as the ‘parallel commissions case’, involving interference in the justice system by illicit groups, was presented by the attorney general’s special anti-impunity unit (Feci), at the time helmed by internationally-lauded prosecutor Juan Francisco Sandoval. Sandoval, who has since fled the country, was fired in July 2021 by US-sanctioned attorney general María Consuelo Porras (who Arévalo has accused of co-leading a coup d’état to prevent him from taking office).

The parallel commissions case centred around claims that Gustavo Alejos, the chief of staff to the late former president Álvaro Colom (2008-2012), had set up a scheme to influence the selection process. Alejos was sanctioned in April 2021 by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (Ofac). Along with Colom, he also featured on the US State Department’s so-called ‘Engel List’, published in June 2021 which includes individuals in the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) accused of corruption, obstructing investigations into corruption, or undermining democratic process. Those featuring on the list are generally ineligible for visas and admission to the US.

On 7 November however, the CC set the 160-member unicameral legislature the deadline of 15 December to make the appointments (by that point more than four years overdue) which were duly finalised on 15 November. The composition of the CSJ is particularly crucial given that it often rules on requests to strip public officials of immunity from prosecution so that they can be investigated – a request filed against Arévalo himself in relation to a case widely considered spurious [WR-23-47].

Of the 13 newly appointed justices, three were accused by Feci of having met with Alejos in February 2020: Oscar Ruperto Cruz, Carlos Humberto Rivera, and José Luis de Jesús Samayoa. Another, Manuel Duarte, who was re-elected to the court, also featured on the US’ 2021 ‘Engel List’ for allegedly “abusing his authority to inappropriately influence and manipulate the appointment of judges to high court positions.” The local media reported that others had previously faced criminal investigations. According to a 16 November report by national daily Prensa Libre, these include Claudia Lucrecia Paredes and Gustavo Adolfo Morales Duarte, who have also been linked to Alejos (with Morales having reportedly been named in relation to the ‘parallel commissions’ case), and Héctor Ricardo Echeverría, who was included in a 2012 case entitled ‘judges of impunity’. The 2012 case was unveiled by the now defunct United Nations-backed anti-impunity commission in Guatemala (Cicig) which was shuttered under former president Jimmy Morales (2016-2020).

Exiled justice officials

On 22 November international human rights NGO Amnesty International (AI) released a new report flagging up concerns about the targeting of independent justice officials in Guatemala – a process which has gathered pace under the conservative government led by President Alejandro Giammettei who is an ally of Porras. The AI report cites data from local NGO Unidad de Protección a Defensores de los Derechos Humanos (Udefegua) which shows that in 2022 at least 73 Guatemalan justice officials, journalists, and activists were forced into exile.

The permanent commission of Peru’s congress voted on 26 February to impeach the judicial council (JNJ) in an eminently politicised process. The unremitting efforts of congress to dismiss the seven magistrates sitting on the JNJ (this is the fourth attempt in recent months), widely condemned at home and abroad, are undermining juridical security in Peru and could deter investors. Approval of their impeachment by the full congress, the final step, would consummate the coup. The vote could take place on 6 March.

The permanent commission of congress voted by 21-4 to approve a report drafted by Esdras Medina, a deputy for Unidad y Diálogo Parlamentario, which had already been passed by the subcommittee of constitutional accusations on 16 February [WR-24-07], calling for the JNJ magistrates to be dismissed and barred from holding public office for 10 years. Not for the first time an alliance between the right-wing Fuerza Popular (FP, Fujimoristas) and the left-wing Perú Libre (PL) and their allies carried the day.

Constitutional expert Samuel Abad, who presented the case for the defence for the JNJ magistrates, was dismissive of the report drawn up to justify their defenestration. In January 2020 Judge Inés Tello was sworn in for a five-year term, although she was due to turn 75 in September of that year. Abad argued that Article 156 of the constitution, which mentions an age limit of 75, must be read together with Article 155 establishing five-year terms for magistrates. He said there was no law saying that those who turn 75 while in office must step down and that the limit of 75 was only for admittance to the JNJ.

Abad said there was no objection from congress at the time when the JNJ interpreted the constitution to decide that Tello could remain in her post. This only changed, Abad said, under this congress, when Tello began investigating the attorney general, Patricia Benavides, who was suspended by the JNJ in late 2023 accused of corruption and collusion with members of congress. He argued that there was no legal basis for the impeachment of the magistrates. He said the case had moved into “the political sphere” because “in the judicial and objective sphere” it had never been questioned.

Abad’s arguments were not heeded by legislators, most of whom took part virtually in a debate which lacked substance and offered no convincing arguments for impeaching the magistrates. In fact two members of congress who voted to dismiss the magistrates simultaneously presented bills calling for the age limit of 75 to be introduced as a cause for impeaching magistrates, thereby making clear that the constitution does not presently make this clear.

Other legislators did not even mention the latest congressional accusation against the JNJ that is being used to justify impeachment. Deputy José Cueto, a former head of the joint command of the armed forces, said the magistrates were “responsible” for letting free criminals and for “people being killed” and “for that reason they must go”. Jorge Montoya, of the right-wing Renovación Popular (RP), said the magistrates should be dismissed because they “believed themselves to be untouchable”.

The impeachment vote now moves to the full congress for the decisive vote. The 30 deputies who sit on the permanent commission will be ineligible to take part in this vote, reducing the number of deputies able to participate from 130 to 100. Impeachment of the magistrates will require a two-thirds vote of 67 in the downsized congress.

Threat to institutional democracy

A former justice and human rights minister and vice president of the JNJ, Aldo Vásquez, said the impeachment of the JNJ magistrates would serve as “the confirmation of the absence of institutional democracy in Peru and the rupture of the separation of powers

Diplomatic relations between Paraguay and the US have gone from strength to strength under the governments of President Santiago Peña and President Donald Trump. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio described the “continued growth” in bilateral relations as “incredible” on receiving Paraguay’s vice president and foreign minister, Pedro Alliana and Rubén Ramírez Lezcano, respectively, in Washington DC on 4 August. During the visit, the two countries signed a new agreement on civil nuclear cooperation and discussed further deepening regional security cooperation, in a reflection of the growing alignment between the Trump administration and many right-leaning governments across the region.

During the visit, Rubio signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Ramírez Lezcano concerning strategic civil nuclear cooperation. According to the US Department of State, the MoU reaffirms the two countries’ “shared commitment to advancing civil nuclear energy projects with the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and non-proliferation”.

In a press conference, Rubio waxed lyrical about the strength of US-Paraguay ties, saying that the bilateral relationship “has grown on a historic scale”, since President Trump took office in January 2025. He stated that the countries were now aiming to establish a relationship that “can survive any of the political changes that may take place in the future”.

Indeed, relations were not quite as harmonious during the administration of former president Joe Biden (2021-2025), which sanctioned Paraguay’s former president (2013-2018) and current party president of the ruling Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC), Horacio Cartes, for involvement in corruption. The Trump administration lifted these sanctions in October 2025, in a sign of the budding relations between the governments of Trump and Peña, the political protégé of Cartes.

Security cooperation was another focus of the meetings in Washington. Rubio and Alliana discussed deepening security cooperation to combat transnational criminal and terrorist threats. Paraguay has already upped cooperation on security, signing a Status of Forces Agreement (Sofa) with the US in December, which establishes a legal framework for regulating the temporary presence of US military and civilian personnel in Paraguay for bilateral security cooperation. The recent meeting indicates that more such agreements can be expected with two years remaining in Peña’s term.

Southcom

Paraguay is one of the partner countries of President Trump’s Americas Counter Cartel Coalition (A3C), also known as Shield of the Americas, a US-led security alliance launched in March and made up of 17 right-leaning governments of Latin America and the Caribbean. On 4 August the US Southern Command (Southcom) announced the creation of a new joint task force comprising the A3C partner countries which it said would synchronise actions of these countries with US military operations “to counter threats, strengthen regional security, and respond rapidly to crises across the Western Hemisphere”.

Lula comments ruffle feathers

Relations between Paraguay and Brazil hit a rough patch in the past week over comments that Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made in relation to the War of the Triple Alliance fought by Paraguay against Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay from 1864-1870.

While touring installations of defence company Avibras Aeroco in São Paulo state on 24 July, Lula attributed the origin of the conflict to Paraguay, saying that, “one fine day, Paraguay decided to invade Brazil”. The comments went down badly in Paraguay, where congress issued a formal rejection; Brazil’s ambassador to Paraguay, José Antonio Marcondes de Carvalho, was summoned for consultations.

While President Santiago Peña received criticism from opposition and ruling party legislators alike for not speaking out against Lula’s comments, his government appears to want to move on from the incident. On 31 July Vice President Pedro Alliana held a press conference in which he reiterated Paraguay’s displeasure with the comments but stressed that the country wanted to keep working with Brazil.

The last couple of years have not been good for Chile. In fact since President Sebastián Piñera was elected the country has suffered from a major earthquake and Tsunami in 2010; followed in 2011 by seven months of student protests, which paralysed the country and caused sizable material damages. Moreover, at the tail end of 2011, a severe drought in the Southern Cone caused a string of forest fires which consumed large areas of Chile and are still wreaking havoc. As a result of all this, the government has been saddled with substantial reconstruction bills, which affects its capacity to invest in other areas of the economy.

Despite the myriad problems, Chile’s economy has remained resilient. Real GDP growth in 2011 was put at 6.2% (not far off the original 6.4% forecast) and it is expected to grow by 4.2% in 2012. However there is no denying that Chile has been slowing a little, with non-mining economic activity coming off the boil in the last quarter of 2011. While the government might normally address this via an additional investment stimulus for the domestic sector , right now it remains tied up with the pressing reconstruction efforts.

On 8 February the government spokesman, Andrés Chadwick, announced that as of 31 January the government had completed 68% of all the reconstruction projects in the country designed to make up for the US$30bn in damages caused  by the 2010 earthquake. According to Chadwick, the priority household reconstruction efforts have been two-thirds completed, with the delivery of 72,000 homes. Chadwick added that “We have already delivered 222,000 subsidies to those affected”. He said that President Piñera would deliver a full report on 27 February, two years after the 8.8 degree 'quake shook Chile.

Ahead of this year’s municipal elections, the government’s next priority will be to address the estimated CL$5bn (US$10.3m) in damages caused to the country’s municipalities by last year’s student protests. Chile’s academic year is set to start on 5 March and the ministry of education has already pledged that it will make biddable funds available to some of those municipalities that suffered the worst damages, including Santiago (CL$ 1.5bn) and Concepción (CL$ 1.2bn). However, there are limits on the level of funding and individual institutions will only be allowed access to CL$ 50m, although some schools have estimated damages in excess of CL$400m. As a result, many city governments are sceptical about their ability to carry out all the repairs. A general manager of Valparaíso’s city corporation, Gustavo Mortara, who claims that the city faces a bill for CL$800m in damages, declared that “Classes will resume like this, because the corporation is broke and the ministry won’t give us a single peso”.

The government is still dealing with the forest fires that are still raging in large parts of Southern Chile. Although there is no official estimate yet of the damages caused by the fires, Chile’s national forestry corporation, Conaf, says that the fires have been the worst in 25 years, with 72,000 hectares (ha) burned to date. Herbert Haltenhoff, Conaf’s head of forest fire prevention, explained on 9 February that as result the Conaf may extend its fire prevention season from April until the end of May. According to Haltenhoff, this implies an increase in spending of approximately US$4.8m. Haltenhoff also noted that “We have detected that this is cyclical, with very tough years such as 1972, 1987, 1988-1989… and again in 1998-1999. And things have been fairly quiet until now”.

Despite all this, the Chilean economy managed to post a 13.5% increase in exports in 2011 to US$80.5bn, on the back of mining. As a result, even though imports rose 25.9% to US$69.96bn, the country still posted a US$10.6bn trade surplus. Moreover, Chile’s central bank has signalled its confidence in the domestic economy’s ability to recover and at its latest monetary policy meeting on 13 February opted to leave the benchmark interest rate steady at 5%, after a 25 percentage point cut the previous month, on concerns of a slowdown.

• Record salmon exports

On 15 February Chile’s customs authorities reported that salmon exports, which were badly hit in 2008 following the Infectious Salmon Anaemia (ISA) virus outbreak, had reached a new historic high of U$2.91bn, a 48% year-on-year increase. In fact, the figure is larger than that registered in 2007 (US$2.2bn) the year before the ISA outbreak. Sector analysts say that the future for the industry is bright and they believe that production levels in 2012 will be higher, with a “significant increase” in sales.

COLOMBIA | Avianca llega al NYSE. El 5 de noviembre a principal aerolínea de Colombia, Avianca, comenzó a operar en el New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) por primera vez. El evento marca un nuevo punto alto en el notable crecimiento de Avianca que ha pasado de ser una modesta y fuertemente endeudada empresa a la segunda mayor aerolínea de América Latina. Significativamente como un artículo del Wall Street Journal para marcar el debut de Avianca en el NYSE muestra, el crecimiento de la compañía parece seguir la senda del propio desarrollo económico de Colombia en décadas recientes.

Fundada en 1920, Avianca es la segunda aerolínea más vieja del mundo que aún está en operación. Pero mientras que la compañía ha crecido constantemente, en 1989 fue afectada por la violencia relacionada con la droga en Colombia, cuando uno de sus vuelos fue derribado en un atentado con bomba ordenado por el ‘barón de la droga’ Pablo Escobar, en un fallido intento de asesinar al ex presidente César Gaviria Trujillo (1990-1994). Los años ’90 vieron la suerte de la aerolínea (y de Colombia) tomar un giro hacia lo peor hasta el punto que para el 2004 se encontró a sí misma con una deuda de US$220m y tuvo que declararse en bancarrota. Ese año, la firma fue adquirida por el empresario local, Germán Efromovich, por US$64m.

Bajo la conducción de Efromovich, la compañía se embarcó en un sostenido periodo de impresionante crecimiento sustentado por un significativo mejoramiento del ambiente de operación en su propio país, acompañado por el crecimiento de la clase media de Colombia, que llevó a Avianca a renovar y expandir su flota y conducir una fusión con la aerolínea Taca de Centroamérica en el 2010, convirtiéndola en una de las pocas aerolíneas latinoamericanas con una verdadera presencia regional.

A pesar de esto, el debut de Avianca en el NYSE resultó ser de alguna manera decepcionante. La aerolínea había proyectado que sus acciones tendrían un precio de entre US$17 y US$20, pero el mercado las valoró en un inesperadamente bajo US$14. Esto tomó por sorpresa a Avianca. Sin embargo el presidente de Avianca, Fabio Villegas, dijo al diario colombiano Portafolio que la firma no estaba desalentada por su oferta pública inicial (IPO, siglas en inglés) en el NYSE. Villegas explicó que durante IPOs la demanda de los inversionistas normalmente tiende a conducir hacia abajo los precios de las acciones –un proceso comúnmente conocido como ‘book buuilding’. Villegas dijo que él esperaba que las acciones de Avianca incrementen en valor gradualmente. Además, señaló que un bajo valor de las acciones no era necesariamente algo malo, pues esto permitiría una más diversificada composición del capital. “Podríamos haber elevado el precio un poco más, pero esto podría haber conducido a una menor presencia de grandes fondos”, Villegas le dijo a Portafolio.

Villegas agregó que operar en el mercado de acciones ubicará a la compañía al mismo nivel que las mejores aerolíneas del mundo y también la pondrá bajo el escrutinio de los más renombrados expertos del mundo en la industria. El vicepresidente del NYSE para América Latina, Alex Ibrahim, expresó similar entusiasmo sobre el lanzamiento de Avianca en los mercados internacionales. En su opinión, Avianca se beneficiará del interés de muchos inversionistas americanos en diversificar su portafolio a través de la compra de acciones de compañías latinoamericanas.

BOLIVIA | Comercio. De acuerdo con el más reciente informe del Instituto Boliviano de Comercio Exterior (IBCE), el instituto privado de comercio exterior con sede en Santa Cruz, difundido el 30 de octubre y que se basa en las cifras del Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), las exportaciones de Bolivia llegaron a los US$9,0mm en los primeros nueve meses del año, subiendo un 6% sobre el mismo periodo del 2012.

Las exportaciones de hidrocarburos alcanzaron US$4,9mm, subiendo un 18% sobre el mismo periodo del año anterior, mientras que las exportaciones de frutas crecieron un 40% hasta alcanzar los US$518m. Los sectores que registraron una caída incluyen minerales (que cayeron un 4%, llegando a US$1,4mm) y la minería industrial que decayó un 12% hasta llegar a un total de US$2mm.

Según el informe del IBCE, las importaciones durante el mismo periodo llegaron a US$6,59mm, de los cuales US$460m corresponden a la importación de alimentos, subiendo un 14% sobre el monto importado en el periodo comparable del 2012. Las importaciones de tipo industriales alcanzaron los US$1,9mm, subiendo un 9%, mientras que los bienes de capital subieron un 21%, hasta alcanzar US$1,5mm. Las importaciones de equipamientos para el transporte totalizaron US$1mm, subiendo un 22% sobre el mismo periodo del año anterior, mientras que las importaciones de combustibles llegaron a US$882m, en línea con el 2012.

El gobierno del Presidente Evo Morales pronostica que las exportaciones excederán los US$12mm en el 2013, subiendo de los US$11,6mm registrados en el 2012. De acuerdo con el informe mencionado arriba, se pronostica que las importaciones llegarán a US$9mm en el 2013, subiendo de US$6,59mm en el 2012.

• El peor clima de negocios

El centro de estudios económicos de la Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) difundió la última edición de su Índice Latinoamericano de Clima de Negocios, que de nuevo ha hallado que Venezuela ocupa el fondo del ranking. El índice, desarrollado en conjunto con el Instituto Liebniz para la Investigación Económica de la Universidad de Munich (IFO) otorga a Venezuela un puntaje general de sólo 1,0; mucho menor que el puntaje otorgado al país que está inmediatamente por encima en el ranking, Argentina (4,0). De hecho, el puntaje de Venezuela es significativamente menor que el promedio regional de 4,4, que ha permanecido sin cambio desde la última edición (julio) pero que continúa representando el puntaje más bajo de la región en los dos últimos años. La FGV dijo que esto podría estar llevando hacia abajo el puntaje regional promedio.

“No es una reprivatización de la red de ferrocarriles”, dijo Florencio Randazzo, el ministro del interior & transporte, el 12 de febrero. Muchos comentaristas, sin embargo, prefieren diferir. Un anuncio del gobierno temprano en el día, entregó la administración de dos de las líneas de trenes que sirven el Gran Buenos Aires, Mitre y San Martín, a Roggio, uno de los más grandes grupos de infraestructura de Argentina y el mayor accionista en Metrovías, que administra el metro de Buenos Aires. Las líneas Belgrano Sur y Roca serán operadas por el grupo Emepa. Ambas compañías locales tienen una larga historia de recibir contratos del gobierno de trenes y otras obras públicas. Este hecho es una de las últimas movidas del gobierno para orientar la economía en una dirección más ortodoxa para prevenir el colapso en el valor del peso y mantener control sobre la inflación.

Años de congelamiento en las tarifas de pasajes en los trenes han limitado la inversión necesaria para modernizar la añosa red de ferrocarriles de Argentina y ha contribuido a la reciente serie de accidentes fatales. En febrero del 2012, 51 personas murieron y 700 fueron heridas cuando un tren de la concurrida línea Sarmiento no frenó en la estación Once en el centro de la ciudad de Buenos Aires y embistió la plataforma. En junio del 2013, dos trenes de pasajeros colisionaron en la misma línea, provocando la muerte de tres pasajeros y produciendo heridas a más de 100. En octubre, más de 80 pasajeros resultaron heridos en la línea Sarmiento cuando un tren, de nuevo, no pudo frenar en la estación Once.

Después del accidente de octubre, Randazzo anunció que la línea Sarmiento sería operada por la Sociedad Operadora Ferroviaria Sociedad del Estado (Sofse) administrada por el Estado. Aunque la última decisión no afecta el funcionamiento de la línea Sarmiento, esta ayudará al gobierno a evitar la monumental tarea de pagar por las renovaciones en las líneas operadas por Roggio y Emepa. Dadas las otras presiones sobre los cofres del gobierno, no menos las rondas de negociaciones salariales que empezaran el próximo mes, la decisión de Randazzo le da al gobierno cierto respiro.

Sin embargo, Randazzo insiste en que el único pensamiento en la mente del gobierno fue en el mejor interés de los pasajeros. “Hemos puesto en vigencia un nuevo régimen de operación que requiere que las compañías presenten planes anuales con respecto a las frecuencias de los trenes y su mantenimiento, servicios de calidad en la limpieza de las estaciones”, dijo. “Hemos establecido un estricto régimen de penalidades que las sanciona en el caso de no cumplir con las nuevas líneas directrices”. El ministro también prometió más inversiones en las líneas operadas por el Estado.

Nuevo índice de la inflación

El 13 de febrero el gobierno de Argentina reveló su nuevo índice nacional de precios al consumidor (IPCNU). Según este nuevo índice, la inflación en Argentina, en el mes de enero, fue del 3,7%.

Argentina había estado bajo fuerte presión del Fondo Monetario Internacional (FMI), para que mejore la metodología bajo la que calculaba la inflación. Mientras que la tasa oficial de la inflación en el 2013 fue del 10,9%, los economistas del sector privado ubicaban la cifra en alrededor del 28,3%. El 12 de febrero, los líderes de la oposición en el congreso difundieron el índice mensual que toma un promedio de las estimaciones privadas, afirmado que los precios subieron un 4,61% en enero, la suba mensual más alta desde 1991.

En vez de medir solamente datos del área metropolitana, el nuevo índice de precios toma en cuenta las variaciones de precios en todas las provincias. El índice será publicado mensualmente y utilizará una canasta fija de bienes y servicios. Aún no se han revelado detalles de la metodología usada, pero en declaraciones previas, los representantes del gobierno han dicho que serían medidos 200.000 precios por 500 encuestadores en 100 lugares en todo el país.

El anuncio del gobierno de la inflación de enero era muy esperado, dada la pronunciada caída en el valor del peso, y consecuentemente agudo aumento en el costo del transporte, combustibles, alimentos, electrodomésticos, y equipos electrónicos.

Muchos economistas del sector privado, sabiendo la manipulación oficial de las estadísticas, aún dudan de la cifra del gobierno.

• Exigencias salariales

El 12 de febrero la Presidenta Cristina Fernández se reunió con los líderes de la facción alineada con el gobierno de la Confederación General del Trabajo (CGT) para discutir las próximas negociaciones colectivas de salarios de marzo. Aunque Fernández no exigió a los líderes que se limiten a un porcentaje de aumento en particular, ella sí insistió que las negociaciones serán realizadas en una base anual, y no en una base de seis meses. Una reciente reunión de gobiernos provinciales concluyó que las exigencias salariales de los líderes sindicales deberían ser limitadas a no más del 25%.

COLOMBIA | Purchase of vehicles down. On 17 July, the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (Andi) business sector lobby reported that the total number of new motor vehicles sold in the Andean country in June reached 19,826 – down 3.7% compared with the same month the previous year when 20,589 new vehicles were registered. This decrease is representative of the entire first half of the year, with 112,974 new vehicles officially registered in the first six months of the year, 3.5% less than in the comparable period of 2016. The Andi attributed the fall in new vehicle sales to the three-percentage-point increase in the value-added tax (VAT) to 19%, as per the fiscal reform approved by the government in December last year. However, despite the fall in domestic sales, the Colombian automotive industry chamber noted that vehicles continue to be “Colombia’s leading manufacturing product”. According to the chamber, the main export markets for Colombian cars to April were Mexico (63% of total exports), Chile (22%), and Ecuador (8%).

PERU | Record bond issue. On 17 July Peru’s finance & economy ministry (MEF) announced the successful placement of sovereign bonds worth PEN10bn (US$3.075bn) in international markets. This is the largest bond issue by the Peruvian government this year and one of the largest ever made in Peru’s local currency, the Sol. An MEF statement noted that the funds raised by the bonds, which offered a 6.15% coupon and have a 15-year maturity, will be used to refinance Peru’s foreign currency denominated debt and will not increase the country’s overall debt levels. The MEF also hailed the fact that the bonds were oversubscribed with total demand reaching PEN34bn (US$10.45bn); and that these were the first bonds issued by Peru processed through the Euroclear international clearing platform.

COLOMBIA | Tourism up. On 13 July Colombia’s trade, industry & tourism minister, María Claudia Lacouture, announced that 2.9m foreign tourists entered Colombia in the first five months of the year, 46.3% more than the 1.9m foreign visitors that entered the country in the same period in 2016. According to a report by the trade, industry & tourism ministry (Mincit), Colombia received US$5.6m in revenue from tourists in 2016, up from US$3.4bn in 2010. The Mincit report also notes that hotel occupation in May 2017 was 55.6% up from 51.9% in May 2016. According to Lacouture, tourists are coming mainly from Venezuela, the US, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The government led by President Juan Manuel Santos has set the target of receiving 6m foreign tourists in 2018.

The complexity and sensitivity of Venezuela’s long-running political crisis is such that every international intervention is immediately analysed in great detail, in search of implicit clues as to which way the wind is blowing. A statement issued on 25 January by the Council of the European Union (EU) – an intergovernmental body representing the EU’s 27 member states – offered support for Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó’s efforts to deliver political change in the country, describing him as an “important actor” and a “privileged interlocutor”. However, by failing to support Guaidó’s claim to the interim presidency of Venezuela, this statement was widely interpreted as the latest in a series of setbacks for the opposition leader.

The topic of Guaidó’s claim to the interim presidency is arguably afforded more political weight than it deserves – he had been recognised as such since January 2019 by the EU, the US, and by most of Venezuela’s neighbours in Latin America, to little avail. And yet, the symbolic importance given to this status makes its withdrawal a matter of undeniable significance; there is no question that the EU will continue to support Guaidó’s efforts to remove Nicolás Maduro’s government from power, but rescinding its recognition of his interim presidency seems to reflect a broader loss of faith that Guaidó is capable of achieving this goal, with allies both at home and abroad increasingly raising such concerns.

Guaidó’s fall from grace is by no means guaranteed; the US looks set to remain a loyal ally under President Joe Biden, and even the EU appears uncertain of its stance, with the EU Council having defied a 21 January appeal from the European Parliament to continue to recognise Guaidó as interim president. On 26 January, Biden’s press secretary Jen Psaki expressed the new president’s support for “a democratic, peaceful transition in Venezuela through free and fair elections”; along with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s commitment last week to continue recognising Guaidó’s authority [WR-21-03], the Biden administration is so far giving the impression that no immediate changes can be expected in US policy towards Venezuela; the question is how long this will last, if Guaidó’s campaign continues to stall.

It has seemed at times over the past two years that his place at the helm of the domestic opposition has been sustained primarily by the lack of an obvious alternative. The EU Council’s recent statement suggested that it will continue to be the leading international exponent of dialogue with Maduro, which it describes as “the only way out of the crisis in Venezuela”. Guaidó has shown little appetite for such negotiations; it is a strategy instead championed within the domestic opposition by two-time former presidential runner-up Henrique Capriles Radonski, who commented on 25 January that “a negotiation must be built”, insisting that “if we do not have a strategy based on reality, we will never be able to advance”.

The EU and Capriles had worked together in 2020, holding negotiations with the Maduro government in an effort to secure concessions that might allow opposition participation in December’s legislative elections. These talks failed largely because Maduro, for all his talk of the need for dialogue, refused the EU’s first condition that the election be delayed long enough for an observer mission to be prepared. With the opposition boycott having achieved little, support for negotiations in some form appears to be growing; it is possible that the only thing still keeping Guaidó at the head of the domestic opposition is Maduro’s scepticism towards those offering dialogue. If this changes, a shake-up in the composition of Venezuelan politics could be just around the corner.

Covid-19 cure?

With Venezuela facing growing numbers of cases and deaths from the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic, and efforts to secure vaccines making slow progress, on 24 January Nicolás Maduro spoke of a “miracle” antiviral treatment which he claims can “neutralise” Covid-19. Maduro said the medication – called Carvativir, said to be derived from thyme leaves, used in traditional medicine – had “gone through nine months of study, experimentation, and clinical application”, and shown potential in helping Covid-19 patients to recover. However, Maduro is yet to produce any evidence of its efficacy, and on 27 January the Venezuelan academy of medicine confirmed it had no knowledge of this treatment.

In his annual state-of-the-nation address (Informe) on 1 September, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador highlighted the development of new free textbooks for schools. The school textbooks were distributed to over 20m students in almost all of Mexico’s 32 states at the start of the new school year on 28 August. However, the books have proven controversial for multiple reasons, serving as a reflection of the polarisation within society more generally under López Obrador’s government.

Addressing crowds in Campeche state, López Obrador said that his government had completed the new contents of the textbooks, which have “scientific foundations and a humanist dimension”. He announced that 83.6m books had been delivered to primary and pre-schools, with a further 41.7m to be sent to secondary schools. López Obrador noted that the textbooks were being distributed in 30 of Mexico’s 32 states, saying he was grateful to the governors of these states for doing so.

The two states in which the textbooks are not being distributed are Chihuahua, governed by María Eugenia Campos of the right-wing opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and Coahuila, which is governed by Miguel Riquelme of the centrist opposition Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Campos and Riquelme filed a constitutional complaint before the supreme court (SCJN), which justice Luis María Aguilar accepted, determining the books would not be distributed in these two states. In several other states - Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Querétaro and Yucatán – parent and teacher groups will decide whether to distribute the books. The governors of all four states are affiliated with the PAN.

The government’s plan to distribute these new educational materials has encountered obstacles and opposition since its inception. The process, which has been underway for several months, involves a complete overhaul of textbooks used in Mexican schools. The education ministry (SEP) claims the new materials, which are based on the ideology of the ‘Fourth Transformation’ as López Obrador’s political project is known, offer a departure from the educational content provided in the past by establishing relationships between schools and communities and connecting with students’ lives.

Critics of the new textbooks raise several objections. Education specialists and opposition politicians argue that the content is politically biased and riddled with factual inaccuracies and errors. They emphasise that the curriculum appears to be designed without adequate consultation with various stakeholders within the education community, which is viewed as a breach of established educational procedures. The parties making up the opposition Frente Amplio por México (FAM) – PAN, PRI, and the left-wing Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD) – have accused the textbooks of pushing a broader ideological agenda – that of the Fourth Transformation - rather than providing unbiased and accurate information to students.

However, in a visit to schools in Campeche state on 31 August, Education Minister Leticia Ramírez Amaya stressed that the new books would improve schooling and encourage a humanist, scientific, and inclusive approach to education. Ramírez stated that the books had been well received at the schools she visited and noted a demonstration by teachers’ union Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Educación (SNTE) in Campeche in favour of using the books. 

Cortés

Marko Cortés, national leader of the right-wing opposition Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), has delivered one of the most damning criticisms of the books, which he said should be destroyed. On 2 August, he said that the government of López Obrador “abhors science and culture” and did not want a prepared public but one that was indoctrinated and easy to manipulate.

Paraguay faces “the enormous challenge” of developing the world’s largest artificial intelligence centre, President Santiago Peña said on 13 May. Peña was speaking to assembled journalists in the western department of Presidente Hayes after returning from a six-day tour of Taiwan and the Philippines. Peña equated the project with the construction of the binational Itaipú hydroelectric dam along with Brazil.

President Peña signed cooperation accords on justice, cybersecurity and advanced technology with Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te at the outset of a four-day state visit to the island on 8 May. These included a treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters; a memorandum of understanding on cybersecurity cooperation, designed to strengthen resilience against “hacker attacks”; and, crucially, another memorandum relating to an investment project in a “sovereign artificial intelligence computing capacity centre”.

Lai said the last of these cooperation agreements would harness Taiwan’s AI technology and Paraguay’s “abundant green energy” to convert electricity into “computing capacity”. Speaking during his visit to Taipei, Peña said the construction of a computing capacity centre for the development of artificial intelligence was an “important step” in Paraguay’s transformation into a “regional technology hub” which would play a key role in helping to lift the quality of life of the country’s population,

Paraguay is one of only 12 countries in the world that still has diplomatic relations with Taiwan and Peña is under pressure to get more out of the relationship from the political opposition which, during the previous presidential election campaign, promised to drop the country’s longstanding recognition of Taiwan for China. His popularity is falling ahead of important municipal elections for the ruling Asociación Nacional Republicana-Partido Colorado (ANR-PC) in October, which are being seen as a plebiscite on his governance ahead of the presidential contest in April 2028.

One of the principal criticisms levelled at Peña, ironically, is that he spends too long abroad. Peña has racked up a series of ‘first visits’ by a Paraguayan head of state during his foreign travels, with the latest coming in the Philippines, where he met President Ferdinand Marcos Jr on 11 May.

Peña signed two memorandums of understanding with Marcos in Manila for diplomatic cooperation and the elimination of visas for those holding ordinary passports “in order to facilitate business, tourism and exchanges” between the two countries.

• Asean treaty

During his visit to Manila, President Peña also announced his intention to join the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), whose rotating presidency is held this year by the Philippines.

China response

The spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, Guo Jiakun, described the Paraguayan officials that visited Taiwan as “pawns of Taiwanese independent separatist forces” on 12 May. Paraguay’s foreign minister, Rubén Ramírez, described his comments the following day as “regrettable”. Ramírez said that relations between Paraguay and Taiwan were “based on [shared] principles and values”, such as freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. He said Paraguay had attempted to establish relations with China in the past “but they won’t accept that we have relations with Taiwan…as such, for us, there was no sense in discussing it”.

Bolivia’s interior minister, Marco Antonio Oviedo, said on 3 August that arresting former president Evo Morales (2006-2019) is a “top priority” for President Rodrigo Paz’s government. Oviedo’s comments came after prosecutors issued another arrest warrant for Morales on 29 July for six crimes allegedly committed during the protests that swept the country in May and June [WR-26-25].

The arrest warrant, which was issued by prosecutors in the eastern department of Santa Cruz in response to complaints filed against Morales by the interior ministry and the conservative civil society organisation Comité Cívico pro Santa Cruz, accuses the former president of armed uprising, terrorism, attacks on transport, criminal association, incitement of crime, and attacks on public services. These alleged offences correspond to the major anti-government protests that lasted for 53 days in May and June, which ended when President Paz sent in the army to clear roadblocks on the highway network.

Although the unrest was initially triggered by discontent at the Paz administration’s conservative economic policies, Morales played a key role in encouraging it. The protests escalated significantly when he called on his followers to march on La Paz in mid-May, when Morales’ human trafficking trial was scheduled to begin in relation to an alleged relationship with a minor [WR-26-19]. That trial, which was due to take place in the southern department of Tarija, was suspended after Morales failed to appear in court, and the authorities’ focus was quickly redirected onto controlling the unrest.

Morales’ defiance of the court summons in May reinforced the perception that he is untouchable, with the authorities unwilling to arrest him for fear of sparking an unprecedented insurrection by his supporters. Since October 2024, when he began to face mounting legal pressure, Morales has been confined to his political stronghold of Chapare, Cochabamba department, where he lives under the protection of his coca union, Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba.

Despite Oviedo’s declaration that “the government has made detaining Morales a top priority”, and Paz’s insistence on 30 July that Morales “should present himself where he has been summoned so that his [legal] responsibility can be assessed”, there is little reason to believe that the latest arrest warrant will be handled in a different way to the human trafficking charges. Paz’s government was left teetering by the previous round of protests, which would likely pale in comparison to those that would follow a potentially dangerous operation to extract Morales from Chapare.

Morales defiant

Evo Morales responded to the arrest warrant with a social media post declaring that “they will not intimidate us”. He claimed that “they’re trying to hold us responsible for the social mobilisations to conceal the true drama that Bolivia is living through: a profound economic and social crisis, which is the product of a model that has abandoned the people and protects corruption”.

IMF deal

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced on 29 July that it has reached a staff-level agreement with the Bolivian government regarding a US$1.9bn, 36-month funding programme. The funds, which would be disbursed through the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility (EFF), would be contingent on President Paz implementing spending cuts, modernising the exchange rate and monetary policy regimes, building financial sector resilience, and enhancing competitiveness, including by reducing “product market distortions” – a reference to subsidies and price controls.

The Paz administration has already taken some key steps in these areas, including the June decision to abandon the dollar peg, which had been fixed at B$6.86/US$1 since 2011, and the cancellation of fuel subsidies late last year, which triggered major protests.

In his 2 January address to the nation, which marked the mid-point of his five-year mandate, Martinelli delivered an attack on the business sector and owners of media outlets that have proved critical of his government, accusing them of being "empresaurios" (business dinosaurs) and "thieves" for allegedly not paying taxes. The diatribe by Martinelli, who owns a leading chain of supermarkets among other business interests, prompted 15 ex-presidents of Panama’s Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture to demand a public apology. Singled out for criticism was the opposition newspaper La Prensa, a leading daily, whose founder, Roberto Eisenmann Jr, has written about government corruption cases such as the one involving the national land authority (Anati) [RC-11-10]. Eisenmann’s Desarrollo Golf Coronado S.A, has since been slapped with a US$3m fine by the revenue department (DGI) following an audit. 

   The attack on the private sector follows an executive decree, issued in December 2011, stipulating an increase of 15%-18% in the minimum wage for private sector workers, bringing it up to between US$432 and US$490 a month. The extent of the increase depends on the type of economic activity, the size of the company and its location. Labour Minister Alma Cortés told reporters that the decree followed six months of unsuccessful negotiations between the private sector and trade unions. The private sector was reportedly calling for an increase of 7% while the unions were demanding an increase of 30%.

Growth: During his speech, Martinelli also pointed to government achievements such as 10.5% GDP growth for 2011 – the highest of any country in Latin America. In a recent report, the UN Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (Eclac) cited as growth drivers: transport and telecommunications, construction, mining and financial intermediation. Economy Minister Frank de Lima told reporters that the government was forecasting 7.5% growth for 2012 although Eclac puts this at 6.5%, (albeit still the highest in Central America).

Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar and her People’s Partnership (PP) government are facing a second tough by-election only three months after ignominiously losing the Chaguanas West poll to disgraced former security minister, Jack Warner, standing for his new Independent Liberal Party (ILP). In the meantime, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is projecting economic growth of just 1.5% for 2013, compared with the government’s projections of 2.5%.

Trinidad’s second by-election in three months will be only its fifth in 27 years, and there is a feeling that maybe the prime minister misjudged the political situation over the 4 November poll. The St Joseph by-election was brought about by the constituency MP Herbert Volney (who had been fired from his job as minister of justice) crossing the floor of the House to join Jack Warner’s ILP. Under new constitutional rules, the Speaker declared the seat vacant.

Where the prime minister may have misjudged matters is in Volney’s reaction. He had 14 days to appeal the Speaker’s decision, and it may have been expected that the former minister would launch a legal challenge, as indeed he had threatened, that would have dragged out until the next general election in 2015. Instead he refrained from appealing and so the government faces another tricky electoral contest.

So far this year the government has lost badly in the Tobago House of Assembly (THA) elections and in Chaguanas West. It now faces the 21 October local elections and then the St Joseph test.

Warner remains the biggest thorn in the government’s side. Despite the fact that his sacking from the government followed the most damning revelations of corruption during his time as a regional football administrator, he has brazenly attacked the PP government for corruption. On 17 September, for instance, he claimed to have been “misled” into supporting the PP coalition and that he had now heard allegations of corruption like never before in the country’s history. He said: “Corruption in this country has become institutionalized and I, Jack Warner, contributed to that” – by which he meant that he had been complicit in bringing a corrupt government to power, not that he had been corrupt himself!

The ILP is fielding a full slate of 136 candidates for the local election, and it will be a formidable challenger in St Joseph, a seat which has traditionally swung between the PNM and the main ruling coalition constituent, the United National Congress (UNC). The UNC first took the seat from PNM control in 1986, lost it in 1991, then held it from 1995 to 2007 before reclaiming it (with Volney as the candidate) in the 2010 general election.

In October, the IMF published its full Staff Report on the Article IV consultation that was completed at the end of March. This full report shows growth projections under “a passive scenario” rising to 2.4% in 2015 but then falling away again to just 1.7% in 2017 and 2018. Amongst other things, the report identifies “an urgent need to reengineer the composition of spending”. It says that subsidies and transfers are “on an unsustainable path, eating up a rapidly growing share of total spending”, from 45% in FY 2007/08 to 53% in FY 2012/13. The IMF accepts that some subsidies and transfers can be justified as “improving equity or fostering positive externalities” but others are poorly targeted and “may impose negative externalities”. In particular it criticizes fuel subsidies as disproportionately benefiting the rich.