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Colombian authorities are keen to obtain details about Panama's third discovery of armaments presumably destined for export to one of Colombia's illegal armed organisations. The cache, seized last week, included 34 AK-47s, 55 boxes of ammunition and three grenade launchers. This made it the smallest this year, but proof enough that Panama continues to be a live conduit for gunrunning in the region.

In March, the police intercepted a shipment of 110 AK-47s in La Chorrera, 32 kilometres southwest of Panama city. In July a cache of 144 AK-47s, 10 PKMs and 1,724 rounds of ammunition was discovered in Santa Clara, in the central province of Coclé.

The Panamanian police are noncommittal over the provenance and destination of the arms. They point out the AK-47 assault rifle has become the weapon of choice of drug traffickers and even the street gangs known as maras, throughout the isthmus and all the way to Mexico's northern border. Still, this conduit has been much used by both guerrillas and paramilitary organisations in Colombia, and the size of the first two shipments seized this year suggests that this is their likeliest destination.

There may be irony lurking somewhere behind the fact that France has become the first country to discuss openly the prospect of military intervention in Haiti, in the wake of the uprising launched almost two weeks ago in Gonaí¯ves. It was in Gonaí¯ves that, after defeating the French, Jean-Jacques Dessalines proclaimed the independence of Haiti in January 1804.

On 17 February, French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin announced that the French government had set up a `crisis cell' to monitor developments in Haiti and `reflect upon what can be done urgently.' He said that one of the options under consideration was to deploy a peace force, drawn from the units stationed nearby, in the `overseas departments' of the Antilles and Guyane.

He suggested that France would not be acting unilaterally. `There are many countries willing to act,' he said. `The international community is willing to mobilise.' De Villepin suggested that intervention would require two things: a real commitment by Aristide to `respect the civil peace' and a parallel one by the opposition to abandon its `strategy of rejection.'

The signals from Washington, meanwhile, have been equivocal. On 10 February it seemed ready to jettison Aristide. The State Department's lively spokesman, Richard Boucher, said that `a political settlement will require some fairly thorough changes in the way Haiti is governed, and how the security situation is maintained.' Another source, whom protocol demands to be identified only as `a senior State Department official', spelt this out: `When we talk about undergoing change in the way Haiti is governed [...] that could indeed involve changes in Aristide's position.'

The next day, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated baldly that the US had `no plans to do anything'. Back at State, `an official' said the government was still trying to assess what the response should be. On 13 February, Secretary of State Colin Powell got together with representatives of Caricom, Canada and the OAS to assert that they supported a `peaceful, negotiated, democratic and constitutional solution' to the Haitian crisis, based on the Caricom proposals. Speaking on behalf of Caricom, Trinidadian prime minister Patrick Manning added, `We will not support any unconstitutional measures to overthrow or support the Aristide government.' In Powell's rendition, `régime change' is not on the agenda for Haiti.

Another nugget from `an official' at State: US policy is to `exhaust every diplomatic option available, before moving on to another level.'

President Néstor Kirchner is taking a big gamble. He is trying to build a web of alliances with provincial governors of the ruling Partido Justicialista (PJ) - or with their PJ rivals in a couple of crucial cases - at a time when his approval rating is falling, the power crisis is threatening economic recovery and the moment of truth is approaching on the external-debt front.

Political analysts in Buenos Aires discern a labyrinthine power-play in Kirchner's most recent relations with provincial governors. He has been holding a series of one-to-one meetings with those he wants to woo: José Alperovich (Tucumán), Mario das Neves (Chubut), Eduardo Fellner (Jujuy), Gildo Insfrán (Formosa). He has also been delivering blatant snubs to others, such as the heavyweight governor of Córdoba, José Manuel de la Sota, and Jorge Obeid, ruler of another of the big provinces, Santa Fe.

In the past few days, Kirchner has pointedly avoided meeting de la Sota, while making a show of conferring with his rival, the mayor of Córdoba city, Luis Juez. He also cancelled at the last minute a scheduled meeting with Obeid, and instead granted an audience to senator and former Santa Fe governor Carlos Reutemann.

Overtly, people in Kirchner's entourage say his offensive against de la Sota is due to the fact that the President sees him as an icon of `old-style' politics and of the neo-liberal approach that he wants to eradicate from the PJ. Another explanation is that both de la Sota and Obeid have been appearing as potential allies of one of the most powerful men in the PJ, Kirchner's predecessor Eduardo Duhalde. Another distinctive development of the last couple of weeks has been the toning-down of Kirchner's criticism of Duhalde - seen as a move to keep him happy while isolating his possible allies within the PJ.

Has support peaked?
A survey conducted by Ipsos Mora y Araujo and published last week by La Nación has been providing much fodder for analysts. It shows Kirchner's personal approval rating at 73% - higher than those of Duhalde and Fernando de la Rúa at the same stage of their mandates. It also shows the disapproval rating at 7% - the lowest since elected rule was restored in 1983.
So much for the snapshot. What the survey also shows is that Kirchner's rating has been falling fast in the last couple of months; in March it was 84%, eleven points higher. His government's approval rating is far lower than his own: 48%. And while only 10% of the respondents think that things will be worse in a year's time, those betting on no change match those expecting an improvement, at 45%. Kirchner is seen as having done best in his efforts against corruption (54%) and in foreign policy (47%); his most important unfulfilled tasks are insecurity (62%) and unemployment (56%). 

On balance, those who believe opposition to Kirchner is insufficient outnumber those who feel the opposite (46:42). Survey director Manuel Mora y Araujo says, `The government is like a tennis player who, though he commits one unforced error after another, wins because he doesn't have a strong adversary.'

One thing can be said with certainty: somebody is planning violence in connection with the 15 August recall referendum or its outcome. Identifying that somebody is a trickier proposition: both sides accuse each other of devious machinations shrouded in deception.

Evidence of preparations to commit violence are plain to see. Over the past fortnight, agents of Disip, the secret police, found a cache of 2.5 tonnes of explosives ('enough to leave a kilometre-wide crater') in Cagua, 90 kilometres west of Caracas; 67 kilos of C-4 plastic explosive with accompanying detonators and fuses were stolen from the naval base of Puerto Cabello, 150 kilometres west of Caracas; and a group wearing military uniforms robbed 14 FAL rifles, an Uzi submachinegun and four pistols from a national guard post in Yagua, 110 kilometres west of the capital.

Henrique Salas, governor of Carabobo state, where all this happened, has publicly accused Vice-President José Vicente Rangel of being behind these incidents. 'He directly controls subversive groups throughout the country,' said Salas, 'prepared to carry out some kind of action that will later be attributed to other persons or groups'. 

'The stolen arms and explosives are in the hands of these subversive groups that he controls.' Salas has said that he will produce evidence of this 'in due course' but for now he has confined himself to noting as highly suspicious the fact that the thefts of well-guarded arms and explosives took place 'without a single shot having been fired'.

Vice-President Rangel riposted immediately by turning the tables on Salas. He said: 'When someone has a guilty conscience and is involved in strange things, he reacts in an unforeseeable manner and generally tries to preempt anything that might unmask him. It is they [the opposition] who are mounting the traps. As for me, the governor can sleep well - if his conscience allows him to do so.'

Rangel has aired his own theory: the opposition will seek to create situations in which many will be killed and injured, so as to provoke a 'Madrid effect' that will swing the recall referendum in their favour. This is an allusion to the 11 March bombing of trains in Madrid that claimed 191 lives and left more than 1,500 injured. It is generally assumed that the government's attempt to divert blame onto the Basque Eta terrorists cost it the general elections held three days later.

Defence minister Jorge Garcí­a announced on 28 July that one suspect had been arrested in the case of the cache of explosives and that 'a considerable number of people' have been providing additional 'crucial evidence'. He promised indictments soon.

Miguel Rodrí­guez, chief of Disip, said on 30 July that confessions of several of the Colombian 'paramilitaries' arrested in early May [WR-04-18] had allowed the authorities to build a fuller picture of the conspiracy in which they were involved. He claimed that some 4,000 'paramilitaries' who eluded arrest in May still represent a threat: 'Their plans continue. They have been paid and they committed themselves to an objective. They may have withdrawn for now, but must be in a process of regrouping.' He described the aims of the plot as attacks on military installations and the ouster and assassination of President Hugo Chávez .

Among those implicated in the plot, Rodrí­guez mentioned opposition legislators Rafael Marín and Liliana Hernández, television presenter Orlando Urdaneta, Enrique Capriles (mayor of one of the Caracas municipalities), exiled 'dictator-for-a-day' Pedro Carmona, leaders of the cattle-breeders' association, a number of unnamed Cubans, Colombians and Venezuelans resident in Miami, three unidentified US nationals, and the military rebels of Plaza Altamira. 

He said the investigations had unveiled 'evident' links between the conspiracy involving the 'paramilitaries' and members of the two opposition coalitions, the broader and more 'moderate' Coordinadora Democrática and the more radical Bloque Democrático.

The chief of Disip said it was not yet clear whether the recent discoveries and thefts of explosives and weapons were part of the same conspiracy.

A recent opinion poll by Keller y Asociados (considered by the pro-Chávez camp to be biased against the opposition) showed 67% of respondents convinced that there will be violence if Chávez 's mandate is revoked in the upcoming referendum, and 37% believing that Chávez will take reprisals against those who vote against him.

What is most interesting about this survey, considering the pollster's perceived bias, is that it shows 45% intending to vote for Chávez and 34% against him. In fact, Keller y Asociados has been recording a steady rise in Chávez 's popularity from 36% in December last year.

This said, company boss Alfredo Keller has stated his personal belief that there is 'a hidden vote, as in Nicaragua in 1999, due to fear'. He points to the fact that a high proportion of respondents (21%) claim to be still undecided, and 30% believe that revealing the way they intend to vote might be turned against them by whoever wins. Keller also says that the high share of 'undecideds' can explain the differences between the various opinion polls. It is not at all clear that Keller's implied arithmetic works the way he thinks it does. What is apparent is that his survey is in line with the last two conducted by US polling firms.

• PR event backfires on Colombia's paramilitaries. The 28 July appearance before the Colombian congress of three paramilitary leaders (all with arrest warrants held in abeyance for the occasion) did not win them many friends. The three were Salvatore Mancuso, Iván Roberto Duque ('Ernesto Báez') and Ramón Isaza. They delivered predictable speeches, reiterating the justification of their actions in terms of their 'legitimate right to self-defence', the absence of the state from much of Colombia, and the fact that they had 'freed half of Colombia from the guerrillas'. They said they were willing to make reparations for their crimes, but only if ensured an alternative to prison.
  
  What most irked the legislators, though, was that, no sooner had they finished delivering their set pieces, the three walked out, instead of engaging the debate all had been expecting. The event was pronounced a failure by lawmakers from across the spectrum, from the pro-Uribe bloc to the leftist Polo Democrático. US ambassador William Wood said Mancuso's address had been scandalous, adding, 'It's a bit strange that in Congress, where they write the laws, approve the laws and defend the laws you would also find those who break the laws'. The government said the 'demobilisation' talks will continue regardless.

Former Paraguayan army chief Lino Oviedo has cleared the first legal hurdle in his battle to recover his freedom. He has been acquitted provisionally of the charge of inciting a coup attempt that took place in May 2000 when he was in exile in Argentina. A definitive acquittal is expected as a matter of course, since the public prosecutor had recommended it due to lack of evidence.

Another 68 people charged with involvement in that coup were acquitted in May 2003 because the statutory time limit of three years for the passing of sentences had somehow been allowed to expire.

Oviedo is currently serving a 10-year prison sentence for rebellion in 1996. He is challenging the trial that led to this, since it followed his earlier acquittal by a military court. He also faces charges of having instigated the killing of seven demonstrators during the unrest that followed the assassination in 1999 of Vice-President Luis Marí­a Argaña, as well as one of having been the 'moral author' of that assassination. There is a strong chance that evidence will be found lacking for these last two charges.

Oviedo fled Paraguay in March 1999 after the resignation of President Raúl Cubas, who had been elected as his proxy. He initially enjoyed political asylum, granted by Argentine President Carlos Menem. His continuing involvement in Paraguayan politics led to a confinement order, which prompted him to take refuge in Brazil. Attempts by Paraguay to extradite him were rejected by the Brazilian judiciary.
On 29 June this year Oviedo returned to Paraguay and surrendered to the authorities, who sent him to the Viñas Cué military prison to serve out his term.

ARGENTINA | End-run for debt-restructuring saga? Last week the government formally made its restructuring offer to the holders of US$88bn in debt bonds defaulted in 2001. Economy minister Roberto Lavagna announced that the government will be satisfied if just 50% of bondholders take up the offer (initially the government had said that it wanted two-thirds acceptance). Bondholder associations have been pressing for 75% acceptance, while the IMF has demanded 80%. The fact that the offer has been approved both by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Italian market regulator has weakened the chances of mounting a legal challenge, but hostile bondholders are still hoping sufficient numbers of investors will be persuaded to reject the offer, forcing Argentina to improve the deal. They have announced a parallel roadshow to counter that of the government.

On the very first day, 14 January, 20% of the bondholders signalled acceptance (a proportion made up largely of Argentine pension fund administrators and the investment funds of Citibank, Banco Rí­o (Santander), Francés (BBVA) and Bank Boston). The government has budgeted issuing US$38.5bn in new debt, but if acceptance were to reach 70% it would have to issue US$41.8bn.

CHILE | Targeting tax evasion. The director of Chile's tax office, Juan Toro, reports that last year the government was able to reduce tax evasion by US$760m, very close to the target of US$800m a year it had set itself. Tax revenues overall rose by 12.7% (US$806m) to the highest level since 2000.

Since an anti-evasion law was enacted three years ago, Chile has managed to reduce evasion by just over US$2bn.

A joint police-military sweep in two areas of St Catherine's, launched on 6 April, has provoked a political storm which has served as a reminder that politics and violent crime have long been intertwined in Jamaica. Leading figures in the opposition are accusing the security forces of political targeting. The pro-government camp has responded with hints that the opposition is seeking to protect criminals.

The military-police raids concentrated mainly on the areas of Ellerslie Pen and Tawes Pen. A curfew was established and more than 100 people were detained and herded into a barbed-wire enclosure erected in a playground; by the weekend almost nine out of every ten had been released. Olivia Grange of the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), who is MP for St Catherine Central, said the operation had focused on areas which were now peaceful, while others in the grip of violence were being ignored. This, she said, 'has sent the wrong message that [the residents] are being targeted because of their political persuasion'.

JLP leader Bruce Golding struck a harsher note. The very day the operation was launched he told a rally in West Kingston, 'The police have the full support of the JLP, but what happened in Spanish Town is unacceptable. They went in there before day and proceeded to grab up every young man. What is happening down there is something that is happening in Afghanistan. If it is wrong in Afghanistan, then it is doubly wrong in Jamaica. This is like a Nazi concentration camp.' He added that if the police continued to act in this fashion, 'then it will be bangarang in Jamaica'.

Police commissioner Lucius Thomas responded indirectly to Grange, saying, 'People are saying that there is no crime taking place in these communities, but they are centres from where criminals leave to commit crimes in other areas.' He noted that Spanish Town, which comes under the jurisdiction of the St Catherine North Police Division, has a very high murder rate. Indeed, since the beginning of the year it has witnessed 50 murders, just over 11% of the national total. Thomas also dismissed the charge of political bias, stating that he would not allow any politician to tell him how to do his job.

Burchell Whiteman, general secretary of the ruling People's National Party (PNP), took issue with Golding's 'inflammatory' remarks, challenging him to spell out what he had meant when he said that bangarang would follow if the police persisted in their tactics. He then took an oblique swipe at Golding's motives: 'As a party, we have maintained that no area is off limits for the security forces and we will not shield any criminal under the guise of political protection.'

Terrorism bill
Political sniping was also the hallmark of another security-related development: the passage by the senate, on 8 April, of the Terrorism Prevention Bill. This was steamrolled through by the ruling party, in one case ignoring an opposition request for a divide on a clause (one of 15 which the JLP opposed). Senator Anthony Jackson, leader of opposition business, accused the government of seeking to muzzle the opposition. Justice minister AJ Nicholson appeared to invoke a higher authority, telling the opposition, 'Let it be known that this bill that is before us comes out of a resolution passed by the United Nations Security Council.' He was alluding to Resolution 1373, which required the passage by member states of anti-terrorist legislation, though in very broad terms, not the detail which was the subject of debate in the senate.

President Hugo Chávez has confounded all forecasters by replacing General-in-Chief Jorge Garcí­a Carneiro as defence minister and keeping the man most touted as his successor, General Raúl Baduel, as commander of the army. Most surprisingly, he has entrusted the defence ministry to a navy officer - though perhaps the most significant move has been the appointment of strategist Melvin López as inspector-general of the armed forces.

Many local analysts, including former high-ranking officers, expected Chávez to elevate Baduel to the defence ministry as Garcí­a Carneiro stepped down upon reaching retirement age. Though Chávez and Garcí­a Carneiro had clashed repeatedly in recent times, the prevailing view was that the president owed both him and Baduel a debt of gratitude for their key role in reinstating him after the April 2002 coup. One retired admiral, Iván Carratú, went as far as to state that it would be 'difficult' for Chávez to appoint a defence minister drawn from either the navy or the airforce, due to the degree of support enjoyed by Garcí­a Carneiro in the army - by far the largest of the services.

Yet that is precisely what Chávez did. He appointed Rear Admiral Orlando Maniglia, hitherto inspector-general of the armed forces, as his new defence minister, promoting him to full admiral - a rank which, Chávez himself underlined, had not been held by any naval officer for 100 years. Worth noting: Maniglia was also due to retire this year.

The post vacated by Maniglia has been entrusted to General Melvin López, hitherto secretary-general of Codena, the national defence council. López had previously been involved in the political side of the Chávez administration, helping run several of its social programmes. At Codena, he is credited with having crafted the intellectual underpinning of the 'integral defence' concept on which Venezuela has based its military strategy.

'Integral defence' has been devised as the response to the prospect of 'asymmetric war' - conflict between very unequally endowed parties, with the weaker party adopting guerrilla tactics. López has defined 'asymmetrical war' as 'involving the entire population [and] adapting to the country's geopolitical [features]'. Melvin is also the populariser of the notion that a 2001 Nato training exercise codenamed Operativo Balboa was actually a blueprint, still valid, for a US-led invasion of Venezuela.

This has been the justification for the enlargement of Venezuela's military reserves from 30,000 to 100,000 (and eventually 1.5m). It has also been the basic assumption for a series of large-scale military exercises staged in early June: in the two that demanded the deployment of large military units, members of the reserve and civilians were also involved as key players in a simulated effort to neutralise invading forces.

Garcí­a Carneiro has not been completely sidelined. Chávez has invented for him a new ministry, of social development and citizen participation, which will be in charge of vetting, coordinating and supervising projects in such areas as housing, health and sanitation proposed by local communities and submitted for consideration via the state governments. This appointment is in line with Chávez 's overall policy of involving the military closely in his social engineering schemes, a feature of his régime that makes it more reminiscent of the 'left-leaning' period of military rule in Peru known as the Revolución Peruana (1968-75) than of the Cuban revolution.

 

A rattled Roberto Madrazo has taken to blaming the government for an increasingly belligerent campaign against his nomination bid, launched officially on 10 October after the PRI leadership accepted the registration of only three aspirants: Madrazo, former México state governor Arturo Montiel and 'far outsider' Everardo Moreno. Most of the hostile acts against Madrazo have been staged by the followers of former PRI secretary-general Elba Esther Gordillo.

The followers of Gordillo, mostly members of the teachers' union, have done their best to disrupt Madrazo's rallies: heckling him, throwing eggs at him, and on one occasion last week preventing him from addressing the PRI's legislators. This incident, in which the pro- and anti-Madrazo camps nearly came to blows, prompted the PRI leadership to invite legislators to sign a document committing themselves to keep anti-Madrazo protests peaceful. The result: 75% agreed to sign, signalling the size of the split within the party. Madrazo's charge against the government is based on Gordillo's well-known proximity to President Vicente Fox and his wife, but it is hard to argue, as he does, that Gordillo is helping Fox when it is unclear whether Fox's man, Santiago Creel, will be the ruling PAN's candidate.

Political commentators agree on dismissing Moreno's bid as, at best, an attempt to position himself to negotiate a 'swing vote'. Moreno has been a member of the PRI for 40 years; the highest he has climbed in the hierarchy was his stint as deputy chief prosecutor during the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). Three other aspirants - Marcela Zúñiga, Rubén de León Arteaga and Raúl Mastache - were not allowed to register because, the PRI leadership said, they did not fulfil all the stipulated requirements.

 

The US government appears to have concluded that the best defence is to go on the offensive and has started highlighting the increase in acts of violence against members of the Border Patrol over the past year and talking about not tolerating any more - in an oblique exculpation of the agent who recently killed a Mexican border crosser. Meanwhile, Mexico is being joined by more Latin American nations determined to adopt a common stance towards US immigration policy, and particularly on 'the wall'.

On 5 January Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff turned up in San Diego for a public event on the border with Tijuana, under heavy armed guard, complete with an anti-riot armoured vehicle. There, after saying that a full investigation would be conducted into the 30 December killing of Guillermo Martí­nez 'to avoid new deaths', he proclaimed that there would be 'zero tolerance' of aggressions against members of the US Border Patrol. These, he said, had doubled in 2005.

The Border Patrol has reported that since 1 October last year there have been 78 attacks against its agents with stones or projectiles like Molotov cocktails, compared with 25 in the same period of last year. Local US media have reported two shooting incidents in Texas since the last week of December. In the first, 10 shots were said to have been fired on officers patrolling the Veterans International Bridge, hitting their vehicle but not injuring anyone. In the second, 20 shots were said to have been fired at Border Patrol agents near Brownsville from across the border by what appeared to be 'a trained shooter'. Again, noone was hit. Local authorities were reported as acknowledging five shots fired against a Border Patrol boat.

Apart from shifting the emphasis on to the aggressions suffered by Border Patrol agents, the Border Patrol has fed the US media with reports that Martí­nez had been arrested 11 times on people-trafficking charges. The Mexican media have concentrated instead on his declared intention of crossing the border to celebrate the New Year with relatives in California and if possible to find a better-paid job in the US.

Also countering the US stance, Mexico's Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) has said that the killing of Martí­nez is not an isolated case. In 2000, it recalls, Roberto Flores and three other illegal Mexican immigrants were surprised by Border Patrol agents in the San Diego area; Flores was shot and seriously injured when he tried to escape back to Mexico. The agents claimed they had been attacked with stones, as in the Martí­nez case. The shooter was not prosecuted; the CNDH says that he was praised and later became a union representative.

In March 2001 Roberto Chávez was intercepted by a Border patrol agent near Tucson and shot dead. His case was cited in a late-2002 report by the UN Human Rights Commission, which also criticises the use of banned dum-dum or hollow-point bullets by Border patrol agents. [A detail: a Border Patrol spokesman said on 4 January that Martí­nez had been killed by a dum-dum bullet.]

The CNDH has warned that more illegal immigrants will be placed at risk by the recruitment of more Border Patrol agents, who will be put in the field with scant training and no experience. If legislation now before the US Senate is approved, the Border Patrol will see its personnel increase this year by 20% to 1,200. Training, says the CNDH, will only last three months.

Diplomatic backlash
Guatemala is not the only country to have raised concerns similar to those of Mexico about the new US border security policy. On 5 January Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez announced that he would be hosting a meeting with his peers from Central America, Colombia and the Dominican Republic on 9 January to discuss Washington's new policy - with a view to 'working out a common position and vision regarding the phenomenon of migration'. They would sound out 'the perceptions of each country regarding the legislation the US is seeking to approve, as well as the kind of actions we should be developing jointly'. In this agenda they will include the case of the South American emigrants who try to get to the US via Central America and Mexico.

Derbez has already had a face-to-face meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick to discuss the matter of the pending legislation, but no details of the talk have been disclosed. Mexico has already served public notice that it intends to lobby hard against approval of the border security bill by the US Senate. Apart from 'the wall', as Latin Americans have taken to calling the border barriers envisaged in this legislation, governments south of the border are very concerned about the Sensenbrenner Amendment, which would make illegal immigrants already in the US guilty of a criminal offence. The Honduran government has reported that the number of its nationals killed while attempting to reach or enter the US had trebled last year to 505. Most of these, though, had perished under trains in Mexico; rail accidents left another 166 Honduran emigrants mutilated and 185 with diverse injuries. The same report noted that 18,154 Honduran emigrants had been repatriated by air from the US last year, raising to 47,000 the number of deportees in the past five years.

A southward flow
Not all commentary in the US makes out the Mexicans to be the bad guys. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has taken up a case which the Mexican government has fruitlessly tried to get acknowledged: the role of the US in keeping the warring Mexican drug cartels supplied with arms and ammunition. It notes that an estimated 95% of the weapons seized from suspected criminals in Mexico were first sold legally in the US. In Mexico there are fewer than 2,500 registered gun owners, yet police there confiscate an average 256 firearms per day from suspects, according to the PGR, the chief prosecutor's office.

The newspaper reports that Mexican buyers pay Texas resident between US$50 and US$500 to buy weapons in the US. In one case, it says, a joint US/Mexican police operation was able to track 80 confiscated firearms back to a single Mexican who ordered them from Texas residents. The report also cites an ATF investigation which led to the prosecution on gun-trafficking charges of a Texas residents who had bought 160 firearms for Mexicans.

While in Nuevo Laredo (the Mexican town considered the epicentre of border violence by the US) no store sells guns legally, across the border in Laredo, says the Times, an AR-15 assault rifle can be bought for US$1,199. Weapons bought and smuggled across the border include the narcos' favourite, the AK-47 assault rifle. Both the AR-15s and the AK-47s are made fully automatic by gunsmiths in Mexico. The most potent weapons seized in Mexico were bazookas, one of which was tracked back to an Arkansas army depot.

Concern about demobilised paramilitaries gaining a position of power at the state's expense have been heightened by a scam uncovered at the Instituto de Desarrollo Rural (Incoder), the land institute currently engaged in redistributing lands seized from drug traffickers among people displaced by the conflict. Some were found to be making their way into a cartel of land invaders led by a former paramilitary leader.

On 8 April Agriculture Minister Andrés Felipe Arias acknowledged publicly that an investigation into Incoder's redistribution of seized land had turned up a series of 'anomalies'. Data reported by Incoder's field agencies turned out not to match what investigators found at local level. 

When these mismatches began to be examined by the procurator-general's office, they discovered that among the beneficiaries were 18 people charged with invading lands, two charged with terrorism, one with drug trafficking and one for illegal possession of firearms.

Among the invaders were members of this 'cartel' led by the unnamed paramilitary leader. There has been a suggestion that by this route some of the land has been full circle. Among the redistributed properties were some expropriated from the heirs of notorious drug traffickers such as Gonzalo Rodrí­guez Gacha and Leonidas Vargas.

The scam relied on inside assistance. On 8 April the government dismissed the deputy manager of Incoder, Omar Quessep, who was suspended a month ago when the investigation got under way.

In some areas the government of President Néstor Kirchner is taking good care to remain in Washington's good books. A case in point is its recent return to the US of highly enriched uranium used in an Argentine reactor, which earned it plaudits in the US. A test case coming up is the prospect of selling military training aircraft to Bolivia as part of a drive for markets in the area of defence matériel.

On 19 July the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) reported that, in conjunction with Argentina's Comisión Nacional de Energí­a Atómica (CNEA), it had removed more than 3 kilos of US-origin highly enriched uranium from an Argentine nuclear research reactor and returned it to the US.

This was the first of three steps in an agreement to remove or dispose of all highly enriched uranium originating in the US still in Argentina. The next step will be to convert the Argentine research reactor from using highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used to produce nuclear weapons, to low-enriched uranium fuel. The final step will be to return spent HEU fuel from the reactor to the US.

NNSA administrator Linton Brooks, who said this was 'part of NNSA's broad global effort to reduce the risk of terrorists acquiring nuclear material', praised 'the leadership role that Argentina is taking to minimise and eliminate the use of HEU in civil nuclear purposes'. The HEU removal operation in Argentina was conducted under NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative.

Getting the Pampa into export markets

The Buenos Aires media have been playing up what may turn out to be the first big sale of defence matériel under the Kirchner administration. Lined up as probable purchasers of Pampa AT 63 military training planes are Israel, Chile and Bolivia. The aircraft are manufactured by a US-owned firm, Lockheed Martin Aircraft Argentina, which bought the airforce's Fábrica Militar de Aviones when it was privatised in 1995.

Fending off local criticism of the possible sale to Israel, the company says it is offering the same conditions all over the Middle East: Israel is inviting bids for 18 to 24 training aircraft and Lockheed Martin Argentina is in the running. Similarly, the firm is gearing up for a Chilean call for tenders to supply 36 training aircraft. Numbers have not been mentioned for Bolivia, whose interest began when the Pampa caught President Evo Morales's eye at an air show.

The Pampa AT 63 is an advanced two-seater training airplane which can be fitted with light weapons for combat missions. Given the recent ructions between Bolivia and the US over the suspension of military assistance, and Bolivia's closeness with Venezuela, whose military purchases are under US prohibition, the question is whether an eventual sale to Bolivia would be allowed to go through.

Lockheed Martin Argentina has upgraded A4 Skyhawks bought by Argentina from the US in the 1990s, and in 2005 won a contract to do likewise with a number of Brazilian navy Skyhawks.

His confidence seemed misplaced and so it turned out. Earlier this month Alvaro Leyva, a mediator between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Farc) and the government, said he expected the 58 hostages held by the Farc to be back in their homes within two months. On 20 October President Alvaro Uribe attributed a car bomb in the heart of the military complex in Bogotá to the Farc and ordered the military to mount a rescue attempt for the hostages.

Uribe was negotiating a zona de encuentro ("meeting place") for the Farc in the municipalities of Florida and Pradera to exchange 500 imprisoned guerrillas for the 58 hostages. The government also spoke confidently of a future peace deal and even discussed how many seats the Farc would have in a constituent assembly. But then, on 20 October, at the site of last week's bomb attack, came a second explosion as Uribe delivered a ferocious attack on the Farc reminiscent of his first term in office: he said the only path available now was a military rescue of the hostages; he stripped mediators of the authorisation to explore a deal; and promised a war without negotiation.

Former president Alfonso López Michelsen said Uribe should explain what evidence he had received to undergo such a radical change in rhetoric. The timing of the car bomb and Uribe's dramatic U-turn is interesting. At the time of writing a top-level delegation from the US is due to arrive in Bogotá amid mounting speculation that the US might decide to cut back on its annual US$700m aid under Plan Colombia. The outgoing commander of Southcom, Bantz J Craddock, recently intimated as much and if the Democrats outperform the Republicans in the US mid-term elections on 7 November there will be more pressure to cut back US military assistance.

The opposition Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) argued that the timing of the car bomb was suspicious because the ensuing crisis with the Farc succeeded in knocking off the agenda a series of highly embarrassing revelations about the extent of paramilitary collaboration with officials from the government and state institutions, and allegations of the continued operations of paramilitaries after they had ostensibly demobilised under the justice and peace law.

The PDA argued that such a breach of security at a top military installation was unusual: the van used for the bombing entered the complex on the morning of 18 October and then again the following morning when the bomb exploded, injuring 23 people. PDA Senator Jaime Dussan speculated that disgruntled elements in the military carried out the attack, which came less than two weeks after the attorney general began a formal investigation into the involvement of three colonels, a major and two army captains in a number of bombings in the capital over the summer. In September General Mario Montoya, the head of the army, attributed these attacks to soldiers, not the Farc.

The Farc denied responsibility for the car bomb on its website. It said it would not have been able to penetrate military security to enter the compound. Military intelligence, however, claimed to have intercepted a telephone call from the perpetrator of the attack to Jorge Briceño ("Mono Jojoy"), a Farc leader, saying "I have graduated", which it said meant "I have carried out the attack". It was this intelligence, apparently, which prompted Uribe to rail against the Farc and order the military to rescue the hostages by force. This was greeted with consternation by relatives of the hostages, who said it was tantamount to signing their death warrants. In May 2003, a botched military rescue attempt led to the Farc killing 10 hostages, including a former defence minister and provincial governor.

Uribe defended his decision to break off negotiations with the Farc on the grounds that they had undermined his "democratic security" plan. He also responded to international pressure to carry out the prisoner exchange by saying, "the international community must ask itself: whether to demand that an honourable and democratic government negotiate with those that plant car bombs or whether to demand that the terrorists free the hostages. That is their dilemma."  

Keeping pressure on US
Stepping up the attacks on the Farc will enable the Uribe administration to inform the high-level delegation from the US, headed by Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and including Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, that the US$700m a year provided under Plan Colombia is more essential than ever. The government has also created a new property tax designed to send a message to the US that Colombia is also making sacrifices and deserves continued support: under the new tax owners of property valued at more than Col$500m (US$214,000) would pay a 1.2% tax, although details are yet to be finalised.

Paramilitary scandal knocked off agenda
The problem for Uribe is that his "democratic security" plan is beginning to lose credibility amid allegations of corruption, extrajudicial killings and inefficiency in the armed forces that have come to light over the last year and serious concerns about the peace process with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) that have emerged over the last few weeks.  

On 19 October Colombia's congress analysed an internal investigative report by the attorney general's office into records found on the computer of the paramilitary leader, Rodrigo Tovar ("Jorge 40") which were leaked to the national daily El Tiempo on 8 October. The debate was called by PDA Senator Gustavo Petro. According to the report Tovar's hit men killed 558 people - ranging from leftist activists to shopkeepers who failed to make extortion payments - in the coastal province of Atlántico, while taking part in demobilisation talks.  

The report also says the computer had records of cocaine shipments to the US and Europe; Tovar's bribing of counter-narcotics police to turn a blind eye to cocaine deliveries; financial assistance to congressmen and "friends", including prosecutors, members of the secret police (DAS) and the military; and accounts showing that Tovar took 10% of the value of public contracts in Atlántico.

Uribe did address the paramilitary issue in his speech. He called on the armed forces to dismantle the so-called "Aguilas Negras" that have sprung up in the coastal regions, comprised of former AUC leaders with links to the armed forces. The latest reports might prompt congress to hold him to his word.

Another damaging report
On the same day as congress debated the report into Tovar the NGO, Comisión Colombiana de Juristas (CCJ), presented a report claiming that 3,005 people had been killed and 300 people kidnapped since June 2003 when the peace talks between the government and the paramilitaries began. The supreme court is investigating three uribista congressmen - Senator Jairo Merlano, Alvaro Garcí­a and deputy Erik Morris - from the department of Sucre for allegedly organising, promoting and financing armed groups.

The political opposition is endeavouring to present a united face for the presidential elections in 2008 and end the ruling Partido Colorado's stranglehold on power. The principal opposition parties - Partido Liberal Radical Auténtico (PLRA), Patria Querida, and Unión Nacional de Ciudadanos Eticos (Unace) - several smaller parties and some 30 social organisations signed a political accord on 5 February to form a coalition, or Concertación Nacional. Conspicuous by his absence was the presidential candidate for Tekojoja, Fernando Lugo, the bishop of San Pedro. Lugo was suspended 'a divinis' by the Vatican last week for refusing to withdraw his candidacy.

The launch of the Concertación Nacional produced some grand rhetoric. "In the 200 years since independence this is the first time that political and social organisations have come together to create a new Paraguay," the final statement read. It will, however, take more than words to unite a traditionally fragmented opposition. The absence of Lugo was also a blow. Opinion polls suggest that he would pose the most serious threat to the continued hegemony of the Colorados. 

The Concertación hopes that by spelling out its agenda it will be viewed as a serious proposition by the electorate and improve on the dire results obtained in a few cameo appearances in last November's municipal elections. The accord defines some basic points: candidates who want to stand in national primary elections for the Concertación must do so as individuals not as a slate; the top two candidates will then form the coalition's presidential and vice-presidential ticket 

The Movimiento Popular Tekojoja, the party recently set up by Lugo, did not sign up to the accord because it disagrees with the idea of primary elections, open to all except the members of other parties, on the grounds that it could be manipulated and would be too costly. The political parties forming the Concertación agreed that primaries must be held by 28 October at the latest. They also agreed on a vague policy agenda consisting of education and health reform, literacy programmes and the strengthening of institutions. 

What next for Lugo?
The Vatican sent a letter addressed to the San Pedro dioceses and released in Asunción last week by the Vatican representative, issuing an 'a divinis' suspension for Lugo, which means he is unable to carry out his episcopal duties. But, in a blow to his presidential ambitions, it also insisted that he could not return to the laity. It maintained that Lugo's position as bishop is "permanent" and while the Pope could defrock a priest or even a deacon, it could "never" defrock a bishop. 

In addition to the admonition from the Holy See, Lugo's candidacy contravenes Article 235 of the constitution which states unequivocally that "ministers of any religion or cult are unfit to stand for the position of president or vice-president of the Republic". 

Interestingly, while the foreign minister, Rubén Ramí­rez Lezcano, cited the article as evidence that Lugo could not stand for election, President Nicanor Duarte, who is also barred from running for re-election under the terms of the constitution, publicly suggested to Lugo on 2 February that it would be in their interests to work together to reform the constitution so that they could both stand. Resorting to one of his favourite football metaphors, Duarte said that both he and Lugo were currently "offside".

Rural protests
The influential rural union, Federación Nacional Campesina (FNC), began a protest in ten departments on 7 February over the price of cotton. The new agriculture minister, Alfredo Molinas, said that the protest action was unwarranted as the government had promised to meet the demands of the FNC to increase the fixed price for cotton from Gs$1,500 (US$0.29) to Gs$2,000 per kg. FNC leaders said that part of the government increase was in the form of a "technological package" while they simply wanted cash.

BRAZIL | Real gains strength. The Real closed at R$1.98 to the US dollar in the domestic currency exchange market on 15 May. This is the lowest exchange rate since February 2001. The Brazilian central bank has been buying dollars in the domestic market since the beginning of the year to hold the exchange rate but to no avail. The government seems adamant now that the central bank should not intervene again and promised to take other measures to compensate the export sector, such as raising import taxes and cheaper credit for certain industries to boost their productivity and competitiveness. 

URUGUAY | Mercosur is not working. The economy minister, Danilo Astori, renewed his criticism of Mercosur's common external tariff (CET), saying that it has an "anti-export slant". Astori said that the CET only serves the interests of Mercosur's largest partners, Argentina and Brazil, and is "detrimental" to Uruguay. Astori called for a review of the trading bloc's tariff system, adding that the only way Uruguay can overcome its rising trade deficit is by "reaching trade agreements with other countries outside the region". In April Uruguay posted a trade deficit of US$6m, bringing its total trade deficit to US$115m so far this year.

“If the suitcase (containing US$790,550) was confiscated on Saturday (4 August), why was it not made public until Tuesday when the Venezuelan president arrived."

Venezuela's foreign minister, Nicolás Maduro, claims a conspiracy behind the corruption scandal involving Venezuelan businessman, Guido Alejandro Antonini Wilson.

“(Bolivia) is perhaps the only country in the region facing a real threat of secession, of breaking up."

Colombia's former president Ernesto Samper.

“This is a leader who cares about people. That is why I implemented programmes to ensure that while balancing the books, I balance people's lives."

The Prime Minister of Jamaica, Portia Simpson-Miller.

ARGENTINA | Booming growth. The economy grew by 9.1% in September, following up 9.2% growth in August, President Néstor Kirchner revealed while inaugurating a Honda Motor plant on 15 November. "Argentina continues to push forward with strength, generating jobs," Kirchner said. Days later he claimed that the country's unemployment rate in the third quarter fell to 8.1% - its lowest level since October 1992 - compared with 8.5% in the second quarter.

PARAGUAY | Military budget. President Nicanor Duarte agreed to augment the budget for the armed forces by G34bn (US$7.2m), with 80% of the extra funding going towards salaries. The total budget for the armed forces in 2007 was originally G$469bn (US$98.7m). Duarte said the extra budget would also be used for medical subsidies and emergency services, as well as revamping the dental surgery at the military hospital. The opposition accused him of electioneering ahead of presidential elections in April 2008.

The Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV), the single party unifying the different strands of Bolivarianism which is presided over by President Hugo Chávez , appointed a new 15-person party leadership committee from 69 candidates on 9 March. There was no place on the committee for any of the former military officers in Chávez 's inner circle, nor candidates from the more radical left. Instead, the committee will be comprised of moderate left-wingers: Aristóbulo Istúriz, an affiliate of Patria Para Todos (PPT) received the most votes, followed by Chávez 's brother, Adán, the education minister.

Mario Silva, the host of La Hojilla, a pro-government television programme; Jorge Rodrí­guez, the PSUV party coordinator and a former vice-president; and Antonia Muñoz, governor of the south-western state of Portuguesa, completed the top five candidates with most votes. Other notable figures to be elected included Cilia Flores, president of the national assembly; Alí­ Rodrí­guez, ambassador to Cuba and former secretary-general of Opec; Nicolás Maduro, the foreign minister and; Héctor Rodrí­guez, leader of the pro-government students' union.

It was interesting that while former members of Chávez 's old party, Movimiento V República (MVR) picked up six positions on the committee, the PPT took three - a big representation given that it only has four deputies in the national assembly - and the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV), one. In January, Chávez made a big show of reaching out to the PPT and the PCV, when he floated the idea of reactivating Polo Patriótico, the coalition that brought him to power in 1998 [WR-08-02]. Both parties had serious reservations about the PSUV and last year's (failed) referendum on constitutional reform. This display of political pragmatism was designed to win the maximum amount of support in November's municipal elections. PSUV delegates will be responsible for the process of selecting candidates for governor and mayor.

• Election process

Just over 100,000 members of the PSUV from more than 14,000 "battalions" were entitled to vote in the March 9 party elections, which were organised by the national electoral council (CNE). Turnout was 91%. Despite this, an open letter to President Chávez was signed by an estimated 30%-40% of PSUV delegates earlier in the week. It was highly critical of the electoral process claiming that it had "weakened democratic participation, transparency, internal unity, the confidence of the active membership and image of the party."

The government reported this week that 40% of the country's soya and beef are produced in the huge area known as Amazônia Legal. This area, covering nine states of the Amazon basin, is 83% forest and 17% pasture and arable land. Amazônia Legal has been earmarked by the federal government for agricultural development that is supposed to ensure the preservation of 80% of the forest.

Striking a balance between the competing demands of environmentalists and commercial farmers eager to capitalise on booming global commodity prices is a growing problem for Brazilian policymakers. There are growing tensions between conservationists (who want to preserve the Amazon rainforest), and Brazil's powerful agricultural sector, which has used the recent world food crisis to argue in favour of increased agricultural activity in the area. This involves vast land clearances for the creation of cattle pastures and soya crops. 

According to the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais (Inpe, the space research agency), 700,000km2 of Amazônia have been deforested in total. Of this, an estimated 360,000km2 have been cleared in the past 20 years, since Inpe has been monitoring the region by satellite. Carlos Minc, appointed environment minister on 14 May, is worried by an apparent acceleration in the pace of deforestation in Amazônia over the past year. Over the three years to mid-2007, the pace of deforestation in Amazônia (broadly defined by the Brazilian authorities as complete clearing or progressive degradation) had slowed, but significantly, since August last year it appears to have accelerated again, coinciding with a steep rise in global crop prices.

The Inpe estimates that in the period August 2006-July 2007, 4,964km2 of the Amazônia were cleared, followed by a further 5,850km2 in August 2007-April 2008. The director of Inpe, Gilberto Cí¢mara, says that every 10 seconds the equivalent of a football pitch is cleared in Amazônia. The environment ministry estimates that ranchers are responsible for 70%-80% of the clearances. Cí¢mara also maintains that the current satellite monitoring system (Deter) is almost at its limit. It can only pick up deforestation of more than 25 hectares. This means that the official figures probably understate the true picture because ranchers have moved towards smaller partial clearings, presumably in order to avoid detection.

On current trends, the environment agency, Ibama, estimates that in 2008 12,000km2 of rainforest will be stripped of most of its trees and turned into agricultural land. Ibama has been trying to make examples of the worst deforesters, but its efforts are puny given the size of the problem (and of Amazônia). So far this year, the agency has seized 3,500 head of cattle and confiscated 4,300t of grain from farmers operating in protected areas.

On 17 June the government extended a law banning the sale of soya produced on illegally deforested land in Amazônia and warned that it could extend the ban to timber and beef. The idea is that only established farmers working on licensed farmlands will receive approval for the sale of their products while unlicensed illegal ranchers who are striking into the rainforest will be unable to sell them. If it can enforce such rules, the government might be able to slow the pace of deforestation. Minc said the new policy showed the government is serious about halting deforestation and is committed to a policy of environmental registration and licensing in Amazônia. The international environmental organisation Greenpeace welcomed the decision and said that the move showed that it was possible to guarantee food production without further damaging the rainforest.

• Mato Grosso

The state of Mato Grosso, the world's largest producer of soyabeans and previously the worst deforestation offender, has made efforts to combat illegal logging and promote more sustainable agriculture. In 2003, 11,000km2 of forest were illegally cleared in the state; in 2007 this figure was 2,700km2. Although coming from a high base, this was the biggest fall in the rate of deforestation anywhere in Brazil.

The commander in chief of the army, Lieutenant General Roberto Bendini, tendered his resignation last week after being accused of embezzling public funds by the federal appeals court in Comodoro Rivadavia, in the southern province of Chubut. President Cristina Fernández appointed his deputy, General Luis Alberto Pozzi, to replace him.

The army, which was “democratised" in a series of purges by former president Néstor Kirchner when he came to power, is now dogged by corruption. In a separate case last month the defence minister, Nilda Garré, fired 36 senior members of the army, including six generals, for alleged irregularities in military purchases and contract of services. Pozzi himself is accused of illicit association by retired solider, Guillermo González Naya, owner of a company representing Chinese and Korean consortiums supplying the army.

Bendini was accused of siphoning off regimental funds to the tune of US$500,000 (US$160,000) into a private bank account he opened in April 2002. Proceedings against him opened in 2003 but they stalled soon afterwards when Kirchner appointed him. Bendini's appointment had fitted in with Kirchner's policy of putting trusted pingüinos into important positions: Bendini was the most senior army figure in the province of Santa Cruz when Kirchner was governor. The press argues that the fact that proceedings against Bendini have got somewhere now owes much to the government's perceived weakness after it suffered a defeat in the long-running conflict with the farming unions.

• Chapel
  The political opposition and the press are accusing the Kirchners of conflict of interests after the recent registration of an investment consultancy, El Chapel, presided over by Máximo Kirchner, the son of the presidential couple, both of whom are on the board of directors. The press argues that El Chapel will swell what they claim is already a huge family fortune. The main criticism revolves around the fact that the firm will have access to a huge amount of privileged information, allowing it to charge for business advice just before the Kirchners might choose to change economic policy, for instance.