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BRAZIL | Industrial production stagnant in April. Brazil’s industrial production rose by 0.1% from March to April, according to figures released by the national statistics institute (Ibge) on 3 June. From January-April this year, only March registered a notable monthly rise in production (+1.2%). January, February, and April saw very slight increases of 0.1% or 0.2%. However, in year-on-year terms, industrial production in April 2025 was down 0.3%.

Out of the 25 product categories measured by the Ibge, 13 registered monthly increases in production and nine registered year-on-year increases. The categories that saw the highest monthly rises were printing & recording equipment (+11.0%), smoking products (+5.6%), and drinks (+3.6%); the greatest decrease was registered in pharmaceutical products (-8.5%).

In year-on-year terms, the categories with the greatest increases were maintenance, repairs, & installation of machinery & equipment (+10.4%), extractive industries (+10.2%), and textile products (+6.6%), while the greatest yearly decreases were in printing & recording equipment (-17.5%), pharmaceutical products (-9.0%), and electrical machines, devices, & materials (-6.7%).

BRASIL | Cayendo como moscas. El escándalo de corrupción que aqueja al ministerio de transporte federal y agencias públicas  relacionadas, han explotado la semana pasada, con 16 funcionarios removidos, a instancias de una furiosa Presidenta Dilma Rousseff, que aparentemente ha ordenado una “limpieza total” en respuesta a la crisis. La limpieza no se limitará al parecer al ministerio0 de transporte, con rumores que la presidenta está en el sendero de la guerra contra otros ministerios, incluido el ministerio de ciudades (conducido por el aliado Partido Prohgresista) y el ministerio del trabajo (conducido por el aliado Partido Democrático Trabalhista). La limpieza ordenada por la presidenta ha puesto los pelos de punta en la coalición gobernante, no menos debido a su decisión de designar reemplazantes por sí misma, pero los asesores presidenciales insisten en que “no hay preocupación acerca de la gobernabilidad”. Los mismos asesores niegan que la presidenta es primariamente motivada por una preocupación con su imagen pública y su rating en las encuestas. Sin embargo, es notable que Rousseff se haya sentido lista para remover a un ministro y varios altos funcionarios sobre la aparente base de alegatos de prensa –y antes de ninguna acción judicial. Los críticos de Rousseff afirman que su reacción a las crisis en sus primeros seis meses en el poder, no se trata de otra cosa que ‘manejo de crisis’ y no corresponde a ningún genuino interés en reformar el intensamente clientelista sistema de Brasil. También advierten que sus esfuerzos podrían poner en riesgo seriamente la gobernabilidad en la coalición gobernante de 15 partidos. El predecesor y mentor de Rousseff, Lula da Silva (2003-2010), salió en su defensa esta semana diciendo que Rousseff había actuado “correctamente” y que ella tiene “la capacidad de liderar en estas y otras situaciones”. El pronostica otro cuatro años para su protegida, más allá de 2014. De una u otra manera, Lula probablemente estará aguardando.

BRASIL | ‘Una bala a través del tren’. La concesión para construir y operar el largamente planeado tren bala desde Río de Janeiro a São Paulo no tuvo oferentes el 11 de julio, forzando al gobierno de Rousseff ha revisar sus términos. Ahora ha decidido dividir la operación en dos partes, y ofrecer primero una licencia de operación, seguido de una oferta separada para la construcción de las obras, que se espera que cueste unos R$35bn (US$22bn). Las nuevas subastas están provisionalmente programadas para febrero de 2012, asumiendo que la nueva propuesta estará disponible para octubre. El tren vinculará Río de Janeiro con São Paulo, una distancia de 513km con otra rama a Campinas, alrededor de 100km al norte de São Paulo. El gobierno desea que ya esté listo para el inicio de los Juegos Olímpicos de 2016.
El congreso ya ha aprobado R$20bn en financiamiento del banco nacional de desarrollo (Bndes) para el proyecto, y el gobierno es reacio a comprometer más, pero puede que esté presionando a fin de hacer que el proyecto despegue. Entre las compañías interesadas están Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. de Corea del Sur; Samsung SDS Co. Ltd y un grupo de construcción brasileño, CR Almeida, pero ellos al parecer fueron frenados por los obstáculos burocráticos involucrados. Analistas del transporte también dicen que la ruta Río de Janeiro-São Paulo está bien servida por aerolíneas baratas, creando dudas acerca de la factibilidad de un tren de alta velocidad.

ARGENTINA | Carne para China. Esta semana, el gobierno de China anunció que permitirá que la carne argentina de primera entre a su mercado; desde que China marginó a EU, las importaciones de carne de Rusia y la Unión Europea favorecen a Argentina, este último se espera que haga de China un destino prioritario para su carne. China importa unas 40.000 toneladas de carne por año, de las 300.000 t consumidas en el país; actualmente, Uruguay, Australia, Nueva Zelanda y Brasil son los únicos países a los que se permite exportar carne a China. La importación de Argentina de frutas cítricas, incluidas naranjas, pomelos y mandarinas, también ha sido aprobada por las autoridades chinas.

The GDP growth figure for the third quarter was respectable: 4.2%, year-on-year, according to the central bank. That brought the rate of growth for the first nine months of 2011 to 3.8%.

The strength of oil prices is the main reason for the growth. Export prices have averaged US$100 a barrel so far this year. The government has been using these export receipts to pay for projects. This policy does two things: it boosts the non-oil sector of the economy and it also pushed up the money supply and therefore provides the kindling for inflation.

It is worth noting that Venezuelan domestic consumption is still not excessive, by regional standards. Total domestic demand was up by 8.9% annually in the third quarter: private sector consumption was up 4.2% and public consumption was up 4.7%. What is dismal is the amount of non-government investment: gross fixed capital formation was a mere 0.4% year-on-year, having contracted 2.2% year-on-year in the second quarter (and 6.3% overall in 2010).

The government argues that this does not matter that much. The energy and oil minister, Rafael Rodríguez, argues that “we don’t have a [oil]volume policy [which would mean more investment in oil infrastructure], we have a price policy”. This stance chimes with several other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (Opec), notably Iran, but also Algeria.

China is also becoming a factor in Venezuela’s oil industry.  It is co-investing with Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa), to push up production towards the (unprecedented) level of 4m bpd. Currently Venezuela is producing less than 3m bpd but no-one is sure how much less. Our guess is that production is around 2.6m bpd, just above Mexico’s.

Law of Costs and Prices: The Nueva Ley de Costos y Precios was approved by the unicameral congress on 21 November. The idea is that the government will control profit margins at each step along the supply chain. The inherent risk is that price signals will get lost, so supply and demand will get (even more) out of kilter.

The government’s supporters argue that the new law will end companies using scarcity as a marketing strategy. This seems plausible because supply chains are so much more flexible than they used to be: to the government supporters only companies which are inefficient or extortionately profitable will fall foul of the new system. The pro-government economists also point out that at least one previous administration, Jaime Lusinchi (1984-89) had used a Comisión Nacional de Costos y Salarios, but this only set the final cost of products taking not account of inputs.

The government’s many critics say that this attempt to manage the market will lead to shortages. Presumably if these occur, especially in an election year, the government will step in and start supplying the supply chain and presumably swallow any loss.

China : On 24 November President Hugo Chávez announced that China is offering the country US$8bn in credits to finance oil projects. Chávez said that US$4bn would go on oil projects developed by the joint venture, Petrosinovensa. The idea is to take Petrosinovensa’s production from the Orinoco tarbelt up from 105,000bpd to 330,000bpd. Pdvsa has a 60% stake in Petrosinovensa and the other 40% is held by the China National Petroleum Corporation

Another US$4bn would come in he first quarter of 2012 to finance other heavy crude projects in the Orinoco tarbelt.

Venezuela has already borrowed (or arranged US$20bn in credit) from China and has further credit available from the Fondo Pesado which was set up in 1997 (so before Chávez took office). Initially this fund held US$6bn but the cap was increased to US$12bn in 2009.

• Venezuela’s trade with China is likely to be over US$17bn in 2011 and the two governments want to get it over US$20bn by 2012.

Netflix, American Express and Mastercard were some of the big US companies to announce a move into Cuba in early 2015, following the historic deal between the two countries to renew full diplomatic relations announced in December last. Google and the agricultural giant Cargill were among the big US companies heavily lobbying President Barack Obama last year to take his decisive step. With a population of 11m, Cuba stands to be a major new consumer market for US firms, who are anxious not to lose out on this lucrative opportunity to rival Canadian and European firms already well established on the ground.

Shortly after the US Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control published revised guidelines on trade and financial transactions with Cuba, as per President Obama’s moves to liberalise economic relations alongside the diplomatic thaw, Mastercard announced it would allow its cards issued in the US to be used in Cuba, effective as of 1 March. American Express followed suit, saying that it planned to begin business activities in Cuba. Visa likely will do likewise; under the new guidelines, US visitors to Cuba can use US credit and debit cards.

The Netflix move is more of a pre-emptive strike, as despite existing and planned fibre optic cables connecting from Venezuela/Jamaica and Miami, most of Cuba does not yet have the Internet capacity for online streaming. However, in a statement, the CEO and co-founder of the California-based company, Reed Hastings said Netflix would be available in Cuba as of 9 February. The current Netflix monthly subscription of US$7.99 is clearly unaffordable to most Cubans, where the average monthly wage was just under US$18 in 2014, according to the national statistics office (ONE), which also reports an internet penetration rate of just 5%, one of the lowest anywhere in the world.

Boosting electronic communications between the US and Cuba has been strongly promoted by President Obama. Cuba has long complained about such surreptitious efforts by the US – ranging from the Miami-based Radio Marti broadcasts to the ill-fated smuggling of computer equipment and satellite phones by Alan Gross; to last year’s rather comical revelations of various covert operations by the US Agency for International Development (USAID, for full details of which see the August 2014 edition of our sister publication, LatinAmerican Security & Strategic Review). Since 2009 Obama has taken significant steps to end restrictions on exports to Cuba of communications hardware, software and services.

Opening up the lines of communication

In April 2009 Obama announced changes under which US telecommunications providers would be able to establish fibreoptic cable and satellite facilities linking the US and Cuba, as well as request licences to enter into and operate under roaming service agreements with Cuban providers. Additionally, US satellite radio and satellite television service providers could get a licence to provide services to customers in Cuba. Persons under US jurisdiction would be allowed to activate and pay US or third-country service providers for telecommunications, satellite radio, or satellite TV services provided to individuals in Cuba, save for certain senior Communist Party and Cuban government officials. People would also, under a licence exception, be able to export to Cuba communications devices such as mobile phone systems, computers, software and satellite receivers.

Obama’s predecessor, President George Bush (2001-2009), in 2008 announced that Cuban-Americans could send mobile phones to family members in Cuba. He also permitted faith-based organisations and non-profit groups working with Cuba to provide computers and Internet access to the Cuban people. That move was in response to President Raúl Castro’s decision the same year to lift the ban on the use of mobile phones by Cuban citizens, as part of his plans to ‘update’ the Cuban economy.

• Google makes web development tools available to Cubans

Following his widely publicised trip to Cuba last year, Google’s CEO Eric Schmidt stated: the “blockade” makes absolutely no sense to US interests: if you wish the country to modernize the best way to do this is to empower the citizens with smart phones (there are almost none today) and encourage freedom of expression and put information tools into the hands of Cubans directly”. Google subsequently launched its Chrome browser in Cuba, followed in November 2014 by its Google Play developer console and Google Analytics. Under the US embargo, it only offers free apps on Google Play, and only the free version of Google Analytics. Notably, third-party developers wishing to offer their free apps in Cuba can do so via Google Play.

*** JAMAICA PLEASES ENVIRONMENTALISTS OVER MINING. On 21 November, Prime Minister Andrew Holness announced a ban on mining in the environmentally sensitive Cockpit Country, an area in Trelawny and Saint Elizabeth parishes. He said that any existing mining licences that allowed mining in the designated zones would be amended. Holness said: “The area is too valuable in terms of its ecological and hydrological importance and uniqueness to allow mining, which may result in permanent and irreversible harm, and deprive future generations of the benefit of the national asset.”

As to the designation of the protected area, this will coincide with the boundary specified in 2005 by the geologist Parris Lyew-Ayee. Holness said: “We are therefore protecting the ‘core Cockpit’, that is areas that have not been degraded and occupied by irreversible human activities, as well as the forests’ flora and fauna that subsist on the core…or surround the boundary of the Cockpit Country and the Cockpit Country Protected Area.”

It is the government’s intention to have the Cockpit Country Protected Area declared a world heritage site by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (Unesco).

*** IMF TELLS REGION TO LOOK TO GRENADA, JAMAICA, AND ST KITTS. In mid-November, International Monetary Fund (IMF) head Christine Lagarde told the 2017 High Level Caribbean Forum that “too often promising reforms have been cut short by policy reversals driven by political pressures”. However, she pointed to Grenada, Jamaica, and St Kitts & Nevis as examples of countries where “well-designed fiscal rules” have contributed to stability. She said: “The experience of these countries, which has been very successful, can provide a good example for other countries in the region”.

Nevertheless, the IMF chief admitted that despite the efforts by “many authorities in the region” to pursue macroeconomic stability and fiscal consolidation, “growth is somehow resisting those efforts”. Lagarde added: “It is actually a bit of a puzzle as to why that is.” External shocks could account for some of this disappointment. Other factors could include high electricity costs, limited access to credit, high rates of violent crime, and the loss of talented youth to emigration.

*** IMF CONTINUES TO FUSS OVER BARBADOS. Barbados appeared to be one of the countries that was in Lagarde’s sights when she urged long term policies that are resistant to short-term political pressures (see above). Over recent years Barbados has introduced and then abandoned a medium-term fiscal strategy, and at the moment it is still resisting turning to the IMF for help. Further to Largarde’s comments, on 20 November Barbados Today published an interview with the IMF director for the Western Hemisphere, Alejandro Werner, in which he suggested that a devaluation of the Barbados dollar, currently pegged at BD$2.00 to US$1.00, could be a sensible option, along with a programme of fiscal consolidation.

Werner’s remarks coincided with warnings from Judith Gold, the head of the latest Article IV mission to Barbados, which ended on 22 November. Gold emphasised in particular the need to reform the country’s state-owned enterprises. She said: “Given the urgency in addressing funding, balance of payments risks, the high debt, and limited policy options, the fiscal adjustment must continue with a focus of accelerating reforms [of state-owned enterprises].” She added that these reforms must include “improved management, cost recovery reduced services, mergers, closures, and privatisation”. Gold added: “Containing other current expenditures, including the wage bill and government pensions is also critical.”

On 24 March, local press reported that Mexican broadcaster TV Azteca had become one of only three companies listed in the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) whose shares were worth less than M$1 (US$0.06). As of 13 April, its stock price was M$0.62.

This was partly a result of three of its creditors – Plenisfer Investments, Cyrus Opportunities, and Sandpiper Limited - seeking that the company declare involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code for missing payments related to loans worth US$63.3m. The announcement led to a fall of 31.4% in the company’s share price on 22 March, the largest fall since it was listed in August 1997, and a fraction of its record price of M$10.45 in June 2007. The company is also facing legal action from creditors represented by the Bank of New York Mellon for delays repaying a US$400m bond agreed in 2017.

However, according to local industry analyst Mario Campa, the losses that the company has experienced are not due to mismanagement. Rather they are the result of changes in consumption of content, with audiences watching less live television and spending more time on streaming platforms. As a result, TV Azteca has lost market share.

Increased competition is also reflected in less income from advertisers, upon which TV Azteca is particularly dependent vis-à-vis Televisa, its principal competitor. Moreover, the government has also reduced its spending in advertising, from some M$10bn by the end of the previous administration to around M$3bn under López Obrador. Within this context, while Televisa sold assets, TV Azteca opted for debt.

According to the company’s most recent financial report, submitted to the BMV on 27 March, its net profits in the fourth quarter of 2022 fell by about half relative to the same period of 2021. TV Azteca said it was due to higher operating costs, which increased by 83% during the same period, and a contraction of advertisement revenue. The company’s debt stood at M$9.45bn by the end of 2022, down from M$12.63bn reported at the end of 2021.

According to press reports, on 5 April the company managed to secure legal injunctions against its creditors’ efforts to secure repayment of the bonds, both in Mexico and abroad. The company claims that the coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic affected its finances, and the creditors sought the bankruptcy before it could seek an agreement. It is uncertain whether the creditors will be willing to consider an agreement. However, the legal route could well take years.

From 10 December Uruguay has a law that regulates, under state control, the cultivation and sale of cannabis. It was pushed through congress on the strength of the ruling Frente Amplio’s majority and, should the opposition win the elections in August 2014, it will be repealed. Well aware that the majority of the public opposes the law, the current administration is already conceding the possibility that, if it is proven not to work, it could change course on this matter.

The law obtained final approval from the senate in a 16-13 vote. According to pollsters Cifra, 61% of the public opposes the law, only five percentage points less than a year ago despite the government’s efforts to persuade them of its benefits. That the government went ahead regardless may reflect the fact that disapproval of the law was highest among the opposition Partido Nacional (Blancos) and Partido Colorados, and approval was highest among Frente Amplio followers.

Still, the government has opened the door, if not to repeal the law at least to amend it if it proves not to work. Julio Calzada, head of the Junta Nacional de Drogas (JND, the antidrugs agency), said a day before the bill received final approval, “This is an experiment in the purest and most sincere form because when one seeks alternatives one must necessarily experiment. Anything else would be dogmatism. We don’t want to fall into the same mistakes as those who tell us that the solution lies with what we have been doing so far, even when the results tell us systematically the contrary.”

Calzada has said that since 2001 the number of Uruguayans using cannabis has increased by 120%. This is hard to verify because reliable historic series are not available (Uruguay has not provided figures beyond 2006 for the OAS’s Cicad database). Using his own snapshot for the current situation, about 75,000 Uruguayans use cannabis at least once a month. This is equivalent to 2.9% of the population above the age of 14 — a low level in Latin America.

Seizures of cannabis plants and leaves (often used as an indicator of the size of the consumer market, but also an indicator of the efficiency of the antidrugs effort) have been erratic, with similar peaks in 2007 and 2011, and falls of up to two-thirds in between.

Prevalence of cannabis use would be one of the indicators of the new law’s effectiveness, but this will require hard, reliable data — and time for the new cultivation and commercialisation system to work (certainly unlikely before next year’s elections).

The crime factor

Another measure of effectiveness would be the neutralisation of the criminal impact of illegal trafficking. The government has suggested that the rate of intentional homicides is an indicator — on the strength of the assumption that one dominant motive, labelled ‘settlement of accounts’, reflects the growing violence attributable to drug traffickers.

Statistics show a peak of intentional homicide cases averaging just over 18 cases a month in 2008-10, one-year slump to just under 17, and a second peak of more than 22 in 2012. In the first half of this year there were 147 cases, a monthly average of 24.5 — a rise of 73% of the first half of 2012 which the authorities are finding it hard to explain.

As a gauge of the cannabis law’s effectiveness, this will first have to be persuasively connected to illegal drug trafficking. It is worth mentioning that in 2012 Uruguay’s intentional homicide rate was 8.1 per 100,000, below ‘epidemic’ level and one of the lowest in the Americas.

BRAZIL | New Petrobras leadership to be approved. On 13 April, the shareholders of Brazil’s state-controlled oil company Petrobras elected new members to the company’s board, including the government’s latest appointee for CEO, José Maura Ferreira Coelho. Marcio Andrade Weber was re-elected board member and appointed chairman. Coelho’s appointment as CEO was expected to be ratified as we went to press on 14 April. 

President Jair Bolsonaro had first unexpectedly announced a new Petrobras CEO at the end of March, effectively ousting the company’s current chief executive, Joaquim Silva e Luna [WR-22-13]. This move came amid disgruntlement with Petrobras’s price hikes, awakening familiar concerns that Bolsonaro might seek to interfere in the publicly listed company.

However, the government’s first pick for new CEO, oil & gas consultant Adriano Pires, backed out on 4 April, citing conflicts of interest. A day earlier the government’s nominee for chairman, sports magnate Rodolfo Landim, had also announced he was declining the position, a decision also believed to have been motivated by conflicts of interest.

This left the government with little time to select new appointees ahead of Petrobras’s shareholders meeting on 13 April. It eventually settled on Coelho, a low-profile technocrat who has held a position in the ministry for mines & energy (MME) and as CEO of the state company that manages contracts and the commercialisation of the oil in Brazil’s deep-water ‘pre-salt’ fields. Weber, the new chairman, has had a long career working for Petrobras.

BRAZIL | Monthly inflation at highest point since Plano Real. Brazil’s national statistics institute (Ibge) released the latest inflation figures on 8 April, which show that the monthly consumer price index (IPCA) increased by 1.62% in March. This brings annualised inflation to 11.30%.

The monthly figure is the highest recorded for the month of March since 1994 – the year that a set of measures to stabilise the economy and fight hyperinflation, known as the ‘Plano Real’, were implemented by former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), at the time finance minister in the government led by Itamar Franco (1992-1995). Meanwhile, the annualised figure is the highest recorded by the Ibge since October 2003.

Inflation, already on an upwards trend, had been expected to accelerate last month due to the repercussions of the war sparked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on oil prices and global supply chains. But Brazil’s March figures exceeded market forecasts, with the president of the central bank (BCB), Roberto Campos Neto, describing them as a “surprise”.

As expected, a sharp increase in fuel prices – up 6.70% in March compared with February – contributed heavily to overall inflation in March, as did a 2.42% increase in prices in the food & drink category. “The increase in fuel prices ends up being reflected in other products in the economy, amongst which are foodstuffs,” says Pedro Kislanov, the coordinator of the IPCA.

Date: 30 November

Type: Presidential, legislative (128 national deputy candidates representing the country’s 18 departments), local (298 mayoral candidates, 298 vice mayoral candidates and more than 2,000 town councillors), plus 20 candidates for the Central American parliament (Parlacen).

Main contenders (presidential pre-candidates): Rixi Moncada, Rasel Tomé (Partido Libertad y Refundación, Libre); Nasry Asfura, Ana Rosalinda Carías, Carlos Urbizo, Jorge Zelaya Munguía (Partido Nacional, PN); Jorge Cálix, Salvador Nasralla, Maribel Espinoza, Luis Zelaya (Partido Liberal, PL).

Broken promises open door to political alternatives

In 2021, Xiomara Castro of the ruling Libre party came out on top in a hotly contested presidential election, replacing Juan Orlando Hernández (2014-2022) of the PN. Castro became the country’s first-ever female president, while Hernández, who had ruled for two consecutive four-year terms in contravention of a constitutional ban on presidential re-election, was convicted in March 2024 in the US of drug and weapons-related charges and in June was sentenced to 45 years in prison. 

Despite promising to overhaul Honduran politics and society after 12 years of PN rule, Castro has had only limited success in enacting her agenda. Attempts to deal with day-to-day concerns such as street crime, public services, and welfare programmes have a mixed record: while the government has expanded the popular Red Solidaria social programmes and improved access to healthcare, Castro’s security policies have come under fire. 

A controversial state of exception first imposed by the Castro government in 2022 has remained in place and has failed to tackle extortion as promised. In fact, a report by local civil society group Asociación Para una Sociedad Más Justa published 3 December revealed a rise in the number of households affected by extortion, with 11.6% of the population affected in November 2024, up from 11.1% in November 2023. And while the government highlights a fall in the homicide rate from 41.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2021 to a projected 26.8 per 100,000 in 2024, it remains the highest in Central America while the state of exception has been linked with alleged human rights abuses by security forces.

Voters have also become disillusioned by a lack of progress in delivering on the lofty promises with which Castro entered office, such as restoring constitutionality and clamping down on corruption by implementing a proposed anti-corruption commission backed by the United Nations (UN) known as CICIH. This can be partly explained by legislative paralysis in congress, as Castro’s fragile legislative coalition fell apart soon after she came to power, leading to gridlock. With the opposition PN as the largest single party, holding 43 of 128 seats, Castro has sought controversial alternative methods to force through policies. For example, the government turned to the supreme court to annul the legal basis for special development zones known as ZEDEs after failing to pass the necessary legislation in congress.

Castro has not made the same kind of efforts to implement a CICIH, and in December the UN criticised the government over the slow pace of necessary legal reforms. One possible explanation is that Castro is dragging her feet to avoid putting her allies at risk of prosecution. The president is herself part of the country’s political elite: she is married to former president (2006-2009) Manuel Zelaya, who was forced out in a coup in 2009 and who is part of an extended political clan. A recent scandal linking members of her extended family to illicit campaign financing from drug traffickers has raised further questions about her anti-corruption bona fides. 

With relations with the US already strained over issues such as the controversial appointment of attorney general Johel Zelaya in 2023, and establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 2022, Castro’s handling of the revelations also further damaged ties with Washington, after the president cancelled a longstanding extradition treaty shortly after the scandal broke. This led to accusations of hypocrisy as observers speculated that the move was designed to protect members of her family from facing justice in the US, which Castro had applauded in the case of her predecessor, former president Hernández.

The suggestion of links between Castro’s family and organised crime have fed into growing disillusionment with politics in Honduras, particularly as the president presented herself as an anti-corruption crusader. Polling undertaken in February-March 2024 by Jesuit research team Equipo de Reflexión, Investigación y Comunicación (ERIC-SJ) revealed that 78% of respondents had little or no interest in politics, and recent scandals have not led to the kind of mass protests that the country has seen in years past.

Despite this feeling of apathy, there is still a heightened risk of political violence as election day approaches. There were 64 documented cases of electoral violence from October 2020-November 2021, and a series of reforms designed to strengthen independence and transparency of electoral institutions have still not been implemented, meaning that similar conditions remain in place this time around. US officials have requested permission to observe the primary elections which are due to take place in March, as they did in 2021.

Castro has resisted calls for her to resign in the wake of recent scandals, maintaining the ability to use her office to help the cause of her chosen successor Rixi Moncada, a lawyer by training who was named defence minister in September 2024. 

Libre’s election hopes will undoubtedly be affected by Castro and her family’s alleged links to drug traffickers, but Moncada will benefit from being a fresh face. There is still time for Castro to make some moves towards her promise to create a CICIH, thereby creating a positive narrative around anti-corruption efforts by the party. 

Her economic record is also relatively strong, with the latest (December 2023) estimate by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (Eclac) projecting that Honduras posted 3.6% GDP growth in 2023, above the 3.1% average for Central America and Castro earned praise from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in October, for agreeing to implement “prudent” macroeconomic policies as part of a funding agreement.

GDP growth has proven “broadly resilient,” said the IMF, which also highlighted improved economic management and lent its support to Castro’s proposed Ley de Justicia Tributaria tax reform, which has caused tensions with the country’s private sector. Libre officials will be hoping that this record, as well as increased social spending, will be enough to outweigh continued concerns over corruption in the minds of voters.

As regards voter preferences, polls suggest the race remains wide open. One survey published on 20 January by local pollster Paradigma shows that Moncada would face off against Asfura of the PN and Nasralla of the PL, with 16.0% of the 2,370 respondents saying they would vote for Nasralla if the elections were held that day, followed by 13.6% for Asfura and 8.7% for Moncada. However, the same poll also showed that 36.9% of those surveyed would not vote for any of the candidates, and 16.2% said they didn’t know who to vote for or didn’t answer at all, indicating a high level of uncertainty.

Trinidad & Tobago’s Prime Minister Stuart Young announced this month that the US had revoked special licences for the development of two offshore natural gas projects between Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela: Dragon, which was being developed by British multinational oil firm Shell and Trinidad’s state-owned Natural Gas Company (NGC), and Cocuina-Manakin, which was being developed by NGC and British multinational BP.

The projects are in Venezuelan waters, very close to the maritime border with Trinidad & Tobago. Developing the Dragon field in particular, (which has an estimated 4tn cubic feet [tcf] of gas reserves, compared with an estimated 1tcf for Cocuina-Manakin), would have solved a big problem for the Trinidad government: the existing Atlantic liquified natural gas (LNG) project is running out of gas to liquefy. Last year Atlantic, a partnership between Shell, BP, and NGC, produced 8.5m tonnes of gas, 4m less than its installed capacity according to figures from UK-headquartered London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG), a global financial data provider, cited in a 20 March Reuters report.

Earlier in March, BP had said it was planning to decommission the first production train at Atlantic, which has been idle since 2020, because of a lack of sufficient feedstock. On paper at least the Dragon field could have solved that problem many times over, providing the natural gas needed to boost Atlantic LNG output.

Both Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela had been eager for the projects to go ahead. In December 2023 NGC announced the signing of the licence relating to the Dragon field between NGC, Shell, and Venezuela’s oil ministry while in July 2024 it announced the signing of a similar licence with BP relating to the Cocuina-Manakin gas fields. Under the previous US government led by former president Joe Biden (2021-2025), the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (Ofac) had granted special licences to the companies, allowing them to operate despite US sanctions against Venezuela.

However, on 9 April Young confirmed Ofac’s decision to revoke the licences, which comes as a major blow to the government. It was hardly a surprise given similar measures taken by the current US administration led by President Donald Trump against other oil companies operating in Venezuela such as US oil firm Chevron [WR-25-10]. In a 9 April statement the Energy Chamber of Trinidad & Tobago (ECTT), the lobby group for the energy and related sectors, described the news as “disappointing…but not unexpected”, underlining the importance of the government “continu[ing] to engage actively” with the US and Venezuela. Young has also revealed plans to seek meetings with US officials ahead of the 27 May deadline for the companies to wind down activities.

• Other opportunities?

In its 8 April statement on the revoked Ofac licenses, the Energy Chamber of Trinidad & Tobago nonetheless highlights “significant opportunities to develop natural gas fields within Trinidad & Tobago’s exclusive economic zone”. It cites the Mento and Coconut offshore gas fields being developed by US-headquartered EOG Resources and BP, Ginger which is being developed by BP, and Manatee (Shell). It also notes that there are others, including Calypso, Blackjack, and Onyx, “where companies are working towards taking a final investment decision”.

Just days after claiming in a state of the nation address that his administration had made significant progress in improving public security, Guatemala’s left-of-centre reformist President Bernardo Arévalo was forced to declare a national state of siege over a wave of violence linked to gang activity. The episode would appear to provide a clear indication that insecurity remains a major problem in Guatemala.

In his state of the nation address to the national congress on 14 January, marking the start of his third year in office, President Arévalo claimed progress had been made in improving public security and that the initiatives implemented by his government were starting to deliver results. In particular, he said that the strategy of deploying joint national police (PNC) and army patrols to reinforce security and combat criminality had led to a fall in homicides in the second half of 2025, although he did not provide absolute figures. He added that the security forces had also dismantled 148 criminal structures and captured 2,800 criminals in 2025, up 92% on 2024. While admitting that more needed to be done to strengthen public security, he insisted that his government was on the right path to achieve this.

Days later however, over the 17-18 January weekend, a wave of armed attacks targeting the PNC across Guatemala City left ten PNC officers dead. The attacks took place amid riots at various prisons by incarcerated gang members reportedly unhappy with their treatment, and follow riots in prisons and a high-profile jail break last year which ultimately resulted in the replacement of the country’s security minister [SSR-25-12]. Government officials said the latest violence was aimed at pressuring authorities into accepting gangs’ demands for their jailed members to get certain privileges. In particular, this included demands for Aldo ‘El Lobo’ Duppie Ochoa, a leader of the Barrio 18 (M-18) gang, who is being held in maximum security prison Renovación I, in Escuintla department, to be transferred to a different prison with better conditions.

• Prison riots

Prison riots have occurred on various occasions since 31 July 2025 after the Arévalo government ordered incarcerated leaders of Barrio 18 (M-18) and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the country’s two main gangs, to be transferred to other prison facilities to isolate them from their subordinates. During the latest riots, which took place over the 17-18 January weekend in three prisons, including maximum security prisons Fraijanes II in Guatemala City, and Renovación I, in Escuintla department, 45 prison officials and a psychologist were taken hostage by inmates who have since released them.

President Arévalo responded to the attacks by declaring a 30-day state of siege, during which some civil liberties are suspended, and the authorities have the power to detain any individual without requiring a judicial warrant, inter alia.  Announcing the measure in a nationally televised address, Arévalo claimed the bout of violence was a sign that the public security initiatives implemented by his government were being “successful,” leading the gangs to take “desperate” actions to try to force it to change course. However, he emphasised that his administration would not be intimidated nor forced to change its course by criminals, and rejected the possibility of his government negotiating with the gangs to stop the violence.

Arévalo, who won the 2023 election by a landslide with the pledge to take on the ‘pacto de corruptos’ network of institutional corruption, has also linked the violence to efforts to overhaul key institutions this year, including the attorney general’s office, the electoral court (TSE), the constitutional court (CC), and the comptroller general’s office (CGC) [SSR-26-01]. On 19 January, the day after he declared the state of siege, he was cited by state news agency Agencia Guatemalteca de Noticias (AGN) as saying that “criminal political mafias” were behind the attacks, amid efforts to “resist and seek to instil terror because they know that this year Guatemala will recover its justice system”. He also accused the attorney general’s office and its head, María Consuelo Porras, who has been blacklisted by the foreign community and is aligned with the ‘pacto’, of protecting the gangs, after prosecutors failed to charge individuals with crimes sufficiently serious for them to face justice under new anti-gang legislation which was passed last year in response to earlier prison riots.

BRAZIL | Job creation slows. The labour ministry released new figures from its national employment registry (Novo Caged) on 30 June, which showed that a net 72,960 new jobs were created in May. This is down on monthly terms compared with the net 79,526 jobs created in April and a year-on-year decrease compared with 153,108 jobs in May 2025. A total of 2.21m new hires were registered in May this year, which is lower than the 2.29m new hires the previous month and 2.28m new hires in the same month last year. Meanwhile, dismissals totalled 2.13m, which is down from 2.21m in April but up from 2.13m in May 2025.

BRAZIL | Public sector deficit widens. The central bank (BCB) released statistics on 30 June showing that the public sector’s primary deficit in May stood at R$56.1bn (US$10.8bn), up from the monthly deficit of R$33.7bn in the same month last year.

The central government and regional governments posted deficits of R$55.2bn and R$1.2bn respectively, while state-owned companies posted a surplus of R$300m. In the 12 months through May 2026, the accumulated annual public sector deficit came to R$149.0bn, or 1.14% of GDP. Meanwhile, the public sector’s nominal deficit, which includes the primary result and debt interest payments, stood at R$163.7bn in May. The annual nominal deficit over the 12 months through May totalled R$1.26tn (9.62% of GDP).

BRAZIL | Federal tax revenue rises. The Receita Federal do Brasil (RFB), the federal government’s tax authority, reported on 25 June that tax revenue in May this year totalled R$266.79bn (US$51.38bn). This marks a real increase of 10.7% compared with the monthly revenue registered in May 2025 and is the highest figure on record for the month of May.

According to a government press release, the result for May was influenced by factors such as the imposition of an export tax on oil, a measure created to offset the reduction in diesel tax rates amid the conflict in the Middle East, with revenue generated by this measure totalling R$1.05bn in May. The government also reported that the tax take in the first five months of 2026 totalled R$1.32tn, which is up 6.42% in real terms compared with January-May 2025.

Last month, the government led by President Juan Carlos Varela released a report by a panel of experts commissioned in April in the wake of the ‘Panama Papers’ scandal [RC-16-04], the biggest leak of secret information in history which exposed the internal operations of a locally-headquartered law firm dedicated to the incorporation of offshore entities. The previous month, Panama signed the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (known as ‘The Convention’). However, these efforts by the government to reassure vis-à-vis tackling official corruption have yet to convince either the public or some members of the international community.

The report into Panama’s financial system was not without controversy itself after two of the panel’s members – US Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, who led the commission, and his colleague, Swiss legal expert Mark Pieth – both quit in August over accusations that the Varela government would not make the contents of the report public. On 21 November, the government released the report’s findings. The overriding message was that Panama must revise and strengthen its corporate, financial and legal system to help create a new global financial architecture in which tax havens have no part. Among various recommendations, the 23-page report urged the national government to “establish as soon as possible an integral vision for the national strategy of international services, which must respond to the national interest and to the national strategy of long-term development. Specifically, this should include Panama's exclusion from any discriminatory list related to tax issues, transparency and effective exchange of information as one of its main objectives. The strategy should define short-, medium- and long-term initiatives to ensure compliance with this strategic objective based on the recommendations made below and on a constant analysis of trends and risks in the international context.”

The report also calls for the creation of an independent, permanent committee of legal and financial experts to ensure that its recommendations are implemented and to further oversee the whole process and recommends that the finance & economy ministry (MEF) presents as part of its annual budget a report into the government’s progress in implementing the report’s recommendations.

The Varela government has also trumpeted as further evidence of its commitment to strengthening transparency, Panama’s adherence to the OECD’s ‘Convention’ on 27 October while, a week later, Panama joined the OECD’s Inclusive Framework which aids collaboration in the implementation of the OECD’s and G20’s Base Erosion and Project Shifting Package (BEPS) which seeks to harmonise tax policy to avoid loopholes and mismatches. However, these efforts have yet to reassure either the public (see box) or members of the international community such as France which announced last month that it would not remove Panama from its list of tax havens (see sidebar).

Popularity

The most recent survey by pollster Dichter & Neira, released on 22 November, showed President Varela with 42% approval in November, up from 39% in October and 40% in September. However, the same survey showed that just 15% of respondents believed that the government operated in a transparent manner. This is the lowest rating of the last twelve months and down from 31% in December 2015. For all the government’s recent efforts [RC-16-11], the same survey also showed that the main public concern is security – cited as such by 30% of respondents (up from 21% in September), followed by unemployment (12% down from 13% in September) and cost of living (9%), down from 17% in September. The survey interviewed 1,200 people and had a 2.9% error margin.

• France

Last month, the local press reported that despite Panama’s inking of the OECD ‘Convention’, France had opted to retain Panama on its list of tax havens, to which it was added in April this year, in the wake of the ‘Panama Papers’ scandal.

Remittance inflows reached US$946.2m in the first quarter, up 9.5% year-on-year, according to El Salvador’s central reserve bank (BCR).

The monthly inflow in March was US$364m, up 8.5% year-on-year and the highest inflow for a single month in the past decade. According to the BCR, 70.9% of inflows came through the banking system and 23% arrived through financial cooperatives such FEDECACES and FEDECREDITO, while the rest was brought into the country in cash by relatives. In 2011 remittances came to US$3.64bn, up 6.4% on 2010 and accounting for roughly 16% of total GDP.

VENEZUELA | Siete nuevos acuerdos con Francia. El ministerio de comunicaciones de Venezuela anunció la semana pasada que Venezuela y Francia habían firmado siete nuevos acuerdos de “complementación e integración” durante una reunión bilateral de alto nivel celebrada en Caracas. De acuerdo con una declaración oficial, la reunión estaba encabezada por el ministro de ciencia y tecnología de Venezuela, Ricardo Menéndez, y el ministro de economía social de Francia, Benoit Hamon, quienes firmaron “acuerdos de cooperación, investigación e innovación, y acuerdos de intercambio en las áreas industrial, social, minería, ciencia, y turismo”. Luego de la reunión, Menéndez y Hamon inauguraron un nuevo centro de entrenamiento en mecánica de autos del fabricante francés, Renault, en Los Teques, la capital del estado Miranda. En la inauguración, Menéndez dijo que la firma de los acuerdos abre la posibilidad de que Renault “pronto pueda construir una nueva planta en Venezuela para producir partes y ensamblar algunos de sus modelos”. Y agregó que esto también podría abrir el camino para que otras firmas francesas que han “expresado sus intenciones de venir y establecerse en Venezuela”.

Según la prensa local, el principal objetivo de la visita de Hamon era asegurar la continuada participación de las firmas ferroviarias francesas en los planes para modernizar el metro de Caracas así como también en otras ciudades. La visita fue resultado de una invitación formal del gobierno del Presidente Hugo Chávez al nuevo gobierno socialista del Presidente François Hollande. De acuerdo con la cancillería francesa, la visita de Hamon a Venezuela es la primera visita oficial hecha por un representante del gobierno de Hollande desde las elecciones de mayo en Francia.

La ministra francesa de comercio exterior, Nicole Bricq, visitó Ecuador el 4 y 5 de diciembre para fortalecer los lazos económicos entre los dos países. Bricq, que estuvo acompañada de una delegación de empresarios franceses, se reunió con el Vicepresidente Lenín Moreno en un esfuerzo por incrementar el comercio bilateral que totalizó solo US$282m en los primeros 10 meses de este año, según el banco central de Ecuador. Ecuador disfrutó de un superávit comercial de US$83m durante este periodo.

Bricq firmó un acuerdo bajo el cual el gobierno de Francia hará un préstamo de €97m (US$127) a Ecuador, para la construcción de una vía tranviaria de 20kms en la ciudad de Cuenca para el 2015. El proyecto tranviario de US$232m está siendo desarrollado por un consorcio compuesto por las firmas francesas Alstom, CIM-TSO, e INEO.

At the end of October, US oil giant ExxonMobil announced a third major oil discovery in Guyanese waters. In May 2015, the company announced that its Liza-1 well could hold a reservoir of 700m barrels of crude. To this, it added as much as 1.4bn barrels with this year’s Liza-2 discovery. Following the drilling of Liza-3 to a depth of 18,100 feet in 6,000 feet of water about 193kn from Guyana’s coast, and about 2.7 miles from the Liza-1 well, ExxonMobil announced: “Based on the positive results of the Liza-3 well, we now expect Liza to be at the upper end of the previously announced estimated recoverable resources.” It added that drilling will now move to a new site 10 miles north-east of Liza where the company is “targeting a similar reservoir package to what was seen at Liza”.

Even before the latest confirmation, Guyana’s Natural Resources Minister Raphael Trotman had described the ExxonMobil discoveries as “explosively transformative for the economic and social development of all Guyanese”. However, there have been some words of caution. Back in July, the outgoing deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Georgetown warned that no country that has not previously been an oil producer “is well-prepared for a discovery of that magnitude”.

Just a week after the new discovery, the Guyana Guardian published a long interview with a Saudi government oil-market analyst arguing against Guyana seeking to develop refining capacity, on the grounds that it would be too expensive. The interviewee, Michael Boer, told the newspaper that building a refinery on the coast, along with the construction of a kilometre-wide deep-water channel, could cost as much as US$4.4bn, which is nearly three times the country’s foreign debt.

According to this analysis, it would be extremely difficult to find private-sector partners to make such a large investment in the current state of the oil market. The best hope, he suggested, might be China. Other analysts, however, have said that a refinery might be built for as little as US$1bn, depending on the specification.

Another problem that has been raised is the need to manage expectations over jobs in the oil sector. It has been suggested that, because of lack of training, at least 85% of oil-sector jobs will be in foreign hands for 10-15 years.

One organisation that is watching all this with particularly close attention is the opposition People’s Progressive Party (PPP). Guyana’s electorate has a habit of rewarding parties with long periods in power, reflecting no doubt the advantages of incumbency. The People’s National Congress (PNC), which is largely supported by the Afro-Guyanese community, held power for 28 years until ousted by the East Indian-supported PPP in 1992. The PPP then held on to power for 23 years until the PNC returned to power in 2015 as the major component in the A Partnership for National Unity (APNU)-Alliance for Change (AFC) coalition government.

ExxonMobil has said that it will be producing 100,000 barrels of oil per day from 2020, and the PPP’s major fear now is that the traditional power of incumbency will be compounded by the flow of new money from oil, thus enabling the PNC to establish another long period of political ascendancy.

Analysts have been puzzled by the outbreak of major protests in Chile, a country that is relatively wealthier and more equal than many of its neighbours. One contributing factor: privatised and inadequate pensions.

Chile has had a defined-contribution and privatised pension system since the early 1980s. It has been seen as emblematic of the country’s neo-liberal economic policies. Employees pay in 10% of their salaries to the pension funds (AFPs) which set up individual investment accounts. The final pension pay-out depends on the performance of the investments minus AFP commissions. The AFPs have been widely praised by investors for their role in widening and deepening Chilean capital markets.

But until recently their terrible performance, seen from the customers’ point of view, had been relatively overlooked. The original architects of the system expected pension pay-outs to be roughly 70% of final salaries. In fact, research suggests they are coming in at around 38% of final salary for men and 28% for women. In August, the average pension pay-out was US$220, about half the minimum wage and widely seen as not enough to live off.

Successive governments have gradually increased state subsidies to supplement the inadequate private system. A state-supported ‘basic solidarity pension’ (PBS) was introduced for those not covered by the AFPs, along with a ‘solidarity pension’ (APS) for those at the bottom end of the scale of AFP pay-outs.

Faced by the current wave of protests, right-wing President Sebastián Piñera has promised a 20% increase in both the PBS and APS. Many see this as being inadequate. For PBS pensioners a 20% increase would take them from an average monthly pension of US$151 up to US$181, still less than half the minimum wage.

A group of three centre-left political parties have made a counterproposal: that pensions for the poorest be lifted by 50%. A debate on further structural reforms of the pension system seems unavoidable. It looks as if, across the region, the neoliberal economic development model is coming in for increased criticism

PANAMA | Gov’t signs off on new contract regarding major copper mine. On 14 June, Panama’s government led by President Laurentino Cortizo announced that the ministerial cabinet had authorised a new contract with Minera Panamá SA (MPSA), the subsidiary of Canadian mining company First Quantum Minerals (FQM), regarding the copper mine Cobre Panamá. This follows the March announcement of a new deal regarding a concession contract which put an end to uncertainty over the future of the project, which is Panama’s biggest single private foreign investment. The two sides became locked in a dispute in December 2022 when talks over a new contract unravelled. The new contract will include payment by MPSA of an annual minimum contribution of US$375m, and a profit-based mineral royalty of 12% to 16%. Describing the contract as “an historic triumph”, Panama’s trade minister, Alfaro Boyd, said that the finalisation of the new contract followed a public consultation which took place from 22 March to 24 April. He said that it would be sent to the comptroller general’s office for endorsement before being presented to the 71-member unicameral legislature for approval.

NICARAGUA | Remittances surge. On 28 June Nicaragua’s central bank (BCN) published new figures which showed that remittances sent to Nicaragua totalled US$426.2m in May, up 60.2% on the same month in 2022. The same figures showed that remittances in the first five months totalled US$1.82bn, up 60.8% on the same period in 2022. Of the total amount received in May, 83.7% came from the US, while 6.8% came from Costa Rica and 5.5% from Spain.

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URUGUAY | Uruguay advances in joining CPTPP. Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin announced on 23 November that the countries that make up the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) have, without objections, accepted the start of negotiations for Uruguay to join the bloc. Lubetkin stated that a “difficult stage of work” would now begin. He stressed the economic potential of the bloc, which is comprised of Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the UK, and Vietnam, saying together the countries accounted for 15% of global GDP and a population of over 595m people, making it one of the biggest free trade areas in the world. President Yamandú Orsi celebrated the decision and congratulated the officials working towards Uruguay joining the CPTPP. The news will likely generate tensions within the Mercosur regional trade bloc, of which Uruguay is a member along with Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia, as it forbids members from pursuing trade deals unilaterally.

BRAZIL | Petrobras announces investment in refinery expansion. Brazil’s state-controlled oil company Petrobras announced on 2 December that it will invest R$12bn (US$2.24bn) in expansion and maintenance works for the Refinaria Abreu e Lima (RNEST), an oil refinery in the north-eastern state of Pernambuco which Petrobras has described as its most modern processing facility. The investment will fund the construction of a second ‘train’ (processing unit) in the refinery and maintenance works in the first train. The estimated completion date will be in 2029, when the refinery’s total production capacity is expected to reach 260,000 barrels per day (bpd). Petrobras CEO Magda Chambriard said that once the expansion works are complete, RNEST is expected to account for 17% of national diesel production.

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PANAMA | Further signs of revival for Panama’s banana sector. On 9 July Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino announced that Chiquita Panamá, the local subsidiary of multinational banana company Chiquita Brands International, is preparing to export some 11m boxes of bananas over the coming months, and around 15m boxes next year. The announcement is the latest sign of the revival of Panama’s banana sector following a major strike by banana workers which began in April 2025 amid more general protests over new reforms to the social security system, among other things. The banana workers’ strike, which lasted until 11 June last year when a deal was reached between the various sides, completely paralysed productive activity in the banana-producing region of Bocas del Toro, and led Chiquita Panamá to halt operations and lay off workers. Mulino made the announcement regarding the planned exports during a visit to a 200-hectare banana farm in Bocas del Toro, one of 20 farms currently in operation, accompanied by Chiquita CEO Carlos López Flores, and the ministers of trade and industry, Julio Moltó, and agricultural development, Roberto Linares. In May Moltó reported that 5,065 formal jobs in the banana sector had been recovered since the resumption of production in December 2025-January 2026 and approximately 5,000 hectares of farmland reactivated.

GUATEMALA | Remittances up. On 7 July Guatemala’s central bank (Banguat) released new figures showing that remittances to the country totalled US$2.32bn in June, up from US$2.22bn in both May 2026 and June 2025. This brings total remittances for January-June 2026 to US$12.97bn, up from US$12.13bn in the first half of 2025. Remittances closed last year at a record US$25.53bn, up from US$21.51bn in 2024.

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