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SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

FROM: JKC de Courcy, Chairman, Strategic Intelligence Forum

DATE: 7 December 2006

SUBJECT: Catastrophic scenarios for the Middle East

The Iraq Study Group Report, published earlier this week, is both an astounding mea culpa by the US and an exercise in fantastic wishful thinking.  Nevertheless, it does represent a necessary last-ditch attempt to mitigate a catastrophic situation.

With regard to the motives for going into Iraq, we have always argued that nations, no less than individuals, do from time to time act irrationally, and the US's decision to invade Iraq was an irrational lashing out in the aftermath of 9/11. Nonetheless, the Bush administration did try to rationalize the invasion, and it did so on the following grounds:

1.  Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction which he might either use or pass on to terrorists for their use.  This threat had to be neutralized.

2.  Saddam Hussein was either an ally or would become an ally of al-Qaeda.

3.  Removing a brutal dictator and introducing free-market democracy would be salutary for the whole of the Middle East.

Everyone now knows that the weapons of mass destruction did not exist.  Nor did any serious link to al-Qaeda exist before the invasion.  As for post-Saddam Iraq providing a beacon of political and economic advancement for the rest of the Middle East to follow, precisely the opposite has occurred.  Iraq has been fractured, and whether or not it is in a state of civil war, more than 3,000 civilians are being killed each month.  According to the ISG: "Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality.  There are multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni insurgency, al-Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death squads, and organized criminality."  Some 1.6m people are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8m have fled the country.

This is bad, but it could get worse, and so frightened has the US become of a further downward spiral in and around Iraq that it will now support any regime throughout the region that provides stability, signalling a region-wide retreat from not an advance towards democracy.

THE SOLUTION?

The ISG knows that there is no miracle cure to hand, but what it does propose at least has the merit of being sensible if it is achievable.  Its key recommendations are to hasten national reconciliation through the establishment of provincial democracy and good governance; to counter centrifugal forces by ensuring that oil revenue remains a central government asset, the benefits of which would be distributed on a per capita basis; to enlist the good offices of all Iraq's neighbours, including Syria and Iran, and other interested parties; and to start a renewed push for an Arab-Israeli settlement.

The ISG report specifically eschews "devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central control", but in reality that is where the suggested policies seem to be heading, with the proviso that control of oil revenues remains with Baghdad as this would provide a means of holding the disparate parts of Iraq together.

In our view, the ISG is correct in seeing Iraq's neighbours as the key to the crisis, but the problems are enormous and include:

1.  Turkey has to be persuaded that strong autonomy for Kurdistan (and possibly letting the Kurds take control of Kirkuk) is not a danger to Turkey's own stability.  This is probably the easiest of the neighbourly concerns to allay in that an Iraqi Kurdish (and US) commitment not to tolerate Turkish PKK guerrillas operating from Kurdistan would go a long way towards appeasing Ankara.

2.  Iran needs to be persuaded that trying to tie down the US indefinitely in Iraq is not in its best interests.  This won't be easy.  Iran's current government is arguably the least pragmatic since the revolution, and it is virulently anti-US.  Besides, not only is the US losing global credibility on a daily basis due to its blunderings in Iraq (which benefits Tehran as it tries to divide international opposition to its nuclear programme), it is also doing Iran's dirty work for it in fighting the Sunni insurgents.  The ISG seems to think that Iran could be persuaded to ease the US's pain in Iraq in return for a deeper US commitment to fight the Taleban in Afghanistan, but this is unlikely.  There is also a tacit threat within the ISG report, where it says: "Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of US policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state.  Iran's population is slightly more than 50% Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24% of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities.  Worst-case scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with serious consequences for Iranian national security interests."  Tehran is unlikely to be persuaded by this implied threat.

3.  Syria provides the most interesting case.  There is undoubtedly an opportunity - and an imperative - to separate Syria from Iran.  That way, at least, whatever additional influence Iran acquires in Iraq will not extend through Syria to Lebanon.  But the price may be too high for the US to pay.  It would include the continuing power of the minority Alawite regime in Damascus (ie no democracy), a return of Syrian influence to Lebanon, and (above all) a return of the Golan Heights - which may not be within the US's power to deliver, certainly not quickly.  Another potential problem is Syria's perennial habit of missing opportunities.

4.  The Sunni Gulf States all share concerns over the rise of Shia power in Iraq and will not be happy with any new constitutional settlement that would lead to the persecution of Sunnis or an unfavourable distribution of oil revenues.  Squaring the Gulf States, therefore, is dependent on the acquiescence of Iran and the Iraqi Shias in a settlement that is fair to Iraq's Sunni Arabs - but see point 2 above.

CONCLUSION

The ISG report is brutally honest in its assessment of the current position, which is a good start.  Its proposals are also as sensible as can be expected in the circumstances.  There is no magic wand.

The keys are establishing responsible provincial government (while containing centrifugal forces through the control and distribution of oil revenues from the centre) and enlisting the support of Iraq's neighbours.  If both things can be achieved, then a positive outcome is indeed possible.  But there must be the gravest doubts - some of which we have outlined above - as to whether these things can be achieved.

And if they are not?  In the ISG's assessment, the dangers that now face the region, the US, and the wider international community are as follows:

"Continuing violence could lead to greater chaos...A humanitarian catastrophe could follow...

"Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders.  Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader regional war...[There would be] the distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world...Such a broader sectarian conflict could open a Pandora's Box of problems - including radicalization of populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes - that might take decades to play out.  If the instability in Iraq spreads to other Gulf states, a drop in oil production and exports could lead to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global economy...

"Terrorism could grow...The global standing of the United States could suffer...at a time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand our full attention and strong US leadership of international alliances..."

These are frightening scenarios, but they are by no means unthinkable - and it would not be difficult to articulate further catastrophic escalations.  The only positive is that the US now recognizes this.  It is something at least.

JdeC

The full report can be downloaded from: http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/iraq_study_group_report.pdf

On Monday Japan’s Defence Agency think tank - the National Institute for Defence Studies - published its 2005 East Asian Security Review. Not surprisingly, most of the general media coverage of the review has concentrated on the frank remarks it contains about China. In addition to this, however, we were also struck by some little noticed remarks about Russia.

On China, the review notes that Beijing is accelerating its military modernization as it searches "for an effective policy to deal with the strengthening Taiwanese identity and moves for independence". And it says: "It is believed that China’s foreign policies and Taiwan policy under the administration of President Hu Jintao will be increasingly influenced by public opinion and nationalism."

The review says that it is "of particular note" that China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) "has been frequently conducting offensive ‘joint (Yitihua)’ training with a focus on the use of armed forces against Taiwan and blocking the US military intervention".

On the wider security environment in East Asia, the review points with concern to possible maritime terrorism in key shipping routes; lack of effective cooperation in preventing traffic in weapons of mass destruction (it says "Japan and Singapore are just about the only countries in the region that actively participate in the [Proliferation Security Initiative]"); and to the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles by North Korea. It also seems to have some concern about the possible effect on East Asia of the US’s review of its conventional military posture.

As far as Japan’s own posture is concerned, the review is frank about its need to build up its defensive capabilities to "effectively cope with the new threats and diverse situations that are likely to affect peace and security". It also says that Japan will be increasingly active in developing cooperative security efforts in East Asia, in part because "Asean still remains wary of China’s influence on its future, and expects Japan to play a leadership role as a restraining factor vis-à-vis the rapidly growing presence of China in this region."

However, as far as Japan’s defensive capabilities are concerned, the review notes with concern "the increasing weight of restraining factors - such as the tightening fiscal conditions and the decreasing youth population" which could adversely affect Japan’s ability to create a "multi-functional, flexible, and effective" force.

Overall, as far as East Asia is concerned, the report concludes: "The security environment in East Asia as it stands now gives no ground for optimism". Given the overwhelming importance of Asia in the world economy today, this is a conclusion that cannot be ignored. We happen to think that the terrorist threat to the maritime trade routes is probably exaggerated, and we have long argued that the threat from Pyongyang is overstated given that regime survival is its main concern, but on the question of China and Taiwan we are in full agreement with Tokyo’s analysis.

But what about the aside on Russia that caught our attention? There are three aspects to it. First, Tokyo is not shy of agreeing with President Vladimir Putin’s critics in the West who say that his "authoritarian bent is mounting".

Secondly, while pointing out that this "authoritarian bent" is not having any adverse effect on his popularity (indeed, the reverse is true), the review postulates that even "a slight fumble" in dealing with the Chechen problem "could heavily cost Putin’s popularity" and the issue has thus become "the biggest Achilles’ heel of the Putin administration".

The third point about Russia that caught our attention was the assertion that given "the worsening strategic environment on its western front…Russia needs to strengthen its economic relations the Asian neighbours in order to recover its national strength". One of these "Asian neighbours", of course, is Japan, and the review notes with approval that Russia "has adopted the Pacific route, advocated by Japan, for its East Siberian oil pipeline project". Coincidentally, also on Monday (the day the review was published) Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said that he hoped Putin would visit Japan "as soon as possible" following a visit in May by Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Talk of a major Russia-Japan rapprochement has been a recurring theme since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it has equally regularly stumbled over an unresolved territorial dispute dating back to World War II. However, another effort is being made to find a resolution to the dispute, and this looks like one to watch as the year develops. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

DATE: 2 November 2006

SUBJECT: Somalia at centre of regional power struggle

Members of the Strategic Intelligence Forum will be fully aware of our concerns about Somalia.  Most recently we looked at the regional rivalries fuelling the conflict in a briefing in the 26 October issue of Strategic Intelligence Review - "Deterioration in the Horn of Africa".

Earlier this week, the BBC Monitoring Service's research department produced an analysis entitled "The Arabs and the Great Game in Somalia", which in turn draws heavily on a report prepared for the US State Department by the former US ambassador to Ethiopia and Somalia, Professor David Shinn entitled "Somalia: Regional involvement and implications for US policy".  It provides many of the details that space precluded us from including in our 26 October briefing.

The key points are:

* Somalia is at the epicentre of a regional power struggle, fuelled by a complex mix of political, geostrategic, and religious rivalries, that threatens to spark a war that could involve as many as 12 countries.

* The principal actors in the regional rivalry are Ethiopia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia - each of which wants to ensure that Somalia is an obedient satellite state. A supplementary role is being played by Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Yemen, Iran, Libya, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

* Egypt's interest in Somalia is part of its national security strategy to gain influence over Ethiopia, one of the principle sources of the Nile. Relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa have been worsening in recent years, mainly because of the dispute over how the Nile waters should be utilized more equitably between the Nile Basin states.  Ethiopian officials have gone so far as to claim recently that the Egyptian armed forces are being trained in jungle warfare in preparation for a possible future military intervention in the Nile Basin.

Egypt on the other hand suspects Ethiopia of being behind the regional campaign to renegotiate the treaty on the usage of the Nile waters drawn up in the late 1950s. The campaign has attracted support in the Great Lakes region and in east Africa, forcing an increasingly isolated Cairo to abandon its hard line stance.

To rally wider Pan-Arab support for its policies, Egypt has sought to portray Ethiopia as a threat to Arab national security intent on undermining any peace effort in Somalia by encouraging regionalism and arming the warlords.

An editorial by the semi-official Egyptian daily Al-Ahram on 14 June entitled "Next Stop Somalia" called on Arabs not to forget the conflict unfolding in the "southern front".  It warned: "It is high time the Arabs start focusing on the southern front, not just the eastern one [Iraq]."

* Although Egypt says it recognizes the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG), it is opposed to the TFG's pro-Ethiopian president, Abdullahi Yusuf. The TFG president is largely viewed in Arab circles as an Ethiopian puppet - a perception that was enhanced by a recent speech to the parliament in Baidoa in which Abdullahi Yusuf dismissed the Islamists in Mogadishu as "Arabophiles frothing at the mouth".

* It was reported on 29 October that Cairo had officially invited the de facto head of the Somali Islamist movement, Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys, for talks. Aweys frequently visits Arab states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia despite the fact he is on the UN Security Council's targeted sanctions list in accordance with Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999.

* Egypt was unhappy with the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) process that led to the creation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Kenya in October 2004 because of the influence wielded over the process by Ethiopia. It now wants to ensure the Arab League keeps a control of the talks in Khartoum so that any deal struck between the Islamists and the TFG is one that would not disadvantage Egypt's geostrategic interests in Somalia.

* Egypt is also opposed to the recognition of the breakaway state of Somaliland, and there have been suggestions that Egypt is behind the move by Saudi Arabia to maintain the debilitating ban on the import of livestock from Somaliland. The ruling elite of Somaliland is strongly pro-Addis Ababa and is thought to have conducted secret negotiations with Israel.  They may even have signed a secret military pact with the Jewish state according to local reports.

* Saudi Arabia has two primary geostrategic interests in Somalia. One of the consequences of Saudi financial and educational aid to Somalia following the oil boom of the 1970s was the rapid growth of Wahhabism, which in pre Al-Qaeda days the Saudi authorities encouraged.  Now Saudi Arabia is engaged in a bitter struggle with "the deviant group" and fears that Somalia may become a haven for Saudi Wahhabi militants who could use it as a base for anti-regime activity.  The respected Middle East commentator, Adel Darwish, in a commentary published by Al-Sharq al-Awsat on 12 August warned about the "Afghanization of Somalia".

* The other Saudi Arabian objective is to counter the growing influence of Iran in the Horn and the Red Sea regions, particularly given Iran's already strong influence in Sudan. Comoros, a traditional Saudi ally, is now ruled by a cleric trained in Iran and could also be moving towards the Iran camp. Saudi Arabia's current strategy is to support the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and Sheikh Hasan Dahir Aweys is a regular visitor to the Kingdom. Aweys is thought to have established links with prominent Saudi business leaders and officials.

* Libya, the UAE, and Yemen each have their own reasons for involvement in Somalia.

* Yemen is said to be currently backing the TFG, largely because of its concern over Eritrean influence over the UIC. Eritrea and Yemen fought a brief border war over the disputed Hanish Islands in December 1995, and though the dispute was settled after arbitration in The Hague the enmity remains. Yemen's formation of the Sanaa Cooperation Forum with Ethiopia and Sudan in 2002 was seen in Asmara as intended to further isolate Eritrea.

* The UAE is primarily motivated by money. It is the main hub for Somali-run telecom and money transfer businesses, and many of the profitable telecom and money transfer agencies with offices in Dubai and the other emirates are run by supporters of the UIC. UAE investors are also keen on Somalia's untapped oil and mineral potential and to invest in the country's infrastructure like the main port of Mogadishu.

* Libya's alleged support for the UIC appears to owe less to genuine strategic calculations that to Colonel Gaddafi's predilection for backing militants groups overseas irrespective of their ideological leanings.

END

Last week Jordan’s King Abdullah warned US President George W Bush that Iran was interfering in the Iraqi election with a view to establishing a "Shia crescent" in the region, extending from Iraq to Lebanon. There is nothing particularly startling or new about Abdullah raising this issue. What is startling, however, is the degree of fear of Iran that has revealed itself in Jordan following the publication of the king’s remarks.

The problem for Jordan has always been that once the decision had been taken to overthrow the Sunni dictatorship in Iraq and to replace it with a democracy, the remorseless logic of numbers was always going to produce a Shia-dominated government - and a Shia-dominated government in Iraq could never be sympathetic to Jordan given Amman’s past close relationship with and support for Saddam Hussein.

But Jordan’s fear of a Shia-dominated Iraq is compounded by the close association between Iraq’s Shias and Iran, which Jordan sees as the historic enemy of the Arabs. Iran, Jordan argues, takes every opportunity it can to exploit Sunni-Shia divisions to undermine pan-Arabism and to promote Iranian interests in the Gulf states, Iraq, and Lebanon. Jordanian strategists also argue that Iran wants nuclear weapons not in order to help liberate Palestine but to increase its influence over the Arab world.

A commentary published on Monday in the Jordanian newspaper al-Rai, supporting King Abdullah’s remarks, provides an accurate reflection of the level of Jordanian fear of, and animosity towards, Iran. Amongst other things, this is what the commentary said:

* "History proves that since the battle of al-Qadisiyah (637 AD), Iran has been waging big and small wars only against the Arab nation. Despite their successive losses in these wars, Iranians have managed to sow and nurture sectarian seditions in the [Arab] homeland, particularly in the Gulf region."

* "When the US-UK aggression [against Iraq] began, Iranians, proceeding from an historical hatred and loathsome racism, headed towards Iraq to carry out various acts of looting and plundering, as well as assassinations…"

* "Whoever examines the political reality of our brothers in the Arabian Gulf realizes the dangerous Iranian role that is being played by Tehran in the region, particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain. Shia deputies in the Bahraini parliament rejected any stance by the parliament that opposes what took place and is taking place in al-Fallujah…Jordan and all the Arab brothers realize the danger that Iran posed and continues to pose towards their Arabism and their homelands."

* "Since Iranians have a long history of stirring seditions inside the Arab homeland, cautioning in a loud and clear voice against the Iranian role in Iraq is the individual duty of each Arab, each Sunni Muslim and each Shia Muslim who refuses to wager his Arabism and sell it to anyone who harbours deeply rooted hatred."

* "It is noteworthy that Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons means an Iranian nuclear capability to strike us, for the Iranians have no enemy but the Arabs. The notion that Iran is preparing its forces to liberate Palestine is a ridiculous illusion. The utmost that the Iranian regime has offered the Palestinian question is the building that was occupied by the Israeli embassy and is now occupied by the Palestinian embassy!"

The commentary concluded: "The problem with Iran is that it does not deal with us as Muslims whose one religion ought to unify them and close their ranks. Iran’s problem will remain that we are Arabs and they are Persians…All cards are now revealed and the Iranian regime has lost its balance and proceeded towards overt and covert alliances that seek to divide up Iraq, destroy it, slaughter Iraqis, and encourage sedition and internecine fighting…"

King Abdullah has not been as outspoken as this, and foreign-ministry officials have since tried to play down the significance of his anti-Iranian remarks. But there can be no hiding Jordanian (and wider Arab) fears of Iran now that Iraq is no longer the bulwark against Iranian influence that it was under Saddam Hussein.

Iran’s reading of its own position is also interesting. It naturally sees developments in Iraq as positive. However, that is only part of the overall position, and it remains concerned about a number of factors, including of course the US military presence to both its east and west coupled with increasing US pressure over its nuclear programme.

It is also concerned about the lack of substantive Russian support in the row over its nuclear programme. However there are signs that it is trying to compensate for this by strengthening its ties with Beijing and by continuing to develop ties with lesser states that are opposed to the US – including Venezuela and Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

On the face of it, resurgence of interest in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process might also look like a negative for Iran, particularly as it appears to be supported strongly by Egypt. Relations between Iran and Egypt had been improving for a while, but they have now suffered a double setback as a result of Egypt’s apparent rapprochement with Israel and the eruption of a spy scandal. (An Egyptian citizen is under investigation for having spied for Iran – or rather for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which in turn is accused of recruiting and training extremists in Hezbollah camps in Lebanon and of plotting terrorist attacks in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Sources in Cairo say that relations between Iran and Egypt are now "back to square one".)

Interestingly, however, sources in the region say that Iranian officials are actually not overly concerned about the new push towards a Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. At least some Iranian officials take the view that renewed US and European interest in the peace process will absorb a huge amount of Western diplomatic energy and divert attention away from Iran.

In the meantime, Iran will continue to extend its influence in Iraq, which in turn should further increase its influence in Syria and Lebanon. King Abdullah’s fears are by no means misplaced - and given that the demographic reality of Iraq cannot be changed or sidestepped (the US cannot support a return to Sunni dictatorship), these fears will not subside until the counter-revolution finally prevails in Iran. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

DATE: 19 October 2006

SUBJECT: North Korea after the bomb

The Asia Intelligence Service (part of the same group as the Strategic Intelligence Forum) has just published in its October AsiaInt Political & Strategic Review an excellent analysis of the options now facing the international community with regard to North Korea.  Stratint Forum members may download this report in full from:

http://www.asiaint.com/arl/arl11752.asp

In our view this report provides a near-faultless analysis of the current position in North Korea, and the options open to the international community.  It looks at recent intriguing speculation about China's hopes for post-Kim North Korea, and it makes the point that little has in fact been changed by the North Korean nuclear test.

Our one caveat is that while little might have changed on the Korean peninsula, there might be severe implications for the Middle East where Israel will view any weakness in dealing with Pyongyang as a signal that it will not be able to rely upon anyone else to deal with the menace of a nuclear-armed Iran.  As we have argued in detail in the last two issues of Strategic Intelligence Review, Israeli unilateral action against Iran has been brought closer by events on the Korean peninsula.

END

JKC de Courcy
Chairman
Strategic Intelligence Forum

Last week we pointed to some marginal improvements in Iraq, including the tentative disarmament of at least some al-Sadr militants in Baghdad and indications that Iraqi Sunni resistance factions might be trying to put some distance between themselves and foreign militants loyal to al-Qaida. It might not have been much, but it was something. However, a couple of developments in the past week have reinforced the essential point, namely that Iraq’s underlying complications, including the future of Kirkuk and Iranian/Shiite views on Iraq’s future diplomatic orientation, remain unaltered.

At the time of the transfer in power to the interim government in Iraq in June, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Jalal Talabani was noticeably conciliatory on the subject of Kirkuk during a visit to Turkey. Turkey’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul laid down the law, saying: "Everybody knows about Turkish sensitivities over Kirkuk. We would never allow [Kurdish domination to become] a fait accompli in Kirkuk. Everyone should have their fair share of the country’s wealth." Talabani, for his part, said: "Kirkuk is a city of brotherhood where Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen live together…We defend Turkmens’ rights and are working for this. We want to reach an agreement so that this city can become a symbol of Iraqi unity."

But, as we pointed out at the time, although Talabani was as conciliatory as he could be when in Turkey, he was also on record as demanding the restoration in Kirkuk of "the normal situation, which existed before the ethnic cleansing [Saddam’s Arabization] policy began".

There have been many similar Kurdish statements since then, and during the past week Masoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), has been in Turkey and Syria stressing the importance of Kirkuk to the Kurds. When in Damascus he said: "Kirkuk is an Iraqi city with a Kurdish identity. Neither Turkey nor any other country has the right to interfere in its affairs. Neither Turkey nor any other country can be allowed to interfere in the issue of Kirkuk."

But Turkey made it clear during Barzani’s visit to Ankara that it takes exactly the opposite position. Osman Koruturk, Turkey’s special envoy for Iraq, said specifically: "Kirkuk is not only an internal affair for Iraq; it concerns its neighbours as well."

In private meetings with Turkish officials, Barzani was told that Ankara "would not remain a bystander if tens of thousands of Turkmens flood over its border to escape potential violence in Kirkuk", and he was warned against any attempts to change the demographic structure of the city.

It should also be noted that the remarks that Barzani made in Damascus were mild compared with comments made last Thursday (14 October) by Sadun Fayli, a PUK official in Baghdad. He is reported to have said that the Kurds are ready to fight "if the Arab side insists on rejecting the Kurdishness of the oil-rich Kirkuk Province…"

He said: "The escalation of the Kurdish political stand on Kirkuk is necessary as long as there are Arab tendencies inside Iraq that oppose the federal plan and refuse to annex Kirkuk to the greater Kurdistan region that includes the provinces of Al-Sulaymaiyah, Arbil, and Dahuk." And he added: "The PUK and KDP stand on this issue is one and the same."

The other development that caught our attention this week was a broadcast by the pro-Shia Voice of the Mujahidin radio station which attacked the close ties between the Iraqi interim government and Jordan. The radio station is based in Iran and reflects the views of the Iranian regime.

Jordan remains anathema to Iran for two opposite reasons. First, because it was an ally of Saddam Hussein; and, secondly, because it has since made peace with Israel and is therefore seen by Tehran (and, in should be said, by the Palestinians - see Mideast section for details) as little more than a US-Israeli pawn.

Iran is concerned about the training of Iraqi security and police personnel and Iraqi diplomats in Jordan, and on Monday this week it voiced its concerns about the closeness of Baghdan-Amman relations when the Voice of Mujahidin broadcast the following commentary:

"Because of the fact that Jordan was a strategic ally of the tyrant Saddam, the new government should at least have refrained from resuming the same strategic relations. Jordan’s relations with the Zionist entity cause suspicion. This country is regarded as a window for the Zionist entity. Through Jordan, elements from the Zionist Mossad intelligence infiltrate and spread into neighbouring Arab countries…The new government is directing accusations against Iran, which the tyrant Saddam regime had always fought, and maintaining its close relations with countries that caused harm and injury to Iraq and the Iraqis, such as the Jordanian government."

So there are two messages from Iraq this week. First, positions on Kirkuk appear to be hardening; and, secondly, a Shia victory in the forthcoming elections will surely impact adversely on any hopes the US might have for tying Baghdad into a moderate pro-peace alliance with Jordan. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

DATE: 9 October 2006

SUBJECT: North Korea's first nuclear test

DEVELOPMENT: On 9 October North Korea carried out its first nuclear test. South Korea and US confirmed the test on the basis of seismic activity at the believed test-site, a mountain in the remote northern province of North Hamgyong. South Korea says that at 10.36am local time it detected a tremor inconsistent with natural phenomena. The detonation, measuring 3.6 on the Richter scale, was equivalent to roughly 550 tonnes of TNT.

ANALYSIS: North Korea has become the world's eighth nuclear power and is the least predictable of the octet. Very little is known about the workings of the North's military government, which is still technically at war with South Korea and the US. On a daily basis Pyongyang's propaganda promises the annihilation of the North's enemies, chief among them the US and Japan.

Although alarming, North Korea's emergence as a nuclear power is no surprise. Its government has publicly committed itself to nuclear weapons, and a test is a necessary step in the process. North Korea stresses its pursuit of such weapons is for defensive and deterrent purposes only. On 3 October, when Pyongyang confirmed speculation that it intended to carry out a test, its foreign ministry pledged no first use of a nuclear missile.

But North Korean pledges are not taken very seriously, and a regional arms race could now ensue. Japan can rely on the US to pulverise North Korea should the North attack Tokyo or Seoul, but nevertheless it might now seek a nuclear capacity of its own. Any suggestion of Japanese rearmament enrages China and South Korea, but in the light of the North's test such opprobrium becomes less justifiable or important.

The test could thus reverse a new, positive trend in neighbourly relations. On 8 October Prime Minister Shinzo Abe became the first Japanese leader to travel to Beijing in five years, as he attempted to repair the damage done to ties by his predecessor Junichiro Koizumi. Abe and China's President Hu Jintao agreed that a North Korean nuclear test would be intolerable.

This consensus will not last. Both countries have condemned the test but they will diverge when the matter goes to an emergency UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting later today. Japan will join the US in pressing for a resolution based on to Chapter 7 of the UN charter, which would facilitate sanctions and even force against North Korea. China will oppose this.

The UNSC has to pass something stronger than Resolution 1695, which it ratified in July after the North's missile tests and from which China successfully purged any mention of Chapter 7. If Japan and the US refuse to let Beijing again excise Chapter 7 deep divisions will appear in the UNSC and the resolution might be vetoed altogether.

Beijing, which described the nuclear test as "flagrant", would take no pleasure in vetoing a Chapter 7 resolution but realpolitik demands it do so. If a UN resolution paved the way for the overthrow of President Kim Jong-il then the 30,000 US troops currently defending South Korea would be free to focus on Washington's major rival in the region: China. The US would be much better placed to defend Taiwan, for example.

China is more likely to impose other forms of punishment on Pyongyang. North Korea relies on China for fuel and food, and Beijing will almost certainly restrict supplies of both unless the North returns promptly to six-way talks on its nuclear programme (with South Korea, China, the US, Japan, and Russia).

Less likely, though still possible, is that China might seek some regime change. Rumours suggest that Kim is losing influence to military hardliners, who successfully pressured the president to sanction the missile and nuclear tests. Beijing could exploit these divisions (the Chinese and North Korean militaries have close ties) to reassert its influence over Pyongyang. The only proviso is that the changes should not create mass upheavals: Beijing is fearful of what might ensue should thousands of North Korean refugees head for the Chinese border.

Whatever the UNSC decides, North Korea is more vulnerable economically and politically than it was before the test. But the North now boasts the ultimate bargaining chip: the power to destroy Tokyo or Seoul in a matter of minutes. Recent stories from Pakistan suggest the US does not necessarily object to attacking nuclear powers, but Pyongyang will feel that a proven nuclear capacity makes it safer from attack than, say, Iraq.

Whoever is in charge of North Korea believes that the short-term pain of economic sanctions, the brunt of which is borne by a long-suffering people, is worth enduring for the longevity of the regime. Ultimately, the international community has no choice but to engage with North Korea. When it does so, Pyongyang will be in a stronger position.

END

In our 16 September issue we said that there were indications that an advisory panel to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi intended to describe China as a military threat in a report due to be ready by the end of September. In the event the report, which will feed into a major defence-posture review that Japan is intending to complete by the end of the year, did not go quite as far as that, but there is still much in it that will anger China.

On Monday, the advisory panel made up of academics and business leaders said that Japan should consider developing the capability to strike at missile bases when it has no other means to counter missile attacks. It also recommended the deepening of weapons-related cooperation with the United States and the abandonment of Japan’s self-imposed ban on exercising the right to "collective self-defence" (that is aiding allies that come under attack).

A Japanese government official briefing on the report said: "China, by definition, is not a threat" - but for Beijing that will have taken little of the sting out of the report, not least because of the coincidence of Japan’s moves to provide itself with greater freedom of action in defence issues, including the right to participate in collective self-defence, with Taiwan’s courting of Japan as an ally.

As we have previously reported, on 10 September Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian told two visiting Japanese parliamentarians, Seiichiro Murakami and Ichiro Kamoshita, that both Japan and Taiwan faced the same threat from China’s military build-up and missile deployments.

Earlier in the year, on 24 July, Taiwan’s National Security Council secretary-general, Chiou I-jen, and Democratic Progressive Party MP Hsiao Bi-khim made a visit to Tokyo, the main purpose of which was reportedly to explore how Taiwan and Japan could develop cooperation on security issues.

That a collective self-defence alliance is what Taipei has in mind was also made clear by Taiwan’s new representative in Japan, Koh Se-Kai, who before flying to Tokyo on 6 July to take up his post talked about an invisible alliance between Taiwan and Japan, saying: "The United States is mandated to come to Taiwan’s defence under the Taiwan Relations Act, while Japan is also obliged to maintain regional security under the US-Japan Defence Guidelines. The two agreements weave a web of common interest shared by the US, Taiwan, and Japan."

Even the chairman of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT), Lien Chan, has urged a greater role for Japan in regional security. He argued recently that bilateral relations between Japan and Taiwan should no longer centre only on economic areas. He said that the two shared "a common basis in terms of geopolitics and security structure" and that both sides should begin to talk about "collective security in East Asia".

Against that background, almost the only part of the panel’s report that Beijing will have approved of was the rejection of any suggestion that Japan should develop nuclear weapons. The report said: "Japan must not possess nuclear weapons."

But this is of little practical significance. As we regularly argue, nuclear weapons are all-but unusable against a country that can retaliate in kind, so it is inconceivable that Japan could use nuclear weapons (if it had them) against China. On the other hand, Japan itself is provided with immunity from nuclear attack by China by the closeness of its military alliance with the US (which includes the stationing of large numbers of US troops in Japan). The key issue, therefore, is the attempt to widen the circumstances in which Japan could use its conventional forces (it has 250,000 military personnel and a national defence budget that is fourth in the world, behind only the US, Russia, and China).

The decision by Japan to risk displeasing China to the degree that it surely has cannot have been taken lightly. There could, for instance, be a serious economic downside to falling out with China.

Equally, given Japan’s stated desire to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, there would be a serious diplomatic cost to any rift with Beijing. Even before the issuing of this report, following Koizumi’s address to the UN on 21 September, Beijing’s foreign ministry launched a scathing attack on Japan, saying that the UNSC was "not a board of directors" and its composition should not be decided "according to the financial contribution of its members".

It also said, in a reference to Japan’s perceived failure to apologize sufficiently for its actions before and during World War II: "If a country wishes to play a responsible role in international affairs, it must have a clear understanding of the historical questions concerning itself."

China’s opposition to Japan’s UNSC ambitions could be fatal given that China has a veto and that modifications to the UN Charter require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly.

So the fact that Japan is clearly willing to antagonize China to such a degree at a time when it is already struggling to gain Chinese support on such a key diplomatic issue is an unambiguous statement of how important Japan thinks it is to reconfigure its defence posture. And even if the prime minister’s advisory panel did not overtly finger China as a military threat, it is hard to see what other driving force there could be for this decision. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

SPECIAL BULLETIN

TO: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

DATE: 19 September 2006

SUBJECT: Coup in Thailand

Thailand has been in constitutional limbo since King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Thailand's powerful monarch, intervened to have the results of the April general election quashed. The election had been called by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to extricate himself from the scandal surrounding his sale of Shin Corp, the company owned by his family, to Singapore for US$1.87bn, a deal worth more than 1% of Thailand's entire economy and which many critics said undermined national security.

Since the king's intervention over the election, which due to an opposition boycott was convincingly won by Thaksin's party, the prime minister's relations with the monarch, and by extension the king's circle in the top echelons of the military, have become steadily more tense. In June Thaksin launched a libel suit against one of his political opponents, despite the king ordering him publicly to desist from such actions six months earlier. The same month Thaksin wrote a letter, later leaked, to US President George W Bush warning of a "charismatic person with extra-constitutional powers" who was planning a coup.

We suggested* at the time that the person alluded to was probably General Prem Tinsulanonda, a former prime minister who currently chairs the king's privy council, but it is possible Thaksin was referring to the monarch himself. In July General Prem began to redeploy officers friendly to Thaksin to outlying areas away from Bangkok, apparently with the agreement of his friend General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the head of the army. Thaksin had been inserting his classmates from military college in key commands as a means of shoring up his position within the military, a tactic known to have irritated the general staff, and we noted that the redeployments could be the precursor to a coup.

On 19 September at 10pm Bangkok time (4pm GMT) Channel 5, an army-controlled television station, issued a statement from the army saying that a "Reform Council", to be headed by the king, had assumed Thaksin's powers. Tanks fitted with loudspeakers patrolled the city warning people to stay off the streets and surrounded government buildings and the royal palace. Thaksin, in New York for the UN General Assembly, used a TV broadcast to call a state of emergency and sack Sonthi as head of the army, before being cut-off after 10 minutes.

Local sources report that Sonthi's forces have seized the prime minister's offices, declared nationwide martial law, arrested senior ministers, banned unauthorized troop movements, annulled the constitution, and silenced pro-Thaksin and English-language media outlets. Thaksin's advisors in New York have retracted his initial promise to return to Thailand tonight.

Thailand has suffered 19 military coups since 1932, most recently in 1991, and the latest shows how superficially the country's elite has embraced Western-style democracy. The traditional power structures - centred round the army, the police, and the civil service - remain in place. All politicians with aspirations to high office retain close links to the military and many leaders are former generals. Politics is seen as merely another path to enrichment, as exemplified by Thaksin's use of his position to further his business interests.

The crucial factor now is the approach to the coup of the king, who is revered by Thais. The king is thought to dislike Thaksin but he has also advocated democratic practices. Whatever his decision, a return for Thaksin looks highly unlikely, despite the prime minister's enduring popularity among rural voters. Metropolitan voters are overwhelmingly opposed to him, a fact that makes coup-related violence in Bangkok unlikely.

* [http://www.asiaint.com/arl/ARL10691.asp]

Last Sunday’s news that Nigerian rebels fighting in the eastern part of Nigeria’s oil-producing southern delta have said that they intend to expand operations to cover the whole of the Niger delta spooked oil markets early this week, but the development also needs to be seen in a wider context.

Raising fears of a repeat of last year’s uprising by members of the Ijaw tribe which closed down 40% of Nigeria’s 2.5m barrels per day oil output, rebel leader Mujahid Dokubo-Asari said: "We have decided to declare Operation Locust Feast which will cover the whole Niger delta. It is going to be an all-out war against the Nigerian state. Now the whole Ijaw nation will be fighting against the Nigerian state."

Asari has accused the government of breaking a ceasefire agreed on 3 September, and he has said that the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (the NDPVF, thought to be about 168,000-strong) will fight until the government calls a conference at which the country’s ethnic groups can renegotiate Nigeria’s federal constitution. Asari said that the NDPVF has already taken the decision to target the Italian oil company Agip and that it will decide soon on whether to target Shell, Total, ChevronTexaco, and Exxon as well.

Securing energy supplies from West Africa is an American priority, and a US-led naval exercise this summer in the Gulf of Guinea (which currently provides the US with 15% of its oil supplies and might supply as much as 25% by 2015) led the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) to worry publicly that this could be a prelude to an eventual military intervention. It recommended that Nigeria and its neighbours increase their military profile in the Gulf.

The spreading rebellion in Nigeria’s delta region is bound to feed both US concerns and corresponding Nigerian paranoia - not least because there is more than oil at stake. The US has wider concerns over instability in Africa and its impact on the war on terror. In March this year, General James Jones, the commander of Nato forces in Europe, warned that the "large ungoverned spaces" of Africa could provide havens for international terrorists.

And the bad news from Nigeria comes in the same week as the UN Security Council has expressed its concern over its near neighbour the Ivory Coast. The UNSC warned on Monday (27 September) that lack of progress in implementing political reforms "is not only holding back the peace process in Ivory Coast but is also detrimental to further progress in the sub-region as a whole".

Until civil war broke out in September 2002, the Ivory Coast was a model of stability - if not good governance - on the continent. Now it provides yet another example of endemic instability along Africa’s Muslim-Christian faultline, with the country divided between the government-controlled mainly Christian (and richer) south and the rebel-held mainly Muslim (and poorer) north.

President Laurent Gbagbo is dragging his feet on promised reforms and a revision of a constitutional clause that bars opposition leader Alassane Ouattara from running for president. On Tuesday, Ivory Coast’s parliament abandoned efforts to pass the agreed reforms by the 30 September deadline. The rebel New Forces group, due to begin disarming by 15 October under the July peace accord, have said they will only begin disarming once the reforms are implemented.

In the meantime, coup rumours have been sweeping Abidjan (it was reported locally on 22 September that the intelligence services had uncovered a plot to assassinate the president), and since last week roadblocks and other security checks have returned to the city. Tank patrols have been increased, and there have been flights of military helicopters over the city. The local media have also reported that up to 1,500 rebels have allegedly been infiltrated into the city "with livestock convoys entering by Noe", and this and other similar reports have been feeding the sense of crisis.

The UN Security Council’s warning that the lack of progress in the Ivory Coast is "detrimental to further progress in the sub-region as a whole" is no doubt true. But it could have gone further. There remains a fear that the north may make a bid for secession, that Guinea could side with the government in trying to reimpose control over the north, and that, in turn, Mali and Burkina Faso (which Ivory Coast blames for backing the September 2002 rebellion) could be drawn into the struggle. Liberia has also been deeply involved in developments in the west of the country.

On Tuesday (28 September), a government spokesman said that President Gbagbo had sent a delegation to tell heads of state in the region about an alleged plan by Burkina Faso to subvert Ivory Coast.

Separately, Mauritania is accusing Burkina Faso of harbouring and training dissident soldiers who are said to have been behind a failed coup attempt in June 2003 and another in August this year. Over the weekend Mauritania’s Communication Minister Hamoud Ould Abdi accused Burkina Faso of training soldiers at two camps. Adding to this combustible mix, Mauritania has also blamed Libya for backing dissident officers.

Meanwhile, on the other side of Africa, in Somalia, a rather different problem is developing for the US and the war on terror.

Somalia is a failed state with no central government, and during this long period of anarchy concerns that al-Qaida might be establishing a presence in the country have been dealt with by the expedient of employing local armed groups to do the dirty work. Sources in the region say that there have been some 15 raids on suspected al-Qaida cells in Somalia in the past 18 months undertaken by Somali proxies on the bidding of foreign powers.

Now Somalia is on the point of establishing a new government, with a president to be elected by members of an interim parliament meeting in Kenya on 10 October. Clearly the US and other Western powers have an interest in seeing legitimate government restored in Somalia, but the sort of raids that have gone on in the past (they have been roundly condemned by Muslim clerics) cannot continue without acutely embarrassing the new government. On the other hand, no one expects that the new government will have either the inclination or power to continue the policy itself. Being seen as a US puppet could be fatal to its existence.

So, while it is growing instability that is causing concern in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and elsewhere in West Africa, ironically the latest concerns over Somalia relate to the long-awaited establishment of legitimate government - which just goes to show, there are never simple answers to complicated questions. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FORUM SPECIAL BULLETIN

To: All Strategic Intelligence Forum members

Date: 18 September 2006

From: JKC de Courcy, Chairman, Strategic Intelligence Forum

Subject: CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA AND IRAN

Long-standing Strategic Intelligence Forum (formerly Courcy's Intelligence Service) members will know that we follow closely the proceedings of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.  Last week the commission looked at China's relationship with North Korea and Iran.  Our reading of the testimony is as follows:

1.  The US considers China to be "a keystone" of the administration's efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology throughout the world.

2.  Chinese entities continue to involve themselves in proliferation activities despite China's formal adherence to non-proliferation treaties and agreements.  According to Paula A DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, China's violations of its commitments include:

* The transfer of missile-related technology and material to missile programmes of concern in Iran and North Korea, thereby making "considerable contributions to the development of ballistic missiles in these countries".

* Research activities and the development of dual-use capabilities that indicate "the possibility that sophisticated BW [biological weapons] and CW [chemical weapons] work could be underway".

* The maintenance of "some elements of an offensive BW capability in violation of its BWC obligations".

* The likely existence of a "CW production mobilization capability".

* Transfers of Australia Group (AG) chemical control list items and technology "to countries of concern".

In his testimony, Ehsan M Ahrari, CEO of Stratetegic Paradigms Consultancy, added: "China has also supplied nuclear knowledge to Iran to manufacture nuclear weapons.  It has been training Iranian nuclear engineers.  In addition, Chinese nuclear experts have travelled to Iran to help that country build uranium conversion facilities..."

Ilan Berman, vice-president for policy for the American Foreign Policy Council, added that a decade on from the Pentagon's 1996 designation of China as "a principal supplier of nuclear technology to Iran", this aspect of the Sino-Iranian strategic partnership "is still going strong".

Berman said: "China has reportedly been a major focus of Iranian procurement activities, with Iranian front companies successfully acquiring nuclear-related materials from the PRC in recent years.  Iranian opposition elements have also charged that Chinese experts are employed at multiple nuclear facilities inside Iran, including the Saghand uranium mine and a uranium centrifuge facility outside Isfahan."

Berman concluded: "As a practical matter, China's record of proliferation to Iran is poor - and getting worse."

3.  Despite Chinese denials, the administration believes that these violations are not simply the consequence of inefficient controls.  As DeSutter put it: "Evidence of recurring transfers by serial proliferators - some of which are state-owned enterprises - suggests that the problem is greater than one of inadequate resources."

4.  China's motives for this behaviour are fairly straightforward - and rational, which makes countering its behaviour more complex.  Its motives include:

a) with regard to Iran:

* It is expected that China's energy reserves will be depleted by 2020.  Already, 40% of China's energy needs have to be met by imported oil - and Iran has the world's second largest reserves of natural gas (after Russia) and third largest reserves of oil (after Saudi Arabia and Canada).  Iran is China's single largest oil supplier, already accounting for 15% of the PRC's annual oil imports by 2002.

* China and Iran share a mutual desire for the evolution of a multipolar world in which the dominance of the United States is considerably diminished.

* China can use its relations with Iran as a means of applying pressure to the US over arms supplies and support to Taiwan.

* The prevention (or at least delay) of regime-change in Iran and any subsequent rapprochement with the United States.

* Iranian collaboration in maintaining stability in Central Asia and preventing the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and separatism.

* The emergence of Iran as the new geopolitical centre of gravity in the post-Saddam Middle East.

b) with regard to North Korea:

* Strong "fraternal" ies with the communists of North Korea, which date back to the 1930s when Kim Il Sung fought against the Japanese in Manchuria.

* The need to control the timing and terms of eventual Korean reunification, so that China can maintain a buffer between itself and South Korea for as along as South Korea remains more US-oriented that China-oriented.

* The prevention of any sudden destabilizing collapse in North Korea.

* The need to maintain influence over the unpredictable Kim Jong Il, in particular trying to prevent the open acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea which could lead to Japan and Taiwan going nuclear.

END

The full testimony from last week's hearings can be accessed via http://www.uscc.gov/

As we argued in some detail in our 11 March issue, the importance of Turkey’s European ambitions cannot be overstated. Turkey has been pursuing an unparalleled and single-minded policy of modernization and Westernization for over 80 years, since the foundation of the secular republic in 1923 by Kemal Ataturk. In 1963 it became an associate member of the European Union (or rather of the European Economic Community as it then was), and on 14 April 1987 it applied for full membership.

The EU Commission will publish its annual report on Turkey’s candidacy on 6 October, and European Union leaders will decide at their summit in December whether negotiations for membership should be opened.

As the recent European Parliament elections showed, there is considerable opposition within Europe - particularly in Germany - to Turkish membership. But in all things expectation management is important, and if the EU intends to further postpone the start of membership negotiations with Turkey, the message is not getting through.

Diplomatic sources in Ankara say that the feeling amongst Turkey’s political elite is that the EU’s decision, taken at its recent summit, that membership negotiations with Croatia will start in early 2005 means that it cannot possibly say no to Turkey in December. There is a feeling in Ankara that the EU will agree to begin talks between July and October 2005 - that is during the period of the British presidency.

Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was in the Netherlands last week to discuss all this with Holland’s Prime Minister Jan Peter Belkenende, who will take over the EU presidency on 1 July.

One element in Turkey’s case for membership that has been emphasized more and more recently is that Turkey can become a bridge between Islam and the Christian world, and this was argued strongly by Erdogan last week.

In the past Turkey has more often emphasized its secular Western nature; now it is saying that it can help change the Islamic world’s perception of the European Union - particularly when Ankara has assumed the office of Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).

Speaking during his visit to Holland, Erdogan said: "We have to create an EU where civilizations meet and reconcile. If we are to eradicate terrorism, we have to achieve this goal."

He repeated the same point when opening a symposium on Turkey’s European Union adjustment programme in Ankara on Monday (21 June), saying that the EU could become "an address where civilizations meet and reconcile" and that Turkey would join the EU "as a representative of the compromise among civilizations".

This argument might persuade some waverers, but the opposition from those who see Turkey’s membership as potentially changing the whole nature of the European Union remains strong.

EU Commissioner Guenter Verheugen, for instance, said recently: "Turkey’s accession will affect and change everything in the EU" - and the feeling in European diplomatic circles is that the most powerful voices still belong to those who want to find a way of maintaining a special relationship with Turkey without actually welcoming it in as a full member.

That might be so, but the problem is that Turkey is now well beyond the point of accepting a compromise solution.

As Erdogan told a press conference in the Hague on 16 June, when asked about how Turkey would react to a failure to set a date for accession talks:

"I do not even want to consider such a negative decision because such a decision will lead to a result on Turkish people beyond disappointment. I should clearly express that Turkey has been waiting at this door for 41 years. Turkey has taken steps required by the EU acquisition more than the EU member countries. I think both the report that will be announced on 6 October and the decision that will be taken in December 2004 will take those into consideration."

Hearing this, there can be little doubt that 6 October is a make or break date for Europe’s relationship with Turkey. Joe de Courcy, Editor.

COURCYINT SPECIAL BULLETIN

To: All Courcy's Intelligence Service members

Date: 12 AUGUST 2006

From: JKC de Courcy, Chief Executive, Courcy's Intelligence Service

Subject: BOMB PLOTS & MIDEAST MAYHEM: THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Since the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, blaming President George Bush and the UK's Prime Minister Tony Blair for the parlous state of relations between the Western world and the Muslim world has become so commonplace as to have attained the status of unquestionable received opinion. The present combination of a major terror plot in the UK and the Israeli onslaught in Lebanon (which is supported by Bush and Blair) has added a touch of panic to the charge. Where are these two taking us, is the question on most people's minds.

But it is the very seriousness of the present situation that demands a return to the basic facts. The war between Islamic jihadists and the Western powers did not begin as a consequence of the invasion of Iraq, let alone Israel's assault on Hezbollah. What is true is that the West's treatment of post-Kuwait Iraq has always been used as a pretext by the jihadists for their militancy, despite the fact that Saddam Hussein was an enemy not a friend of Islamism, as has the very existence of Israel.

The definitive statement on jihadists motives and goals was made on 23 February 1998. The founding statement of Osama bin Laden's World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders (published in the Arab nationalist al-Quds al-Arabi) listed America's three crimes as the occupation of the lands of Islam in the Arabian peninsula, the devastation inflicted upon the Iraqi people (through sanctions) by "the Crusader-Jewish alliance", and its support for the Jews' "petty state" and the occupation of Jerusalem.

The statement said that these crimes amounted to "a clear declaration of war by the Americans against God, his prophet, and the Muslims". It then went on to declare, in the form of a fatwa attributed to Osama bin Laden, that "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military, [is] and individual duty of every Muslim" anywhere and at anytime.

Backing these words with actions, a simultaneous terrorist attack was launched on 7 August 1998 on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar al-Salam, killing 258 people and wounding 5,000 others.

It was only after these attacks, on 21 August 1998, that the then US secretary of state Madeleine Albright declared a "war on terrorism". Even then, it was not until more than three years later, following the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, that the US invaded Afghanistan and then Iraq.

The attacks on America came after it had helped oust the Soviets from Afghanistan (1989) and after it had supported the Muslim cause in the Balkans against the Serbs (1992-1999), and they came after the Oslo I (1993) and Oslo II (1995) peace accords between the Israelis and the Palestinians (not to mention the 1978 Camp David accords with Egypt) and the slow but steady retreat by Israel from its 1967 conquests that they represented.  And they came before the US invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and before its move to oust Saddam Hussein from power (2003).

The point is this: jihadism is not a response to current events; it is a deep-seated phenomenon resulting from the failure of the Arab and wider Muslim world to keep pace with the West and other rival civilizations such as India and China.

The evidence suggests that restraint on the part of the Western powers or Israel will have no discernible impact on jihadism. But that is not the same as saying that unrestrained counter-aggression is therefore justified. Each action needs to be weighed on its merits, and in our assessment, the following are the key points at this stage in the war against jihadism. They are:

1. Al-Qaida remains incapable of mounting a sustained terror campaign in the West. This point is reinforced by the failure of the recent terror plot in the UK. Unfortunately it is not possible to move from that assumption to the conclusion that threat perceptions should be downgraded. The possibility that jihadists could acquire the capability (they certainly have the will) to use weapons of mass destruction against Western civilian targets ensures that they retain a strategic significance far beyond their conventional capabilities.

2. Al-Qaida's weakness is in part a consequence of no longer having a safe-haven within a friendly sovereign power. The invasion of Afghanistan was fully justified on these grounds, and vigilance over Somalia and other potential future havens (including Afghanistan again) is necessary.

3. The question of Iran needs to be divorced from the war on terror and al-Qaida. The contest with Iran is one against an inimical sovereign power determined to increase its influence in the Middle East at the expense of its Arab neighbours. Conflating it with the war on terrorism is a mistake. The Israeli assault on Hezbollah has to be seen in the context of containing Iran (and justified or not on those grounds) not in the context of the war on terror.

4. Ousting Saddam Hussein might have been justified on humanitarian grounds, but it was irrational to see Saddam Hussein as an enemy in the war on terrorism. And the ousting of Saddam Hussein led to two unfortunate consequences. The first was that, rather than advancing the fight against jihadism, it brought jihadism to the heart of the Middle East, providing al-Qaida with a significant boost and a popular cause for which to recruit.

The second was that it significantly improved the strategic position of Iran, compounding the already existing problem of how to contain an expansionist-minded power. It brought Iranian influence deep into Iraq, strengthening its linkages with Syria and southern Lebanon to the extent that Jordan's King Abdullah could warn accurately of the creation of a threatening "Shia crescent".

5. Iran is pursuing a two-pronged strategy. First, it is developing nuclear weapons to provide it with a deterrence against the US and Israel (and with which to threaten its Arab neighbours). Secondly, it is using militant support for the Palestinian cause (through Hezbollah and the Palestinian radical groups) as a means of courting street-level Arab opinion and thus neutralising establishment-level Arab enmity.

6. If the ousting of Saddam Hussein (arguably a humanitarian necessity) was a strategic catastrophe, it cannot now be undone. Even if it were desirable (which it isn't), the reimposition of a Sunni-Arab dictatorship is not possible. The emergence of a Shia-Arab ascendancy, on the other hand, is possible, but with Iran in its current mood it would be an extremely undesirable outcome. The United States has tried - is still trying - to achieve a civilized rapprochement between the rival parties and a stable democratic outcome, but this was always the longest of long shots and now seems utterly unattainable.

The end result is likely to be a growing acceptance of the views expressed by former US ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith. In an article explaining his views in the New York Times on 25 July, he wrote:

"Since it [the US] cannot unify Iraq or stop the civil war, it should work with the regions that have emerged. Where no purpose is served by a continuing military presence - in the Shiite south and in Baghdad - America and its allies should withdraw.

"As an alternative to using Shiite and American troops to fight the insurgency in Iraq’s Sunni centre, the administration should encourage the formation of several provinces into a Sunni Arab region with its own army, as allowed by Iraq’s Constitution. Then the Pentagon should pull its troops from this Sunni territory and allow the new leaders to establish their authority without being seen as collaborators.

"Seeing as we cannot maintain the peace in Iraq, we have but one overriding interest there today - to keep al-Qaida from creating a base from which it can plot attacks on the United States. Thus we need to have troops nearby prepared to re-engage in case the Sunni Arabs prove unable to provide for their own security against the foreign jihadists.

"This would be best accomplished by placing a small "over the horizon" force in Kurdistan…"

Galbraith is nearly right. But there are two overwhelming goals, not one. If the first is to prevent al-Qaida establishing a base in Iraq, the second is to curtail Iran's advance. Skirting over the fact that neither issue was a problem before the ousting of Saddam Hussein, both goals can be served by his proposal.

7. Which brings us back to Israel's assault on Hezbollah. As a means of curbing Iran's expanding influence in the region (which, given the current mood in Tehran, is a necessary and desirable policy objective), it will be successful only if it leads to two developments. The first is the establishment of the Lebanese government's writ throughout Lebanon (albeit with substantial assistance from outside powers); the second is a re-engagement with Syria - leading in the most-positive scenario to a severing of Damascus's alliance with Iran and a dropping of its support for Hezbollah in return for a role for Syria in Lebanon's reconstruction and renewed negotiations with Israel over the Golan Heights and a peace agreement. If that were to happen, then the price in Lebanese blood (whilst forever beyond justification to those personally involved) might just begin to look a little bit more proportionate.

CONCLUSIONS

We have four main conclusions. They are:

First, the al-Qaida jihadist phenomenon is exacerbated only at the margins by Western policies. Its causes go much deeper.

Second, al-Qaida's weaknesses (illustrated by its inability to mount a sustained bombing campaign in the West) is compensated for by one overwhelming strategic advantage: its perceived willingness to kill as many Western civilians as its capabilities permit, allied to the possibility that these capabilities could soon encompass biological and chemical terror weapons.

Third, the invasion of Iraq led to a strategic own goal, but there are now signs that the US is beginning to work towards a way of neutralising, if not reversing, the consequences of that own goal.

Fourth, it is necessarily to divorce the struggle to contain Iran from the fight against al-Qaida-led jihadism. The assault on Hezbollah is part of the former not the latter, and there is still a chance that a successful outcome could mitigate the disastrous immediate consequences of that assault - but this will happen only if Damascus (with a lot of help from Israel) can be persuaded to come in from the cold.

END

With so much noise emanating from the Middle East, it is important from time to time to focus on the really important factors. What is happening (or not) in Egypt, Turkey, and Iran is of supreme strategic importance; what is happening in Libya, Syria, and Yemen is less so. The problem is that the Iranian regime remains untouched by the Arab revolutions at a time when Turkey has already made a significant shift away from its Ataturkist pro-Western orientation, and Egypt, inspired by popular revolt, is making the same reorientation as Turkey. Events in the past week have confirmed this unhappy combination.

The slightly positive sign from Turkey that we reported two weeks ago, with the withdrawal of the Mavi Marmara from the second Gaza ‘Freedom Flotilla’, has been superseded by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan refusing to accept a compromise solution to the dispute with Israel over the Israeli attack on the Mavi Marmara in May 2010. The conclusion being drawn in Jerusalem is that the damage to the former strategic alliance with Turkey is indeed irreversible and that there will be no resumption of the defence, military, or intelligence cooperation that was so important in boosting Israel’s feeling of security.

During his recent tour of North Africa, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu was greeted with slogans of “Thank you, Turkey” and “Erdogan, Turkey, Muslim!”. It is this intoxicating popularity in the Arab Middle East that is now inspiring Turkey’s foreign policy rather than the forlorn hopes of membership of the European Union, and it will drive Turkey towards an increasingly active pro-Palestinian stance. Davutoglu has now been to Egypt four times in the last six months while Erdogan is due to make a visit within the next 10 days.

Meanwhile, in Egypt itself, there has been a change in foreign minister, and the new foreign minister has being going out of his way to reassure the Egyptian public that this does not mean a retreat from Egypt’s post-revolution reorientation.

When it was announced in May that Egypt’s first post-Mubarak foreign minister, Nabil Abdallah al-Araby, was to become Secretary-General of the Arab League there was dismay in pro-revolutionary circles. The key point about al-Araby’s short tenure as Egyptian foreign minister was the way in which he quickly re-oriented Egyptian foreign policy back towards a traditional Egyptian one of seeking Arab leadership and away from Camp David. His sudden and unexpected transfer to the Arab League post caused widespread concern that the move might presage a watering down of Egypt’s post-revolution foreign policy.

Much of the grumbling in Egypt following the announcement that al-Araby was to move to the Arab League was along the lines that the move was orchestrated by the West to prevent Egypt from continuing with the new foreign policy instituted by al-Araby. One well-informed Arab commentator noted: “The popular reaction comes as a warning to...that group in charge of government in Egypt [not] to adopt alternatives to its current foreign policy.”

Such concerns were heightened by the appointment of Muhammad al-Urabi as the new foreign minister. Al-Urabi, according to Al-Wafd newspaper, once said: “I believe that Mubarak is an unprecedented leader, and that Egyptian history will not witness another leader like him.” He also bears the stigma of having served for four years as deputy ambassador to Israel.

However, although a former Mubarak loyalist, al-Urabi shows every sign of maintaining Egypt’s new orientation. In his first few weeks in office he has confirmed that Egypt is “correcting the course of foreign policy in a way that reflects the Egyptian people’s aspirations”. He has also confirmed that Egypt’s post-revolutionary concentration on relations with the Arab world and Africa will be maintained.

The new foreign minister has confirmed his support for al-Arabi’s policy of rapprochement with Iran. In a 9 July interview with the Saudi-owned Al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper he said: “I really felt a serious Iranian desire to establish healthy relations with Egypt more than one year ago during my visit to Tehran...Egypt, too, is ready, but the timing is an issue that will be decided later. Dr Al-Araby set a timeframe when he said: After the election of the new Egyptian parliament.”

As we reported in our 15 June issue, Egypt has been under huge pressure from the US and the Gulf States not to resume diplomatic relations with Iran, and on 12 June al-Araby said that the decision to resume diplomatic relations will be left to the new Egyptian parliament to decide in about three months’ time. This looked like a neat way of by-passing US pressure as the US would find it harder to oppose democratic decisions taken by a newly elected Egyptian parliament. Al-Urabi, in his Al-Sharq al-Awsat interview, seems to have confirmed this strategy.

What is particularly interesting about all this is that while a huge three-way battle for control of Egypt continues to be waged between the military, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the 25 January democratic movement, the question over Egypt’s future foreign-policy orientation appears to have been settled. It is to take Egypt back to the centre of Arab leadership, and to work for a new Mideast order in close coordination with the major non-Arab states of Turkey and (as far as maintaining good relations with Saudi Arabia permits it) with Iran.

This might be no bad thing were it not for two factors: the first is that Iran remains highly dangerous and is pursuing destabilizing policies in Iraq and the Gulf; the second is that the re-orientation of Turkey, and now of Egypt as well, hugely worries Israel, and for as long as Israel feels insecure there will be no peace with the Palestinians.

The intelligence consensus in Jerusalem is that it will be at least 10 years before Israel will be able to fully assess the consequences of the Arab Spring. This is not just because of the uncertainties provoked by the shift in Turkish and Egyptian foreign policy; or by the continuing malign interference by Iran in Iraq, the Gulf States, Syria, and Lebanon; or even by the unfinished revolutions in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. It is also because of the likelihood of unfulfilled expectations even in those countries that manage reasonably complete and peaceful transitions. There are, after all, 100m people in the Arab world aged between 15 and 29, many of whom have never had jobs. They are looking for more than just democracy: they want genuine improvements in prosperity as well. JdeC.

NOTE: All of this may go some way to explain an interesting opinion-poll result published this week in Israel which shows Israelis far more positive about Europe than is generally imagined. According to the survey published by the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev on 11 July, 81% of Israelis would support European Union membership for Israel.

The survey, entitled Israeli Positions on the EU, questioned 1,000 people from a representative sample of the Israeli public, and as one of the compilers of the poll said, the survey shows "Israelis are really into strengthening and deepening the cooperation between Israel and the EU. Israelis understand the importance of the EU for the future of Israel and they want to strengthen the relations."

Israel has in fact never applied to join the EU, but a debate held on the issue was sparked last year after Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi visited the Middle East and said that Israel should be admitted to the European Union.

Senior American diplomats are describing the relationship between the US and Turkey  as “the best since the one between George Bush [Snr] and Turgut Ozal” in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This assessment is no doubt correct, and it is a reflection of the degree to which the Obama administration has bought into the proposition that it should rebase its Mideast policy in response to the Arab Spring and the seemingly inevitable ascendancy of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Turkey’s Islamist-based democracy is seen in Washington as the best available role model for the region.

This service has expressed considerable concern about Turkey under its Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.  Our worry has been the extent of Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambitions – clearly expressed in his June election victory speech – and his lack of judgement.  In June, Erdogan’s Islam-based Justice and Development Party (AKP) won its third consecutive mandate.  Saluting the AKP’s victory, Erdogan proclaimed from the balcony of his party’s headquarters that “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul; Beirut won as much as Izmir; Damascus won as much as Ankara; Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir.”  In other words, Turkey under Erdogan intended to be an active supporter of the Bosnian Muslims, the Sunni opposition in Lebanon and Syria, and, above all, the Palestinians.

The advantage of close American engagement with Turkey (in addition to securing Turkish agreement to station elements of Nato’s anti-missile shield on its soil) is that it might be able to moderate Erdogan’s wilder enthusiasms and lack of judgement, and this is no doubt the message that Washington is trying to convey to Israel, which is the country most affected by Turkey’s lurch away from its pro-Western secularist tradition.  But Israel will take some persuading.

As we reported in our 12 October issue, Erdogan continues to step up his anti-Israel rhetoric, and his remarks in Pretoria on 5 October were amongst his strongest so far.  He said that Israel imposes “state terrorism” in the region; that it has killed tens of thousands of Palestinians with “bombs that have rained down on them from Israel”, including phosphorus bombs; and that he saw Israel as “a threat for its region because it has the atomic bomb”.  He also said that the West applied double standards (by pursuing Iran over its nuclear programme and not Israel) and that the United Nations had failed to implement its resolutions against Israel (“89 from the UN Security Council and 247 resolutions of the General Assembly”).

Then there is the wider context.  The Muslim Brotherhood has won the first post-revolutionary elections in Tunisia and will almost certainly emerge as the most powerful political grouping in Egypt if and when the election process is completed.  After Egypt, it is beginning to eye the prospects of power in Jordan.  The fall of Assad, now actively sought by Turkey, would also open the way to an MB ascendancy in Syria.  And in the Palestinian territories, Hamas is looking to extend its influence from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank through a rapprochement with Fateh and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

These are the forces that the US is seeking to control through courting the Erdogan government in Turkey.  We are not suggesting this is a wrong policy, just that in all likelihood these forces will prove too powerful to control, and that Turkey will only modify its policies at the margins in response to US pressure.  The end result is likely to be an enhanced feeling in Israel that not only has it lost Egypt and Turkey, but that it may be losing the US as well.  This, in turn, can only fuel Israel’s determination to neutralize the Iranian nuclear threat and to avoid any territorial compromise.  A sense of how concerned Israel is about developments in general and Turkey in particular can be taken from a commentary by the influential academic Barry Rubin in the 21 November Jerusalem Post.  He wrote: “The Islamist regime in Ankara isn’t opposing the Syrian regime out of its love for democracy.  Erdogan’s government wants to have a fellow Sunni Islamist dictatorship in Damascus, preferably under its influence.  In this situation, Turkey is just as bad as Iran.”

COURCYINT SPECIAL BULLETIN

To: All Courcy's Intelligence Service members

Date: 11 MAY 2006

From: JKC de Courcy, Chief Executive, Courcy's Intelligence Service

Subject: PUTIN HAS WASHINGTON IN SIGHTS DURING ANNUAL ADDRESS TO RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT

On 10 May, Russia's President Vladimir Putin made his annual "state-of-the-nation" address to parliament.  Reporting on the address, the BBC said that it "had a less heavy international focus than had been predicted by Kremlin sources".  But although there was only the shortest overt mention of Russia's relations with the world's main powers, concern over Russia's international standing suffused almost the entire speech.  We were also struck by the extent of the criticism of the United States - although, of course, without mentioning the US by name.

If this interpretation is right, it could have important immediate implications.  Also on 10 May, the US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick made it clear to the US House of Representatives Committee on International Affairs that it is Russia, not China, that is blocking agreement on how to proceed against Iran.  He said that China "will not be an obstacle" to efforts to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions if the US can convince Russia of the need to support tough action.  He added that China has "been given a little bit of a cushion because of Russia" and that "if we can bring Russia along with some of this, my own sense is that China will not be an obstacle in the process".

Putin's speech was prefaced with the remark that "our main efforts are directed at those very areas which directly determine citizens' quality of life".  However, the real driving force behind Putin's speech and the measures he announced seemed to be contained in a passage where he said: "We must be capable of responding to attempts by anybody whatsoever to exert foreign policy pressure on Russia, including attempts with the aim of strengthening their own standing at our expense."

Even the section devoted to Russia's demographic problems (its population is declining "by nearly 700,000" a year), was introduced not as primarily an economic issue but as a defence issue.  Putin said: "And now the main thing.  What is the main thing for us? ...At the Ministry of Defence they know what the main thing is for us.  I really am going to talk about love, about women, about children..."

And it really did seem to be the United States that was causing Putin most concern.  Although there was obvious ambiguity as to whom the criticism was aimed at, he appeared to criticise the US over the WTO negotiations, disarmament, Russia's response to domestic terrorism and ethnic conflicts, the use of force to resolve disputes, and unilateralism and hypocrisy over human rights.  These are the key passages:

*** ON WTO NEGOTIATIONS: "We continue to hold negotiations on joining the World Trade Organization.  We will conduct these only under conditions that fully correspond to Russia's economic interests.  It is obvious that our economy is even now more open than the economies of many members of that respected organization.  And talks on Russia's admission to the WTO must not become a bargaining tool on issues that have nothing to do with that organization's activities."

*** ON DISARMAMENT: "Against the background of the acute threat posed by international terrorism, the key issues of disarmament have virtually fallen off the global agenda.  It's premature to speak of the end of the arms race...It's gaining momentum and is approaching a new technological level, threatening to create a new arsenal of the so-called destabilizing types of weapons.  There is still no guarantee that weapons including nuclear ones, will not be deployed in space.  There is the potential threat of the creation and proliferation of low-yield nuclear charges."

*** ON RUSSIA'S RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM AND ETHNIC DISPUTES: "Terrorism remains a considerable danger.  Local conflicts, often ethnically fuelled and sometimes accompanied by interfaith conflicts...still remain a significant support base for terrorists, a source for their weapons and a field for them to use force...I know that some would be glad to see Russia mired in these problems and, by way of consequence, unable to resolve any of its development issues."

*** ON THE USE OF FORCE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES: "Let me stress that we unequivocally favour strengthening the non-proliferation regime, without any exception, on the basis of international law.  It is known that the use of force rarely brings the desired result, and its consequences are often worse than the original threat."

*** ON UNILATERALISM AND HYPOCRISY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS: "Just where does all the rhetoric on the need to fight for human rights and democracy disappear when it comes to the need to realize one's own interests.  It turns out that everything is permitted, there are no restrictions whatsoever."

As to what should be done about all this, Putin said: "In the coming five years, the strategic nuclear forces should be substantially better equipped with modern aircraft for long-range aviation, submarines, and launch installations for the strategic missile troops.  Even today, work is being successfully carried out to create unique precision weapons and highly manoeuvrable warheads that present an unpredictable trajectory to a potential foe.  Along with the air defence penetration systems that we already have, new types of weaponry will allow us to maintain what is undoubtedly one of the most significant guarantees of world stability, namely the preservation of the strategic balance of forces.  We must take into account plans and trends in the development of other countries' armed forces.  We must know about possible developments.  But we must not try to keep up in terms of quantity, we must not spend money in vain.  Our response must be based on intellectual superiority.  It will be asymmetrical and less cost-intensive, but will undoubtedly increase the reliability and effectiveness of our nuclear triad."

He concluded: "Russia needs an army that has all the resources to respond appropriately to modern day threats.  Our armed forces must be capable of simultaneously fighting in global, regional and, if necessary, several local conflicts.  It must be able, under any circumstances, to ensure Russia's security and territorial integrity."

THE FULL TEXT OF PUTIN'S STATE-OF-THE-NATION SPEECH CAN BE ACCESSED VIA THE FOLLOWING LINK:

http://www.courcyint.com/crl/crl9896.asp

If our assessment of Russia’s latest moves is correct (see following briefing), the Middle East equation has just become considerably more complicated as the prospects for an early return to stability remain remote.

The overall picture is fairly clear.  The Arab Spring is ushering in a period of possibly prolonged Muslim Brotherhood ascendancy.  The MB–affiliated Ennahda party won the first of the Mideast’s post-revolutionary elections in Tunisia.  The MB-affiliated Justice and Development Party (PJD) has emerged as the strongest party in Morocco following elections there.  And the Muslim Brotherhood will almost certainly become the largest party in the Egyptian parliament following the elections that began on 28 November.  This latter development means, in turn, that the MB-linked Hamas group will be strengthened in the Palestinian territories, increasing its influence in the West Bank to go with its dominance of the Gaza Strip.  The alternative to the Alawite regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria is the Muslim Brotherhood, and the MB is gaining in strength in Jordan where King Abdullah is struggling to maintain stability in a rapidly changing Middle East. 

Alongside this, Iran is set to increase its ascendancy in Iraq following the end-year withdrawal of US troops.  And now, with Russia’s determination to back Assad against both Nato and Turkey (see following briefing), there is a likelihood that Iran will retain its influence in Syria and Lebanon.  Meanwhile, there are signs of a rekindling of Shia unrest in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Into all this must be factored the actions of an increasingly worried Israel, and not just with regard to the Iranian nuclear programme.  On Egypt, there is a concerted effort to play down the possibility of a breach, but the fears of what could happen continue to emerge from various corners.  On 23 November, for instance, former deputy IDF chief of staff Maj-General Uzi Dayan said during a security conference at Bar-Ilan University that it may become necessary to mobilize a counter-terrorism intervention force for the Sinai.  An even more apocalyptic view was put by Professor Eytan Inbar, the head of the Begin-Sadat Centre that organized the conference.

Professor Inbar warned about a possible collapse of law and order in Egypt.  He said: “The collapse of law and order will allow terror groups to rise up.  We could find ourselves in an Islamic lake.  Turkey is not our friend...Syria was not our friend and will not be our friend under a new regime with an Islamist influence.  Lebanon is controlled by Hezbollah.  Sinai could turn into Somalia.”

Israel’s new multi-year ‘Halamish’ defence programme (which is itself under review) goes beyond the previous Tefen plan in adding potential threats from the West Bank and Egypt to the established threats from Iran, the northern front (Syria and Lebanon), and the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.  The Halamish plan says: “There is an increasing probability of conflict on multiple fronts.” 

Many influential voices in Israel are still arguing that the Camp David peace treaty will survive the transition in Egypt, not least because of the economic benefits to Egypt of peace.  This is a valid point.  Egypt could lose $1.65bn in aid from the US if it abrogated the treaty at a time when the newly elected government has to cope with a collapse in tourism revenue by 25%, a near 70% decline in foreign direct investment, and economic growth down to 1.8% from 6%, which is only just above the rate of population growth of 1.7%.  Nevertheless, there are ways short of abrogating Camp David in which the new Egypt could become problematic for Israel, such as in its support for Hamas or if, as Professor Inbar warns, it were to lose control of Sinai.  And there is nothing hypothetical about the mounting dangers on the other fronts.  Israel has no option but to prepare for the worst, which is in itself, of course, destabilizing.  JdeC.

COURCYINT SPECIAL BULLETIN

To: All Courcy's Intelligence Service members

Date: 30 MARCH 2006

From: JKC de Courcy, Chief Executive, Courcy's Intelligence Service

Subject: EAST ASIA STRATEGIC REVIEW 2006

Japan's National Institute for Defence Studies has just released its East Asian Strategic Review 2006.

The report notes that while a full-scale attack on Japan as envisaged during the Cold War is now inconceivable, "there is a mounting necessity to provide against new threats and diverse situations such as ballistic missile attack or an invasion of Japan's offshore islands".  Key points in the report include:

CHINA

China's strategy in East Asia "is not entirely clear".  It is pursuing "neighbourly diplomacy" aimed at cultivating cooperative relations with neighbours, however its policy towards Japan is "increasingly stalemated".

The report notes that China is continuing to modernize its nuclear and missile capabilities and its naval and air forces to enable it to prevent Taiwan from becoming independent.  For instance, it has acquired Sukhoi fighters from Russia to secure command of the air over the Taiwan Strait, and it has increased the number of short-range ballistic missiles deployed in the coastal area bordering the Strait.  Since 1996, the PLA has repeatedly carried out military exercises with an invasion of Taiwan in mind, including a first-ever large-scale bilateral military exercise with Russia in August 2005.

China is also pressing ahead with research and development on technologies for building missiles with multiple warheads and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) to counter the missile-defence capability of the United States.  It test launched an SLBM with an estimated range of 8,000km  in June 2005.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is believed to have nuclear weapons and chemical and biological weapons - and it is developing missiles to deliver these weapons, including the 3,500-6,000km range Taepo Dong-2.

SOUTH KOREA

The report makes an interesting point about South Korea.  It says that Seoul is frightened that it might "become entrapped in the US policy toward China".  There are discussions about assigning a regional role to the US-South Korea alliance, and "should this happen, South Korea would have to cooperate with the United States in deterring China, making it difficult for Seoul to play the role of mediator envisaged in the Balancer of Northeast Asia Initiative."  The report notes: "Being an ally of the United States is not easily compatible with being a regional mediator among great powers."

NON-CONVENTIONAL THREATS

In addition to these conventional threats, the report identifies a number of unconventional threats in Southeast Asia such as terrorist activities, separatist and independence movements, and maritime piracy in areas surrounding the Malacca Strait.

THE UNITED STATES

A section of the report looks at the East Asia role of the United States.  It notes that the US-Japan alliance is growing stronger, but, on the other hand, it also notes that "a movement for creating an East Asian Community excluding the United States is gathering pace".  It says the question for Japan of "how to get involved in the process of forming such a community in the face of China's ambition to exclude the US presents a difficult challenge".

It also notes that US forces in the region are undergoing a major change, with the US moving from a military posture geared to deterrence to one that places more emphasis on the capability to undertake expeditionary operations.  The report says that "US forces in the region have to meet two competing requirements, namely, a reduction in troop numbers and maintenance of deterrence and rapid reaction capability" - and it adds the realignment of US forces in East Asia "will have a great impact on Japan's security".

JAPAN'S EXPANDING ROLE

The report notes that one characteristic of Japan's new defence posture is "the emphasis it places on cooperation with Japan's ally the United States and the international community, and more active involvement in global security problems".  It concludes: "In a highly globalized world [Japan's Self-Defence Forces] specializing only on the defence of the homeland can hardly defend Japan's overall security.  The SDF must expand and deepen international cooperation and deal with regional and security problems."

AN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE EAST ASIAN STRATEGIC REVIEW 2006 CAN BE DOWNLOADED FROM THE FOLLOWING LINK:

http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/pdf/east-asian_e2006s.pdf

COURCYINT SPECIAL BULLETIN

To: All Courcy's Intelligence Service members

Date: 23 MARCH 2006

From: JKC de Courcy, Chief Executive, Courcy's Intelligence Service

Subject: THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

The US government's Energy Information Administration (EIA) has just released its latest report on the SOUTH CHINA SEA.

The key highlights are as follows:

* Ownership of virtually all of the South China Sea remains contested, and the disputed areas often involve oil and natural gas resources.

* Between now and 2025, oil consumption in developing Asian countries is expected to rise by 3.0% annually on average, with more than one-third of this increase coming from China.  If this growth rate is maintained, oil demand for these nations will increase from about 15.1m barrels per day in 2002 to nearly 33.6m barrels per day by 2025.

* Currently the South China Sea region has proven oil reserves of about 7.0bn barrels and oil production of around 2.5m bpd.  Chinese estimates suggest that potential oil resources for the South China Sea could be as high as 213bn barrels, with the Spratly and Paracel Islands accounting for 105bn barrels.

* China's optimistic view of the South China Sea's hydrocarbon potential is not shared by most non-Chinese analysts.  However, the South China Sea is important regardless of its potential as a source of energy.  More than half of the world's annual merchant fleet tonnage passes through the Straits of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok, with the majority continuing on into the South China Sea.  Virtually all shipping that passes through the Malacca and Sunda straits must pass near the Spratly Islands.  More than 80% of the crude oil supplies for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan flow through the South China Sea from the Middle East, Africa, and South China Sea nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia.  LNG is also shipped via this route, and as a result about two-thirds of South Korean energy supplies and almost 60% of Japan and Taiwan's energy supplies flow through the Sea.

* The UN Law of the Sea created the potential for overlapping claims in semi-enclosed seas such as the South China Sea.  Claims to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) could be extended by any nation which could establish a settlement on the islands in the region.  South China Sea claimants have established (mostly military) outposts on the islands in order to conform with Article 121, which states that rocks that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive zone or continental shelf.

The full report can be downloaded using the following link: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_China_Sea/pdf.pdf

END

COURCYINT SPECIAL BULLETIN

To: All Courcy's Intelligence Service members

Date: 31 OCTOBER 2005

From: JKC de Courcy, Chief Executive, Courcy's Intelligence Service

Subject: CHALLENGE OF CHINA DRIVING US-JAPAN STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

On 29 October, Japan and the United States issued an interim report on the "Transformation and Realignment" of the US-Japan Alliance.  At a press conference in Washington, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld said: "I think it would be difficult to overemphasize the importance of today's meeting and progress that has been made in our alliance."

The source of Rumsfeld's enthusiasm for developing the US-Japan alliance is not hard to find.  Only 10 days earlier, during his 18-20 October visit to China, Rumsfeld publicly rejected Beijing's denials that it was spending up to three times more on defence than its declared $30bn annual defence budget.

He had been even more outspoken at the Shangri-La conference in Singapore in early June, where he made the same point about China's military spending and then added: "China appears to be expanding its missile forces, allowing them to reach targets in many areas of the world, not just the Pacific region, while also expanding its missile capabilities within this region.  China also is improving its ability to project power and developing advanced systems of military technology.  Since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment?  Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?  Why these continuing robust deployments?"

The motivation for Japan's enthusiasm for an expanding alliance with the US is equally clear.  In its annual defence white paper, released in early August, Japan said that it was "exceedingly concerned" about the activities of Chinese vessels in waters near Japan.  It said: "Regarding the pick-up in China's maritime activity, the trends need to be watched since...it has also been pointed out that the Chinese navy is aiming in the future to become a so-called blue-water navy."

The same white paper expressed concerns over the passing in March by Beijing of a law authorizing the use of force to re-unify with Taiwan.

The full-text of the interim report on the "Transformation and Realignment" of the US-Japan Alliance (which we reproduce in full below) does not actually mention China, but that China's growing military capabilities are a prime consideration is hardly concealed.  The agreement states:

"The Security Consultative Committee (SCC) members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have emerged as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the US and Japan.  They also re-emphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacfic region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region." [Our emphasis added].

The report also emphasizes the need to prepare "responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan", and it emphasizes in particular the threat from ballistic missiles.  "Several specific areas of cooperation" are listed as requiring special attention, including air defence, ballistic-missile defence, and "mine-sweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic".  Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations are also listed as primary areas for increased cooperation.

The report adds: "Emphasizing that BMD [Ballistic Missile Defence] plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities."

JKC de Courcy
Chief Executive
Courcy's Intelligence Service

FULL TEXT

The following is the full text of "US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future", an interim report on the realignment of US forces in Japan, adopted on 29 October by Japan and the United States at "two-plus-two" top security talks among their foreign and defence affairs ministers in Washington.

I. Overview

The US-Japan Alliance, with the US-Japan security arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan's security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the alliance also plays an important role in effectively dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment. Therefore, following the December 2002 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the US and Japan intensified consultations on respective US and Japanese security and defence policies in order to examine the direction of the US-Japan alliance, and to develop options to adapt the alliance to the changing regional and global security environment.

At the February 19, 2005 meeting of the SCC, the Ministers reached an understanding on common strategic objectives, and underscored the need to continue examinations of the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and the US Armed Forces in pursuing those objectives. They also decided to intensify their consultations on realignment of US force structure in Japan and directed their staffs to report expeditiously on the results.

Today, the SCC members reaffirmed their shared view of the security environment, in which new and emerging threats have surfaced as common challenges that can affect the security of nations worldwide, including the US and Japan. They also reemphasized the persistent challenges in the Asia-Pacific region that create unpredictability and uncertainty and underscored the need to pay attention to modernization of military capabilities in the region. In this context, both sides reiterated their commitment to work closely together to pursue the regional and global common strategic objectives identified in their February 19, 2005 Joint Statement.

The SCC members approved findings and recommendations on roles, missions, and capabilities. They also approved recommendations for realignment, as reflected in this report. These measures are designed to enhance the alliance's capability to meet new threats and diverse contingencies and, as a whole, will reduce burdens on local communities, thereby strengthening security and ensuring the alliance remains the anchor of regional stability.

II. Roles, missions, and capabilities

Both sides recognized recent achievements and developments in security and defence policies related to the roles, missions, and capabilities of the US and Japan, to include: bilateral cooperation in international activities such as the fight against terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), assistance to Iraq, and disaster relief following the tsunami in the Indian Ocean and the earthquake in South Asia; Japan's December 2004 National Defence Programme Guidelines; progress in ballistic missile defence (BMD) cooperation; Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies; the SDF's planned transition to a new joint operations posture; and the transformation and global posture realignment of US forces.

1. Primary Areas In this context, the US and Japan examined bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, particularly those of the US forces and the SDF, for responding to diverse challenges in the contemporary security environment, placing primary emphasis on the following two areas: - Defence of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including responses to new threats and diverse contingencies; - Efforts to improve the international security environment, such as part icipation in international peace cooperation activities.

2. Basic Concepts of Roles, Missions, and Capabilities Both sides confirmed several basic concepts relevant to bilateral defence cooperation. Related to defence of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan, these concepts include: Bilateral defence cooperation remains vital to the security of Japan as well as to peace and stability of the region.

Japan will defend itself and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan, including addressing new threats and diverse contingencies such as ballistic missile attacks, attacks by guerilla and special forces, and invasion of remote islands. For these purposes, Japan's defence posture will be strengthened in accordance with the 2004 National Defence Programme Guidelines.

The US will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defence of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan. The US will provide all necessary support for the defence of Japan.

US and Japanese operations in the defence of Japan and responses to situations in areas surrounding Japan must be consistent so that appropriate responses will be ensured when a situation in areas surrounding Japan threatens to develop into an armed attack against Japan or when such a situation and an armed attack against Japan occur simultaneously.

Japan will continue to provide host nation support including facilities and areas for US forces (hereafter referred to as "US facilities and areas"). Japan will also take appropriate measures to provide seamless support to US operations as the situation evolves, including support based on Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies. Both sides will work with local communities to ensure stable support for the presence and operations of US forces in Japan.

US strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the US remain an essential complement to Japan's defence capabilities in ensuring the defence of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.

Both sides also confirmed several basic concepts relevant to roles, missions, and capabilities in the area of improving the international security environment, to include: Bilateral cooperation in improving the international security environment to achieve regional and global common strategic objectives has become an important element of the alliance. To this end, the US and Japan contribute as appropriate based on their respective capabilities, and take necessary measures to establish effective posture.

Rapid and effective response requires f lexible capabilities and can benefit from close US-Japan bilateral cooperation and policy coordination. Regular exercises, including those with third countries, can improve these capabilities.

The US forces and the SDF will strengthen cooperation with other partners to contribute to international activities to improve the international security environment.

In addition, both sides emphasized that the increasing importance of addressing new threats and diverse contingencies and improving the international security environment compels both sides to develop their respective defence capabilities, and to maximize the benefits of innovations in technology.

3. Examples of Operations in Bilateral Security and Defence Cooperation to be Improved Both sides reconfirmed that the entire spectrum of bilateral cooperation must be strengthened, consistent with relevant national security policies and laws, and with agreements between the US and Japan. Through their examination of roles, missions, and capabilities, they emphasized the importance of improving several specific areas of cooperation:

Air defence.

Ballistic missile defence.

Counter-proliferation operations, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).

Counter-terrorism.

Mine sweeping, maritime interdiction, and other operations to maintain the security of maritime traffic.

Search and rescue operations.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations, including increasing capabilities and effectiveness of operations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and maritime patrol aircraft.

Humanitarian relief operations.

Reconstruction assistance operations.

Peacekeeping operations and capacity building for other nations' peacekeeping efforts.

Protection of critical infrastructure, including US facilities and areas in Japan.

Response to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including disposal and decontamination of WMD.

Mutual logistics support activities such as supply, maintenance, and transportation. Supply cooperation includes mutual provision of aerial and maritime refueling. Transportation cooperation includes expanding and sharing airlift and sealift, including the capability provided by high speed vessels (HSV).

Transportation, use of facilities, medical support, and other related activities for non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

Use of seaport and airport facilities, road, water space and airspace, and frequency bands.

Both sides emphasized that other areas of operations not explicitly listed above remain important to alliance capabilities; this list highlights key areas for further enhancement but is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible areas of cooperation.

4. Essential Steps to Strengthen Posture for Bilateral Security and Defence Cooperation Based on the examination of roles, missions, and capabilities described above, both sides further identified the following essential steps that can be taken in peacetime to strengthen the posture of bilateral security and defence cooperation to deal with diverse challenges in the new security environment. Both sides also emphasized the importance of continuing examinations of roles, missions, and capabilities, based on the progress made thus far, to ensure effective bilateral cooperation.

Close and Continuous Policy and Operational Coordination.

Both sides recognized that regular policy and operational coordination will improve the alliance's timely and effective response to future changes in the strategic environment and to contingencies. Close and continuous polic y and operational coordination at every level of government, from unit tactical level through strategic consultations, is essential to dissuade destabilizing military build-ups, to deter aggression, and to respond to diverse security challenges. Development of a common operational picture shared between US forces and the SDF will strengthen operational coordination and should be pursued where possible. Closer cooperation between defence and other pertinent authorities is also increasingly necessary. In this context, both sides reaffirmed the need to improve the effectiveness of the comprehensive mechanism and bilateral coordination mechanism under the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation by streamlining their functions.

Advancing Bilateral Contingency Planning.

Recalling that the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation provide a basis for bilateral defence planning and mutual cooperation planning, both sides affirmed the continual requirement for such planning while taking full account of the changing security environment. This planning will reflect Japan's legislation to deal with contingencies, which provides a strengthened basis for contingency use by US forces and the SDF of facilities, including airports and seaports, in Japan. Both sides will expand their planning by adding specificity, coordinating closely with relevant government agencies and local authorities, enhancing bilateral mechanisms and planning methods, conducting detailed surveys of civilian and SDF air and seaports, and validating their planning work through strengthened bilateral exercise programmes.

Enhancing Information Sharing and Intelligence Cooperation.

Recognizing that common situational awareness is a key to well coordinated cooperation, both sides will enhance information sharing and intelligence cooperation in the whole range from unit tactical level through national strategic level. To facilitate this interaction, both sides will take additional necessary measures to protect shared classified information so that broader information sharing is promoted among pertinent authorities.

Improving Interoperability.

To ensure smooth cooperation as the SDF transitions to a joint operations posture, US forces and the SDF will maintain regular consultations to maintain and strengthen interoperability. Continued cooperation in planning for bilateral operations and exercises will strengthen connectivity between the headquarters of US forces and the SDF and will benefit from improved secure communications capabilities.

Expanding Training Opportunities in Japan and the United States.

Both sides will expand opportunities for bilateral training and exercises to improve interoperability, improve capabilities, enhance readiness, more equitably distribute training impacts among local communities, and advance the effectiveness of bilateral operations. These measures will include increasing mutual use of US and SDF training facilities and areas throughout Japan. The training of SDF personnel and units in Guam, Alaska, Hawaii, and the US mainland will also be expanded.

In particular, the US plan to expand its training infrastructure in Guam will provide increased training opportunities for the SDF in Guam.

Additionally, both sides recognized that US forces and SDF participation in multinational training and exercises will enhance their contribution to a better international security environment.

Shared Use of Facilities by US Forces and the SDF.

Both sides recognized that shared-use of facilities between US forces and the SDF contributes to closer bilateral operational coordination and improved interoperability. Specific opportunities for shared use of facilities are described in the force posture realignment recommendations ( see section below).

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD).

Emphasizing that BMD plays a critical role in deterring and defending against ballistic missile attacks, and can dissuade other parties from development and proliferation of ballistic missiles, both sides stressed the value of closely coordinating improvements in their respective BMD capabilities. To support these BMD systems, they emphasized the critical importance of constant information gathering and sharing, as well as maintaining high readiness and interoperability in light of the minimal time available to respond to a ballistic missile threat. The US will deploy additional complementary capabilities in and around Japan when appropriate, coordinating their operations to support Japan's missile defence operations. Close coordination between respective BMD command and control systems will be critical to effective missile defence operations.

Both sides committed to strengthen and improve the effectiveness of bilateral cooperation under the 1997 Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation and, as appropriate, in additional areas not currently addressed by the Guidelines.

III. Force posture realignment

Both sides reviewed the posture of US forces in Japan and related SDF forces, in light of their shared commitment to maintain deterrence and capabilities while reducing burdens on local communities, including those in Okinawa. Both sides recognized the importance of enhancing Japanese and US public support for the security alliance, which contributes to sustainable presence of US forces at facilities and areas in Japan.

1. Guiding Precepts In their review, taking full account of the examination of bilateral roles, missions, and capabilities, both sides established several precepts to guide force posture realignments in Japan.

The US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a core capability that is indispensable to regional peace and security and critical to both the US and Japan. Japan contributes capabilities that are additional and complementary to those provided by the US forces, while taking the leading role of providing for its own defence. The presence of US forces and the SDF must evolve as the regional and global security environment changes and as both sides assess alliance roles and missions.

Capabilities will be strengthened through realignment as well as adjustment of roles, missions, and capabilities; these capabilities underpin the credibility of US commitments to the defence of Japan and peace and security of the region.

Enhanced coordination and improved interoperability between headquarters for flexible and responsive command and control is a core capability of critical importance to the US and Japan. In that context, both sides recognized the continued importance of Headquarters, US Forces Japan for strengthened bilateral coordination.

Regular training and exercises, as well as availability of facilities and areas for these purposes, are essential to ensure readiness, employability, and interoperability of forces. When consistent with military missions and operational requirements, dispersal of training can provide greater diversity of training opportunities and can have the ancillary benefit of reducing burdens of training on local communities.

Shared military use of both US and SDF facilities and areas is valuable in promoting effectiveness of bilateral cooperation and increasing efficiencies.

Adequate capacity of US facilities and areas is necessary, and the capacity above typical daily peacetime usage levels also plays a critical and strategic role in meeting contingency requirements. This capacity can provide an indispensable and critical capability towards meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and consequence management situations.

Particular attention will be paid to possible realignment of force structure in such regions where US facilities and areas are concentrated in densely populated areas.

Opportunities to introduce civil-military dual-use of US facilities and areas will be studied, where appropriate. Implementation of such dual-use must be compatible with military missions and operational requirements.

2. Recommendations for Realignment Based upon intensive consultations conducted thus far and in keeping with these basic precepts, domestic and bilateral coordination should be conducted for the following initiatives in a timely manner, consistent with the US-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements. The Ministers committed themselves to completing local coordination, and directed their staffs to finalize these specific and interrelated initiatives and develop plans, including concrete implementation schedules no later than March 2006. These initiatives represent elements of a coherent package, which will begin to be implemented upon agreement on the overall package. Both sides emphasized the importance of taking necessary measures required for the prompt implementation of these initiatives.

Strengthening Bilateral and Joint Operational Coordination.

Recognizing the Government of Japan's intention to transform the SDF into a joint operations posture, the Headquarters, US Forces Japan will establish a bilateral and joint operations coordination centre at Yokota Air Base. The shared use of this centre will ensure constant connectivity, coordination, and interoperability among US forces in Japan and the SDF.

Improvement of US Army Command and Control Capability.

The capabilities of the US Army Japan's command structure in Camp Zama will be modernized to a deployable, joint task force-capable operational headquarters element. The transformed command structure will provide an additional capability to respond rapidly for the defence of Japan and other contingencies. Adjustments to US facilities and areas will be made to accommodate the new Army command structure and integral capabilities. The establishment of the headquarters of a Ground SDF Central Readiness Force Command, which will operate units for nation-wide mobile operations and special tasks, will be pursued at Camp Zama, thereby strengthening the coordination between the headquarters. In relation to this realignment, possibilities of more effective and efficient use of Camp Zama and Sagami General Depot will be explored.

Collocation of Air Command and Control.

Japan's Air Defence Command and relevant units, currently located at Fuchu, will be collocated with the headquarters of the US 5th Air Force at Yokota Air Base, strengthening the coordination between air and missile defence command and control elements, and sharing relevant sensor data through the bilateral and joint operations coordination centre described above.

Yokota Air Base and Air Space.

Measures to facilitate movement of civilian aircraft through Yokota air space will be explored, bearing in mind the planned expansion of nearby Haneda Airport in 2009. Possible options to study will include reducing the air space under US control and collocation of Japanese air traffic controllers at Yokota Air Base. In addition, both sides will take into account development of the process of transferring the Kadena radar approach control. The specific conditions and modalities for possible civil-military dual-use will be studied, while noting that dual-use must not compromise the military operational capabilities of Yokota Air Base.

Missile Defence.

The optimum site for deployment in Japan of a new US X-Band radar system will be examined. Through timely information sharing, this radar will support capabilities to intercept missiles directed at Japan and capabilities for Japan's civil defence and consequence management. In addition, as appropriate, the US will deploy active defences, such as Patriot PAC-3 and Standard Missile (SM-3) to support US treaty commitments.

Regional Realignment of US Marine Forces for Flexible Crisis Response.

As part of its global posture realignment effort, the US is making several changes to strengthen its force structure in the Pacific. Among these changes are a strengthening of Marine Corps crisis response capabilities and a redistribution of those capabilities among Hawaii, Guam and Okinawa that will provide greater flexibility to respond with appropriate capabilities according to the nature and location of particular situations. These changes will also enable increased theatre security cooperation with countries of the region, thereby improving the overall security environment. In connection with this realignment, both sides identified an integrated set of interrelated measures that will also substantially reduce burdens in Okinawa.

Acceleration of Futenma Relocation: Both sides, bearing in mind the strong request from r esidents of Okinawa for early return of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, as well as the preference that any Futenma replacement facility (FRF) be located outside of Okinawa prefecture, considered options to satisfy these requests while maintaining the deterrence capabilities that will remain necessary in the future. They determined that the rapid crisis response capabilities provided by the presence of Marine Corps forces constitute a critical alliance capability that both sides desire to maintain in the region. Moreover, they recognized that sustaining those capabilities, which consist of air, ground, logistics and command elements, remains dependent upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises and operations. For this reason, both sides concluded that the FRF must be located within Okinawa prefecture where rotary wing aircraft currently stationed a! t ! Futenma Air Station will be near the other elements with which they operate on a regular basis.

Both sides, recognizing the extensive delays in Futenma relocation resulting from the many problems related to the 1996 Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) plan for relocation of Futenma Air Station to a civil-military facility located on a coral reef in deep waters, examined numerous other possible options for relocation within Okinawa prefecture that could accelerate return of Futenma Air Station while maintaining operational capabilities. Both sides considered several factors in this work, including: Safety of neighbouring communities and military personnel.

Noise impacts on local communities, taking into account future housing and commercial development patterns that might occur in the vicinity of the FRF.

Minimization of adverse environmental impacts.

Ability of the FRF to support operational and mission requirements in peacetime and in contingencies.

Inclusion of necessary operational support, billeting and related facilities in the FRF, to avoid creation of traffic congestion and related irritants that might otherwise detract from the quality of life of local residents.

Bearing such factors in mind, both sides will locate the FRF in an "L"-shaped configuration that combines the shoreline areas of Camp Schwab and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay. The runway portion of the facility will cross Henoko-saki, extending from Oura Bay into the water areas along the south shore of Camp Schwab. The lower section of the facility, oriented in a northeast-southwest direction will include a runway and overruns, with a total length of 1800 meters exclusive of seawalls. Hangers, maintenance, fuel supply pier and related infrastructure, and other aviation support activities required for the operation of the new facility will be located on the areas of the FRF to be constructed within Oura Bay. Furthermore, facilities in the Camp Schwab area will be reconfigured as necessary to accommodate the relocation of Futenma-related activities. (Reference: Initialed concept plan dated 26 October 2005.) Both sides concurred that other capabilities now present at Futenma Air Station would be relocated and maintained as provided for in the SACO Final Report, with the following adjustments: With regards to the KC-130's, which are to be relocated from Futenma Air Station to Iwakuni Air Station under SACO Final Report, alternative facilities will be considered with priority consideration given to Maritime SDF Kanoya Base. The final basing configuration will be determined by both sides based on ongoing operational and engineering studies.

Strengthened contingency use of the Air SDF bases at Nyutabaru and Tsuiki will be provided for US forces. Improvements to operational facilities at these bases will be made to support this contingency use. These improved facilities, when completed, will also support the expanded bilateral training activities described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report.

Improved contingency use of civilian facilities for long runway operations that cannot be replicated at the FRF will also be provided for US forces.

Both sides recognized that early realization of the foregoing measures, in addition to enabling the long-desired return of Futenma Air Station, is an essential component of the realignment of the Marine Corps presence in Okinawa.

Force Reductions: In conjunction with the realignment of US Marine Corps capabilities in the Pacific region outlined above, the headquarters of the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) will be relocated to Guam and other locations and the remaining Marine units in Okinawa will be realigned and reduced into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). This realignment in Okinawa will include the transfer of approximately 7,000 Marine officers and enlisted personnel, plus dependents out of Okinawa. These transferred personnel will come from units in each of the elements of Marine capability (air, ground, logistics and command), including portions of the Marine Air Wing, the Force Service Support Group, and the 3d Marine Division.

The Government of Japan, recognizing the strong desire of Okinawa residents that such force relocations be realized rapidly, will work with the US Government to examine and identify appropriate financial and other measures to enable the realization of these relocations to Guam.

Land Returns and Shared-Use of Facilities: Recognizing that successful relocation of Futenma Air Station and the force reductions described above will make further consolidation of forces and return of land possible, both sides discussed the concept of consolidation of those Marine Corps units that remain in Okinawa into a smaller total land area. This would enable the return of significant land in the densely populated areas south of Kadena Air Base. The US stressed its willingness to develop and implement a concrete programme for this concept in cooperation with the Government of Japan.

Furthermore, recognizing the limited access that the SDF have to facilities in Okinawa, most of which are located in urbanized areas, the US also underscored its willingness to implement shared-use of Kadena Air Base, Camp Hansen, and other US facilities and areas in Okinawa in cooperation with the Government of Japan. Both sides consider that such shared use could facilitate bilateral training and interoperability between their forces, as described in the Roles, Missions and Capabilities section of this report, and thereby strengthen overall alliance capabilities.

Steady Implementation of SACO Final Report: Both sides validated the importance of steady implementation of the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report unless otherwise changed by the recommendations in this document.

Relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station.

To ensure the viability of a long-term forward-deployment of the US aircraft carrier and its airwing, the carrier jet and E-2C squadrons will be relocated from Atsugi Air Facility to Iwakuni Air Station, which will have the necessary facilities and training airspace for safe and effective operation of the aircraft in a less intrusive manner after the current construction of the replacement runway is completed. To alleviate the impact of the increased operations at Iwakuni Air Station, the following related measures will be taken.

Relocation of Maritime SDF E/O/UP-3 squadrons and other aircraft from Iwakuni Air Station to Atsugi Air Facility.

Adjustment of training airspace for all US Navy and US Marine Corps aircraft to ensure adequate readiness levels are maintained.

Identification of a permanent field-carrier landing practice (FCLP) facility. In the interim, th e US will continue to conduct FCLPs at Iwo Jima in accordance with existing temporary arrangements. The Government of Japan reiterates its commitment to provide an acceptable permanent FCLP facility for US naval aviation forces.

Development of necessary facilities at the Maritime SDF Kanoya Base to accommodate KC-130 aircraft. These facilities will also be available to support rotations of additional SDF or US C-130 or P-3 aircraft from elsewhere in Japan to increase alliance capabilities and flexibility.

Development of necessary additional facilities, infrastructure, and training areas required to support US Navy and US Marine Corps units based at Iwakuni Air Station, as well as civil aviation operations.

Training Relocation.

Consistent with the necessity of improving bilateral interoperability discussed in this report, and with reference to the goal of reducing the impact of training activity, renewed attention will be given to expanding the distribution of training from US air facilities such as Kadena Air Base as well as Misawa Air Base and Iwakuni Air Station to other military facilities.

Efficient Use of Capacity at US Facilities in Japan.

Opportunities to strengthen US cooperation with the Government of Japan and local communities regarding efficient use of capacity at US facilities in Japan will be pursued when consistent with operational requirements and safety. For example, both sides will explore possibilities for utilizing the capacity of Sagami General Depot for meeting local emergency needs such as in disaster relief and civilian consequence management.

Future changes in US facilities and areas and force structure not addressed elsewhere in this report will be addressed in accordance with existing practices under the US-Japan Security Treaty and its related arrangements.

Source: Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, in English 0021 gmt 30 Oct 05